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The thesis analyses nine key areas of trusts of land within the context of the Trusts of 
Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996. First, it considers whether it was 
necessary or desirable to prevent the creation of new strict settlements. Second, it 
questions whether a new unitary system of a trust of land has made trusts for sale 
unnecessary. Third, it examines whether the doctrine of conversion has been 
abolished. Fourth, it investigates whether entailed interests can still be created. Fifth, 
it enquires whether the provisions as to trustees' powers are expedient reforms. Sixth, 
it evaluates whether the delegation provisions are deficient. Seventh, it discusses 
whether the right to occupy is an advantageous reform. Eighth, it assesses whether the 
courts are adopting a new, flexible approach in exercising their powers. Ninth, it 
debates whether conveyancing efficiency can be improved by redrafting the 
provisions concerning protection of purchasers. It takes account of surveys of 17 
leading finns of solicitors to ascertain on a practical level the views of these solicitors 
on some provisions of the Act. The underlying theme of the thesis is that the statutory 
provisions reflect an evaluation of the superior features of strict settlements and trusts 
for sale rather than an innovative approach taken in initiating and constituting a novel 
or original trust. The thesis critically considers manifold difficulties and 
complications in respect of the main sections and demonstrates that the statutory 
provisions are periodically fragmentary and unmethodical and embody a quagmire of 
uncertainty and ambiguity. Although many of the problems may be speculative and 
hypothetical, practical problems remain and the thesis suggests how statutory 
provisions might be more appropriately drafted. 
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CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION 
The Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, which introduced a new 
form of landholding by way of the trust of land, brought about very significant 
changes to the 1925 legislation governing trusts of land. This thesis analyses the 
following issues: the necessity or desirability of preventing the creation of strict 
settlements, whether trusts for sale are still necessary, whether the doctrine of 
conversion has been abolished, whether entailed interests can still be created, 
problematic provisions governing powers of trustees including powers of delegation, 
the status of the right to occupy, whether the powers of the court are being exercised 
in such a way as to represent a departure from the previous law and whether 
amendments are necessary to the provisions governing protection of purchasers to 
improve conveyancing efficiency. 
The central focus of this thesis is a critique of the provisions of this Act and analysis 
of the provisions to demonstrate why some are defective. As well as providing an 
academic review and analysis of Part I of the Act, I consulted with some solicitors 
who had particular experience of settled land to provide practical input., To this end I 
drafted a questionnaire which can be found in Appendix I which I devised to assess 
the impact of the main provisions of Part I of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of 
Trustees Act 1996 on clients of significant firms of solicitors. 
I conducted 17 interviews between April 1999 and January 2000. Only a small 
number of firms have clients interested under Settled Land Act settlements which can 
no longer be created after the 1996 Act. It is regrettable that a number of firms refused 
to be interviewed at all which meant that only 3 solicitors whose firms are situated 
outside London were interviewed. My survey is not intended to be a statistical survey, 
but aims to demonstrate a broad range of responses from some leading firms in the 
field. The objective was that all the possible range of views would emanate from this 
sample, even though the sample cannot be truly representative. 13 of the interviews 
were conducted in person at the offices of the solicitor concerned and 4 were 
11 wrote to Charles Harpum, the Law Commissioner, to arrange an interview with him but he was 
unwilling to be interviewed. 
20 
telephone interviews. I intended that only those interviews (3), which were outside 
London, would be conducted by telephone but one London firm (Eversheds) also 
requested a telephone interview. The firms who were interviewed are listed in 
Appendix 2 with the name and address of the solicitor who was interviewed, his 
position in the firm and whether it was a personal or telephone interview. The firrns 
are listed according to the date of the inter-view. Only a small selection of the answers 
to some of the questions have been used in this thesis since other answers were of 
peripheral significance only. 
There follows a breakdown of the approximate number of relevant clients each firm 
had in the ten years preceding the date of the interview. 
Name of firm Number of clients solicitor Number of clients firm has 
has or had with strict 
settlements 
or had with strict 
settlements 
Allen and Overy 2 5-10 
Boodle Hatfield 7 or 8 15 or 16 
Burges Salmon 3 5-10 
Charles Russell 5-10 10-20 
Currey and Co 0* 10 
Eversheds 1-4 5-10 
Farrer and Co 18** 18 
Herbert Smith 1-4 1-4 
Linklaters and Alliance 2 2 
Macfarlanes 3 10-20 
May, May and Merrimans 1-4 More than 20 
Official Solicitor 4 4 
Payne Hicks Beach 2-3 5 
Public Trust Office More than 20 More than 20*** 
Speechly Bircham 5-10**** 2 
Wiggin and Co I I 
Withers 6 Just under 20 
21 
Edward Perks of Currey and Co had no personal experience of strict settlements 
but his remarks were based on the views of an experienced partner with whom he had 
discussed the answers. 
Includes own clients and overseeing other solicitors' clients. 
This is only an estimate comprising approximately 10 intended strict settlements 
and 40 accidental ones. 
**** Includes the number of clients solicitor had in previous firm (Withers) as well. 
The original draft of this thesis contained an analysis of every subsection of sections I 
to 16 in great depth. 2 As this came to almost 200,000 words, only the most important 
provisions have been selected. 
2 Sections I to 16 are contained in Appendix 3 for ease of reference. 
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CHAPTER 2- WAS IT NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE TO 
PREVENT THE CREATION OF NEW STRICT SETTLEMENTS? 
A historical overview of strict settlements 
The purpose of strict settlements was to preserve land within the traditional landed 
family through succeeding generations by a settlor (S) granting a life interest to 
himself, remainder to his eldest son (A) for life and remainder to that son's eldest son 
(B) in male tail (inheritable by his male lineal descendants), then to S's younger sons 
in male tail (this being to cover the contingency of a failure in A's male line), and in 
the event of a total failure of male successors, one or more female descendants could 
be stipulated as heiresses. 3 The scheme worked as long as B did not bar the entail 
after A's death and sell the fee simple. To prevent B when he became entitled to the 
land on A's death from barring the entail and converting it into a fee simple, what 
would happen was that in A's lifetime when B came of age and needed financial 
assistance from his father, A and B would join in a re-settlement of the land. B would 
bar the entail and re-settle on A for life, remainder to B for life, remainder to B's 
eldest son in tail. In return, B would be granted an immediate income charged on the 
land. 
This meant that the land was tied up for another generation and if a re-settlement was 
effected in each generation, the tenant for life had no power to sell the fee simple. ' It 
was devised to ensure that the tenant in tail never came into possession of the land, 
because if he did so, he might secure the land to himself and so defeat the whole 
purpose of the strict settlement. 5 In this way the family estate might be made to 
descend generation after generation from one life tenant to another despite the rule 
against perpetuities. 
3 For a detailed analysis of strict settlements, see M. R. Chesterman Family Settlements on Trust: 
Landowners and The Rising Bourgeoisie in Law, Economy and Society 1750-1914: Essays in the 
History ofEnglish Law edited by G. R. Rubin and D. Sugarman (1984) p. 124-167. 
4 For a general discussion, see Cheshire and Burn's Modern Law ofReal Property (16"' edn 2000) by 
E. H. Bum p. 69-78, Megarry and Wade The Law ofReal Property (6 Ih edn 2000) by Charles Harpurn 
paras. 8-011-8-018 and Kevin Gray Elements oftand Law (2 nd edn 1993) ch. 15. Kevin Gray and 
Susan Francis Gray Elements oftandLmv (3 rd edn 2001) only briefly covers the topic p. 646-653. 
5 See A. H. Manchester Modern Legal History (1980) p. 311 and A. W. B. Simpson A History of1he 
Land Lcnv (2 nd edn 1986) p. 235ff. 
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in reality many sons did not reach the age of majority in their father's lifetimes so 
most re-settlements were made voluntarily when they came to marry. 
6 Alternatively, a 
settlement was made on death in the will of the father. Settlements were also used to 
provide portions 7 for the younger children and ajointure8 for the widow. 9 It was the 
estate itself which met the cost of such provision and to meet his financial obligations, 
the life tenant might have to mortgage his estate. ' 0 The types of entailed interests were 
tail male (where only the male heirs can inherit), tail female (female heirs only) and 
tail general (male and female heirs) and any of these forms could be made special by 
limiting the issue to the issue by a particular wife or husband. ' 1 
Settlements have been common since the early thirteenth century. Statute De Donis 
Conditionalibus was passed in 1285 to preserve settlements according to the donor's 
intention and it rendered land virtually inalienable. 12 The result of this Statute was the 
appearance of a new kind of fee, the fee tail or in Latinfeodum tallialum meaning a 
cut-down fee, because the quantum of the estate was cut down since the right to 
inherit was restricted to the class of heirs mentioned in the gift. 13 The fee tail was a 
rigid, unalterable, inalienable perpetuity and this continued for two hundred years 
after the Statute and indeed had mischievous effects. 14 In the 1470's ways were found 
of barring the entail and converting it into a fee simple. Entails were not barrable until 
the issue was of full age and entails remained the basic ingredient of family 
settlements for centuries. The kind of settlement, which was perfected between 1640 
and 1700 and remained in use for three hundred years, was the strict settlement. 15 
6 See generally J. H. Baker An Introduction to English Legal History (40edn 2002) ch. 16 and J. H. 
Baker The Oxford History ofthe Laws ofEngland Vol. VI 1483-1558 (2003) ch. 36. Simpson op. cit., 
p. 238 explains that if the bride and her children were to be protected from the risk that the groom 
might prove unreliable, it was essential that the groom's power of disposition be restricted. 
7 Sums of money provided under a strict settlement of land for the benefit of the children of the settlor, 
other than the one who succeeds to the land. 
' interest given to a widow for support by a rentcharge or annuity after her husband's death. 
9 For a detailed discussion of the development of strict settlements, see Eileen Spring Law, Land and 
Family. Aristocratic Inheritance in England 1300 to 1800 (1993) ch. 5 Tile Strict Settlement. 
10 See Manchester op. cit., p. 312. 
1 See Simpson op. cit., p. 90ff. 
2 Ibid., p. 81-102. 
13 BakerAn Introduction to English Legal History op. cit., p. 273, William Searle Holdsworth An 
Historical Introduclion to the Land Law (1927) p. 56. 
14 Cheshire and Bum op. cit., p. 27 1. 
" The expression is found in 1715: 1 P. Wms 291- see BakerAn Introduction to English Legal History 
op. cit., p. 293 footnote 67. 
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Chesterman analyses the period between the Civil War and the mid-eighteenth 
century (1640's to 1750) as a period of a great deal of land acquisition by the larger 
landowners, 16 but thereafter land acquisition slowed down, because with the aid of the 
strict settlement, the great landed families sat firm on their estates. 17 Chesterman 
perceives the period between 1750 and 1914 as marking the heyday and decline of 
strict settlements, since it was the period when substantial quantities of investments, 
for example government stocks and mortgages of land, came to be included in family 
trusts established by industrialists, merchants and other wealthy individuals whose 
personal capital was not wholly or predominantly bound up in land. 18 
Strict settlements by the mid-nineteenth century may have been imposed on as much 
as three-quarters of English land. 19 The economic undesirability of tying up so much 
land in settlement was widely felt. Land could not be prised out of the landed families 
so those nouveaux riches could not acquire real property. 20 There were management 
problems from the point of view of the landed family. 21 The owner, being only a 
tenant for life, could not exercise the necessary powers of leasing, mortgaging 
(mortgages were undertaken only in order to provide portions; they were rarely 
allowed for improvements), felling timber and mining that belonged to an absolute 
owner. Improvements could not be carried out without ways of raising cash and the 
fact that the life tenant's interest detennined on his death did not encourage life 
tenants to invest their private funds in settled land. Broad powers, however, could be 
expressly conferred on the tenant for life by each individual settlement. 
Many landowners, however, were compelled to seek private Acts of Parliament. 
Eventually the most commonly needed powers such as powers of leasing, selling, 
exchanging and partitioning settled land were conferred by public general statutes on 
16 Chesterman op. cit., p. 132 relying on Sir John Habakkuk Marriage Settlements in the Eighteenth 
Century in Transactions ofthe Royal Historical Society 4 Ih Ser. XXXII (1950) p. 15-30. 
17 Other writers argue against this, such as Eileen Spring The Settlement ofLand in Nineteenth Century 
England in American Journal ofLegal History Vill (1964) pp. 209-223 and L. Bonfield Marriage 
Settlements and the Rise of The Great Estates: The Demographic Aspect in Economic History Review 
2 nd Ser. XXXII (1979) p. 483-93. 
" Chesterman op. cit., p. 126ff. 
19 Ibid., p. 13 0. 
20 See Baker An Introduction to English Legal History op. cit., p. 295. 
21 Simpson op. cit., p. 239 highlights how there were grave disadvantages in subjecting a large portion 
of the country to the management of a series of life tenants. 
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all tenants for life with leave of the court by the Settled Estates Acts 1856 and 1877.22 
The continuing sentiment which favoured strict settlements was shown by the fact that 
the state chose not to abolish the strict settlement but to assist it to adapt to modem 
needs. 23 
Great reform came in the 1880's when the great agricultural depression gave rise to 
strong desires among landowners to be able to convert land into more profitable 
investments. 24 The Settled Land Act 1882 was passed to give every tenant for life 
power to sell the land in fee simple. When he sold, the settlement was not destroyed 
but attached to the proceeds of sale. The substance of the Settled Land Act 1882 was 
reproduced in the 1925 legislation though certain extensions and alterations of the 
statutory powers were made. 25 After 1925 the legal estate had to be vested in the 
tenant for life but his powers were restricted. 
Strict settlements survived as a means of ensuring that the estates of the nobility 
followed the peerage titles, which were usually limited in tail male. Eileen Springý 6 
summed up strict settlements in three words: patrilineal, primogenitive and 
patriarchal. Settlements sprang from a society already patrilineal and primogenitive in 
its beliefs, but in giving the aristocratic ethos a legal vehicle, settlements went far to 
strengthen it. The basic objective of aristocratic settlement strategies was to exclude 
women from any effective form of land ownership. 27 
The taxation system had a large part to play in the decline of strict settlements during 
the twentieth century. 28 Estates became vulnerable to high taxation (estate duty) on 
the death of the life tenant, since taxation fell on the full capital value of the estate on 
the termination of each successive interest. 29 The declining rates of return from 
agriculture and other economic factors also played a part. Social and political 
22 For more details, see Simpson op. cit., p. 284-286. 
23 See Manchester op. cit., p. 313. 
24 See Baker An Introduction to English Legal History op. cit., p. 295. 
25 For a detailed analysis, see Megarry and Wade op. cit., paras. 8-011-8-108. 
26 Law, Land and Family., Aristocratic Inheritance in England 130010 1800 op. cit., p. 144. 
27 Alain Pottage Proprietary Strategies: The Legal Fabric ofAristocratic Settlements (1998) 61 
M. L. R. 162. 
28 See Manchester op. cit., p. 315. 
29 Estate duty was introduced by the Finance Act 1894: see Gray (2 d edn) op. cit., p. 608. 
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developments, together with the growth of commercial and industrial capital, 30 meant 
that profit-yielding investments outside the possession of land were increasingly 
available to attract wealth. The trust of investments (including stocks and shares) was 
the form of family settlement which merchants and industrialists developed in rivalry 
to strict settlements. 
REASONS SOLICITORS STATED IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE THAT STRICT 
SETTLEMENTS WERE SET UP 
10 solicitors 31 gave (a) as their reason [(a)- as a medium for intergenerational transfer 
of wealth within the family]. 
2 solicitors 32 gave (a) and (b) as their reason [(b) as a means of protection of 
individual beneficiaries]. 
3 solicitors 33 gave (c) only as their reason [(c) other purpose]. 
I solicitor 34 gave (a), (b) and (c) as his reason. 
1 solicitoP5 did not answer the question. 
John Glasson (Eversheds) creatively set them up in a matrimonial context. He stated 
that, 'The divorce department would make the arrangements and the trusts 
department would be asked what trust should be used Ifa wife was living in the 
matrimonial home with children, it was only reasonable that she should be in the 
position ofan absolute owner. She was given a life interest and the husband had a 
remainder interest. The Settled Land Act procedure was most appropriate as it 
seemed to me reasonable to give her a power ofsale rather than compel her to go cap 
in hand to the trustees ifshe wanted to move house. The choice ofnew property would 
also be hers. It gave the wife as much real control as possible. You cannot do it now 
because you would have to persuade trustees to delegate the power ofsale to the wife. 
Trustees are very cautious. ' 
30 See Chesterman op. cit., p. 166. 
31 Allen and Overy, Boodle Hatfield, Burges Salmon, Charles Russell, Herbert Smith, Linklaters and 
Alliance, May, May and Merrimans, Payne Hicks Beach, Speechly Bircham and Withers. 
32 Farrer and Co and Wiggin and Co. 
33 Eversheds, Official Solicitor and Public Trust Office. 
34 Macfarlanes. 
35 Currey and Co. 
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This demonstrates that new uses could be found for strict settlements and it may be 
regrettable to prevent creative usage by legislative means where there is scope for 
manoeuvre. 
TO WHAT EXTENT WERE SOLICITORS CREATING STRICT SETTLEMENTS 
ON DIVORCE? 
I tried to assess the extent to which solicitors were creating strict settlements on 
divorce. To this end, I devised a short one page questionnaire which comprised the 
following questions: 
1. Have you created strict settlements on divorce? 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 




(d) More than 20 
3. Why did you create them? 
4. Are you trying to achieve the Settled Land Act effect using the 1996 Act? 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
If yes, please explain how? 
5. Were you disappointed when the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 
1996 was passed which meant that you could no longer create strict settlements on 
divorce? Please explain your answer. 
I sent the questionnaire in January 2000 to 18 family law firms selected from The 
Legal 500: The Clients'Guide to UK Lmv FirmS36 together with a stamped addressed 
envelope. After extensive chasing, I received 13 replies (some by telephone). The 
replies were from the following firms: Anthony Gold Lerman and Muirhead, Bates 
36 (1 2h edn 1999) edited by John Pritchard. 
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Wells and Braithwaite, Charles Russell, David Truex and Co, Dawson and Co, 
Kingsley Napley, Manches, Miles Preston and Co, Mishcon De Reya, Reynolds 
Porter Chamberlain, Russell Jones and Walker, Stephenson Harwood and Withers. Of 
these firms, only 2 had created strict settlements on divorce- Stephenson Harwood 
and Mishcon De Reya. 
Jonathan Walsh (Stephenson Harwood) had created 5 to 10 strict settlements over a5 
year period from early 19 80's to mid- I 980's and stopped after the mid- I 980's. He 
created them because they seemed appropriate and what was required. He used them 
where a couple was divorced and the wife was given a right to income or the right to 
live in the house for life or until re-marriage. After the mid-1980's case law meant 
that this was frowned upon, because cases showed that broadly the wife was entitled 
to the house and capital outright. For this reason he was not disappointed when one 
could no longer create them after 1996. He is not trying to achieve the Settled Land 
Act effect using the 1996 Act. 
Katherine Waldemar Brown (Mishcon De Reva) created up to 5 strict settlements on 
divorce. She created them to allow the wife to live in the house which was beyond her 
means, for the sake of the children, when her entitlement was in fact less. The wife 
was given an interest for life or until the children were grown up when the house 
would be sold and the proceeds divided. The last strict settlement Ms Waldemar 
Brown tried to create was in 1996 when her firm was acting for the husband and she 
asked for an interest for the wife for life or until the children were grown up. It was a 
short marriage; there was a lot of money and the children were young. The judge 
would not agree to this. He awarded the house to the wife outright. Ms Waldemar 
Brown was not disappointed when the 1996 Act was passed, because strict 
settlements were used extremely rarely. She is not trying to achieve the Settled Land 
Act effect using the 1996 Act. 
DID SOLICITORS STATE THAT THE NUMBERS OF STRICT SETTLEMENTS 
HAVE BEEN DECLINING? 
Only 2 solicitors 37 specifically stated that the numbers were not declining stating the 
reason that strict settlements continue for a long time. Of those who stated that they 
37 May, May and Merrimans and Payne Hicks Beach. 
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had been declining, the comments of William McBryde (Assistant Official Solicitor) 
are illuminating. He commented, 'There are not very many andyou rarely come 
across them. I have been doing trusts in this office nowfor thirty years. There were 
certainly more when I came in. I was used to them. JVhen I was in private practice, we 
had quite a lot. I was in a smallfirm in Northumberland which was an old established 
farming-based country-town practice where we had a lot ofvery old established 
clients including some of the local landed estates. But even then we were breaking the 
settlements and winding them up. But most ofthe other strict settlements were created 
by accident by will. ' This highlights that even strict settlements which had been 
common in north-east England were declining. 
Some of the solicitors consulted by the Law Commission in Transfer ofLan& Trusts 
ofLand 38 did favour the retention of the existing dual system 39 (trust for sale and strict 
settlement) and suggested that there is a need for Settled Land Act settlements or their 
functional equivalent. The Law Commission declared that originally the two systems 
performed different flanctionsýo but that due to reformS, 41 many of the differences 
between the two systems had been removed. Crucially, the Law Commission stated 
that in either system the land can be sold and thus the strict settlement was no longer 
an effective method of keeping land in the family. 42 
This statement is an overhasty summary of a far more complex situation, since 
inevitably family pressure had a role to play in keeping land in the family. However, 
the information which the Law Commission received in response to the Working 
Paper confirmed that although some strict settlements are currently in existence, very 
few new settlements are being created. Only one firm expressly proposed creating 
38 Law Com. No. 181 (1989). 
39 Mid., para. 1.6. The Report does not specify how many favoured the retention of the existing system. 
40 Quoting para. 3.2 of the Working Paper No. 94 Trusts oftand (1985)- the strict settlement was to 
keep land within the ownership of a particular family and the trust for sale was used where a sale was 
intended or the land was bought as an investment. 
41 The SeUlcd Land Act 1925 increased the powers of the tenant for life and the Law of Property Act 
1925 section I prevented life interests from existing as legal estates, so that all settlements had to take 
effect behind a trust. 
42 Sale could, however, be prevented by leaving a remainder interest contingent on the property being 
unsold at the death of the life tenant and no sale being permissible without the remainderman's 
consent: see Re Inns [ 19471 Ch. 576 at 5 82. 
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new settlements in the future. 43 The Law Commission was of the view that if the 
powers of delegation held by trustees of land are broadened, settlors will be able to 
create what is in effect an 'enhanced' strict settlement, 44 although such a settlement 
would not be precisely the same as a strict settlement, because the trustees will retain 
the legal title. The Law Commission therefore concluded 45 that there should be no 
new strict settlements but existing settlements will continue as Settled Land Act 
settlements. 
The prevention of new strict settlements and continuation of existing strict 
settlements- are the provisions sufficiently exhaustive and comprehensive? 
Prevention of neiv strict settlements 
Section 2(l) of the 1996 Act states that, 'No settlement created after the 
commencement of this Act is a settlement for the purposes of the Settled Land Act 
1925; and no settlement shall be deemed to be made under that Act after that 
commencement. ' The prohibition applies to settlements created under section 1 (1) 
Settled Land Act and settlements deemed to be settlements by that Act. This means 
that any attempt to create a strict settlement will result in a trust of land. Section 2(l) 
is well drafted, is a straightforward means of achieving this result and has not left any 
loopholes. Existing Settled Land Act settlements, however, are unaffected and will 
continue as Settled Land Act settlements. This means that where a strict settlement 
was created accidentally, the Act does nothing to convert it into a trust of land. Before 
answering the question why such a stance was taken, it is first of all necessary to 
analyse the exact provisions which apply to existing settlements. 
Continuation of existing strict settlements 
Subsection (2) makes it clear that there will still be a Settled Land Act settlement 
where there is an alteration of an interest in, or of a person becoming entitled under, a 
settlement which exists at the date the Act came into force (I January 1997) or where 
the settlement derives from a settlement which exists at the date the Act came into 
43 See footnote 72 in para. 4.3 of the Law Commission Report. 
44 The Law Commission op. cit., para. 4.5 recognised that there are situations in which the strict 
settlement might be preferred to the trust for sale or trust under the new system. This will continue by 
way of the delegation of powers under a trust of land. See also para. 4.11. 450 
. P cit., para. 8.3. 
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force. Section 2(2) states that, 'Subsection (1) does not apply to a settlement created 
on the occasion of an alteration in any interest in, or of a person becoming entitled 
under, a settlement which- (a) is in existence at the commencement of this Act, or 
(b) derives from a settlement within paragraph (a) or this paragraph. ' The only way in 
which it will not be a settlement is if provision is made to that effect in the instrument 
by which it is created, 46 thus giving an opportunity to convert it to a trust of land. This 
is contained in section 2(3) which states that, 'But a settlement created as mentioned 
in subsection (2) is not a settlement for the purposes of the Settled Land Act 1925 if 
provision to the effect that it is not is made in the instrument, or any of the 
instruments, by which it is created. ' This provision gives a resettlement an 
opportunity to become a trust of land, thus furthering the policy of the Act to establish 
the trust of land as the norm. 
Kenny and Kenny have pointed out that, 'This provision will doubtless be used 
extremely rarely, and its operation is not so straightforward as appears at first sight. 
This provision confers no new powers upon trustees and they will still only be able to 
vary or appoint under a settlement in the manner permitted by the settlement, 
otherwise there will be a breach of trust. Providing these powers are sufficient to 
allow creation of a derivative settlement which is not a settled land settlement, this 
subsection can be relied upon. 47 It is correct to say that this provision will be used 
extremely rarely, since none of the solicitors interviewed for the questionnaire 
mentioned using it in the general discussions I had with them when they had an 
opportunity to comment. It is difficult to accept, however, that its operation is 'not so 
straightforward' and no cogent argument is used to support this contention. As to the 
argument that, 'This provision confers no new powers upon trustees ...... any legal 
adviser drafting the resettlement would surely be negligent if he or she did not 
exclude the provisions of the Settled Land Act 1925 and enable the trustees, inter alia, 
to have the benefit of wider powers under section 6 of the 1996 Act. Proper drafting 
should avoid the problems which Kenny and Kenny fear. 
46 A separate document will therefore not suffice: see Chris Whitehouse and Nicholas Hassall Trusts of 
Land, Trustee Delegation and the Trustee Act 2000 (2 d edn 200 1) para. 2.13 footnote 6. 
47 Phillip Kenny and Ann Kenny The Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (1997) p. 5. 
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However, no such provision applies to settlements generally. Is this a skilfully 
considered provision or an ineptly designed strategy? The policy underlying the 
legislation, as previously stated, is to eliminate strict settlements by a gradual process 
and as Barraclough and Matthews stated, 'What the 1996 Act gives us is not instant 
abolition, but the prospect of their eventual extinction through rigorous birth 
control. A8 What Barraclough and Matthews do not state, however, is that no method 
of birth control is one hundred percent reliable, whereas the birth control envisaged by 
section 2(l) is infallible. Yet the underlying reason why the option was not given to 
convert existing strict settlements into trusts of land must have been that to divest an 
existing tenant for life of subsisting rights would infringe the tenant for life's human 
rights and would require proper compensation. In this sense, therefore, this provision 
is satisfactory and was a sensible policy decision, although one which admittedly 
could have been the antithesis in order to expedite a speedier demise of strict 
settlements and facilitate the conversion of strict settlements created accidentally into 
trusts of land. 
Adding new land to a strict settlement 
Where new land is brought into a strict settlement, will that land be held under the 
strict settlement or a trust of land? The Law Commission Report stated that, 'If an 
existing settlement acquires more land, that land will be held under the new system. A9 
Clause 13 of the draft Bill50 attached to the Law Commission Report had that effect. 
Section 2 of the Act, however, does not have that effects' and is worded totally 
differently. Section 10 of the Settled Land Act 1925 which states that, 'Where.... land 
is acquired with capital money arising under this Act ....... the land shall be conveyed 
to the tenant for life' will still apply since it has not been repealed, so the question 
arises where capital money is used to buy further land, whether the land will remain 
48 Hugh Barraclough and Paul Matthews A Practitioner's Guide to the Trusts ofLand andAppointment 
of TrusteesAct 1996 (1996) para. 2.1. 
49 Law Com. No. 181 para. 8.3. 
50 'Land shall not be or deemed to be settled land for the purposes of the Settled Land Act 1925 by 
virtue of being or being deemed to be subject to a settlement, unless it was or was deemed to be such 
land by virtue of being or being deemed to be subject to that settlement immediately before the 
commencement of this Act and has remained so since. ' The Explanatory Notes to clause 13 in the 
Trusts of Land Bill state, inter alia, that there should be no addition to settled land held under existing 
settlements. 
51 See Barraclough and Matthews op. cit., para. 2.4, who state that clause 13 carrying the Law 
Commission's proposal into effect are not repeated in the Act and section 2 does not say or imply that. 
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settled land. It is worth noting that in the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum 
attached to the Bill in the House of Lords, it states under clause 2 that, 'An existing 
settlement can have new land added to it'. 
Sydenharn states that, 'where new land is brought into an existing strict settlement, it 
will continue to be governed by the Settled Land Act 1925.52 She does not, however, 
give any reasoning or amplify her statement but is presumably referring to a settlor 
adding land by way of gift to the Settled Land Act settlement. By way of contrast, 
Whitehouse and Hassall state that, 'Further property cannot be added to an existing 
settlement. In such a case further property, being land, will be held on a trust of 
land. 953 The footnote to thiS54 recognises that if capital money is used to buy the land, 
section 10 of the Settled Land Act 1925 will apply so that the land would be settled 
land. This is different from Settled Land Act trustees using proceeds of sale of Settled 
Land Act land to buy new land. The problem with the assumption behind their general 
statement is that predominantly capital money would be used to purchase further 
property which means that their general statement at face value needs to be inverted. 
I wrote to Nicholas Hassall who clarified 55 the point as follows: 'I think that 
paragraph 2.11 on page 22 of the book of which Whitehouse and I are the co-authors 
is looking at a rather definite scenario. I think it refers to the situation where you have 
a Settled Land Act settlement which was in existence, necessarily, prior to I" January 
1997 and the settlor wishes to add further land which he owns beneficially to that 
settlement. Prior to I" January 1997 he could have conveyed the land to the tenant for 
life as an addition to the settlement. However the general view is that if a settlor 
attempted to do that after I" January 1997 he would be creating a referential 
settlement, which would be a new settlement and since you cannot create a new 
Settled Land Act settlement after I" January the land would not be subject to a strict 
settlement but would be held as a trust of land. I would add that this is the 




P cit., at para. 2.13. 
Footnote 2 states that, 'The position may of course be different if capital money is used to acquire 
further land when the Settled Land Act 1925 slO will apply assuming that there is never a moment 
when the settlement does not include "relevant property. "' 
55 In a letter to me dated 4 January 2000. 
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conventional view concerning attempted additions of land after I" January 1997 to a 
strict settlement and is the view taken by the Land Registry. I think on the other hand 
it would be possible for a settlor of a pre- 1997 Settled Land Act settlement to make an 
addition of money to the capital cash of the settlement which addition could then be 
used to purchase land which would be subject to the same settlement. What I have 
said above and what is said in the book represents the conventional view. I have 
always wondered a little about it. In practicewhere additions are made we tend to 
draw a distinction between purely referential trusts, where a new settlement is created 
by reference to trusts of an existing settlement, and an addition to an existing 
settlement where a settlor adds funds which are to be held as part of the same trust 
fund. I have always wondered whether the latter is really a referential settlement and 
is therefore caught by section 2(l) of the Act. However the conventional view is as 
expressed in the book and as I have already stated it. ' 
Thereafter, I wrote to the Land Registry and was informed 56 that if a settlor wishes to 
add land which he owns beneficially to that settlement after Is'January 1997 or cash 
is used and added to the settlement after I't January 1997, the Land Registry's view is 
that a referential settlement is being created which is a fresh settlement and caught by 
section 2(l). The reason is that the land and cash do not fon-n part of the settlement 
prior to I't January 1997. This view is in accordance with the policy of the Act to 
restrict strict settlements as much as possible; any other view could lead to the 
proliferation of strict settlements. 
Both land and cash added to the settlement after I" January 1997 should be treated as 
referential settlements and thus caught by section 2(1 ), 57 which is the Land Registry 
view. This means that section 10 of the Settled Land Act 1925 will not apply to cash 
added to the settlement after I" January 1997, but will apply where settled land is sold 
and that capital money is used to buy new land and also where settled land is 
exchanged for other land. What is problematic is the initial complication that section 2 
has not been drafted in such a way to make it clear that a referential settlement is 
56 In a letter to me dated 3 February 2000 from Ms S Wheeler, Assistant Land Registrar. 
57 This is despite the fact that the formalities required for both are different: land added to the 
settlement will require writing in accordance with section 53(l)(b) Law of Property Act 1925 whereas 
a trust of cash declared by reference to the old settlement can be oral or in writing. 
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considered a new settlement for the purposes of section 2(l) and clearer drafting 
would have been welcome in this subsection. 
Cessation ofstrict settlenient? 
A strict settlement ceases to exist when there is no 'relevant property' in the strict 
settlement. Section 2(4) states that, 'Where at any time after the commencement of 
this Act there is in the case of any settlement which is a settlement for the purposes of 
the Settled Land Act 1925 no relevant property which is, or is deemed to be, subject 
to the settlement, the settlement permanently ceases at that time to be a settlement for 
the purposes of that Act. ' 'Relevant property' is defined in section 2(4) as 'land and 
personal chattels to which section 67(l) of the Settled Land Act 1925 (heirlooms) 
applies'. Do personal chattels exclude money so that if all the land is sold and the 
trustees hold the proceeds of sale, the settlement has ceased to exist? There is no 
58 
definition of personal chattels in the Settled Land Act 1925. A statutory definition is 
to be found in the Administration of Estates Act 192559 and this clearly excludes 
money. There is no reason for a different definition to be given in the Settled Land 
Act. 
Therefore, if there ceases to be any land or heirlooms subject to the settlement, but 
merely capital money, the settlement comes to an end . 
60 Accordingly any land which 
later becomes subject to the settlement bought with the proceeds of sale will be held 
on a trust of land .61 This further ensures the phasing out of strict settlements and 
means that trustees need to retain part of the land, however small, or heirlooms, 
however low in value, for the strict settlement regime still to apply. If the tenant for 
58 The heading to section 67 Settled Land Act 1925 refers to 'sale and purchase of heirlooms under 
order of court'. Money is not an heirloom. Robert Megarry and H. W. R. Wade The Law ofReal 
Property (5h edn 1984) p. 370 state that the Settled Land Acts are not in general concerned with 
chattels but they have made special provision for personal chattels settled so as to devolve with settled 
land. Megarry and Wade note that furniture, pictures, armour and other family possessions, if settled 
along with land, are now governed by the Act of 1925. They state that 'such things are often, though 
inaccurately referred to as "heirlooms"'. 
59 Section 55(l)(x) states that personal chattels do not include money. 
60 See Megarry and Wade op. cit., para. 8-027 footnote 21. 
6' This is reinforced by Schedule I para. 6 which states that, 'Where a settlement ceases to be a 
settlement for the purposes of the Settled Land Act 1925 because no relevant property (within the 
meaning of section 2(4)) is, or is deemed to be, subject to the settlement, any property which is or later 
becomes subject to the settlement is held in trust for the persons interested under the settlement. ' See 
Barraclough and Matthews op. cit., para. 2.4. 
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life sells land simultaneously purchasing replacement land, there is still relevant 
property and accordingly a Settled Land Act settlement, but if the sale is concluded 
any time before the purchase is completed, there is then a moment when there is no 
relevant property so the Settled Land Act regime will not apply. 62 
WERE THE CLIENTS OF SOLICITORS SATISFIED WITH THE SYSTEM OF 
STRICT SETTLEMENTS? 
6 solicitors 63 stated that their clients were satisfied with the system of strict 
settlements. 
3 solicitors 64 stated that their clients were not satisfied with the system of strict 
settlements. 
7 solicitors 65 stated that their clients were partly satisfied with the system of strict 
settlements. 
I solicitor 66 did not answer the question. 
It appears that the satisfied clients were normally satisfied from a position of 
ignorance, a passive type of acceptance, rather than satisfaction from an informed 
position as demonstrated by Christopher Jessel (Farrer & Co) who stated that, 'Most 
clients did not understand and the traditionalfamilies accepted them the way they 
were. They do noffit in easily with modern ideas oftrusts. Families who were used to 
them and knew how they worked were happy with them. ' 
Yet if the system was working for these clients, this must surely speak for itself. It 
was an inherited system which was fine for those who set up their estates in the way 
that they had. Those who were either satisfied or partly satisfied constituted a large 
majority. Those who expressed dissatisfaction stressed the inflexibility of the system, 
the fact that it was not a system which clients wanted to use in a modem envirom-nent, 
the desire of their clients to do other things rather than follow strict settlements and 
62 See Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., para. 2.13 footnote 4. 
63 Currey and Co, Farrer and Co, Linklaters and Alliance, Macfarlanes, May, May and Merrimans and 
Withers. 
64 Burges Salmon, Official Solicitor, Payne Hicks Beach. 
65 Allen and Overy, Boodle Hatfield, Charles Russell, Eversheds, Herbert Smith, Speechly Bircham, 
Wiggin and Co. 
66 Public Trust Office. 
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the problems which arose in the the litigation about the Blenheim estate where the 
tenant for life was not thought to be a suitable person to exercise the conveyancing 
powers. 67 
WERE SOLICITORS THEMSELVES SATISFIED WITH THE SYSTEM OF 
STRICT SETTLEMENTS? 
4 solicitors 68 stated that they were satisfied with the system of strict settlements. 
4 solicitors 69 stated that they were not satisfied with the system of strict settlements. 
9 solicitors 70 stated that they were partly satisfied with the system of strict settlements. 
Significantly a clear majority were either satisfied or partly satisfied. A trend noticed 
whilst interviewing was that solicitors who had the least experience were generally 
glad that solicitors could not create them in the ftiture. Those who had a great deal of 
experience with them exhibited a supreme fondness for them and whilst recognising 
their deficiencies, retained an overall affection for them. However, even amongst 
those who had extensive experience, there was no doubt that the system was in need 
of reform. 
At one extreme William Hancock (Speechly Bircharn) expressed the view that, 'It 
was always thought that the system was a well-drafted Act ofParliament. The system 
did work well. ' Yet the view of Christopher Jessel (Farrer and Co) epitomised the 
mixed views expressed by many of the solicitors. He stated that, 'Advantages (a) 
Simplicity: a lot ofthought went into the legislation. The Settled Land Act 1925 was 
good legislationfor its time but was hopelessly out ofdate. (b) Legal estate in the 
tenantfor life made it simpler because he was the person running the show. 
Disadvantages (a) Out ofdate. (b) Powers of trustees ofmanagement and of tenant 
for life werejar too narrow. The straightforward statutory regime was not 
67 See Hambro v. Duke ofMarlborough [ 1994] Ch. 15 8 where the eleventh Duke of Marlborough did 
not trust his irresponsible son, the Marquess of Blandford, and so applied to the court proposing a new 
scheme varying the beneficial interests even though his son did not consent. 
69 Currey and Co, May, May and Merrimans, Speechly Bircham and Withers. 
69 Burges Salmon, Linklaters and Alliance, Payne Hicks Beach and Public Trust Office. 70 Allen and Overy, Boodle Hatfield, Charles Russell, Eversheds, Farrer and Co, Herbert Smith, 
Macfarlanes, Official Solicitor and Wiggin and Co. 
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satisfactoty. It could be n7ade to work by a well-drafted instrument. It was in need of 
reform if it was going to continue. ' 
The success of strict settlements depended partly on the personal qualities of the 
tenant for life. Co-operation between trustees, tenant for life and professionals was 
necessary for the system to work well. If land was being put in trust to make it as 
difficult as possible for an individual member of the family to sell the land, a strict 
settlement should not be set up, since this gave the tenant for life power to sell the 
land. William McBryde (Assistant Official Solicitor) attributed the breaking and 
winding up of settlements partly to tax reasons and partly to the powers of trustees 
and life tenant never really being adequate for modem land management. He 
highlighted many innovations since 1925 such as agricultural and woodland grants 
that were difficult to deal with under a strict settlement and were much easier to 
organise under a trust for sale. His comments emphasise the necessity for change and 
how some solicitors found the system too archaic to be of contemporary use. 
WAS THE INADVERTENT CREATION OF STRICT SETTLEMENTS A 
PROBLEM? 
14 solicitors 71 stated that they were aware of strict settlements being created 
inadvertently. 
3 solicitors 72 stated that they were not aware of strict settlements being created 
inadvertently. 
These figures help to reveal the huge scale of the problem of accidental creation. 73 
Christopher Jessel (Farrer & Co) explained the situations in which they were most 
commonly created accidentally- 'Accidental charitable section 29 Settled Land Act 
ones were very common because people did not know what they were doing when 
transferring to charities. Also in wills, notjust home-made ones, but also those 
71 Allen and Overy, Boodle Hatfield, Burges Salmon, Charles Russell, Eversheds, Farrer and Co, 
Herbert Smith, Linklaters and Alliance, Official Solicitor, May, May and Merrimans, Payne Hicks 
Beach, Public Trust Office, Speechly Bircham and Withers. 
72 Currey and Co, Macfarlanes and Wiggin and Co. 
73 The Law Commission in Law Com. No. 18 1 para. 4.8 states that, 'The problem of the "unintended" 
strict settlement is perhaps the most immediate and substantial difficulty in the present system. ' See 
also para. 4.2, para. 1.3 quoting para. 3.5 of Working Paper No. 94 and Mark P. Thompson Alodern 
Land Lmv (2 nd edn 2003) p. 237-239. 
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Professionally drawn by a solicitor e. g. will to motherfor life and then to the son. The 
proper way was to executors on trustfor sale. Ifthis were not done, there would be a 
strict settlement. ' 
It is most worrying that solicitors themselves were creating them accidentally. 
However, this problem could have been dealt with without preventing individuals 
creating strict settlements if they wanted to. This was well articulated by Murray 
Hallam (Withers) who stated that, 'There was no need to abolish strict settlementsjust 
to prevent them being created inadvertently. ' The approach adopted by the legislation 
has been to use a sledgehammer where such drastic measures were not necessarily 
warranted. It would have been sufficient if the onus of the statute had been reversed, 74 
so that a trust of land would be created in all cases unless it was specifically stated 
that a strict settlement under the Settled Land Act 1925 was being created. This would 
have satisfied those solicitors who wished to retain the flexibility of being able to 
create strict settlements in the future. 
WERE SOLICITORS PERTURBED THAT THE 1996 ACT PREVENTS 
CREATION OF NEW STRICT SETTLEMENTS? 
5 solicitors 75 stated that they were perturbed that the 1996 Act prevents creation of 
new strict settlements. 
10 solicitors 76 stated that they were not perturbed that the 1996 Act prevents creation 
of new strict settlements. 
2 solicitors 77 stated that they were partly perturbed that the 1996 Act prevents creation 
of new strict settlements. 
A sizeable minority were perturbed or partly perturbed at the prevention of creation of 
new strict settlements and expressed strong views in favour of having the choice to 
retain the ability to create strict settlements. This was well expressed by Roderick 
Steen (May, May and Merrimans) who stated that, 'It was a pity because it was not 
74 The wide wording of section I (1)(i) of the Settled Land Act 1925 has long been in need of 
amendment. 
75 Charles Russell, Currey and Co, May, May and Merrimans, Speechly Bircham and Withers. 76 Allen and Overy, Boodle Hatfield, Burges Salmon, Herbert Smith, Linklaters and Alliance, 
Macfarlanes, Payne Hicks Beach, Official Solicitor, Public Trust Office and Wiggin and Co. 77 Eversheds and Farrer and Co. 
40 
necessary to cut down on the options open to somebody. Ifsomeone wants to create a 
strict settlement, there is no reason not to allow it. Strict settlements ensure that the 
estate goes in line with the peerage. One could specify that the estate goes with the 
peerage to the eldest son. Ifsomeone wants to create entails, why should it not be 
allowed? The argument against that was that people made strict settlements when 
they did not mean to. The answer is that specificform ofwords should be used to 
create strict settlements. ' 
This view appears eminently reasonable and it is easy to sympathise with such a 
stance. It does, however, ignore the fact that the reform was prompted by the desire to 
bring an antiquated system to an end and to streamline and simplify the law. A desire 
to cling on to strict settlements emphasises the reactionary, conservative and 
traditional inclinations of these solicitors who favour retention of the status quo, albeit 
in a moderately modified manner rather than innovative reform. A more conciliatory 
attitude was expressed by Christopher Jessel (Farrer and Co) who explained that, 'My 
initial reaction was to argue against it. Ourfirm was consulted very early on in the 
Law Commission's proposals and consulted at various stages. Thefirm said 
consistently that it ought to be able to continue with strict settlements but it does need 
modernising. But sojew people understand it now that it is probably sensible to get 
rid of it. I now accept it. ' This approach demonstrates that opposition to change is 
being replaced by reluctant acquiescence to reform. 
DO ANY SOLICITORS' CLIENTS WANT TO CREATE NEW STRICT 
SETTLEMENTS BUT ARE NOW UNABLE TO? 
3 solicitors 78 stated that their clients did want to create new strict settlements but are 
now unable to. 
13 solicitors 79 stated that their clients did not want to create strict settlements. 
I solicitor 80 did not answer the question. 
78 Farrer and Co, Speechly Bircham and Withers. 79 Allen and Overy, Boodle Hatfield, Burges Salmon, Charles Russell, Eversheds, Herbert Smith, 
Linklaters and Alliance, Macfarlanes, May, May and Merrimans, Official Solicitor, Payne Hicks 
Beach, Public Trust Office and Wiggin and Co. '0 Currey and Co. 
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The minority view of Murray Hallam (Withers) that, 'There is still a marketfor strict 
settlements' and of Christopher Jessel (Farrer and Co) that, 'A few traditional landed 
families might want to' is tempered by the realism of Christopher Jessel's additional 
comment that, 'ifyou were going to have a Settled LandAct situation, andyou trusted 
the beneficiary enough to be a tenantfor life, you wouldprobably trust him enough to 
be an absolute owner. The old style has probably gone. ' Inevitably, if a minority of 
solicitors still wish to create strict settlements, the inability to create strict settlements 
raises the issue whether a trust of land can be created to replicate a strict settlement. 
How close can a trust of land approximate to a Settled Land Act settlement? 
Although it is not possible to place the legal title in the tenant for life, there are three 
alternatives. First, a specific provision that trustees shall not dispose of the land 
without the consent of the tenant for life, and if directed by the tenant for life to make 
a disposition must do as directed, will in substance confer the same power upon the 
tenant for life as placing the legal title in the tenant for life. Section 8(2) of the 1996 
Act recognises this where consent is needed. Section 6(6) will be applicable since it is 
a rule of equity that trustees must comply with the settlor's directions in the trust that 
confer equitable powers upon the tenant for life or protector 81 with a special role in 
the life of the trust. Secondly, section 6(l) can be partly ousted by providing under 
section 8(l) that the power to dispose of land should be in the tenant for life and not 
the trustees so that trustees must implement a transfer of the legal estate vested in 
them. 82 Thirdly, the power could be delegated by the settlor's trust instrument to the 
tenant for life rather than being delegated by the trustees. 
All these options would further strengthen the position of the tenant for life, 
demonstrating that the 1996 Act can be used, abused and misused to recreate the 
position of the tenant for life. In fact, the position of the tenant for life can be stronger 
than under the Settled Land Act 1925, since there are no prevailing limitations on the 
powers of the tenant for life such as are contained in the Settled Land Act. 83 Further, 
paragraph 10 of Schedule 2 of the Trustee Act 2000 has amended section 75 of the 
81 See Underhill and Hayton Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees by David J. Hayton (16'h edn 2003) p. 
29-34. 
132 This was envisaged to a lesser extent by Law Com. No. 181 para. 10.2. 113 CP See sections 38 to 75 of the Settled Land Act 1925. 
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Settled Land Act 1925 to diminish the power of the tenant for life under the Settled 
Land Act in respect of investment or application of capital money, since trustees now 
only have so far as practicable to consult the tenant for life and so far as consistent 
with the general interest of the settlement give effect to his wishes. 84 Prior to the 
Trustee Act 2000 investment by trustees was to be made according to the direction of 
85 the tenant for life. Thus a resurgence of the omnipotence of the tenant for life is 
given potential by the 1996 Act to be utilised in a manner perhaps as yet unforeseen, 
but laying the embryonic seeds for future flexibility, development and evolution. 
Conclusion 
There is not wholehearted support for the measures taken in the Trusts of Land and 
Appointment of Trustees Act 1996. It was necessary to prevent the creation of 
accidental strict settlements and such reform would have been uncontroversial. Even 
though the prevention of creation of strict settlements has ftirthered the aim of 
modemising, simplifying and streamlining the law, the overwhelming impression 
given throughout numerous interviews was that it was not necessary to prevent strict 
settlements being created in the future. Strict settlements still have a role to play 
where land is associated with a title such as with the Duke of Westminster or on 
divorce or where it may be desirable to have a tenant for life in the driving seat. 
Resistance to change is, however, being superseded by acknowledgement that creative 
means can be devised to attempt to replicate the position of the tenant for life under 
the Settled Land Act within the trust of land regime. 
84 See paragraph 10(2) of Schedule 2 of the Trustee Act 2000. 
"' Section 75(2) of the Settled Land Act 1925. 
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CHAPTER 3- A UNITARY SYSTEM OF A TRUST OF LAND: 
HAS THE ACT MADE TRUSTS FOR SALE UNNECESSARY? 
One of the perceived achievements of the 1996 Act was the introduction of a 
superficially simple concept by way of a trust of land. The trust for sale had been 
compulsory to create concurrent interests in land and was almost always used to 
create successive interests in land to prevent the application of the Settled Land Act 
1925.86 The Law Commission was of the view that a dual system of successive and 
concurrent interests in land was unnecessary and one system for successive interests 
would be sufficient so that Settled Land Act settlements should no longer be capable 
of being created. 87 In addition the trust for sale mechanism was not appropriate to the 
conditions of modem home ownership. 
The imposition of a duty to sell had been wholly artificial and misleading because 
with the rise of owner-occupation and social and economic changes in the mid to late 
twentieth century, the intention of co-owners was to retain land primarily for 
88 occupation as a 'use' asset and not an investment asset. Maitland referred to a 
mortgage transaction as 'one long suppressio veri and suggesfiofalsi', 89 and the same 
analogy could have been applied to co-ownership though not to successive interests. 
The Law Commission recommended" that there should simply be a trust of land in 
the case of concurrent and successive interests in land9l with trustees holding the legal 
estate on trust with a power to sell and a power to retain the land i. e. no duty of sale 
unless the settlor deliberately intended to create an express trust for sale but with a 
mandatory power to postpone sale. 
86 For a review of the history of the trust for sale, see John M. Lightwood Trustsfor Sale (1927) 3 
C. L. J. 59. 
87 See Law Com. No. 181 para. 1.3. 
88 Mid., para. 3.2 and Alain Pottage Law Com. 181: Reforming Trusts ofLand (1989) 52 M. L. R. 683 at 
684-685. See also Loma Fox Living in a Policy State: from Trustfor Sale to Trust ofLand (2000) 22 
Liverpool L. R. 59 at 60-62 and 78-80. 
'9 F. W. Maitland Equity (2 nd edn 1936) p. 182. 90 Law Com. No. 181 para. 20.1. 
91 Roger Smith Properly Law (4th edn 2003) p. 346 notes that it is interesting that virtually none of the 
special features of the strict settlement have been thought worthy of adoption (though one exception is 
the deed of discharge which protects purchasers when the trust has come to an end: section 16). 
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Practitioners can conveniently start by thinking of the new trust of land as being the 
old trust for sale minus any implied duty to sell, plus practically extended powers. 92 
The change from a trust for sale to a trust of land is an innovation conspicuous by its 
determinate banality. As Kenny and Kenny state, 93 the change of name to trusts of 
land is curiously insignificant. 'To lawyers brought up in the 1925 legislation ....... it 
seems a portentous change but in itself it does nothing. 94 There has been no 
ftindamental reform of the 1925 legislation which remains substantially intact. 
DO SOLICITORS THINK THAT HAVING A NEW UNITARY SYSTEM OF A 
TRUST OF LAND IS AN IMPROVEMENT? 
12 solicitorS95 stated that they thought that having a new unitary system was an 
improvement. 
5 solicitors 96 stated that they thought that having a new unitary system was not an 
improvement. 
Problems with trusts for sale were emphasised by George Duncan (Charles Russell) 
who asserted that, 'The previous system was deeply unsatisfactory in some respects 
.... It was deeply confusing that ifyou wanted to set up a trust under which 
land 
would be retained indefinitely in thefamily, the best way to do it was to use a trustfor 
sale. That was enormously confusing to lay clients andpretty confusing evenfor 
professional advisers. It could make the drafting very, very complicated' 
Modification was necessary with the recognition that trusts for sale no longer 
reflected the reality of contemporary methods of ownership of the family home. 
Yet the new regime has its drawbacks, since successive interests are not adequately 
covered by the 1996 Act which focuses on co-ownership. This was explained by Chris 
Jarman (Payne Hicks Beach) who stated that, 'I think that so much of the Law 
Commission Report wasfocused on the system of co-ownership in tenants in common 
92 Emmet andFarrand on Title (19"'edn 1986 looseleaf) by Julian Farrand and Alison Clarke R. 34 
P ara. 22.001. 
3 op. cit., p. 48. 
9' This does seem to overstate the position but it does convey their point of view. 
95 Allen and Overy, Boodle Hatfield, Burges Salmon, Charles Russell, Eversheds, Farrer and Co, 
Herbert Smith, Linklaters and Alliance, Macfarlanes, Official Solicitor, Public Trust Office and Wiggin 
and Co. 
96 Currey and Co, May, May and Merrimans, Payne Hicks Beach, Speechly Bircham and Withers. 
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as opposed to successive interests tinder a trust. I entirely agree with what they were 
trying to achieve in the co-ownership context. ... But to extend their thinking, almost 
without thinking, to the successive interest trusts was not as good as it might have 
heen. ' This highlights the problem that successive interests have been sacrificed for 
the sake of uniformity and simplicity, although the delegation provisions, which will 
be examined later, rectify to a certain extent the lacunae created by the new 
legislation. 
IS IT ADVANTAGEOUS TO HAVE A POWER TO SELL AND A POWER TO 
RETAIN LAND UNDER THE NEW TRUST OF LAND I. E. NO DUTY TO SELL? 
13 solicitors 97 stated that it was advantageous to have a power to sell and a power to 
retain land under the new trust of land. 
3 solicitors 98 stated that it was not advantageous to have a power to sell and a power 
to retain land. 
I solicitor99 (6%) did not answer the question. 
Two main points were highlighted by the solicitors' comments. First, the fact was 
emphasised that the reforms are beneficial for the co-ownership situation but not 
necessarily for the successive interest situation. This was explained by Chris Jarman 
(Payne Hicks Beach) who stated that, 'I think it comes down to a distinction between 
the co-ownership situation and the successive interest situation. In co-ownership I am 
sure it is advantageous that there is no overriding duty to sell because that is what 
people will actually understand much more. ... It may be a marginal disadvantage to 
have that Position in terms ofsuccessive interests. ' 
Secondly, the theme emerges as to how you can have a power to do two inconsistent 
things. This was underlined by William Hancock (Speechly Bircham) who explained 
that, 'I try to decide ifI should have a trust to sell or a trust to retain assets. 
Presumably ifyou have a power to sell and a power to retain and the trustee does not 
97 Allen and Overy, Boodle Hatfield, Burges Salmon, Charles Russell, Currey and Co, Eversbeds, 
Farrer and Co, Linklaters; and Alliance, Macfarlanes, May, May and Merrimans, Official Solicitor, 
Payne Hicks Beach and Withers. 
98 Herbert Smith, Public Trust Office and Speechly Bircham. 
99 Wiggin and Co. 
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want to do anything, nothing happens. I think it is better to spell out the siluation. 
do not like the idea ofthere being silence. ' 
Trust to retain with power to sell? 
There should be a trust to retain or sell: there should be an underlying obligation of 
some sort. 100 Trustees must exercise powers unanimouslylo, and if they are divided, 
then they must have some guidance as to what they should do. They do not sell if they 
are divided and this shows a trust to retain with a power to sell. The Act is 
indeterminative on this point where trustees are in disagreement. In removing the duty 
to sell, the Act does not offer an intelligent alternative. A trust to retain with a power 
to sell would have accurately mirrored the true position and laid any legal fictions to 
rest. Hopkins states that, 102 'Despite the absence of an underlying obligation, the Act 
is biased against sale. The Act enables the settlor of an express trust to prevent sale, 
by removing the power of sale, 103 but not to compel sale. Even where the power of 
sale is not removed, the trustees invariably have a power to postpone sale. 104 Under 
the previous law the power to postpone sale could be removed by a settlor under 
section 25 of the Law of Property Act 1925. "05 Due to the inviolability of the power 
to postpone sale, the trust of land is in substance a trust to retain and a power to 
sell. 
106 
100 See Roger Smith Trusts ofLand Reform [ 19901 Conv. 12 at 15. Smith states in footnote 18 that, 
'Thus in McPhail v. Doulton [1971] A. C. 424 at 448, Lord Wilberforce refers to the narrow distinction 
between a power to distribute coupled with a trust to accumulate income and a power to accumulate 
coupled with a trust to distribute. A power to accumulate and distribute is not mentioned as a feasible 
analysis. ' Lord Wilberforce's words do not, however, rule out a power to do both as a viable 
alternative. His silence on this point is not to be taken as a statement that this is not legitimate. 
101 Smith ibid., p. 15 footnote 19 states, inter alia, that a power to retain or sell would make sense if 
trustees acted by a majority decision. 
102 Nicholas Hopkins The Trusts ofLand andAppointinent of Trustees Act 1996 [1996] Conv. 411 at 
414. 
103 Section 8(l). 
'04 Section 4(l). 
'05 Section 25(l) of the Law of Property Act 1925 states that, 'A power to postpone sale shall, in the 
case of every trust for sale of land, be implied unless a contrary intention appears. ' "'6 This view is also held by Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., para. 2.36 who state that in practice what 
will occur is that the land will not be sold, so that the underlying position is that a trust of land 
comprises a power to sell backed up by (the equivalent of) a duty to retain and the Lord Chancellor's 
Department has confirmed in correspondence with them that this is their understanding of the position. 
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Problems with the power to postpone sale 
It can be seen from section 4(l) that that this provision only applies where there is a 
trust for sale created by a disposition. Section 4(l) states that, 'In the case of every 
trust for sale of land created by a disposition there is to be implied, despite any 
provision to the contrary made by the disposition, a power for the trustees to postpone 
the sale of land; and the trustees are not liable in any way for postponing sale of the 
land, in the exercise of their discretion, for an indefinite period. ' Where a trust for sale 
has not been created by a disposition, where it arises for example by implication of 
law, 107 there may be no power to postpone sale under section 4(l). 
However, under section 6(l) the trustees will presumably have the power to postpone 
sale which cannot be excluded by section 8, since section 8 only applies in the case of 
a trust of land created by a disposition but there may be liability for an indefinite 
postponement unlike section 4.108 A trust for sale would arise by implication of law 
where a trustee acts in breach of trust, for example by buying an asset which the 
trustee has no power to buy. This would be ultra vires and an immediate duty to sell 
the unauthorised investment would arise. In such a case of a breach of trust there 
ought to be no power to postpone sale. Where a power to postpone would arise under 
section 6(l), it is arguable that the rule of equity would apply under section 6(6) so 
that a trustee could not postpone sale. 
If the power to postpone is excluded in an ordinary trust of land and all the trustees 
want to postpone sale, 109 it is irrelevant that there is no power to do so as the trustees 
have only a power to sell and no duty to sell and unless they decide to exercise this 
power of sale, they can legitimately postpone sale by not exercising the power of sale. 
This leads to the absurd position that there can be a trust of land with a power to sell 
stating specifically that the power to postpone sale is excluded, yet this direction is 
meaningless since the trustees do not have a duty to sell. This change in section 4(l) 
is therefore only significant for trusts for sale and was only contemplated by the Law 
107 See Re Jenkins and H. E. Randall and Co's Contract [1903] 2 Ch. 362 (purchase of land in breach of 
, rust) and Emmet and Farrand on Title op. cit. R. 55 para. 22.024. log See Emmet and Farrand on Title ibid. 
'09 Trustees must be unanimous to exercise a power: see Re Roth (1896) 74 L. T. 50, Re Hilton [ 1909] 2 
Ch. 548, Re Mayo [1943] Ch. 302, and Cheshire and Bum op cit. p. 220 especially footnote 19. 
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Commission for this purpose. ' 10 Section 4(l) will only be of any assistance where all 
the trustees want to postpone sale. If the trustees are not unanimous, section 4(l) will 
not help them. In addition, the power to postpone only applies to a power to postpone 
the sale of land so if the trust is mixed and includes land and personalty, there is no 
power implied by section 4(l) to postpone the sale of personalty. "' 
The wording of section 4(l) is also worthy of examination: 'the trustees are not liable 
in any way for postponing sale of the land, in the exercise of their discretion, for an 
indefinite period. ' This wide wording mirrors the language used in section 25(2) of 
the Law of Property Act 1925.1 12 Yet such immunity seems far too widely drafted. It 
would, indeed, be odd if there were no liability where a wasting leasehold was not 
sold due to postponement of sale and was held until it was worthless. This did not 
seem to pose a problem under the 1925 legislation and may not do under the 1996 
Act. 
Does, however, the immunity override a trustees' general duties, 113 inter alia, to act in 
good faith, ' 14 act honestly, ' 15 consider from time to time the exercise of the power, 11 6 
and not unfairly benefit one beneficiary at the expense of another? ' 17 It would seem 
that the section overrides the duty to consider the exercise of the power from time to 
time due to the words 'not liable in any way for postponing sale for an indefinite 
period. ' Do the words 'not liable in any way' remove the duty to act in good faith or 
to act honestly or are these general duties saved by the words 'in the exercise of their 
110 See Law Com. No. 181 para. 3.7. 
111 See Barraclough and Matthews op. cit., para. 4.4 footnote 9a. 
112 Section 25(2) stated that, 'the trustees for sale shall not be liable in any way for postponing the sale, 
in the exercise of their discretion, for any indefinite period ..... The litigation on section 25 of the 1925 Act included cases showing a contrary intention such as Re Rooke [1953] Ch. 716 (where a direction 
by the testator to sell the farm as soon as possible was held to be a contrary intention thus excluding the 
power to postpone sale) and Re Atkins' Will Trusts [ 1974] 1 W. L. R. 761 (vesting of gift depends on 
time of sale). 
113 For a detailed discussion of the trustees' duties as donees of powers, see Geraint Thomas Thomas on 
Powers (1998) ch. 6. See also Underhill and Hayton op. cit., ch. 11. 114 Gisborne v. Gisborne (1877) 2 App. Cas. 3 00 (in the absence of malafides the court would not 
interfere). Compare Tempest v. Lord Camoys (1882) 21 Ch. D. 571 (court will intervene if trustees act 
improperly or in a way which is wrong or unreasonable- obiter per L. Jessel M. R. and Cotton L. J. ). See 
Maurice Cullity Judicial Control of Trustees'Discretions (1975) 25 U. of Toronto L. J. 99. 115 Re Smith [ 1896] 1 Ch. 7 1. 
116 See Re Gulbenkian's Settlements [ 1970] A. C. 508 at 518 per Lord Reid and Re Hay's Settlement 
Trusts [ 1982] 1 W. L. R. 202 at 209,2 10 per Megarry V. -C. 117 Nesili v. National Westminster Bank plc [ 1993] 1 W. L. R. 1260. 
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(ul'iraliliv-111-L) 
discretion'? It would seem that the words 'not liable in any way' are qualified by 'in 
the exercise of their discretion' which means 'in the conscious bonafide exercise of 
discretion' so the trustees are not relieved of their basic duties. 118 
Can the broad exemption seemingly given by section 4(l) be reconciled with the view 
taken in older cases such as Fry v. Fry' 19 where Romilly M. R. held that trustees were 
liable for negligence in not selling the trust property where there was improper 
retention of unauthorised investments? Can it be reconciled with Re Chapman 120 and 
Rawsthorne v. Rowle 121 where trustees were not liable for a loss arising through the Y 
retention of an authorised investment unless wilful default, which includes want of 
ordinary prudence on the part of the trustees, was proved? One way of limiting the 
broad exemption of section 4(l) is to tie section 4(l) with section 6(6) which only 
refers to the powers conferred by this section (i. e. section 6), but section 6(l) includes 
the power to postpone sale, so it can be said that the rules of equity still apply to 
section 4, so that Fry v. Fry and other such cases would still be decided in the same 
way. 
By the same circuitous argument, under section 6(9) 122 the duty of care under section 
I of the Trustee Act 2000, which applies from February 12001 to trustees of land 
when exercising the powers conferred by section 6, could be argued to apply to 
section 4(l) so that trustees are still overall bound by the duty of care. Thus a court 
would hold that trustees are liable for postponing sale where they are in breach of 
their duty of care or are not acting in good faith because section 4(l) is subject to 
section 6(6) and section 6(9). 123 
"' Section 4(3) is a saving section for those who have claims arising before the commencement of the 
Act. 
'9 (1859) 27 Beav. 144. 
20 [ 1896] 2 Ch. 763. 
21 [1909] 1 Ch. 409. 
22 Inserted by the Trustee Act 2000 s. 40(l), Sch. 2, para. 45(3). 
123 It is odd that commentators are unperturbed by the immunity provided by section 4(l) and 
seemingly accept it at face value. 
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DO SOLICITORS STILL WANT TO CREATE AN EXPRESS TRUST FOR SALE 
SO INCLUDING A DUTY TO SELL? 
12 solicitors 124 stated that they would still want to create an express trust for sale 
which would include a duty to sell. 
5 solicitors 125 stated that they would not still want to create an express trust for sale 
which would include a duty to sell. 
The distinction between trusts with successive interests and those with concurrent 
interests was stressed by Chris Jarman (Payne Hicks Beach)- 'If we are setting lip a 
trust with successive interests, virlually always yes we are setting them 126 up. In the 
context of co-ownership, I am happy with the system. In the context ofsuccessive 
interests, it is appropriate to regard the property as an investment primarily. ' It 
appears too dogmatic to state unequivocally that with successive interests a trust for 
sale is appropriate, but not with concurrent interests, and this does not allow for 
individual circumstances to be taken into consideration. As a generalisation, however, 
his statement may have some validity. 
This view should be contrasted with the view taken by John Glasson (Eversheds) who 
stated that, 'I was delighted to see the end of the trustfor sale. Although the trustfor 
sale has to be admired as a useful and ingenious conveyancing device, it has, in my 
view, little merit beyond this and is particularly unsuited to co-ownership ofhouses 
and to modern property development. It gave the law a bad name when explaining 
conveyances and wills to clients. Also it complicated the drafting ofquite simple 
documents. ... Years ago I designed a will to 
do away with the trustfor sale. You could 
not eliminate it completely. It was nonsense to explain to the client about a trustfor 
sale. I would not want a trustfor sale in a will now. ' This view does not allow for the 
flexibility which may be provided by a trust for sale where appropriate, yet epitomises 
the view of those who avoid creating trusts for sale. 
124 Allen and Overy, Boodle Hatfield, Burges Salmon, Charles Russell, Currey and Co, Farrer and Co, 
Linklaters and Alliance, Official Solicitor, Payne Hicks Beach, Speechly Bircham, Wiggin and Co and 
Withers. 
125 Eversheds, Herbert Smith, Macfarlanes, May, May and Merrimans and Public Trust Office. 
126 Referring to trusts for sale. 
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The status of trusts for sale 
All the solicitors agreed that the Act should not have abolished the possibility of 
creating an express trust for sale, which is a significant finding as to the utilitarian 
value of creating trusts for sale. In the Second Reading of the Bill in the House of 
Lords on 0 March 1996, the Lord Advocate, Lord Mackay of Drumadoon, stated 
that, 127 'Trusts for sale are abolished and existing trusts for sale become trusts of land 
from commencement. ' Stephen Gold in an impetuous, hasty summary of the Act was 
incorrect to state 128 that, 'The Act abolishes trusts for sale (those existing when it 
comes in are killed off)'. Sydenham's view is that only those trusts for sale which are 
implied by statute are converted into trusts of land but not express trusts for sale since 
the duty to sell remains, although there is power to retain despite any provision to the 
contrary. 129 
Hopkins, on the other hand, is of the view that the duty to sell remains in pre- 
commencement express trusts for sale, but such trusts do become trusts of land. 130 He 
retracted his original statement that all trusts for sale in existence at the 
commencement of the Act are converted into trusts of land. This is achieved by 
removing the duty to sell. ' 13 1 Draper states that the conversion process is simply a 
generic reclassification that does not without more change the basic nature of the pre- 
commencement trust for sale. 132 
The correct opinion is a combination of Hopkins' and Draper's views, since there is 
still a duty to sell but there is now a trust of land. Draper is correct that there is no 
provision which removes the duty to sell from trusts for sale created expressly before 
the Act, which is in direct contrast to section 5 and Schedule 2 of the Act, which 
removes the duty to sell from statutory trusts for sale arising prior to the Act. Thus 
unlike express trusts for sale, conversion in these cases is not simply a generic 
127 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard): House of Lords Official Report 5 Ih Series Vol. 569 col. 1718. 
1211 The Civil Way (1996) 146 N. L. J. 135 1. 
29 Letters [ 19971 Conv. 242. 
30 Letters [ 1997] Conv. 243. 
: 321 0. P cit., p. 413. 
Michael Draper Reformation or Revolution? (1999) 21 Liverpool L. R. 97 at 102-103. 
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reclassification, but a fundamental change to the basic nature of pre-commencement 
implied trusts for sale. 133 
A trust for sale can still be created expressly and this is explicitly recognised by 
section 4(l ). 134 Trustees will be under a duty to sell and must be unanimous' 35 when 
they exercise the power to postpone sale which cannot be excluded. The only 
argument which can be advanced to support the view of the Lord Advocate and Gold 
is that section 6(l) clearly states that, 'For the purpose of exercising their functions as 
trustees, the trustees of land have in relation to the land subject to the trust all the 
powers of an absolute owner. ' This does not recognise that trustees can have any 
duties at all and would primafacie negate any duty to sell under a trust of land. 
Does section 6(l) leave room for a duty of sale to arise or is section 6(l) 
comprehensive in its coverage and rule out any duties existing? The better view is that 
the wording of section 6(l) does not exclude a trustee having a duty of sale under a 
trust for sale and is merely stating that the trustees of land have all the powers of an 
absolute owner. Section 6(l) does not deal with duties and does not prevent their 
existence. Section 4 is implicitly recognising the existence of a duty of sale and 
section 5(l) explicitly recognises that a trust for sale contains a duty to sell. Further 
proof is that the term trust for sale is still defined in section 205(l)(xxix) of the Law 
of Property Act 1925 136 albeit deleting three elements of the definition: the word 
'binding', the words 'and with or without a power at discretion to postpone the sale' 
and the definition of 'power to postpone a sale'. 
'33 Ibid., p. 103-104. 
134 P. H. Pettit Demise of Trustsfor Sale and the Doctrine ofConversion? (1997) 113 L. Q. R. 207 at 
207-208 advances the following arguments in favour of the proposition that the 1996 Act has not 
abolished trusts for sale: the preamble to the Act does not refer to the abolition of trusts for sale but to 
amending the law in respect thereof; the definition of trust of land in section I (1)(a) is any trust of 
property which consists of or includes land and section 1(2)(a) specifically states that this includes a 
trust for sale; section 3 clearly assumes that a trust for sale can exist as does section 4; section 17(4)(a) 
contains provisions in similar terms to section 1(2)(a). 
135 As laid down in Re Mayo. 
136 As amended by section 25(2) and Schedule 4 of the 1996 Act, the new definition reads: ... Trust for 
sale", in relation to land, means an immediate trust for sale, whether or not exercisable at the request or 
with the consent of any person; "trustees for sale" mean the persons (including a personal 
representative) holding land on trust for sale. ' 
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When will trusts for sale be created? 
Inter vivos 
In simple cases of co-ownership, especially the purchase of a matrimonial or quasi- 
matrimonial home, an express trust for sale is rarely justified. In Williams on Wills'37 
three possible situations where a trust for sale might still be appropriate are set out. 
The first situation is where the settlor or testator particularly wants there to be an early 
sale, an express trust for sale would emphasise his intention, but would not impose 
any greater legal obligation to sell, because section 4 of the 1996 Act confers a non- 
excludable power to postpone sale. This view of section 4 is difficult to justify since 
section 4 cannot remove the underlying conceptual difference between a duty to sell 
and a power to sell and cannot equalise them in the eyes of the law. A trust for sale 
does impose a greater legal obligation to sell irrespective of section 4. 
The second situation is where land is intended to be held as an investment, and not 
for the occupation of beneficiaries, the traditional trust for sale wording might be a 
way of emphasising this, although the strict legal position would probably be little or 
not at all different from one where there was no trust for sale. The third situation is 
where there is a gift of or including land, for example a gift of a residuary estate 
which includes land to two or more persons as tenants in common (orjoint tenants) 
absolutely and beneficially, the minority in terms of value of their interests may have 
a stronger right to an immediate sale against the wishes of the majority if there is a 
trust for sale. If that is what is intended, section II of the 1996 Act should be 
excluded. 
In all those three cases an expression of intention should be included as well as a trust 
for sale, because a trust for sale could always be there through continuing to use old 
forms, rather than because of specific intent, and it may be that the expressions of 
intention will be more decisive than the presence of a trust for sale. The intention will 
be important under section 15(l)(a) when a court decides an application under section 
14, yet if an old form is used, even unintentionally, there will be a duty of sale which 
will prevail until an application is made under section 14. 
137 C. H. Sherrin, R. F. D. Barlow, R. A. Wallington, Susannah L. Meadway, Michael Waterworth (8h 
edn, 2002), Vol. 2 pam. 200.56. 
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In a will 
Trusts for sale in a WiII138 are a more complex area. The view of Kenny and Kenny is 
that there is no need to include an administrative trust for sale in a Will. 139 The view 
of Barraclough and Matthews is that there is no need to create a trust for sale of 
residue or of o ther property given to more than one beneficiary. 140 This raises the 
question of why a trust for sale for one beneficiary would be desirable. It would seem 
that a trust for sale would be more likely where there is more than one beneficiary 
since the assets need to be sold so that proceeds of sale can be distributed. 
Whitehouse and Hassall take the view that one situation where it may continue to be 
standard practice to use a trust for sale is in the residue clause of a will. 141 They state 
that in cases where residue is to be divided amongst a number of beneficiaries, it will 
be necessary for the assets to be sold and the proceeds of sale then to be distributed 
and in such cases a trust for sale is obviously appropriate. 142 Their conclusion is that, 
'It is therefore thought that although trusts for sale are no longer necessary to deal 
with the problem of land which forms part of the residue, it will often remain the case 
that such a trust will remain part of any residue clause. ' 143 
On the other hand, the view of Wallington 144 is that an administration trust will not 
need to provide a trust for sale and will only need to provide that the testator's assets 
not otherwise disposed of are given to his executors/trustees to hold them on trust 
with power to sell them when the trustees think fit. 145 Wallington's opinion is that this 
138 Section 18 gives personal representatives with appropriate modifications the same rights and powers 
as trustees. 139 op. cit., p. 59-60. 400 
. P cit., para. 4.12. 41 op. cit., para. 2.26 footnote 2. 
142 op. cit., para. 6.4 1. 
143 The same view is expressed in The Encyclopaedia ofForins and Precedents (5, h edn 2002 Reissue) 
b Lord Millett P. C. Vol. 40(2) para. 383 footnote 2 [3063]. 
1W Richard Wallington The Trusts ofLandandAppointment of Trustees Bill (1996) 146 N. L. J. 959 at 
960. 
145 The Act will enable considerable simplification in the drafting of wills in 3 ways: first, an 
administration trust will not need to provide a trust for sale, since land will no longer be settled land 
under the Settled Land Act 1925 if no trust for sale is imposed; secondly, the powers conferred on 
trustees of land under section 6 will avoid the need for most of the extensive express powers which are 
currently needed in wills disposing of land; thirdly, it will be possible to simplify considerably the 
drafting of any clause intended to provide a residence for a beneficiary by leaving the statutory scheme 
in sections 12 and 13 to govern the beneficiary's rights of occupation (though section II may have to 
be excluded since it will add significantly to the burdens taken on by the trustees if not excluded). 
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will have the incidental effect that the rules in Howe v. Dartmouth 
146 and Re 
Chesterfield's Trusts 147 will be excluded without further express provision (Re 
pilcairn 148). Thus the rules in Howe v. Dartmouth and Re Chesterfield's Trusts can be 
excluded, or rather rendered inapplicable in the first place, by providing a 
discretionary power of sale over all residuary assets. 149 However, as Mitchell points 
out, 150 it is not merely the absence of an express duty to sell which has this result. 
What excludes Howe v. Dartmouth is the indication of intention that the time of sale 
should be within the trustees' discretion. Problems with this were demonstrated by Re 
Hey's Settlement Trusts'51 which established good reason to avoid trusts for sale if at 
all possible. 
Mitchell identifies 5 areas where he questions whether a trust for sale will help in 
relation to trustees' powers of sale. 152 First, executors' powers of sale under the 
general law can be exercised only for the purpose of paying debts and legacies and 
may not extend to foreign property. This is resolved by conferring a general power of 
146 (1802) 7 Ves. 137. Where a will contains a residuary bequest of personal property to be enjoyed by 
persons in succession, unauthorised investments are held upon an implied trust to sell them and invest 
the proceeds in authorised investments unless the will reveals an intention that no sale is to take place. 
See Hayton and Marshall Commentary and Cases on the Law of Trusts and Equitable Remedies by 
David J. Hayton (I Ith edn 2001) paras. 9-182-9-184 and Hanbury andMartin Modern Equity by Jill E. 
Martin (16th edn 2001) p. 554-561. 
147 (1883) 24 Ch. D. 643. Where personalty which is subject to a duty to convert includes reversionary 
property or other non-income producing property, the mode of apportionment on sale or on the life 
tenant's death is done by ascertaining the sum which, put out at interest at 4 per cent per annurn on the 
day of the testator's death, and accumulating at compound interest calculated with yearly rests and 
deducting income tax, would with the accumulations of interest, have produced, at the day of receipt, 
the amount actually received. The aggregate of the sums so ascertained must be treated as capital and 
the residue as income payable to the tenant for life. See Hayton and Marshall op. cit., paras. 9-186-9- 
190 and Haribury and Martin op. cit., p. 557-558. 148 [ 189612 Ch. 199. 
149 See Williams on Wills op. cit., para. 38.18 and footnote 4. 
150 Robert Mitchell Trustsfor Sale in Wills- Excess Baggage? [1999] Conv. 84 at 99. 
151 [1945] Ch. 294 where the testator specifically tried to exclude the rule in Howe v. Dartmouth, yet 
there was a resulting trust interest of which neither the testator nor his executors were aware. As 
residue was subject to a trust for sale with power to postpone, it was held that Howe should apply. 
152 op. cit., p. 95-96. See also Williams on Wills op. cit., para. 200.55 for analysis of why trusts for sale 
are generally no longer necessary. Para. 200.56 demonstrates three situations where a trust for sale 
might be appropriate. Paras. 214.1-214.2 discuss the recommendation that trusts for sale in 
administration trusts of residue are not provided but that there should be express provision of a power 
of sale if there is no provision of a trust for sale, even though there are wide powers conferred by 
sections 39 and 40 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 and section 6(l) of the 1996 Act for the 
purposes of the administration. James Kessler Drafting Trusts and Will Trusts A Modern Approach (6th 
edn 2002) p. 25 adopts the view that, '... it is not necessary to use a trust for sale of land. It has never 
been necessary to use a trust for sale of personal property. These clauses can now be regarded as 
completely obsolete. ' 
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sale exercisable whether or not any debts or legacies remain to be provided for and 
wherever the assets are situated. Secondly, there are small technical gaps in trustees' 
general power of sale but this is resolved by conferring a general power of sale. Both 
the first and second areas do not justify the continued use of a trust for sale. Thirdly, 
executors and trustees are subject to the right of an absolutely entitled beneficiary in 
appropriate cases to demand transfer of his share in kind. A trust for sale alone is not 
sufficient to deal with this problem but a trust for sale may give 'valuable cosmetic 
comfort to executors and trustees in resisting beneficiaries' demands for transfer in 
kind'. 153 
Fourthly, trustees of land are subject to constraints arising from the statutory right of 
occupation. Mitchell's view is that a trust for sale is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
deal with rights to reside, but should rather be dealt with by a declaration by the 
testator that the land is not available for occupation. Mitchell's fifth area is that 
trustees of land are subject to judicial interference under section 14 of the 1996 Act. 
In this area lies a second possible cosmetic reason for the continued use of a trust for 
sale. A court is more likely to give weight to a trust for sale than a power to retain or 
sell. 
Conclusion 
The change from a trust for sale to a trust of land is not a momentous, pivotal reform 
and it is unfortunate that following the 1996 legislation, the law has not been 
reformed in a way which necessarily streamlines and simplifies it. Practitioners will 
still need to be aware of the possibilities and pitfalls of trusts for sale. The simple 
concept of the trust of land may not be the panacea that the Law Commission was 
hoping for. Certainty has not been bought by introducing seemingly simplified 
provisions. Section 4(l) should be drafted to omit the words 'and the trustees are not 
liable in any way for postponing sale of the land, in the exercise of their discretion, for 
an indefinite period. ' Additionally, the trust of land should be a trust to retain with a 
power to sell in order to reflect the reality of the situation. This can be achieved by 
153 op. cit., p. 96. 
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means of a subsection added to section 6 imposing a duty to postpone the sale of land 
rather than a power in the case of a trust of land. 
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CHAPTER 4- HAS THE DOCTRINE OF CONVERSION BEEN 
ABOLISHED? 
DO SOLICITORS THINK THAT THE ABOLITION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 
CONVERSION IS WORTHWHILE? 
13 solicitors 154 stated that the abolition of the doctrine of conversion was worthwhile. 
2 solicitors 155 stated that the abolition of the doctrine of conversion was not 
worthwhile. 
2 solicitors 156 did not answer the question. 
The vast majority of the solicitors interviewed recognised that the demise of the 
doctrine of conversion was long overdue, since solicitors had in any event disregarded 
the doctrine in recent years. This should be compared with the poignant comments, 
which represent the minority view, lamenting the loss of the doctrine by William 
Hancock (Speechly Bircham) who stated that, 'I am not happy with the abolition of 
the doctrine ofconversion. For international tax and trusts work, it is sometimes 
useful to have concepts like the doctrine of conversion. Whether or not it should be 
useful in practice, it has been. E. g. ifI have a client who is not domiciled in this 
country who wishes to set up a trust and let us assume the client is Italian, if the trust 
is ofrealty, then normally you would not be able to dispose ofthat property 157 
because you look to the law ofthe home jurisdiction. IfIraly does not recognise 
dispositions ofproperty in trust by Italian domiciliaries, 158 then you have not effected 
a transfer ofthe property. There was a case called Re Piercy 159 in 1895 (it has been 
followed in subsequent tax cases) where North J appeared to accept that because of 
the application ofthe doctrine ofconversion, there was an effective trust. It isjust an 
154 Allen and Overy, Boodle Hatfield, Burges Salmon, Charles Russell, Eversheds, Farrer and Co, 
Linklaters and Alliance, Macfarlanes, May, May and Merrimans, Official Solicitor, Payne Hicks 
Beach, Wiggin and Co and Withers. 
55 Currey and Co and Speechly Bircham. 
56 Herbert Smith and Public Trust OfTice. 
137 On trust. 
158 Nowadays due to Italy's ratification of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and 
on their Recognition 1985, Italians can create trusts of Italian immovables on valid 'trusts intcmi'. See 
Maurizio Lupoi The Development ofProtected Trust Structures in Italy in Extending the Boundaries of 
Trusts and Similar Ring-Fenced Funds edited by David Hayton (2002) p. 85 at 92. 
159 [189511 Ch. 83. 
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example, perhaps a rather obscure one, why I am not happy with academic changes 
in the law which arefor the main part directed at helping conveyancers but have 
knock-on effectsfor practitioners in other areas connected with land and trusts. ' 
Recommendation for reform 
The doctrine of conversion developed in the eighteenth century160 and originated as an 
equitable doctrine under a trust for sale of land whereby as soon as a trust for sale 
came into operation, the interests of the beneficiaries under the trust became 
automatically interests in the proceeds of sale of the land 16 1 and not in the land itself, 
since 'equity looks on that as done which ought to be done. ' 162 The doctrine of 
conversion also applied in reverse if money was being held by trustees under a duty to 
buy land, known as reverse conversion, whereby the interests of the beneficiaries 
became automatically interests in land. 163 The doctrine became important because 
before 1926, realty and personalty descended to different people on intestacy, 164 so it 
was viewed as wrong that the precise moment at which the trustees carried out their 
duty to sell or buy should determine whether the rights of beneficiaries were realty or 
personalty. 
There is a view that the prolonged survival of the doctrine of conversion was probably 
because it was considered to have a role in the concept of overreaching, but it was 
never an essential element. The redundancy of conversion is demonstrated by the fact 
that it can now be removed without the edifice collapsing. 165 The abolition of the 
doctrine of conversion has not had any effect on overreaching on sale by two 
160 See Lightwood op. cit. p. 59ff. Stuart Anderson The Proper Narrow Scope ofEquitable Conversion 
in Land Law (1984) 100 L. Q. R. 86 undertakes a thorough, detailed, historical analysis of the doctrine 
of conversion. In early case law conversion-logic rarely succeeded in applying where it was held that 
such interests should not be treated as personal property and that conversion-absolutism under which 
equitable interests were always treated as personal property was an invention of twentieth century 
commentators. 
16 1 Fletcher v. Ashburner (1779) 1 Bro. C. C. 497, Stevens v. Hutchinson [ 1953] Ch. 299. 
162 See e. g. Lechmere v Earl ofCarlisle (1733) 3 P. Wms. 211 at 215, Guidot v Guidot (1745) 3 Atk. 
254 at 256. 
163 Re Scarlh (1879) 10 Ch. D. 499. 
164 Realty devolved on the heir (ascertained by virtue of the common law as amended by the 
Inheritance Act 1833) and personalty devolved on the next-of-kin (ascertained according to the Statute 
of Distribution 1670, as explained and amended by the Statute of Frauds 1677 and the Statute of 
Distribution 1685). Since 1925 realty and personalty have devolved in the same way on intestacy. The 
distinction will only be of importance today if a will specifically provides for land or realty to pass to 
one beneficiary and personalty to a different beneficiary. 
165 See Barraclough and Matthews op. cit., para. 3.1. 
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trustees. 166 Conversion is not necessary to explain overreaching which is a view 
robustly held by Charles Harpum. 167 
The Law Commission's recommendation was that 'the doctrine of conversion should 
be abolished in relation to all trusts, whenever created. The equitable interests of the 
beneficiaries will continue to be overreached if payment is made to two trustees, the 
interests becoming interests in the proceeds of sale if or when the land is sold. In this 
way the practical utility (in conveyancing terms) of the doctrine will remain 
undiminished. ' 168 Clause 21 of the draft Bill was drafted differently from section 3 
and was in fact better drafted than section 3.169 Clause 21 stated that, 'In determining 
for any purpose whether property subject to a trust or held by personal representatives 
should be treated as personalty or realty, any duty of the trustees or the personal 
representatives to deal with that property so as to alter its nature in that respect shall 
be disregarded. ' This clause did, however, sow the seeds of the problem which took 
root in section 3, because the draftsman was not thinking of the interests of the 
beneficiaries, but was thinking of the property in the hands of the trustees. 
Problematic drafting of section 3? 
Section 3(l) adopted aprimafacie simpler and more straightforward formulation 
which is, in fact, highly problematic, since it states that, 'Where land is held by 
trustees subject to a trust for sale, the land is not to be regarded as personal property; 
and where personal property is subject to a trust for sale in order that the trustees may 
acquire land, the personal property is not to be regarded as land. ' Both the preamble 
166 This misconception had its origin in an attractive but ultimately misleading thesis first promulgated 
by Lightwood op. cit., p. 65: see Graham Ferris and Graham Battersby The General Principles of 
Overreaching and the Reforms of 1925 (2002) 188 L. Q. R. 270 at 281 footnote 73. 
167 Overreaching, Trustees'Powers and the Reform of the 1925 Legislation [1990] C. L. J. 277 at 278- 
279. Harpum repeats his view more briefly in Overreaching, Trusts ofLand and Proprietary Estoppel 
(2000) 116 L. Q. R. 341 at 343. Anderson op. cit., p. 109 stated that we should drop 'the dogma 
conversion is, or once was, necessary to explain overreaching. That has never been true; nor could it 
ever have been true ...... See also Charles Harpum The Law Commission and the Reform oftand LMv in Land Law Themes and Perspectives edited by Susan Bright and John Dewar (1998) ch. 6 at p. 174, 
Ferris and Battersby op. cit., p. 271 and Birmingham Midshires Mortgage Services Ltd v. Sabherwal 
(2000) 80 P. & C. R. 256 para. 22 per Robert Walker L. J upholding the reasoning of Lord Oliver in City 
ofLondon Building Society v. Flegg [ 1988] A. C. 54 at 90. 
168 Law Com. No. 181 para. 3.6. 
'69 The wording is wide enough to cover property held by personal representatives subject to an option 
to purchase. 
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to the Act and the heading of the section refer to the abolition of the doctrine of 
conversion, but section 3 does not actually state this. 170 
A side- or headnote to a statutory provision is not part of the provision and has no 
legislative force. 171 As Upjohn L. J. stated in Stephens v. Cuckfield R. D. C. '172 'While 
the marginal note to a section cannot control the language used in the section, it is at 
least permissible to approach a consideration of [the section's] general purpose and 
the mischief at which it is aimed with the note in mind. ' 173 A different view was taken 
by Lord Reid in Chandler v. D. P. P. where he stated that 'side-notes cannot be used as 
an aid to construction. They are mere catch-words... ' 174 However, in the later case of 
D. P. P. v. Schildkamp, 175 Lord Reid suggested that the side-notes represent the 
intention of Parliament. The side-note will thus be of value as an aid to 
construction, 176 but the central question is whether section 3 has abolished the 
doctrine of conversion. 
A further problematic aspect is the wording of section 3 itself. Section 3 states that, 
'the land is not to be regarded as personal property' and 'the personal property is not 
to be regarded as land'. The problem with this is that it was only the beneficial 
interests in the land which were treated as personalty and not the land itself, and it 
was only the beneficial interests in the personal property which were treated as land 
and not the personalty itself. A literal interpretation of section 3, therefore, would 
render it otiose and ineffective leaving the doctrine of conversion intact in the state it 
had been prior to the passing of the Act. In addition, the terminology in section 3 that 
'the land is not to be regarded as personal property' is too loose and inaccurate, since 
it seems to cover the trustee's interest which has never been converted. The section 
170 See generally Paul Matthews Nice Try: Shame about Conversion (1996/97) 5 P. T. P. R 87 and P. H. 
Pettit Demise of Trustsfor Sale and the Doctrine ofConversion? op. cit. 
171 See Attorney-General v. Great Eastern Railway (1879) 11 Ch. D. 449 at 461, Nbcon v. Attorney- 
General [1930] 1 Ch. 566 at 593. 
172 [1960] 2 Q. B. 373 at 383. 
173 See Cross Statutory Interpretation (P edn 1995) by John Bell and Sir George Engle p. 132. 
: 74 [1964] A. C. 736 at 789. 
75 [197 11 A. C. I at 10. 
176 Charles Harpurn The Law Commission and the Reform ofLand Law op. cit., p. 173 states that a 
side-note is necessarily conditioned by the long title of the Act, which states that its purpose is 'to make 
new provision about trusts of land including .... abolishing the doctrine of conversion'. He draws an 
analogy in footnote 164 with the side-note to section 6 'General powers of trustees' which nobody 
would suggest was concerned with anything other than the powers of trustees of land. 
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should rather have specifically referred to the beneficiary's interest. As Matthews 
said, 'it gives us little confidence that the draftsman really understood what he or she 
was doing here. ' 177 
Has section 3 abolished the doctrine of conversion? 
Section 3 may not have abolished the doctrine itself; at best the draftsman may have 
negatived the effects of conversion. 178 The draftsman should have named the doctrine 
and like the side-note, declared it to have been abolished. Alternatively, he could have 
set out the doctrine, 'then given it its quietus' 179 and stated it is abolished. There is 
little substantive difference between those two options, although the first is preferable, 
since the latter may give rise to disputes over interpretation of the exposition of the 
doctrine. What section 3 has done is to set out the doctrine and say that it is not to 
apply. The draftsman described what he or she thought to be the effects of the doctrine 
and then reversed those effects. This should have the effect of abolishing the doctrine, 
but demonstrates the deficiency in relying on the draftsman's interpretation of the 
doctrine. 
Matthews concludes by saying that it would not have been difficult without abolishing 
conversion to provide that a beneficiary under a trust for sale of realty should be 
treated for the purposes of this Act as having an interest in land pending sale and 
similarly with personalty held on trust to acquire land. 180 In his view that would have 
led to the same substantive result as that intended by the Act. Yet this construction 
would have been a half-hearted attempt to deal with a problem which the Law 
Commission emphatically wanted dealt with by way of abolition of conversion in 
relation to all trusts whenever created. 181 
: 11 op. cit., P. 9 1. 78 See Matthews op. cit., p. 90. 
179 Matthews gives as an example section I (I) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1989. However, the difference with section l(l) of the 1989 Act is that it did not abolish a doctrine but 
a rule of law which was never epitomised by way of a doctrine. Thus setting out the rule and abolishing 
it is easier than purporting to abolish a doctrine which is encapsulated by one word without using that 
word. 
'0 Op. cit., p. 94. 
" Law Com. No. 181 para 3.6. 
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Concerns as to whether the draftsman fully understood the implications of the drafting 
are also exemplified by reverse conversion which Matthews argues' 82 is not abolished 
and is alive and well and living in equity textbooks, since section 3(l) covers the sale 
of personal property so that trustees may acquire land. Matthews argues that reverse 
conversion is where money is given to trustees on trust to buy land and there is no 
trust for sale at all. The wording of section 3 is yet again unfortunate. However the 
wording can be distorted to cover reverse conversion by stretching the meaning of the 
words. Although infelicitous wording is used, strictly the money is exchanged so that 
land may be acquired and if money is held by trustees on trust to buy land where the 
land is to be held on an express trust for sale, it is within the realm of possibilities to 
state that the money is subject to a trust for sale so that section 3 will cover this 
situation. 183 
Kenny and Kenny are more forthright. 184 Their view is that section 3 does not have 
the effect of abolishing the doctrine of conversion and rightly state that section 3 is 
intended to prevent the doctrine of conversion operating in the case of a trust for sale 
which was the intention of the Law Commission. It is thus partial abolition of the 
doctrine of conversion. They state that, 'It is not possible to compliment the proposers 
of this change for its sense or the draftsperson for the wording. For the section to 
apply there must be a trust for sale. It has no application, therefore, to any implied, 
resulting or constructive trust because there is no trust for sale in respect of these 
In other cases where there was, before the Act, an implied trust for sale on the 
statutory trusts, these cases are now all trusts of land and the statutory trusts were 
abolished by the repeal of s. 35 of the LPA 1925. ' It is, however, uncontroversial that 
section 3 does not apply to implied, resulting or constructive trusts, since the doctrine 
never had any application in these situations, unless there was an implied trust for 
sale. 
'82 op. cit., p. 92. 
183 Harpurn The Law Commission and the Reform ofLand Lmv op. cit., p. 173 maintains that on a 
purposive interpretation, Matthews' view is hard to maintain and even a literal interpretation points to 
the same result. Harpurn asserts that since where personal property is sold to enable land to be 
purchased, it would defeat the section if, as soon as it had been converted into money, the doctrine of 
conversion then applied, a direction that money should be applied in the purchase of land is an a 
fortiori case. 
194 Op. cit., p. 6. 
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More controversially Kenny and Kenny state that, 'This does not, however, although 
it may have been intended by the draftsperson so to do, have the effect that the 
interest of the beneficiary is necessarily an interest in land where land is held by the 
trustees. This will depend on the nature of the beneficiary's interest. ' 185 They explain 
that it will be necessary to examine the tenris of the express trust to see if a particular 
interest is land or not. 186 If the interest of the beneficiary is an interest only in income, 
e. g. where the form of words is that the trustees 'stand possessed of the income of the 
trust fund and the net rent and profits until sale upon the trusts declared', the 
beneficiary does not have an interest in possession in land but only in the income of 
the trust fund. 
Kenny and Kenny state that this is so notwithstanding the effect of section 3, since 
section 3 does not mean that the interest of the beneficiary is an interest in land- the 
interest is what it is stated to be; if it is only in income, it is only income. 187 The crux 
of their argument is that the land which may be the sole property in that fund is vested 
in the trustees and the rent of that land is paid to them by any tenant because they 
have the right to receive it. The trustees are in possession of the land and the 
beneficiaries of the fund. 
Tax cases demonstrate that the views of Kenny and Kenny are misconceived. The 
House of Lords in Baker v. Archer-Shee 188 recognised the right to income as an 
equitable interest in possession 189 and this approach was followed in Memec v. 
L R. C 190 In addition the weakness of Kenny and Kenny's argument is that it ignores 
the wording of section 3 itself. Section 3 has a broad scope: it applies where land is 
held by trustees subject to a trust for sale. Where the trustees stand possessed of the 
income of the trust fund and the net rents and profits until sale on trust, this still falls 
within the wording of section 3, since land is held by trustees subject to a trust for 
:: 16 OOPP. cit., p. 6. 
. Cit. P. 
16. 
187 An analogy is drawn with the tax case on interests in possession Pearson v. LR. C [198 1] A. C. 753. 
181 [19271 A. C. 844. 
"9 There has been much controversy over the nature of a beneficiary's interest whether it is a right in 
rem or a right in personam. See D. W. M. Waters The Nature ofthe Trust Beneficiary's Interest (1967) 
45 Can. B. R. 219 and generally Hayton and Marshall op. cit., paras. 149-1-54. 190 [1996] S. T. C. 1336 at 1351 and on appeal [1998] S. T. C. 754 at 764. 
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sale. Under the wording of section 3 it is irrelevant if the interest of the beneficiary is 
an interest only in income. 
For Kenny and Kenny to be correct in their analysis, section 3 would have to state 
'and where beneficiaries have an interest in possession in the land' but without such a 
qualification, their analysis cannot be correct. If Kenny and Kenny are right, then the 
effect of section 3 as they interpret it is perverse and deviant. There can be no logic in 
the doctrine of conversion still applying where the trustees stand possessed of the 
income of the trust fund and the net rent and profits until sale upon the trusts declared. 
No judge could sensibly interpret section 3 in this way which would make a mockery 
of the reforms. The wording of the trust for sale if it is a trust of land should not make 
a difference. If Kenny and Kenny are wrong on this point as is likely, then section 3 
will not abolish the doctrine of conversion, but it will prevent the doctrine of 
conversion operating in the case of a trust for sale as the beneficiary's interest will be 
an interest in land whatever the wording of the express trust. 
What does section 3 not encompass? 
Contractsfor the sale or purchase ofland? 
Pettit identifies three areas that section 3 does not cover. 191 First, he states that it 
clearly does not cover conversion under a contract for the sale or purchase of realty. 
His argument is that from the moment a contract for the sale of land is entered into, 
the vendor becomes a trustee for the purchaser as a result of the doctrine of 
conversion; 192 he is a trustee of land within the 1996 Act which in section 1(2)(a) 
expressly includes a constructive trustee; the vendor as constructive trustee does not 
hold the land on trust for sale; section 3 only applies where land is held by trustees 
'9' Demise of Trustsfor Sale and the Doctrine ofConversion? op. cit., p. 209-211. 
192 This is based on equitable principles going back to Lady Foliamb's case in 1651 cited in Daire v. 
Beversham (1661) Nets. 76: see the view of Pettit expressed in more detail in an earlier article 
Conversion under a Contractfor the Sale ofLand (1960) 24 Conv. 47 and in his book Equity and the 
Law of Trusts (9ýh edn 200 1) p. 694-696. The law was restated by Vaisey J. in Hillingdon Estates Co. v. 
Sionefield Estates Ltd [ 19521 Ch. 627 at 63 1. This principle has been stated in many judgments: Green 
v. Smith (1738) 1 Atk. 572 per Lord Hardwicke, Paine v. Meller (1801) 6 Ves. Jnr. 349 per Lord Eldon, 
Capel v. Girdler (1804) 9 Ves. Jnr 509 per Grant M. R., Wilson v. Clapham (1819) 1 Jac. & W. 36 per 
Plumer M. R., Shaw v. Foster (1872) L. R. 5 H. L. 321 at 349 per Lord Cairns, Phillips v. Silvester 
(1872) 8 Ch. App. 173 per Lord Selbome, Lysaght v. Edwards (1876) 2 Ch. D. 499 at 507 per Jesse] 
MR, Lockharts v. Bernard Rosen [ 192211 Ch. 433 at 438 per Astbury J., Cumberland Consolidated 
Holdings Ltd v. Ireland [ 1946] K. B. 264 at 269 per Lord Greene M. R. 
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subject to a trust for sale; accordingly there is still a conversion under a contract for 
the sale of land. 
It is odd that Pettit includes contracts for the sale of land as an omission in what 
section 3 should be covering. Section 3 was neither designed nor drafted to cover 
contracts for the sale of land. The Law Commission specifically refers to abolishing 
the doctrine of conversion 'in relation to all trusts' and in the context of overreaching 
by payment to two trustees. 193 This raises the issue whether the basis of the 
relationship between vendor and purchaser after exchange of contracts is one of trusts 
or contract law. The constructive trust in its application to the vendor and the 
purchaser is as old as the law of trusts; its origin is to be found in the implied use 
which at the beginning of the sixteenth century was understood to arise in favour of B 
when A bargained and sold lands to B. 194 
Yet, as Waters argues, 195 the constructive trust between vendor and purchaser is a 
current legal problem that should never have existed and is a superfluous concept in 
the sense that the vendor/purchaser relationship could always have been contained 
adequately within the law of contract; its existence has led to no conceptual 
development in the law of sale and has in fact created problems which otherwise 
would not have existed. His view 196 is that the essential futility of the trust analogy 
was masked by the fact that the concept was accepted; the questioning which should 
have concerned its essential validity became concerned with its mode of operation 
with the result that the basic problem of vendor/purchaser trust has been continually 
fought on the wrong issue. Waters' opinion is that the problem of the essential 
incompatibility between the position of the trustee and the vendor before completion 
is insoluble. 
193 Law Com. No. 181 para. 3.6. Clause 21 of the draft Bill was worded in such a way as to make it 
even clearer that it did not apply to contracts for the sale of land. 
194 See Donovan Waters Constructive Trust- Vendor and Purchaser (1961) 14 C. L. P. 76, William 
Searle Holdsworth A History ofEnglish Law (3rd edn 1945 reprinted 1966) Vol. IV p. 424 and Irebey v. 
Gibone (1579) Cary 82. 
195 Constructive Trust- Vendor and Purchaser op cit., p. 76. 
196 Ibid., p. 78. 
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This should be compared with the conclusion of Oakley, 197 who having considered 
Waters' arguments, concludes that constructive trust still provides an acceptable basis 
for the vendor and purchaser relationship on the basis that different anomalies might 
have resulted from basing the relationship entirely on the law of contract and that the 
courts have managed to apply the trust concept consistently to the different problems 
which have arisen. 
The fact that this is an unusual trusteeship 198 has led Thompson to argue that it is 
misleading to describe it as a constructive trust and that it is better to regard it as sid 
generis. 199 This focuses the analysis on the central issue which is that the doctrine of 
conversion operates due to the availability of specific performance with the 
consequence that equity looks on that which ought to be done as already having been 
done, so that conversion will not operate where specific performance cannot be 
obtained. 200 If a court will not order specific performance, then a trust will not arise 
and the equitable title will not pass. 201 If specific performance ceases to be available 
as a remedy, the trust relationship terminates. 202 
197 A. J. Oakley Constructive Trusts (3 rd edn 1997) p. 304-305. 
198 See Lord Cairns in Shaw v. Foster op. cit., at 338. The vendor is entitled to remain in possession of 
the property until completion and acquires an equitable lien on the property for payment of the 
purchase price. He is entitled to receive and retain all income prior to completion and must discharge 
all outgoings. For more details, see Oakley op. cit., p. 292-305. 
199 M. P. Thompson Must a Purchaser Buy a Charred Ruin? [1984] Conv. 43. See generally Thompson 
Modern LandLaw op. cit., p. 185-189 as to the unusual nature of the trusteeship and Hanbury and 
Martin op. cit., p. 326-328. 
200 HolroydV. Marshall (1862) 10 H. L. C. 191 at 209-210 per Westbury L. C., Howardv. Miller [1915] 
A. C. 318 at 326 per Lord Parker, Central Trust and Safe Deposit Company v. Snider [1916] 1 A. C. 266 
at 272 per Lord Parker, Buckinaster v. Harrop (1802) 7 Ves. 550 per Grant M. R. See Lewin oil Trusts 
by John Mowbray, Lynton Tucker, Nicholas Le Poidevin and Edwin Simpson (17 th edn 2000) para. 
10-02 referring to Broome v. Monck (1805) 10 Ves. Jr. 597, Re Thomas (1886) 34 Ch. D. 166, Ridout V. 
Fowler [190412 Ch. 93. See also Oakley op. cit., p. 277ff. Waters Constructive Trust- Vendor and 
Purchaser op. cit., p. 78 states that it is fairly clear that the basis of equitable conversion was founded 
in the availability of specific performance and refers to Atcherley v. Vernon (1725) 10 Mod. 518 where 
Lord Parker giving judgment appears to treat this statement as incontrovertible. 
'0' This was demonstrated in Warmington v. Miller [ 1973] Q. B. 877 at 8 87 where Stamp L. J., 
discussing Walsh v. Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch. D. 9 at 14, held that, 'The equitable interests which the 
intended lessee has under an agreement for a lease do not exist in vacuo, but arise because the intended 
lessee has an equitable right to specific performance of the agreement . .................. But the intended lessee's equitable rights do not in general arise when that which is agreed to be done would not be 
ordered to be done. ' This should be compared with the view of Simon Gardner Equity, Estate 
Contracts and the Judicature Acts: Walsh v. Lonsdale Revisited (1987) 7 O. J. L. S. 60. 202 plewS V. Samuel 11904] 1 Ch. 464 at 468 per Kekewich J. and in the Privy Council case of Central 
Trust and Safe Deposit Company v. Snider op. cit., at 272 per Lord Parker. See generally Thompson 
Must a Purchaser &y a Charred Ruin? op. cit., p. 4548 criticising the decisions in Gordon Hill Trust 
Ltd v. Segall [1941] 2 All E. R. 379 and Lake v. Bayliss [1974] 1 W. L. R. 1073. See also the discussion 
by Oakley op. cit., p. 290-292 of authorities which establish that non-completion of the contract, for 
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Thompson challenges 203 the conventional wisdom that if the house is damaged or 
destroyed, the loss falls on the purchaser204 on the ground that this is based on the 
trust analysis which depends on specific performance being ordered. He contends that 
if the house in question has been badly damaged or destroyed, it is not clear that 
specific performance would be ordered and thus the loss should not fall on the 
purchaser. The Standard Conditions of Sale now remedy this problem205 by providing 
that the risk in the property remains with the vendor. 
In addition Thompson regrets 206 that as a result of the application of the doctrine of 
conversion in this context of contracts for sale, Mrs Carrick lost her home in Lloyds 
Bank plc v. Carrick-207 on the ground that 'there is nothing in it [Lloyds Bankplc v. 
Rossel 2081 to suggest that where there is a specifically enforceable contract the court is 
entitled to superimpose a further constructive trust on the vendor in favour of the 
purchaser over that which already exists in consequence of the contractual 
relationship. 209 Although the decision today would be different on the basis that due 
to section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, there would 
have been no contract and the doctrine of conversion would not have operated, 210 the 
decision highlights the dangers that may still lurking from the remnants of the 
whatever reason, after the doctrine of conversion has operated, does not affect the converted state of 
the subject-matter of the contract: Curre v. Bowyer (1818) 5 Beav. 6, Re Blake [1917] 1 Ch. 18, 
Whittaker v. Whittaker (1792) 4 Bro. C. C. 3 1, Hudson v. Cook (1872) 13 Eq. 417, Rose v. Watson 
(1864) 10 H. L. C. 672. 
203 Must a Purchaser Buy a Charred Ruin? op. cit., p. 48-50 and Modern Land Law op. cit., p. 186-187. 
204 Established in Lysaght v. Edwards op. cit., at 507 per Jessel M. R. 
205 Standard Condition 5.1.1 (4h edn 2003) provides that, 'The seller will transfer the property in the 
same physical state as it was at the date of the contract (except for fair wear and tear), which means that 
the seller retains the risk until completion. ' The Law Commission in Transfer ofLand Risk ofDamage 
after Contractfor Sale Law Com. No. 191 (1990) para. 3.12 decided that, 'If it turns out that the use of 
those Conditions does not, contrary to our expectations, result in the substantial elimination of the 
?( roblems which we identified earlier, we consider that this topic should again be examined. ' 
06 M. P. Thompson The Widow's Plight [19961 Conv. 295. Thompson at 300 relies partly on Lord 
Westbury in Rose v. Watson op. cit., at 678 to argue that the beneficial ownership that the purchaser 
acquires seems to be independent of the notional ownership acquired simply by entry into the contract 
of sale. 
207 [199614 All E. R. 630. The Court of Appeal held that Mrs Carrick's estate contract was void against 
the bank on the ground that the Class C(iv) land charge under the Land Charges Act 1972 had not been 
registered as a land charge. For criticisms of the decision, see Patricia Ferguson Estate Contracts, 
Constructive Trusts and the Land Charges Act (1996) 112 L. Q. R. 549 and Mika Oldham Estate 
Contracts, Constructive Trusts and Estoppels in Unregistered Land [ 19971 C. L. J. 32. 208 [ 199 1]A. C. 107, referring to the speech of Lord Bridge. 2090 
. P cit., p. 639 per Morritt L. J. 
210 See Morritt L. J. at 639 and Thompson The Widow's Plight op. cit., p. 301-302. 
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doctrine of conversion which may lead to unfortunate and questionable results and 
decisions. 
Pettit, dealing with the first area outside section 3, points out that if there is still 
conversion under a contract for the sale of land, the anomalous rule in Lawes v. 
Benne, 1211 will presumably also continue to apply. 212 This raises the question of 
whether one is dependent on the other. If they are independent of each other, then the 
question has to be analysed whether the doctrine of conversion will still apply under 
Lawes v. Bennett. In Snell's Equity an option to purchase land is under the heading of 
a contract for sale and is treated as an extension of the doctrine of conversion by 
contract of sale; 213 Meagher, Gumniow and Lehane are of the view that conversion 
depending on an option to purchase comes under the general heading of settlements 
and wills; 214 yet in his book Equity and the Law of Trusts Pettit places an option to 
purchase under a separate heading from a contract for the sale of land thus giving it 
autonomous legitimacy. 215 
Under the rule in Lawes v. Bennett if a testator in his will devised all his realty to A 
and bequeathed his personalty to B, and having granted X an option to purchase the 
land, died before X had exercised the option, the devise to A would be adeemed and 
the proceeds of sale would be payable to B, the land being treated for the purpose of 
devolution on death as devolving from the date of the exercise of the option as 
proceeds for sale and not as real estate. 216 It made no difference that the option was 
not even exercisable until after T's death. 217 
It was made clear in several cases 218 that conversion does not take place at the date 
when the option is granted but only when it is exercised so that A would get an estate 
211 (1785) 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 167. 
212 Demise of Trustsfor Sale and the Doctrine ofConversion? op. cit., p. 2 10. 
213 (30'h edn 2000) by John McGhee para. 30-10. 
214 Meagher, Gummoiv and Lehane's Equity Doctrines and Remedies (4"' edn 2002) by R. P. Meagher, 
J D. Heydon and M. J. Leerning paras. 38-060-38-075. 2iS 0 
216 
P. cit., p. 696-697. 
217 
See Pettit Equity and the Law of Trusts op. cit., p. 696. 
See Re Isaacs [1894] 3 Ch. 506 where the rule was applied on intestacy before 1926 between the 
heir-at-law and the next of kin. 
2 18 Re Isaacs, Re Marlay [ 1915] 2 Ch. 264, Re Carrington [ 1932] 1 Ch. 1. 
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defeasible by the exercise of the option, upon which event and not before conversion 
would take place. 219 The only case in which the proceeds do not descend as personalty 
is where there is a specific devise made subsequently to the creation of the option in 
which case the devisee obtains the proceeds if the option to purchase is exercised after 
the death of the testator, the principle being that where the testator, knowing of the 
existence of the option, devises a specific property notwithstanding the option to 
purchase, 220 he indicates an intention that the devisee should have all the interest 
therein, whether the property or the purchase money. 221 
The doctrine of conversion under Lawes v. Bennett will not be extended further due to 
its anomalous character 222 and it will only be applied to claims between people 
entitled to the real and personal property of a deceased grantor of an option. 223 It was, 
however, applied by the Court of Appeal in Re Carrington where a specific legacy of 
shares was adeemed. 224 
The question remains whether the doctrine of conversion will still apply under Lfflves 
v. Bennett. Section 3 was drafted with inter vivos trusts in mind; yet section 23(2) 
which refers for definitions to section 205(l)(xxix) of the Law of Property Act 1925 
shows that trustees for sale include personal representatives in the definition of 
trustees for sale, thus giving section 3 wider application than might primafacie be 
realised. Under the will, when an option to purchase is exercised, the personal 
representatives hold the land subject to a trust for sale. If there is the judicial 
inclination, then the wording of section 3 can be interpreted widely on a purposive 
construction, though admittedly it is stretching section 3 beyond that which was 
contemplated due to the complex technicalities bound up in the doctrine of 
2 19 This means that any rents and profits which accrue between the date of death and the exercise of the 
option would go to A and not B. If there is conversion it seems to make no difference that the contract 
is not carried through to completion: Re Blake. 
220 See Meagher, Gununow andLehane op. cit., para. 38-060. 
221 See Page Wood V. -C. in Weeding v. Weeding (186 1) 1 John & H. 424 at 43 1. 222 See Pettit Equity and the Law of Trusts op. cit., p. 697. 
223 It was not applied in Echvards v. West (1878) 7 Ch. D. 858 between a vendor and purchaser. 
224 This decision has been attacked by H. G. Hanbury in Notes (1933) 49 L. Q. R. 173 on the basis that 
the decision was an unwarrantable extension of the Lawes v. Bennett doctrine because the doctrine of 
conversion proper is concerned with conversion from real into personal property and vice versa and not 
with the mere change from one kind of personalty into another. It has been followed since in a first 
instance decision Re Rose [ 1949] Ch. 78: see Pettit Equity and the Law of Trusts op. cit., p. 697. 
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conversion. The only admitted case of conversion of any kind which has a 
retrospective effect arising from the rule in Ltnves v. Bennett demonstrates the 
shortfalls in the drafting of section 3. 
Order ofthe Court? 
The second area that Pettit identifies in his article Demise of Trustsfor Sale and the 
Doctrine of Conversion? 225 is conversion under an order of the court. If the court by 
an order directs the sale or purchase of realty, it operates as a conversion from the 
date of the order. 226 Snell's Equity states that conversion would only apply where a 
court orders a sale of realty in which two or more persons are interested and one dies 
before the sale takes place, his interest being part of his personalty and not of his 
realty. 227 Pettit states that the courts have treated this in its effect as analogous to the 
situation where there is a trust for sale but it is not a trust for sale and would not 
appear to come within section 3. The reasoning behind this argument is that the order 
in itself amounts to the conversion quoting Kay J. in Hyett v. Mekin 228 and reaffirmed 
by the Court of Appeal in Burgess v. Booth. 
It is, however, splitting hairs to state that the court order amounts to conversion and 
that there is no trust for sale, since it is the wording of the court order which brings 
conversion into effect. If there were no words in the court order, there would be no 
conversion. If there is a trust, which there necessarily will be, and the court orders 
sale, there is ipsofacto a trust for sale which merges with the court order so that they 
are one entity to bring about conversion. 
As if almost realising this, Pettit qualifies what he has previously already said by 
differentiating between an absolute trust for sale and a trust for sale ordered by the 
225 op. cit., p. 2 10. 
226 Steed v. Preece (1874) L. R. 18 Eq. 192, Hyett v. Mekin (1884) 25 Ch. D. 735, Burgess v. Booth 
[190812 Ch. 648, Faun1leroyv. Beebe [191112 Ch. 257, Re Silva [192912 Ch. 198, Re Dodson [19081 
2 Ch. 638. There are exceptions in statutory provisions such as the Mental Health Act 1983 section 
101. In addition the court has power when ordering a sale or purchase of realty to provide that the 
change in the nature of the property shall not affect its devolution on death: . 411orney-General v. Alarquis ofAilesbury (1887) 12 App. Cas. 672, Re Searle [1912] 2 Ch. 365. 
227 op. cit., para. 30-09. 
228 op. cit., p. 742 where Kay J. said, '... if in an action for administration of an estate the Court in the 
exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction makes an order for the sale of the estate, the order for sale will 
amount in itself to a conversion. ' 
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court. This is an erroneous distinction to draw and one which cannot be justified even 
in view of section 3. The term absolute adds nothing to the term trust for sale and the 
term trust for sale covers a trust for sale ordered by the court. Conversion under 
section 3 could actually have undesirable consequences where trustees have no 
authority to buy land, only authority to buy personal property, and they act ultra vires 
by purchasing land. Conversion would operate and section 3 states that the land is not 
to be regarded as personal property which totally frustrates the settlor's intention. This 
is one situation where it would be convenient if the personalty could remain 
personalty. 
Partnership land? 
The third area that Pettit identifies in his article is partnership land, though by his own 
admission, the position is now unclear. 229 Section 22 of the Partnership Act 1890 
provided that real property belonging to partners is, subject to the expression of a 
contrary intention, to be treated as personalty and not realty. 230 The reason was that on 
dissolution of the partnership the land would have to be sold and the proceeds of sale 
divided among the partners. Section 22 is repealed by Schedule 4 of the 1996 Act. 
Pettit postulates two possibilities as to the effect of the repeal. The first is that 
partnership land is no longer subject to a trust for sale, but is held by the partners as 
land under a trust of land. This has to be the correct interpretation. Pettit does not spell 
it out, but this means that section 3 has no application to partnership land and was not 
meant to. Simply stated, the effect of the repeal of section 22 is that there is no 
conversion where real property belongs to partners and section 3 of the 1996 Act is 
irrelevant. 
229 Demise of Trusisfor Sale and the Doctrine ofConversion? op. cit., p. 210-211. One oddity which 
Matthews points out op. cit., p. 92 is that as a result of the repeal of section 22 of the Partnership Act 
1890, partnership interests in realty are now realty instead of personalty, so options to take up 
partnership in a firm owning realty will become subject to the Pcrpetuities and Accumulations Act 
1964 section 9(2) and must be exercised within 21 years. This is unlikely to be problematic in practice. 
230 Section 22 states that, 'Where land or any heritable interest therein has become partnership property, 
it shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be treated as between the partners (including the 
representatives of a deceased partner), and also as between the heirs of a deceased partner and his 
executors or administrators, as personal or moveable and not real or heritable estate. ' 
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Pettit's second possibility is more ingenious. His argument is that there was an 
equitable rule existing prior to the Partnership Act 1890 that real property belonging 
to partners was regarded in equity as personalty and that there is no reason why the 
pre-Partnership Act equitable rule should not continue to apply. He analyses the basis 
of the equitable rule and argues that the choice between which of the two views is 
correct depends on what is held to be the basis of the equitable rule. If the basis of the 
equitable rule is implied contract, the first possibility will apply so that the land will 
be held under a trust of land, there will be no conversion and section 3 will not be 
applicable. 231 
If the basis of the equitable rule is an implied trust for sale, Pettit states that if 
partnership property is treated as subject to an implied trust for sale, there would be a 
trust of land within the 1996 Act and section 3 would apply. Pettit repeats in his 
book 232 that only in the case where the rule is based on an implied trust for sale would 
section 3 of the 1996 Act apply to prevent the operation of the doctrine of conversion. 
In Attorney-General v. Hubbuck 233 Bowen L. J. explains the reason for conversion that 
partnership property is personal property, because it is an established principle in 
equity that when money is directed or agreed to be turned into land, or land agreed or 
directed to be turned into money, equity will treat that which is agreed to be, or which 
ought to be, done as done already. 
The real question to be analysed is what happened to the pre-existing equitable rule on 
the repeal of section 22 of the Partnership Act? Section 22 was a re-enactment of the 
rule of equity 234 and the rule of equity merged with the statutory provision. The 
equitable rule set out in cases prior to 1890 was not modified or altered by section 22; 
it was merely consolidated. It would be absurd if the rule remained in force when 
section 22 has been repealed. Yet section 16(l)(a) of the Interpretation Act 1978 does 
not apply as the equitable rule is in force and existing at the time at which the repeal 
231 Pettit derives this from Darby v. Darby (1853) 3 Drew 495 per Sir R. T. Kindersley V. -C. at 505, 506. 
232 Equity and the Law of Trusts op. cit., at p. 697. 233 (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 275 at 289. 234 See Phillips v. Phillips (1832) 1 My &K 649, Crmvshmv v. Alaule (1818) 1 Swan 495,. 4 t1orney- 
General v. Hubbuck, Darby v. Darby. 
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takes effect. A fortiori the repeal will not revive anything in force or existing at the 
time when the repeal takes effect. 
The only judicious interpretation is that the repeat of section 22 has swept away the 
amalgamated equitable rule at the same time, otherwise the repeal of section 22 would 
be futile. The equitable rule cannot, in any ease, have independent validity for the 
reason stated previously, that after 1996 the existence of the trust of land signifies that 
there is no place for the equitable rule that equity regards as done that which ought to 
be done in the absence of an express trust for sale. Yet, strangely, Pettit takes the view 
that there is no reason why the pre-Partnership Act equitable rule should not continue 
to apply for the rationale for it remains valid. There is no justification for saying that 
the rationale remains valid, because the pre-existing rule was based on there being a 
trust for sale in the context of which conversion operated. The only situation where 
the rationale remains valid is where there is an express trust for sale which will be 
dealt with by section 3. The conclusion on partnership property is that section 3 will 
apply where there is a trust for sale in the partnership agreement. 
Inconsistency between will trusts and inter vivos trusts created before 1997 
Section 3(2) states that, 'Subsection (1) does not apply to a trust created by a will if 
the testator died before the commencement of this Act. ' This leads to inconsistencies 
arising between will trusts and inter vivos trusts created before January 1" 1997. As 
Matthews himself says, 235 if this were not so, then the Act would not affect existing 
inter vivos trusts arising through the operation of sections 34 and 36 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925. Yet there is justification for arguing that section 3(2) should have 
allowed an exception for inter vivos express trusts as well as trusts created by the will 
of a testator. 
The rationale behind section 3(2) as it stands is that there is an exception for will 
trusts because it cannot be right to change the nature of a beneficiary's interest once it 
had vested. 236 Yet the same is indubitably true of inter vivos express trusts. 
Theoretically this could lead to absurdities. If a testator died in 1996 leaving on trust 
235 Op. cit., p. 92-93. 
236 See Matthews op. cit., p. 92. 
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for sale realty to A and personalty to B, then the 1996 Act would have no effect on 
this. Yet if an express inter vivos trust for sale in 1996 provided that the land of the 
trust was to be held for A and the personal property for B, section 3 of the 1996 Act 
would apply and after January 1" 1997, A would be entitled to the land and B to the 
personalty, wh creas on December 31" 1996 under this express trust for sale, A was 
entitled to personalty and B to realty. If A and B were sui iuris and entitled under the 
rule in Saunders v. Pautier 237 to call for the trust property, it is odd that with a day's 
difference, they would be entitled to different property. 
Legislation is here interfering with beneficiaries' interests once they have vested. If a 
vested right has been taken away and no compensation provided, there may be a 
breach of Article I of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which has been incorporated into English law by the Human Rights Act 1998 
and which provides that, 'Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions. No-one shall be deprived of his possessions except in 
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and the general 
principles of international law. ' The sub-section could be declared incompatible with 
Convention Rights under section 4 of the 1998 Act which does not affect the validity 
of the provision, but will almost certainly prompt legislative change. Due to the way 
trusts are worded nowadays, these problems are theoretical rather than practical. 
Modernjudicial perspective on conversion 
A refreshingly modem and realistic approach was taken in 2002 in Race v. Race. 238 
The issue in this case was whether the gift to the defendant of a half share in residue 
which included the testator's interest in a public house had been adeemed by a 
subsequent lifetime gift of half of his interest in the public house to the defendant. 
Behrens J. 's pragmatic stance led to his conclusion 239 that there is now no rule of law 
that the rule against double portions does not apply to land and that the rule did apply 
in this case with the consequence that the gift was adeemed. 
237 (184 1) Beav. 115, affinned Cr. & Ph. 240. 
238 [20021 E. W. H. C. 1969, Lawtel 9 July 2002. 
239 Ibid., para. 36. 
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The relevance of this case to the doctrine of conversion is based on statements of 
Behrens J. in which he explained that, 'It is difficult to see, as a matter of principle 
why there should be any distinction in the twenty-first century between gifts of realty 
and gifts of personalty. The rule against double portionS240 is based on the presumed 
intention of the donor. It is difficult to see why he should now be presumed to have a 
different intention as between realty and personalty. That difficulty is increased when 
one considers the effect of TLATA. It seems odd that the presumed intention of 
Wilfred Race should depend on the coming into force of an Act of which he probably 
had no knowledge and certainly had no interest. 241 The significance of these 
comments is that they are indicative of the perspective likely to be taken by the 
judiciary in relation to the doctrine of conversion which is to treat the doctrine of 
conversion as inapplicable and irrelevant to the modem era. 
Conclusion 
One desirable consequence of abolishing the doctrine of conversion is that there will 
be no difference between the interests of beneficiaries under a trust for sale and those 
under a trust of land. Uniformity is beneficial and necessary if the 1996 Act is to 
achieve its underlying goals. It would defeat what coherent strategy there is in the Act 
if beneficiaries under different types of trust were to hold different types of interest. 
Yet what is increasingly apparent is that the doctrine of conversion is far more 
complex than the drafters of the statute realised, since section 3 has its roots deep in 
history, leaving open the question whether the doctrine of conversion has 
categorically been abolished and in what areas the doctrine still survives. Section 3(l) 
is the most badly drafted subsection of the Statute and should state that the doctrine of 
conversion is hereby abolished in respect of realty held on trust for sale and 
personalty held on trust for sale to acquire realty, so that the section and the heading 
of the section would be the same. 
240 This is the rule that the donor did not intend to give two portions to the same donee. 2410 
. P cit., para. 27. 
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CHAPTER 5- CAN ENTAILED INTERESTS STILL BE 
CREATED? 
HAVE SOLICITORS' CLIENTS BEEN AFFECTED BY THE PROHIBITION ON 
THE CREATION OF NEW ENTAILED INTERESTS? 
5 solicitors 242 stated that their clients had been affected by the prohibition on the 
creation of new entailed interests. 
12 solicitors 243 stated that their clients had not been affected by the prohibition on the 
creation of new entailed interests. 
It was unexpected that such a large minority of those firms would be affected in this 
way. William Hancock (Speechly Bircham) typified the minority view when he stated 
that, 'Clients believe in landpassed on to them by theirfather and grandfather and 
they want to see a trust deed that land is to continue in thefamily . ... ... ... You can 
endeavour to recreate an entailed interest by creating trusts that confer a series oflife 
interests butyou do run against a perpetuity problem in the end because you cannot 
confer a vested interest in someone who is not in being. ' 
Chris Jannan (Payne Hicks Beach) stressed the tax advantages of creating entailed 
interests when he explained that, 'Prohibition is most inconvenientftom the point of 
view oftax planning. There are occasions when you want to make someone as near 
absolutely entitled as you can under an existing trust without doing that absolutely 
and an entailed interest represented quite a useful way ofdoing that. Now we have to 
lookfor other structures. ' 
A strong sense of tradition amongst traditional landed families wishing to cling to the 
old rules of descent emerged from these responses and the sense of loss and 
frustration at the need to adapt to changed circumstances was blatant amongst this 
minority who fervently resented the restrictions imposed by the new legislation. 
242 Charles Russell, Currey and Co, Payne Hicks Beach, Speechly Bircharn and Withers. 
24' Allen and Overy, Boodle Hatfield, Burges Salmon, Eversheds, Farrer and Co, Herbert Smith, 
Linklaters and Alliance, Macfarlanes, May, May and Merrimans, Public Trust Office, Official Solicitor 
and Wiggin and Co. 
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Paragraph 5 of Schedule I 
Paragraph 5 of Schedule I of the 1996 Act is an example of deficient, inappropriate, 
inept and incongruous drafting. It states that, '(1) Where a person purports by an 
instrument coming into operation after the commencement of this Act to grant to 
another person an entailed interest in real or personal property, the instrument- (a) is 
not effective to grant an entailed interest, but (b) operates instead as a declaration that 
the property is held in trust absolutely for the person to whom an entailed interest in 
the property was purportedly granted. ' The following four propositions are contended 
here. 244 First, the paragraph is not worded so as to fulfil the Law Commission's aims. 
Secondly, the repeal of section 130(l) and (2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 now 
enables the creation of entailed interests in certain limited and specified 
circumstances. Thirdly, the repeal of section 130(l) and (2) revives the rule in Wild's 
Case. 245 Fourthly, contrary to the view stated in a recent article, 246 the doctrine of cy- 
pris has not survived the 1996 Act. 
Were the Law Commission's aims fulfilled? 
The Law Commission proposed explicitly that, 'Given that our recommendations are 
designed to minimise use of the Settled Land Act 1925, it seems logical to suggest 
that there should be no new entails, particularly as the latter would have little purpose 
outwith the framework of a strict settlement. 247 In the interests of freedom of choice, 
entailed interests could have been preserved for use in a trust of land for those landed 
families whose priority was for land to pass with a title. The Law Commission 
continued, 'We recommend that an attempt to create an entailed interest in land 
should operate as a grant of a fee simple absolute, unless the grantor has an equitable 
interest only. In this latter case, the attempt to create an entail will take effect as a 
declaration of trust on the part of the settlor or the personal representative that the 
land is held on trust (under the new system) for the grantee absolutely. ' 
244 See Susan Pascoe Solicitors: Be Bold- Create Entailed Interests [200 1] Conv. 3 96. 
245 (1599) 6 Co. Rep. 16b. 
246 Elise Bennett Histed Finally Barring the Entail (2000) 116 L. Q. R. 445. 
247 Law Com. No. 181 para. 16.1. The Law Commission was of the erroneous view that, 'At present, 
entailed interests can only be constituted behind a strict settlement. ' See also Whitehouse and Hassall 
op. cit., para. 6.28. 
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The Law Commission would not allow freedom of choice to remain for personalty 
since it recommended that, 'Given that we are concerned to approximate the positions 
of trusts of real and personal property, we further recommend that it should no longer 
be possible to create entailed interests in personal property. ' Whitehouse and Hassall 
state that, 'The authors (contrary to the findings of the Law Commission) have 
encountered entailed interests (of chattels) behind a trust for sale. For a titled family 
desirous of ensuring that the "family treasures" are kept in the male line (together 
with the title), an entailed interest offers the most appropriate vehicle. The passing of 
such interests is to be lamented. 9248 The lamentations for the entailed interest appear 
to be more widespread than was originally anticipated. 
This was not the view taken by Mr Lawrence Collins Q. C. sitting as a Deputy Judge 
in the Chancery Division in the year 2000 in DAbo v. Paget (No. 1). 249 He gave a 
brief historical overview of strict settlements and entails and stated obiter that even 
since 1925, entails 'were not of great importance, and they had become obsolete 
before they were abolished by the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 
1996: see Megarry & Wade, 6h ed. p. 52.9250 This statement is too wide. What 
Megarry and Wade actually said was that, 'Entails became virtually obsolete 251 and 
footnote 34 recognised that, 'It appears that they were still sometimes created in 
certain parts of the country, notably in the north east of England. ' The case turned on 
the wording of clause 7 252 and was therefore one of construction and is not of great 
importance on the issue of entails other than to manifcst a judicial perspective on 
entails. 
248 op. cit., para. 6.30. 
249 [2000] W. T. L. R. 863, Lawtel 10 July 2000. 
250 bid., para. 15. 
251 Op. cit., para. 3-037. 
252 Clause 7 stated that the property was held on trust for Michael William Vernon Maude for life and 
after his death 'as to both capital and income absolutely for the child or other issue ..... who if the devolution of the said property .... had been subject to limitations in strict settlement in favour of the 
said .... and his issue would on the death of Michael William Vernon Maude first have become entitled 
as tenant in tail in possession to the said property. ' Mr Lawrence Collins Q. C. held that the will should 
be construed to the daughters successively and not concurrently as tenants in common with the result 
that the trustees held the property on trust for the eldest daughter absolutely. 
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Clause 16 of the draft Bill annexed to the Law Commission Report contained 
different wording from paragraph 5 of Schedule I of the 1996 Act. 253 The wording of 
clause 16(2) is worthy of analysis, since it laid the foundation stones for the 
problematic wording of paragraph 5 of Schedule 1. It provided that, 'Where such an 
instrument contains an expression showing an intention to create an entailed interest 
in either real or personal property then .... (a) if it purports to grant any person a legal 
interest in tail, it shall operate instead to transfer the property to him absolutely; and 
(b) if it purports to grant any person an equitable interest in tail, it shall operate 
instead as a declaration that the property is held in trust for him absolutely. ' This 
should be contrasted with the wording in paragraph 5 of Schedule 1. In its Working 
Paper the Law Commission originally proposed, 254 in addition to forbidding the 
creation of new entailed interests, to convert all existing entails into fee tail estates but 
this proposal disappeared without any explanation from the final report. 
Purports- broad or narrow meaning? 
The use of 'purports' in paragraph 5 is enigmatic. The paragraph is saying that the 
effect spelt out only applies when one purports to grant to another an entailed interest, 
rather than actually grants it. If the creation of entailed interests had been prohibited 
after the commencement of the Act, then the wording would have the desired effect. 
There is, however, no clear provision stating that entailed interests cannot be created 
after the commencement of the Act. 255 The repeal of section 130(l) to (3) and (6)256 
does not have that effect as will be discussed later. Its use in the original clause 16 is 
understandable and justifiable and is used in a different context. That clause applies 
'where such an instrument contains an expression showing an intention to create an 
entailed interest ...... whereas paragraph 5 only applies 'where a person purports .... to 
253 Clause 16(l) stated that, 'Section 130(l) to (3) shall not apply to any instrument taking effect after 
the commencement of this Act. ' Clause 16 did not refer to section 130(6). 
254 Law Com. Working Paper No. 94 para. 6.8. See also Roger Sexton The Lcnv Commission's report 
on trusts ofland at last a lawfor contemporary society? [1989] Trust L. & P. 66 at 70. 
255 Compare section 2(l) of the 1996 Act dealing with strict settlements which puts the matter beyond 
doubt. 
256 It should be noted that clause 16 of the Law Commission's draft Bill did not repeal section 130 but 
stated that section 130(l) to (3) shall not apply and left it to Schedule 2 to repeal section 130(6), 
whereas paragraph 5 of the 1996 Act does not deal with section 130 and leaves it to section 25(2) and 
Schedule 4 to repeal subsections (1) to (3) and (6) and the words 'Creation of' in the sidenote. 
81 
grant to another an entailed interest ...... They apply 
in completely different 
circumstances and cannot have the same effect. 
The reason 'purports' was used in clause 16(2)(a) is that after 1925 it was no longer 
possible to create a legal interest in tail, since such interests necessarily had to be 
equitable due to section 1 (1) to (3) of the Law of Property Act 1925. The use of 
cpurports' in clause 16(2)(b) is questionable, since it was possible to create equitable 
interests after 1925 and is used either to be consistent with (a) or due to a 
misunderstanding of the effects of repealing parts of section 130. If the narrow 
meaning of 'purports' is adopted, as it is in its usual sense, it is used in common 
parlance to mean when one tries to do something but does not succeed. If one actually 
does succeed at something, one is not purporting to do it. This means that paragraph 5 
only applies where one tries to create an entailed interest but fails to do so. 257 
How can one try to create an entailed interest but fail to do so? Before I January 1882 
the words of limitation necessary to create an entailed interest by deed were 'heirs 258 
and 'of his body 259 and if these were not used, a life estate was conferred on the 
grantee. 260 However, section 51 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 provided that in deeds 
executed after that date, it should be sufficient to use the words 'in tail' instead of 
'heirs of the body'. Less formal language would create an entailed interest in a Wi11261 
and executory instrument such as marriage articles. However, section 130(l) of the 
Law of Property Act 1925 extended the strict requirements of the common law 
applicable to deeds to wills and therefore in both wills and deeds after 1925 specific 
wording 'to A in tail' or 'to A and the heirs of his body' was required. This means 
257 This idea was first suggested by Kenny and Kenny op. cit., p. 33. 
258 And not expressions like seed, offspring, descendants, issue etc. 
259 See Kenny and Kenny op. cit., p. 33. This was to indicate that the inheritance was to pass to the 
direct descendants (though other expressions were sufficient such as 'of his flesh' and 'from his 
proceeding' etc. ). 
260 See Cheshire and Bum op. cit., p. 276-279 and Megarry and Wade op. cit., paras. 3-033-3-034. 
26 ' Any expressions that indicated an intention to give the devisee an estate of inheritance, descendiblc 
to his lineal as distinct from his collateral heirs, conferred an entailed interest e. g. devises to A and his 
seed, A and his offspring, A and his family according to seniority, A and his issue, A and his posterity: 
see Cheshire and Bum op. cit., p. 277. 
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that paragraph 5 can be strictly construed to apply only to cases where the appropriate 
wording to create an entailed interest is not used. 
262 
The broad meaning of 'purports' is to signify or imply. This will give paragraph 5 the 
meaning intended by the Law Commission and is supported by Joseph v. Joseph 
263 
where Lord Denning M. R. stated that, 'The word "purports ........ does not mean 
"professes". It means "has the effect of'. ' Russell L. J. said, 'For my part I would not 
give a narrow construction to that phrase in this context: one meaning I take to be "to 
have as its effect", and this seems to be a suitable meaning when the statute is 
avoiding an agreement and, therefore, is presumably aimed at its effect. 264 This 
throws a totally different light onto the interpretation of 'purports' and was in the 
context of section 38(l) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 which provides that any 
agreement relating to a tenancy under Part Il of the Act shall be void in so far as it 
purports to preclude the tenant from making an application or request under the Act. 
The context of the 1954 Act is different from the context in paragraph 5 of the 1996 
Act and 'purports' should not take the wider meaning in the 1996 Act. However a 
court will look at the Law Commission's Report following the House of Lords 
decision in Pepper v. Har ? 65 and applying a purposive approach to construction, will 
no doubt take a broad view of 'purports' and give it a wide meaning. If a judge 
considers that the application of words in their grammatical and ordinary sense would 
produce a result which is contrary to the purpose of the statute, he may apply them in 
any secondary meaning which they are capable of bearing. 266 
262 Kenny and Kenny op. cit., p. 33 offer alternative suggestions as well. First, they suggest that the 
literal interpretation could be grants where only the word 'entail' is used, but this is an unlikely 
construction and stretches the construction of the paragraph too far. Secondly, they suggest that it 
should be read with the following meaning, 'where the purport of any grant might be to create an 
entailed interest then para. (lXb) takes effect' which is an unwarranted re-drafting of the paragraph. 
263 [1966] 3 All E. R. 486. See John B. Saunders Words and Phrases Legally Defined (Ya edn 1989) 
Vol. 3: K-Q. 
264 op. cit., p. 493. 265 [ 1993] 1 All E. R. 42. 
266 See Cross op. cit., p. 81-92, Pinner v. Everett [1969] 3 All E. R. 257 at 258 per Lord Rcid, Afaunsell 
v. Olins [19751 A. C. 373 at 391 per Lord Simon of Glaisdale. 
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Needfoi- an Instrument 
Can entailed interests be created orally or by a form of writing that is not an 
instrument? Section 130(6) of the Law of Property Act 1925 states that, 'An entailed 
interest shall only be capable of being created by a settlement of real or personal 
property or the proceeds of sale thereof... ' Settlement is not defined in the Law of 
Property Act 1925, but section I 17(l)(xxiv) of the Settled Land Act 1925 states that, 
'"settlement" includes 267 an instrument or instruments which under this Act or the 
Acts which it replaces is or are deemed to be or which together constitute a settlement 
This definition is circular and unhelpful, because it is not a comprehensive 
definition of settlements and the definition of instrument in section II 7(l)(viii) does 
not facilitate an answer, since it merely states that it 'does not include a statute unless 
the statute creates a settlement. ' The same formalities applied to entailed interests in 
personal property as to real property 268 which meant that section 53(l)(a) or (b) of the 
Law of Property Act 1925 had to be satisfied for both. This meant that there had to be 
writing signed by the person creating the interest or declaring the trust. 
The question arises whether this is the same as an instrument. Stroud's Judicial 
Dictionary of Words and PhraseS269 defines instrument as 'a writing, and generally 
imports a document of a formal legal kind'. The use of the word 'generally' allows 
room for manipulation to allow an informal document into the definition. Section 
130(6) has now been repealed. 270 Consequently, is a rough piece of paper written by a 
settlor informally creating an entailed interest caught by paragraph 5 of the 1996 Act? 
Or to take the argument to its extreme, if the bare minimum is scribbled on the back 
of an envelope or a shopping list, is the back of this envelope or shopping list an 
instrument for the purposes of paragraph 5? A court would inevitably answer in the 
affirmative but the dilemmas posed indicate that the detail of the legislation has not 
been sufficiently thought through. 271 
267 Emphasis added. 
268 See section 130(l) of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
269 Vol. 2: G-P (6h edn 2000) by Daniel Greenberg and Alexandra Millbrook. 
270 See Section 25(2) and Schedule 4 to the 1996 Act. 
271 Harpurn in The Law Commission and Me Reform ofLand Lmv op. cit., p. 171 footnote 151 states 
that it has been suggested to him by a member of a well-known firm of solicitors with a large private 
client practice that it is 'still possible' to create an entail of personalty orally, because the Act deals 
only with purported dispositions by instrument. He states that why anyone would wish to do anything 
so strange is not apparent, but in any event, it has never been possible to create an entail of personalty 
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Meaning ofgrant 
The word 'grant' is odd here, because one normally grants a legal estate 
272 and one 
cannot grant a legal entail. The reason for the use of the word grant can be traced to 
the original clause 16 of the Law Commission's Bill which referred to purporting 'to 
grant any person a legal interest in tail' in (a) yet the same terminology was used in 
(b) for purporting 'to grant any person an equitable interest in tail'. Since paragraph 5 
does not use the wording 'grant a legal interest in tail', the use of the word grant is 
inappropriate, because one does not normally grant equitable estates or interests. 
Problematic drafting ofparagraph 5(2) 
Paragraph 5(l) was as far as the original Bill went. However, Schedule I now also 
includes paragraph 5(2) which states that, 'Where a person purports by an instrument 
coming into operation after the commencement of this Act to declare himself a tenant 
in tail of real or personal property, the instrument is not effective to create an entailed 
interest. ' This was an amendment added in the House of Lords where the Lord 
Chancellor stated that, 'Amendment No. 30 closes a possible loophole; namely, where 
a person attempts to create an entailed interest not by granting it direct to another but 
by declaring himself a trustee in tail. In that case, the declaration in tail is simply 
ineffective, and the effect may be illustrated by an example. 273 The Lord Chancellor 
then went on to give an example: 'If A purports to declare himself a trustee in tail for 
B, he will simply remain the owner; and if he purports to declare himself trustee for B 
for life and C in tail thereafter, B's life interest will not be affected, but the property 
will simply revert to A, or his estate, when that life interest ceases. ' 
The Lord Chancellor's examples are problematic (for example what is a trustee in 
tail? ) and he is wrong because they do not demonstrate the application of paragraph 
5(2). His first example is not what paragraph 5(2) covers, since A is not declaring 
himself a tenant in tail, rather he is declaring himself to be a trustee in tail. That 
example is covered by paragraph 5(l), because A purports by an instrument to grant 
orally due to sections 130(6) and 205(l)(xxvi) of the Law of Property Act 1925 and section I (I) of the 
Settled Land Act 1925. It is unfortunate that Harpum does not deal with the repercussions of the repeal 
of section 130(6). 
272 See, for example, section 70(l)(k) of the Land Registration Act 1925 and para. I of Schedule I and 
? aras. I and 2(d) of Schedule 3 of the Land Registration Act 2002. 
la H. L. Debs., Vol. 570, col. 1555. 
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to B an entailed interest. On applying paragraph 5(l), A holds the property in trust 
absolutely for B, whereas if paragraph 5(2) were to apply, B takes no interest 
whatsoever. The consequences are totally different for B and the Lord Chancellor is 
saying that B has no interest. 
Similarly, in the second example, the Lord Chancellor is mistaken because paragraph 
5(2) does not apply, since A is not declaring himself a tenant in tail. This second 
example is also covered by paragraph 5(l), since A is purporting to grant to C an 
entailed interest, so after B's life interest, A holds on trust absolutely for C. In 
addition, paragraph 5(2) has no (b). It states that the instrument is not effective but 
does not state what will happen. Paragraph 5(l) has (a) which states that the 
instrument is not effective and (b) which sets out the consequences of this. In 
paragraph 5(2) is the instrument void (which it is clearly not in paragraph 5(l)) or 
does it operate as a resulting trust? Either way A remains with his absolute (or lesser) 
interest. The wording of this sub-paragraph is deficient and paragraph 5(2) should 
have been omitted. Rather paragraph 5 should have been amended to include a person 
purporting by an instrument to declare himself a tenant in tail of real or personal 
property with the consequence that the instrument is not effective to create an entailed 
interest but operates instead as a resulting trust. 
Does the repeal of section 130(l) and (2) enable the creation of entailed interests? 
Section 130 
Section 130(l) had two main effects: the strict requirements of the common law 
applicable to non-executory deeds were extended to wills and it extended the common 
law so that entailed interests could be created in personal property. Section 130(l) 
provided that, 'An interest in tail ........... (in this Act referred to as an "entailed 
interest") may be created by way of trust in any property, real or personal, but only by 
the like expressions as those by which before the commencement of this Act a similar 
estate tail could have been created by deed (not being an executory instrument) in 
freehold land, and with the like results and accordingly all statutory provisions 
relating to estates tail in real property shall apply to entailed interests in personal 
property. ' 
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Section 130(2) had the effect that if the requisite expression used in a deed was one 
which in a will would have created an entailed interest but not in a deed, then it would 
create the interest in land which would have been created if the property had been 
personal estate. 274 Section 130(2) provided that, 'Expressions contained in an 
instrument coming into operation after the commencement of this Act, which, in a 
will, or executory instrument coming into operation before such commencement, 
would have created an entailed interest in freehold land, but would not have been 
effectual for that purpose in a deed not being an exeeutory instrument, shall ....... 
operate in equity, in regard to property real or personal, to create absolute, fee simple 
or other interests corresponding to those which, if the property affected had been 
personal estate, would have been created therein by similar expressions before the 
commencement of this Act. ' 
Section 130(3) was a concession for personal property enjoyed with land in which an 
entailed interest had been created. Section 130(3) provided that, 'Where personal 
estate ....... is, after the commencement of this Act, directed to be enjoyed or held 
with, or upon trusts corresponding to trusts affecting, land in which, either before or 
after the commencement of this Act an entailed interest has been created, and is 
subsisting, such direction shall be deemed sufficient to create a corresponding entailed 
interest in such personal estate. ' Section 130(6) concerned the formalities for the 
creation of an entailed interest and has already been examined under the question of 
the need for an instrument. 
Is section 16(1)(a) ofthe Interpretation Act 1978 applicable? 
The argument advanced here is that the repeal of section 130(l) and (2) enables the 
creation of entailed interests, because section 16(l)(a) of the Interpretation Act 1978 
does not apply. Section 16(l) of the Interpretation Act 1978 states that, where an 
Act repeals an enactment, the repeal does not, unless the contrary intention appears, - 
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes 
274 See Cheshire and Bum op. cit., p. 278-280 and S. J. Bailey The Lmv ofProperty Act 1925, s. 130(2) 
(1936) 6 C. L. J. 67 for an analysis of the complex issues of what interest passes under a gift of 
personalty. For a contrary view of the effect of section 130(2), see R. E. Megarry 'To A and his Issue. 
the Law ofProperly Act, 1925, section 130(2) (1945) 9 C. L. J. 46 and the reply by S. J. Bailey 'To A and 
his Issue. the Laiv ofProperty Act, 1925, section 130(2) with a note by J. H. C. Morris in (1946) 9 
C. L. J. 185. 
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effect'. As Bennion states, 275 it seems that the wording of (a) 'also applies to rules of 
common law which had been abrogated by the repealed Act and were therefore "not 
in force or existing" at the time the repeal took effect. ' Bennion's view is that this 
application of paragraph (a) to common law rules 'is unsatisfactory, and can be said to 
be contrary to principle ....... It makes little sense to say that a rule of common 
law is 
occluded by statute when the statute in question has been repealed. 9276 
Section 16(l)(a) does not, however, have the effect of repealing the common law for a 
number of reasons. First, section 130(l) to (3) and (6) did not abolish the common 
law on the creation of entails: it modified the common law. In these subsections the 
common law had been revised or reformed but not abrogated. Where the repealed 
provision did not in itself abolish the common law, the repeal of the statutory 
provision cannot have the effect of doing so. Only where the repealed provision 
abolished a rule of the common law would there be a direct analogy to a repealed 
provision that had repealed an earlier statute. 
As Diamond stated in Repeal and Desuetude ofStatutes, 277 the relations between 
statute and common lakv are more complex than the relations between statute and 
statute. If the statute did not abolish the common law, then the common law is 
existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect and so the statute is not reviving 
'anything not .... existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect. 
' The common 
law has continued to exist with a statutory requirement, now repealed, superimposed 
on it. 278 It has been lying don-nant and although it is not in force, it is existing though 
quiescent or suspended. This means that section 16(l)(a) does not apply. 
Secondly, there is a contrary intention to displace section 16(l)(a). Since no contrary 
intention is expressed in section 25(2) or Schedule 4 of the 1996 Act, this means that 
an implied contrary intention must be sought. The argument is that on the wording of 
275 F. A. R. Bennion Statutory Interpretation A Code (4h edn 2002) section 89 p. 258. 
276 Ibid., p. 259. 
277 Aubrey Diamond [1975] C. L. P. 107 at 110. Diamond was writing on section 38(2) of the 
Interpretation Act 1889 which was the predecessor to section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978. Section 
16 of the 1978 Act made 'no effort to improve the notoriously opaque drafting': see Bennion op. cit., p. 
258 footnote 1. 
278 See Diamond op. cit., p. II 1- 112. 
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the relevant subsections of section 130, repeal removes the limitations and extensions 
imposed by section 130(l) to (3) and (6), so that after the repeal entailed interests can 
only be created in real property. It will not be possible to create entailed interests in 
personal property, 279 because Statute De Donis Conditionalibus 1285 applied only to 
'tenements' i. e. property held in tenure, real property. The current repeal has no effect 
on the 1285 Statute, since section 130 of the Law of Property Act 1925 did not repeal 
that Statute. Less formal language will create an entailed interest in a will and in an 
executory instrument but not in a non-executory deed. 
Lastly, section 16(l)(a) does not apply because repeal does not 'revive 280 the 
common law, rather it restores or reimposes or reinstates it. This is related to the first 
argument that the common law is existing and lying dormant. It is, however, pedantic 
and captious to differentiate between words such as revive and restore, reimpose or 
reinstate on repeal. A different, weaker argument is that the word 'anything' in 
section 16(l)(a) is not apt to cover a rule at common law, since the subsection should 
have been more specific if it was intended to cover common law. 281 If 'anything' is 
construed to mean 'an enactment' 282 in the light of section 16(l) and section 15, then 
section 16(l)(a) will not apply. The better view, however, is that the term 'anything' 
is sufficiently wide to cover common law and a more specific reference was not 
necessary. 
It must be questioned whether section 130 impliedly repealed the common law. There 
is a principle that where a statutory provision is contrary to a common law rule, 
Parliament is taken to intend the earlier to be repealed in accordance with the maxim 
legesposteriorespriores contrarias abrogant (later laws abrogate earlier contrary 
279 A purported grant of personalty in tail before 1926 gave the grantee absolute ownership of the 
property: see Megarry and Wade op. cit., para. 3-087. 
280 The term 'revive' has been considered judicially in relation to wills and codicils- McLeod v. McNab 
[ 1891 ] A. C. 47 1, Re Dennis [ 189 11 P. 326 (reference to codicil did not revive it), Re Chilcoll [ 1897] P. 
223 (codicil revived the earlier will): see Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases op. cit., 
Vol. 3: Q-Z. 
281 See Diamond op. cit., p. 110-111. 
282 Compare Associated Newspapers Group v. Fleming [1973] A. C. 628 where 'anything' was 
construed in the light of the preceding subsections to mean anything in the way of entertainment, and 
had no application to a newspaper proprietor whose trade was to provide newspapers: see Stroud's 
Judicial Dictionaty of Words and Phrases op. cit., Vol. 1: A-F. 
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283 laws). The test is whether section 130 is so inconsistent with or repugnant to the 
common law that the two cannot stand together. Examining section 130, the two can 
stand together. As Bennion states, there is a presumption against implied repeal. 
284 
The courts presume that Parliament does not intend an implied repeal or an implied 
revocation of a common law rule. 285 
Effect of the repeal of section 130(l) and (2) 
Therefore the startling conclusion is reached that a disposition in a will to A and his 
seed, A and his offspring, 286 A and his issue, 287 to A and his descendantS288 or any 
expression indicating an intention to devise an inheritance to lineal and not collateral 
heirs may confer an entailed interest due to the repeal of section 130(2). How will 
paragraph 5 of Schedule I deal with this? The argument is that the entailed interest is 
not caught by paragraph 5(l) because 'a person does not purport .... to grant to 
another person an entailed interest'. Since there is no statutory provision preventing 
the existence of entailed interests, a devise drafted with such terminology is not 
caught by paragraph 5(l). 
This view exploits a loophole in the existing legislation but this may not be upheld by 
the judiciary who would be reluctant to run contrary to the intention of the legislation 
and so would take a broad view of paragraph 5(l). However, if laws are passed which 
do not achieve the stated intention, it is up to Parliament to reform the law and not to 
the judiciary to remedy the defects exposed by inadequate legislation. It is an 
undesirable result as entails could arise unintentionally and one of the overriding 
forces behind the 1996 Act was the elimination of the unintentional creation of strict 
settlements. It would be an alarming irony if the unintentional creation of strict 
settlements were replaced by the unintentional creation of entailed interests. 
283 See Bennion op. cit., section 87. 284 op. cit., section 87. 
285 Jennings v. United States Government [1982] 3 All E. R. 104. 
286 Young v. Davies (1863) 2 Drew & Sm. 167. 
287 Slater v. Dangerfield (1846) 15 M. & W. 263 at 272. Children prima facie meant descendants of the 
first generation only, and was less apt to create an entail than words such as issue, which prima facie 
included descendants of any generation and were the informal equivalent of heirs of his body: see 
Megarry and Wade (5th edn) op. cit., p. 57. See also S. J. Bailey (1936) 6 C. L. J. 67 op. cit., p. 761T. 
28' Re Sleenzan (1929) W. N. 16- this was the decision of Clauson J. on the will of a testator who died 
before 1926. 
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Does the repeal of section 130(l) and (2) revive the rule in Wild's Case? 
The rule in Wild's Case 289 was that where realty was devised to A and his children 
and A had no child at the time that the will was made, the word children was prima 
facie construed as a word of limitation, with the result that A acquired an estate tai I. 
290 
The reasoning was that 'the intent of the devisor is manifest and certain that his 
children or issues should take and as immediate devisces they cannot take, because 
they are not in rerum natura, and by way of remainder they cannot take, for that was 
not his intent, for the gift is immediate, therefore such words shall be taken as words 
of limitation, sciL as much as children or issues of his body'. 291 
An analysis of the case reveals that this was obiter, since the actual decision was that 
on the construction of the will, Rowland Wild and his wife had an estate for life with 
remainder to their children for life. Therefore even in Wild's Case the rule was not 
applied, since the devise was to parents for life 'and after their decease to their 
children'. 292 This rule was in any event disregarded by the courts where it would 
defeat the intention of the testator expressed elsewhere in the Will. 293 The rule obeyed 
the old principle that the time of making the will was the significant time even after 
the modem rule that the will speaks from death was adopted for other forms of gift. 294 
The original reason for this construction was that no person could benefit from an 
immediate gift unless he was in existence when the gift was made. 
Nowadays a will does not operate until the testator's death so exponents of the rule 
seek some other justification for retaining the date of the will as the relevant time. 295 
The rule in Wild's Case never applies to a devise to A and his issue for the 
presumption is that the testator intended to confer an estate tail on A. After 1925 A 
289 The rule is of even earlier origin from Lovelace v. Lovelace (27 Eliz. ) Cro. Eliz. 40 as explained in 
Re Cosby's Estate (1922) 1 Ir. R. 120 at 132. See S. J. Bailey (1936) 6 C. L. J. 67 op. cit., p. 78. 
290 See Cheshire and Bum op. cit., p. 278. 
2910 
. Cit , P. 17a and b, referring to a case, Trin. 4 Eliz. reported by Serjeant Bendloes, where one 
devised land to husband and wife and to the men-children of their bodies begotten. It did not appear in 
the case that they had issue male at the time of the devise and it was adjudged that they had estate tail 
to them and the heirs male of their bodies. 
297 Emphasis added. See S. J. Bailey (1936) 6 C. L. J. 67 op. cit., p. 78. 
293 Byng v. Byng (1862) 10 H. L. C. 171 at 178, Roper v. Roper (1867) 3 C. P. 32, Bowen v. Leivis (1884) 
9 App. Cas. 890 at 897. 
294 See Megarry and Wade op. cit., para. 11 -080. 295 See S. J. Bailey (1936) 6 C. L. J. 67 op. cit., p. 78. 
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could not take an entail, because it could not be created by informal words. 
296 It is not 
wholly clear whether paragraph 5 of Schedule I would operate to prevent an entailed 
interest. Here the reasoning of Histed 297 could be utilised. The settlor would not be 
purporting by an instrument to create an entailed interest but the court would do so. 
This turns on whether a judge is a 'person'. The best argument against this is that the 
Act uses the words 'the court' wherever required so the person referred to in 
paragraph 5 is not the court. Additionally the word grant refers to individual settlors 
or testators rather than a decision of the court. To avoid Histed's convoluted 
reasoning, it is preferable to state that paragraph 5 does not apply because the 
common law is being applied and this is not caught by the wording of paragraph 5. 
Has the doctrine of cy-prýs survived the 1996 Act? 
It is maintained here, that contrary to the view of Histed '298 the doctrine of cy-prýs has 
not survived the 1996 Act. This doctrine saved limitations from the destructive effects 
of two rules: the rule in Whitby v. MitchelP99 and the rule against perpetuities . 
300 It is 
unfortunate that the article by Histed does not interweave the rule in Whitby v. 
Mitchell into her intricate historical analysis, since the totality of the origins of the 
doctrine of cy-pris are necessarily germane to any analysis. 
Cy-prL and the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell 
The rule in Whitby v. MitchelPol was that after a limitation for life to an unborn 
person, any further limitation to his issue was void. So if land was given to a person 
for life (and such person was as yet unborn) with remainder to his issue, that 
remainder and all subsequent limitations to his issue were void. Kay J. stated that he 
296 Megarry and Wade op. cit., para. 11 -08 1. 297 Op. Cit. p. 469ff. 
298 op. cit., p. 465ff. 
299 (1889) 42 Ch. D. 494 per Kay J. and affirmed in the Court of Appeal (1890) 44 Ch. D. 85. The rule 
appears in Perrot's Case (1594) Moo K. B. 368, but was not clearly laid down until Duke of 
Marlborough v. Earl Godolphin (1759) 1 Eden 404 at 415,416: see Megarry and Wade (5h edn) op. 
cit., p. 1186. 
300 For a history of the development of the rules against perpetuities, see Holdsworth An Historical 
Introduction to the LandLmv op. cit., p. 217-231 and J. H. C. Morris and W. Barton Leach The Rule 
against Perpewities (2 nd edn 1962) chapter 1. 
301 See generally Simpson op. cit., 216ff and John Chipman Gray The Rule against Perpeluities (4'h edn 
1942, reprinted 2002) sections 931-947. 
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agreed that it is an absolute rule independent of the rule against perpetuities 
302 and 
Cotton L. J. in the Court of Appeal stated 303 that the basis of it was a rule called a 
possibility upon a possibility, 304 which has not been superseded by the modem law of 
perpetuities. His view was that they were two independent and coexisting rules. 
The severity of the rule in TVhitby v. Mitchell was mitigated by the application of the 
cy-prýs doctrine by saying that the testator had manifested a general intention that a 
particular unborn devisee and his issue should take certain property and the court, in 
support of the general intention to provide for the issue of the devisee, would vest an 
estate tail in him. 305 The testator's general intention would be more closely 
effectuated if the eldest son was given an entail than if he took a mere life estate. 
306 
Section 161 of the Law of Property Act 1925 abolished the rule in JVhitby v. Mitchell. 
307 The general view, as typified by that of Morris and Leach, is that section 161 has 
the consequence that to the extent that the doctrine of cy-prýs was a mitigation of the 
rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, cy-prýs cannot be applied. Section 161 has not been 
repealed by the 1996 Act so according to this view, only to the extent that cy-prýs was 
a mitigation of the modem rule against perpetuities can cy-prýs still be applied. 308 
Cy-pris and the rule against perpetuilies 
The second situation where cy-pris applied was where a testator devised a perpetual 
series of life estates to a person and his issue in succession with cross-remainders, if 
302 op. cit., p. 502. 311 op. cit., p. 89-91. 
304 This rule was invented by Popham C. J. in Rector ofChedinglon's Case (1598) 1 Rep. 153a, 156b 
and repudiated by Lord Nottingham in the Duke ofNorfolk's Case (1682) 3 Ch. Cas. I at 29. Megarry 
, ainst 
double and Wade (5h edn) op. cit., p. 1187 criticise the description of the rule- the rule ag 
possibilities or the rule that a possibility upon a possibility is void- as unsuitable: see Re Nash [ 1910] 1 
Ch. I at 10. Cheshire and Bum op. cit., p. 3 10 state that it was really a particular application of the 
parent rule that the grant of an unbarrable entail is void. A few months later in Re Frost (1889) 43 Ch. 
D. 246 Kay J. decided that legal contingent remainders were subject to the modem rule against 
ferpetuitics: see Morris and Leach op. cit., p. 259. 
(05 See L. A. Sheridan and V. T. H. Delany The Cy-Pris Doctrine (1959) p. 12 and Robinson v. 
Hardcastle (1788) 2 T. R. 241 at 254. 
306 See R. E. Megarry Perpetuities and the Cy-Pris Doctrine (1939) 55 L. Q. R. 422 at 423. 
307 op. cit., p. 264. 
308 The view expressed in Wolstenhohne and Cherry's Conveyancing Statutes by J. T. Farrand (130'edn 
1972) Vol. I p. 291 was that section 161 does not affect the qy-prýs doctrine but this rule has been 
abolished by section 130(l), since no entailed interest can after 1925 be created by expressions which 
would not have created an entailed interest in a deed not executory and the rule was never applied to 
limitations in a deed not being an executory instrument. 
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there was a gift over on failure of issue sufficient to show an intention to give an 
estate tail, in such a case, the first generation that was unborn at the testator's death 
took an estate tail by qy-prýs. 309 Cy-pris did not apply if the estates were limited by 
deed .3 
10 The cy-pris doctrine rescued descendants from ill-drawn wills which 
infringed the rule against perpetuities. 311 
Histed pays insufficient attention to the view of Gray 
312 that the doctrine of cy-pris 
313 
was not to be extended . Gray stated that 'this doctrine has always been regarded 
with suspicion and disapproval by the ablest judges. ' Lord Kenyon stated in Brudenell 
v. Elwes that, 'The doctrine of cy-prýs goes to the utmost verge of the law.... We 
must take care that it does not run wild... I know that great judges entertained 
considerable scruples at the time concerning that decision. [Pitt v. Jackson. 314] It went 
indeed to the outside of the rules of construction. 315 Sir J. L. Knight Bruce V. -C. in 
Boughton v. James said, 'The doctrine has gone, at least, far enough. 316 The Court of 
Exchequer in Monypenny v. Dering stated, 'Without, therefore, meaning to say that 
the doctrine [of cy-prýs] on which Lord Kenyon proceeded, and which V. C. Wigrarn 
felt himself bound to follow, is satisfactory to our minds, it is sufficient for us to say 
that those authorities are not precisely in point, and we do not feel inclined to carry 
the doctrine on which they rest one step further. ' 317 
309 See Morris and Leach op. cit., p. 263. The doctrine did not apply if there was no gift over on failure 
of issue (Re Richards [ 1904] 1 Ch. 332) or if the series of life estates was limited to a stated number of 
generations (Seaward v. Willcock (1804) 5 East 198), since no intention to give an estate tail could be 
implied in such cases. It also did not apply if the testator gave successive terms of years determinable 
on the death of the devisee (Somerville v. Lethbridge (1795) 6 T. R. 213 and Beard v. Westcott (1822) 5 
B. & Ald. 80 1). At first the doctrine applied to cases of executory trusts but later to direct devises (Pitt 
v. Jackson (1786) 2 Bro. C. C. 5 1). 
310 Brudenell v. Dives (180 1) 1 East 442. 
311 See Humberston v. Humberston (1716) 1 P. Wms 332, a decision of Lord Cowper. For more detail, 
see Holdsworth A History ofEngfish Law op. cit., Vol. VI I p. 211 ff. The doctrine of cy-pr& was 
initially seen as an indulgence granted to a testator who attempts to create an unbarrabIe entail: see 
Histed op. cit., p. 446. 
312 J. C. Gray op. cit., section 65 1. 
313 Section 651 and see also section 877. Gray quotes a large number of sources and see also Morris 
and Leach op. cit., p. 264: Brudenell v. Owes op. cit., per Lord Kenyon, Boughton v. James (1844) 1 
Coll. 26 at 44 per Knight Bruce V. -C., Hale v. Pew (1858) 25 Beav. 335 at 338 per Lord Romilly, 
Bristow v. Warde 2 Ves. Jr. 336, Monypenny v. Dering (1847) 16 M. & W. 418 at 434 per Rolfe B., Re 
Mortimer [ 1905] 2 Ch. 502 at 505 per Farwell J., at 512 per Vaughan Williams L. J., at 513 per Stirling 
L. J., Dennehey's Estate 17 Ir. Ch. 97. 
314 (1786) 2 Bro. C. C. 5 1. 
315 op. cit., at 45 1. 
316 op. cit., at 44. 317 op. cit., at 434. 
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In this category of successive life estates in perpetuity, Megarry's view318 was that the 
cy-prýs doctrine could not apply after 1925, because of section 130(l) of the Law of 
Property Act 1925 for two reasons. First, section 130(2) would convert a momentary 
entail to the first unborn generation into a fee simple. It was one of the fundamentals 
of the cy-prýs doctrine that the construction adopted by the courts must be one which 
would be capable of carrying the property to all persons whom the testator intended to 
benefit and to no others. Secondly, there was a view that the doctrine could not apply 
319 where a fee simple would be created . If the cy-pris doctrine 
did not apply, what 
effect would the repeal of section 130(l) and (2) by the 1996 Act have? Where there 
are successive life interests in perpetuity, the view of Histed cannot be supported. 
Application of the cy-prýs doctrine could not be the intention of the testator, since this 
is something he could not do expressly by instrument. 
Cy-pris after 1996 
Analysing the two possible origins of cy-pris, neither could be applicable. First, the 
rule of construction, that a general intent can overrule a particular intent of the testator 
where the particular one cannot take effect, 320 would not apply after 1996 because 
there can be no general intent to create an entailed interest. Secondly, the view that 
the doctrine of cy-pris was not a rule of construction, but a discretionary intervention 
by the Chancellor to save a disposition which would otherwise have been struck down 
as void for perpetuity 321 would not prevail, because a court would not voluntarily 
impose a type of interest which Parliament had intended to abolish whether or not it 
had been successful in doing so. 
The only category that Megarry recognised that the cy-prýs doctrine would apply to 
after 1925 was where after a life interest to an unborn person, there was a remainder 
in tail to his issue, strict words of limitation being used, such as to A for life, 
remainder to his eldest son for life, remainder to that son's first and other sons 
successively in tail male. His view was that 'like expressions' in section 130(l) 
318 (1939) 55 L. Q. R. 422 op. cit., p. 43043 1. 
319 See J. C. Gray op. cit., sections 663-670. 
320 See Monypenny v. Dering (1852) 2 De G. M. & G. 145 at 173 per Lord St. Leonards, Parful v. 
Hember (1867) L. R. 4 Eq. 443 at 447 per Lord Romilly, Hampton v. Holman (1877) 5 Ch. D. 183 at 
190. See generally Histed op. cit., p. 46046 1. 
321 See Histed op cit., p. 462. 
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should mean 'words of limitation' and not 'the whole limitation including the 
circumstances at the time of the gift, 322 and that after 1925 the doctrine of cy-prýs 
should apply where after a life interest to an unborn person, there is a remainder in tail 
to his issue, strict words of limitation being employed. The view of Morris and 
Leach 323 is that Megarry's argument allows insufficient force to the word 'similar' in 
the section, because the estate tail raised by the cy-prýs doctrine was an estate tail by 
implication and no estate tail was ever raised by implication in a deed. 
In any event, after 1996, the doctrine of cy-prL would have no part to play, since 
such a limitation would be caught by paragraph 5 of Schedule 1, converting the 
remainder to a declaration that the property is held in trust absolutely for the person to 
whom an entailed interest was purportedly granted, and after applying the wait and 
see rule, a court would have no justification for applying the cy-prL doctrine. If A 
had no son, the equitable cy-pris doctrine cannot operate after the statutory provisions 
of the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964, because the 1964 Act leaves no 
room for the operation of the doctrine of cy-prL and the view of Histed to the 
contrary 324 cannot be supported. 
Since the perpetuity rule defeated many gifts which might have vested within the 
permitted period, the principle of wait and see was introduced by the 1964 Act which 
supersedes the qy-prL doctrine. To apply the cy-prL doctrine would be unwarranted 
judicial interference in an area governed by Statute. The doctrine of cy-prL and the 
wait and see rule do not co-exist in English law. A gift which would be void for 
perpetuity at common law is now to be void only if and when circumstances make it 
clear that it can only vest outside the perpetuity period. If circumstances make this 
clear at the outset, the gift is void from the beginning. 325 
322 This is to deal with the example of 'to A for life, remainder to his eldest son for life, remainder to 
that son's first and other sons successively in tail male' where Megarry is of the view (1939) 55 L. Q. R. 
422 op. cit., p. 432 that even if A is a bachelor, it can be construed cy-prýs for words of limitation have 
been used which would have sufficed to create an entail in a deed before 1926. 323 op. 
cit., p. 265. 324 op. cit., p. 467468. 
325 See Megarry and Wade op. cit., para. 7-03 1. 
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Maudsley proposes as one solution to the problem of the rule against perpetuities 
giving the court a power to adjust a void limitation to render it valid, altering as little 
as possible and observing the settlor's or testator's intention as far as possible. 
326 This 
would plainly not have to incorporate entailed interests but could be a generalised cy- 
prL jurisdiction. This has been enacted in a number ofjurisdictions, mostly 
American, either independently or in conjunction with wait and see. 
There would be no chance that English courts would adopt cy-prýs to reform the 
perpetuity rule. The English courts show a great reluctance to exercise any power to 
"rewrite the instrument' for any of the parties. 327 Maudsley drafted a model 
Perpetuities and Accumulations Act and proposed a statutory basis to cy-pris after the 
expiry of the wait and see period. 328 In 1993 the Law Commission in its Consultation 
Paper 329 suggested five options, one of which was to introduce a cy-prýs power for the 
court to reform dispositions. In 1998 the Law Commission 330 did not adopt the 
proposals concerning cy-prýs, instead proposing one fixed perpetuity period of 125 
years 331 and the wait and see principle. 332 The response to the proposal to adopt a cy- 
pris system in the Consultation Paper was 'at best lukewarm. A number of difficulties 
were identified in adopting any such scheme. It would make the law still more 
complicated and at the same time less predictable. It was thought that it would be 
rarely used, and difficulties were anticipated in identifying the settlor's intention and 
in defining the court's jurisdiction. In the light of our other proposals, we have 
decided not to pursue further such a scheme. 333 It is therefore most unlikely that the 
qy-prýs doctrine has survived the 1996 Act. 
326 Ronald H. Maudsley The Modern Lmv ofPerpetuilies (1979) p. 81-82,228-229 and 263. 
327 See Maudsley ibid., p. 81. 
328 See clause II ibid., p. 263. 
329 The Law of Trusts: The Rules against Perpeluilies and Excessive Accumulations Consultation Paper 
No. 133 para. 5.57. 
330 Law Commission Report No. 25 1: The Rules against Perpetuilies and Excessive Accumulations. 
See also P. Sparkes Perpetuilies Reforin (1998) 12 T. L. I. 148. 
331 Para. 8.13. 
332 Para. 8.25. 
333 Pam. 8.3 1. 
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Conclusion 
Insufficient care has been taken in drafting, scrutinising and considering the 
consequences of the legislation. 334 As Histed declared, 'To change fundamental areas 
of this law requires immense care in the manipulation of concepts and doctrines, not 
the hatchet of sweeping prohibition which seems to commend itself to the modem 
mind. 335 Any such move to create entailed interests can be seen as retaliation for the 
removal of hereditary peers from the House of Lords, thus asserting the peers' 
authority and refusal to be subdued. Lord Irvine of Lairg recently stressed in a 
different context the contemporary importance of the Magna Carta as continuing to 
resonate in modem law, which is clearly lacking in paragraph 5 of Schedule 1.336 
Amending legislation would be the most efficacious way of dealing with any potential 
challenge and any provision should be drafted to state simply and categorically that it 
is no longer possible to create entailed interests and any attempt to do so will be void. 
334 Compare the view of Harpurn in The Lmv Commission and the Reform ofLand Leav op. cit., p. 172 
who states that it is inconsistent to retain a rule against perpetuities while allowing the continued 
creation of entails, which can and do endure for centuries. Harpurn criticises Matthews' view in ffit 
ain't broke, don'Ifix it (1996) 10 T. L. I. 97 of the foolish policies behind the Act and maintains that the 
policies are anything but foolish, but are rooted in some of the most fundamental principles of English 
V roperty law. 3'5 op. cit., p. 472. 
336 The Spirit ofAfagna Carta Continues to Resonate in Modern Law (2003) 119 L. Q. R. 227. 
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CHAPTER 6- POWERS OF TRUSTEES: AN EXPEDIENT OR 
IMPRUDENTREFORM? 
DO SOLICITORS CONSIDER IT ADVANTAGEOUS THAT TRUSTEES OF 
LAND UNDER SECTION 6 HAVE WIDER POWERS THAN PREVIOUSLY, 
HAVING NOW POWERS OF AN ABSOLUTE OWNER? 
All the solicitors consulted stated that it was an advantage that trustees of land now 
have wider powers than previously. 
Some of the solicitors had considerable praise for the reforms such as Christopher 
Jessel (Farrer and Co) who stated that, 'Section 6 is worth the whole of the rest ofthe 
Act. When I saw the Bill, I thought it was worth it even if the rest of the Bill is not. ' 
Other solicitors were more circumspect in their approval. William McBryde 
(Assistant Official Solicitor) lamented the fact that . ..... when you are dealing with 
will trusts, the wider powers apply to the land and not to the personalty which strikes 
me as a very odd result. You need to extend the powersfor personalty ifyou are going 
to have theflexibility . ............ It is a pity that the Law Commission did not address 
that problem more universally than dealing with it in part because you are getting 
hybrid trusts now. ' The fact that there are different regimes for land and personalty 
makes the law more complex and does not provide a unitary system for trusts in this 
narrow sense. 
Problematic drafting? 
The Law Commission was of the view that 'we consider that trustees of land should 
be put in much the same position as an absolute owner . ....... It is desirable that 
trustees should have the powers necessary to make efficient use of the land. Our 
proposals are designed to reflect this state of affairs whilst maintaining the general 
equitable duties of trustees. Therefore, although the powers will be approximate to 
those of an absolute owner, they will not be quite as readily exercisable. 337 The 
337 Law Com. No. 181 para. 10.4. 
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powers under section 28 of the Law of Property Act 1925 338 were too restrictive 
339 
and necessarily extended in practice. 
Section 6(1) 
Yet the repeal of section 28 and the drafting of section 6(l) itself are not free of 
problems. Section 6(l) states that, 'For the purpose of exercising their functions as 
trustees, the trustees of land have in relation to the land subject to the trust all the 
powers of an absolute owner. ' There are two restrictions contained within section 
6(l): firstly, 'For the purpose of exercising their functions as trustees' 340 and 
secondly, the powers of an absolute owner are limited to those powers 'in relation to 
the land. ' Kenny and Kenny state that, 'For a section which is clearly intended to be 
an unproblematical extension of trustees' powers the opening words are unhelpfully 
, 341 ambiguous. 
The first limitation 'For the purpose of exercising their functions as trustees' is 
arguably superfluous wording as the same effect would be achieved without these 
words, since any exercise by the trustees of their powers for an improper purpose 
would be a breach of trust and be in contravention of section 6(6). Kenny and Kenny 
state that, 'If the words add anything to the sense (which may be doubted) they must 
add this- the trustees (who must still act as trustees) have, in relation to the land, the 
powers conferred by section 6.342 It is difficult to see how this construction can add 
anything to section 6(l) and how this circuitous and tautologous wording can be 
33" They are 'all the powers of a tenant for life and the trustees of a settlement under the Settled Land 
Act 1925'. The Law Commission in para. 10.5 footnote 116 referring to section 28 stated that, 'This 
definition by analogy is rather clumsy, and does not provide trustees for sale with a sufficiently 
extensive set of powers. ' 
339 See Barraclough and Matthews op. cit., para. 5.1, Megarry and Wade (5h edn) op. cit., p. 391-395, 
Gray Elements ofLand Law (2 nd edn) op. cit., p. 539-540, Cheshire andBurn's Modern Lenv ofReal 
Property by E. H. Bum (I 5h edn 1994) p. 205-208. 
340 A similar phrase appears in section 9 (delegation- any of their functions as trustees which relate to 
land), section 10 (consents- any function relating to the land), section II (consultation- any function 
relating to land), section 14 (power of court- any of their functions), section 18 (functions of personal 
representatives), section 20 (incapable trustee- functions as trustees). 
341 Op. cit., p. 8. 
34, Op. cit., p. 8. 
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supported. This wording was not in section 28 of the Law of Property Act 1925 and 
not in clause 4 of the Bill attached to the Law Commission Report. 
343 
Function is not defined in the statute nor in the Law of Property Act 1925. As 
Whitehouse and Hassall state, 'Function is a singularly inelegant word and it is 
unfortunate that that it has been employed instead of the more familiar (and accurate) 
"powers and duties"'. 344 The word function may be even wider than power and duty 
and incorporate any action done by a trustee in his capacity as trustee. Functions 
certainly incorporate rights, duties, powers and discretions of trustees, since these 
embody the scope of the trustee's activities. In Notting Hill Housing Rust v. 
Brackley 345 the Court of Appeal examined the meaning of 'function' within section II 
and Peter Gibson L. J. gave it a broad interpretation. He stated that, 'I accept that the 
word "function" is a wide one. But in my judgment it is quite clear that in relation to 
trustees what one has to consider is whether the action of each of them, if such 
action is called into question, is the exercise of a power or a duty, that is to say a 
function, such as to bring the duty under section II into operation. ' 346 The opening 
words of section 6(l) are a seemingly deliberate inclusion to counter the wide powers 
given by section 6(l) and to clarify beyond doubt, albeit unnecessarily so, that the 
powers are conferred on trustees as trustee and not as absolute owner. 
The second limitation, that the powers are limited to those powers 'in relation to the 
land', is significant, since it does not broaden the trustees' powers to allow them to 
invest in personalty as was commented on by some of the solicitors in their replies. 
This is where the lack of a complete, all-inclusive policy covering land and personalty 
343 Clause 4 provided that for section 28(l) of the Law of Property Act 1925, there shall be substituted, 
'Subject to the provisions of this section and to any restrictions imposed by any enactment on the 
exercise by trustees of land of any particular power, such trustees shall have all the powers of an 
absolute owner in relation to the land subject to the trust. ' 
"4 Op. cit., para. 14.34(e). 
345 [200 11 E. W. C. A. 601, [200 1]E. G. 106. The judges in the Court of Appeal were unanimous in their 
view that the giving of notice to quit by one joint tenant under section II was not a function relating to 
a trust of land. Peter Gibson L. J. stated para. 23 that the reason was that, 'it is no more than the 
exercise by the joint tenant of his or her right to withhold his or her consent to the continuation of the 
tenancy into a further period. ' Jonathan Parker L. J. stated para. 32 that, 'in serving such a notice a joint 
tenant is not acting as a trustee ..... 316 Ibid., para. 15. 
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is demonstrated. It is regrettable that the legislation has been fragmentary and 
unmethodical. 
It is odd, again exemplifying the lack of homogeneity in this whole field, that the 
word 'land' is defined in section 205(l)(ix) of the Law of Property Act 1925, as 
amended by the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 section 25(2) 
and Schedule 4, but that definition is not used in the Trustee Act 2000, which means 
that the definition contained in the Interpretation Act 1978 347 needs to be analysed. 
The definition in the Law of Property Act 1925 as amended is far wider, 348 thus 
leading to a potential discrepancy and the theoretical, though unlikely, result that the 
definition of land in section 8 of the Trustee Act 2000 may exclude trustees from 
investing in 'land' which they may have been previously been able to invest in under 
the 1996 Act. If, for example, the issue arose as to whether the trustees could invest in 
mines, this is clearly covered by the Law of Property Act definition, but left to 
judicial interpretation under the Trustee Act 2000 whether mines are included in 
'other structures'. 
Section 6(5) 
Section 6(5) is an odd subsection, since a trustee is obliged to have regard to the 
interests of beneficiaries in any event 349 and the subsection demonstrates incoherence 
of objectives of the draftsperson. Trustees are under a general duty to act in the best 
interests of the trust, which means in the best interests of the beneficiaries. 350 TbiS 
duty is in addition to the general duty under trusts law, not instead of it. Clause 4(3) of 
347 Section 5 and Schedule I- unless a contrary intention appears, 'land' includes 'buildings and other 
structures, land covered with water, and any estate, interest, easement, servitude or right in or over 
land. ' 
348 See section 205(l)(ix). 
349 The Trustee Act 2000 does not contain any similar provision in Part III and the Notes to that Act 
comment that, 'The express duty to have regard to the interests of the beneficiaries in exercising power 
under s. 6(5) is not replicated .... However that provision merely clarifies what is already the law and 
the omission of an equivalent provision is not intended to diminish the obligations of trustees. ' See 
Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., para. 2.42. See also Lewin on Trusts op. cit., para. 37-16. 
350 Most of the traditional duties of trustees would seem to be examples of the duty to act fairly or with 
an even hand as between beneficiaries with different interests. The same general duty also requires a 
trustee to act impartially between a life tenant and the remainderman. Although the purpose of the rule 
is often said to be to attain 'equal' treatment for all beneficiaries, it would seem more accurate to regard 
it as achieving a broad fairness: see Thomas on Powers op. cit., paras. 6-166-6-167. See also Megarry 
V. -C. in Cowan v. Scargill [ 1985] Ch. 270 at 287 who stated that, 'The starting point is the duty of 
trustees to exercise their powers in the best interest of the present and future beneficiaries of the trust. 
..... This duty of the trustees towards their beneficiaries is paramount. ' 
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the draft Bill attached to the Law Commission Report was worded differently: 
'trustees of land shall have regard to the rights and claims of all the persons interested 
in the land (whether beneficially or otherwise)' which explains the use of the word 
rights, since the original clause was not restricted to beneficiaries. 
The Lord Advocate, Lord Mackay, at the Second Reading of the Bill in the House of 
Lords stated that the Bill 'is subject to the requirement to act in accordance .......... 
with the general equitable duties attaching to the position of trustee, in particular the 
duty to have regard to the interests of the beneficiaries in exercising such powers. ' 351 
Yet the subsection was not worded in such a way. Section 6(5) may also seem 
unnecessary in the light of the duty to consult under section 11, though the parameters 
of section 6(5) and section 11 are different. 
Section 6(6) and (8) 
The wording of section 6(6) seems unduly complex, contorted and unnecessary. A 
power would have to comply with rules of law and equity in any event, so section 
6(6) serves no purpose other than to restate general principles. It seems that every 
case will have to be construed on its facts as to whether the wide power under section 
6(l) will prevail or whether rules of law or equity will interfere with this. Misconduct 
will in most cases be a breach of the rules of equity and it is irrelevant that every 
breach of law or equity may not be misconduct. Kenny and Kenny argue that the 
literal effect of section 6(6) is that any exercise of a power in breach of any rule of 
law or equity is void. 352 This cannot be right as Kenny and Kenny intimate later on in 
that paragraph, a power in relation to unregistered land is not invalidated as against a 
purchaser who 'has no actual notice of the contravention. 353 Section 6(8) seems to 
serve less purpose than section 6(6) and is surplus to requirements. 
351 Op. cit., Vol. 569, col. 1719. 352 Op. cit., P. 8. 
353 Section 16(2) of the 1996 Act. 
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Is it undesirable to limit investment to land in the United Kingdom? 
The statutory provisions 
Since there was no power to purchase land in the Trustee Investments Act 1961, 
section 6(3) of the 1996 Act gave trustees such a power limited to a legal estate in 
England and Wales. The Trustee Act 2000 amended the original section 6(3) of the 
1996 Act to extend the power conferred by section 8 of the Trustee Act 2000 to land 
in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Section 6(3) of the 1996 Act states that, 'The 
trustees of land have power to acquire land under the power conferred by section 8 of 
the Trustee Act 2000. ' Section 8(l) of the Trustee Act 2000 states that, 'A trustee may 
acquire freehold or leasehold land in the United Kingdom ............. 
The reasoning behind the confinement of the power to the United Kingdom is 
contained in the Law Commission Report Trustees'Powers and Duties 354 and is that, 
'The concept of the trust is not universally recognised and, even in those jurisdictions 
that do recognise trusts, the law does not necessarily give effect to the safeguards for 
the protection of the interests of beneficiaries against the claims of third parties that 
apply in England and Wales. 355 Another reason is that jurisdictions with forced 
heirship provisions would cause difficulties in dealing with the land if trustees bought 
land in those jurisdictions and were not aware of the rules. 
Circumvention 
The fact that section 8 of the Trustee Act 2000 is confined to land in the United 
Kingdom is too narrow in the light of the current global economy. 356 Many trustees 
354 Law Com. No. 260 (1999) para. 2.42. 
355 As a general rule, the courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an application for the determination of 
the title to, or the right to possession of, any immovable (which term obviously includes land) situated 
abroad: British SouthAfrica Company v. Companhia de Mocambique [ 18931 A. C. 602. However where 
a court has jurisdiction in personam over a defendant, it will enforce a limited range of obligations 
against him in relation to foreign land: see Penn v. Baltimore (1750) 1 Ves. Sen. 444,27 E. R. 1132. In 
such circumstances the court may grant a declaration that the defendant holds foreign land as trustee: 
Cook Industries Inc. v. Galliher [1979] Ch. 439. Nevertheless the courts have always applied the lex 
situs to the essential validity of trusts of immovables and if the foreign lex situs does not recognise 
trusts of land, the trust will fail: see Re Pearse's Settlement [ 1909] 1 Ch. 304. The recognition of trusts 
in a number of states such as Italy, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Malta is governed by the Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition 1985 (incorporated into law in 
the United Kingdom by the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987). See generally para. 2.42 footnote 88 of 
Law Com. No. 260 for more details of the Convention. 
356 See, for example, Penelope Reed and Richard Wilson The Trustee Act 2000A Practical Guide 
(2001) para. 4.17. 
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hold land in other jurisdictions, particularly if there are beneficiaries who are resident 
there, or some other connection between the trust and that country. It could be argued 
that there should be a list of countries which have ratified the Hague Convention on 
Trusts where there would be little difficulty in the beneficiaries being protected. The 
solution to the law as it now stands is that it is up to settlors to confer express powers 
for trustees to acquire land injurisdictions which are not part of the United Kingdom, 
because the Law Commission did not consider that it would be appropriate to confer 
such powers as a default position. 357 Alternatively, interests in foreign land may be 
acquired by acquiring shares in a company that owns foreign land. 358 
A very important point about the territorial application of the 1996 Act arose at first 
instance in Ashurst v. Pollard . 
359 The issue was whether Mr Pollard's trustee in 
bankruptcy could obtain an order for sale of ajointly owned villa in Portugal or 
whether the Portuguese courts had exclusive jurisdiction, because the proceedings had 
as their object rights in rem in immovable property for the purposes of Article 16(l) 
of Schedule I of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters 1968. It had been argued by counsel for the Pollards 
that since section 27(3) provides that the 1996 Act extends only to England and 
Wales, no order could be made under the 1996 Act. 
Jacob J. at first instance circumvented this by stating, 'That it is self evidently so but 
seems to me to be irrelevant. What the 1996 Act does not say is that the court cannot 
act in relation to trust property held abroad or that similar orders as can be made under 
the 1996 Act cannot be made by virtue of the court's jurisdiction over property held 
under an English trust. ' 360 In the Court of Appeal361 Jonathan Parker L. J. stated that 
counsel for the Pollards 'does not repeat in this court the submission which he made 
to Jacob J. to the effect that the English court has no jurisdiction to make orders in 
relation to trust property held abroad: he accepts that such jurisdiction exists, 
independently of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996. He 
357 See Law Com. No. 260 para. 2.42. 
358 See Hayton and Marshall op. cit., para. 9-124 footnote 29 and Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., para. 
11.74. 
359 [2000] 2 All E. R. 772. 
360 Mid., para. 20. 
361 [2001] 2 All E. R. 75 para. 24. 
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submits, however, that it is ajurisdiction which the court will rarely exercise in 
practice, and that it should not be exercised in the instant case. ' 
The actual basis of the Court of Appeal decision, following Webb v. Mebb, 362 was that 
Article 16(l) did not apply because the proceedings did not have as their object rights 
in rem in immovable property since 'no issue arises as to the factual situation in 
Portugal, nor do the proceedings involve any question of Portuguese law or practice. 
........ the proceedings do not seek to assert any property right against third 
parties/strangers: rather, they raise personal issues as between the trustee on one hand 
and Mr and Mrs Pollard on the other. 363 Jonathan Parker L. J. rationalised that 'the 
fact that the resolution of a dispute as to personal rights (rights in personam) may 
impact upon property rights enforceable against third parties/strangers (rights in rem) 
does not in myjudgment lead to the conclusion that the subject matter of the 
proceedings for the purposes of article 16(l) is rights in rem. 364 Consequently the 
English court had jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings based on reasoning which 
may seem artificial and contrived, but which can be attributed to the end result 
justifying the means adopted in order that the court could reach the conclusion which 
the judges wanted to reach. Therefore, so long as the action is framed as an action in 
personam, English courts will have jurisdiction. 
Harris' view is that although the Hague Trusts Convention leads to the application of 
the law applicable to the trust, and not the lex situs, given the exclusive control 
ordinarily exercised by the courts of the situs in disputes concerning land and the risk 
of unenforceability in the situs, it is far from obvious that the 1996 Act should be 
362 [1994] Q. B. 696. For criticisms of JVebbv. Webb, see Adrian Briggs TrustsofLandand the 
Brussels Convention (1994) 110 L. Q. R. 526 who questions whether it is helpful to see the right of the 
beneficiary as one inpersonam where the right would be enforceable against a transferee, unless he 
were a species of bonafide purchaser. Adrian Briggs in Ordering the Sale ofa Bankrupt's Land in 
Portugal (2000) 71 B. Y. B. I. L. 443 at 445 was far more vitriolic in his condemnation of Webb stating 
that, 'It was appalling reasoning in Webb, but it represents the law, and proves that if hard cases make 
bad law, bad lawyers can make worse. ' For more favourable appraisal of Ifebb, see Catharine 
MacMillan The European Court ofJustice Agrees with Afailland. Trusts and the Brussels Convention 
[1996] Conv. 125 at 129 who rightly indicates that it is preferable that the determination of a trust 
created in England be made by an English court, though she recognises that if the trustee had conveyed 
to a third party in the country where the property was situated, it becomes much more difficult to assert 
that the case involves merely a personal relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary. See also 
Pippa Rogerson Equity, Rights in Rem and the Brussels Convention [ 1994] C. L. J. 462. 3630 
. P cit., paras. 54 and 55. 364 op. cit., para. 56. 
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construed as applying to land situated overseas. 365 Jacob J. was specifically 
addressing section 14, although his comments appear applicable to the whole Act. 
This could be problematic in seeking to enforce a right to occupy under section 12 or 
exclusion of a beneficiary under section 13 in a foreign jurisdiction. Harris is right 
that the sweepi ng statement of Jacob J. 'as to the territorial reach of the 1996 Act 
appears exorbitant and distinctly dubious'. 366 
Is the power to acquire land sufficiently comprehensive? 
Limitations 
The power applies to freeholds and leaseholds which are no longer restricted to land 
held for a term of at least 60 years. The effect of section 8(2)(a) of the Trustee Act 
2000367 is that trustees cannot invest in equitable freeholds or leaseholds nor in 
equitable interests in land, 368 such as a beneficial interest in a commercial property, 
which might provide a very good return, or in other legal interests in land such as 
rentcharges, 369 which may be a serious lacuna. Trustees may be able to combine 
together with third parties to purchase a share of land as the statutory definition of 
'land 070 includes any interest in land, provided that the trustees hold the legal estate. 
There may be a difficulty if trustees of different trusts with different trustees wish to 
combine together to buy freeholds or leaseholds since, even if there is no requirement 
for the legal estate to be vested in purchasing trustees to the exclusion of other legal 
365 See Jonathan Harris Ordering the Sale ofLandSituated Overseas [2001] L. M. C. L. Q. 205 at 213- 
214 who is generally critical of the decision in Pollard. Harris at 209, whilst recognising that Pollard 
was a weaker case for application of Article 16 than Webb, questions whether the proceedings had as 
their object rights in rem in immoveable property on the basis that the proceedings sought, ultimately, 
to bring about a change in ownership of the land. See also Briggs Ordering the Sale ofa Bankrupt's 
Land in Portugal op. cit., at 445 who argues that the effect of English bankruptcy law making the 
trustee legal owner of all property of which the bankrupt had been legal owner is a matter which has a 
right in rem as its object. 366 op. cit., p. 214. 
367 Section 8(2) states that, "'Freehold or leasehold land" means- (a) in relation to England and Wales, 
a legal estate in land'. 
368 Reed and Wilson op. cit., para. 4.19 postulate that in jurisdictions where equitable interests in land 
are not regarded as land as such (and give the example of the case in this jurisdiction prior to the 
abolition of the doctrine of conversion), trustees will be able to invest in those interests in land by 
relying on the general power of investment. 
369 These were permitted by the Trustee Investments Act 1961 and for trustees who have invested in 
perpetual rentcharges before the coming into force of the Act, they will not be regarded as exceeding 
their powers of investment just because they retain those rentcharges- para. 7 of Schedule 3 to the 
Trustee Act 2000 and see Reed and Wilson op. cit., para. 4.15. 
370 Section 5 and Schedule I of the Interpretation Act 1978. 
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owners, the restrictions on the number of trustees of trusts of land may preclude 
compliance with section 8(l) of the Trustee Act 2000.371 
Section 6(3) of the 1996 Act reversed Re Poiver 372 where it was held that an express 
power to invest as an absolute owner did not enable trustees to purchase land for 
occupation by beneficiaries. Section 17(l) of the 1996 Act stated that section 6(3) 
applies 'in relation to trustees of a trust of proceeds of sale of land as in relation to 
trustees of land' thus reversing the decision in Re Makenian, 373 where it was held that 
once all the land was sold, the trust for sale ceased and with it the power to invest. 
Section 17(3) of the 1996 Act defines a 'trust of proceeds of sale of land' as including 
not only proceeds of a disposition of land held in trust, but also any property 
representing such proceeds. Section 17(l) of the 1996 Act has been repealed by the 
Trustee Act 2000374 since the trustees of the proceeds of sale of land have power to 
buy land under Part III, so it is no longer necessary to treat them as if they were 
trustees of land and thus authorised under section 6(3) of the 1996 Act. 
Section 8(l) of the Trustee Act 2000 states that, 'A trustee may acquire freehold or 
leasehold land in the United Kingdom- (a) as an investment, (b) for occupation by a 
beneficiary, or (c) for any other reason. ' Subsection (1)(a) and (b) of section 8 may 
seem superfluous in the light of (c) which is widely drafted, yet are included to avoid 
any doubt that those two reasons are pennissible. 375 In the draft Bill attached to the 
Law Commission Report clause 4(l) substituted section 28(2) of the Law of Property 
Act 1925 to include the provision that trustees 'may purchase .......... for any purpose 
they think fit. ' This broadened the Law Commission's recommendation 'that trustees 
should have a broad power to apply some or all of any of the proceeds of sale to the 
purchase of land, either as an investment or for occupation by the beneficiaries. ' The 
end result in section 8(1) is a combination of these two. 
371 See Lewin on Trusts op. cit., para. 35-194F. 
372 [19471 Ch. 572. 
373 [ 1945] Ch. 177. See, however, Re Wellsted's Will Trusts [ 1949] Ch. 296 at 319 where Cohen L. J. 
stated in relation to the decision of Uthwatt J. in Re Wakeman 'in what I have said on the construction 
of this section I desire to reserve the question of what the position would be if at the time when the 
1 uestion of investment arose no land was held upon the trusts of the settlement. ' M 
See section 40(l) and Schedule 2 para. 48 of the Trustee Act 2000. 
375 See Alastair Hudson Equity and Trusts (3d edn 2003) para. 9.2.4. 
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Scope of investnient 
There is no definition of investment in the Act, thus leaving section 8(l)(a) of the 
Trustee Act 2000 (which enables trustees to acquire land as an investment) open to 
interpretation. Traditionally investment has been defined as income-producing 
assets 376 defined by Lawrence J. in Re Mragg as 'to apply money in the purchase of 
some property from which profit or interest is expected and which property is 
purchased in order to be held for the sake of the income which it will yield. 377 The 
result would be that non-income-producing assets such as antiques, works of art and 
premium bonds could not be purchased. This is why the purchase of a house for 
occupation by a beneficiary which produces no income was held not to be an 
investment in Re Power. Yet a closer analysis of the judgments of Lawrence J. in Re 
Wragg and Jenkins J. in Re Power reveals that the judges were not formulating rigid 
rules which they have subsequently been quoted as establishing. 378 
Lawrence J. in Re Wragg preceded his definition by stating that he was not giving 'an 
exhaustive definition' and that the definition he gave was merely 'one of its 
meanings', 379 thus indicating that this was not the only meaning. Jenkins J. in Re 
Power stated in tentative and inconclusive language in reference to purchasing 
freehold property for occupation by a beneficiary that 'it is not necessarily an 
investment, for it is purchase for some other purpose than the receipt of income. 380 
The word 'necessarily' indicates that his statement is not definitive. Jenkins J. 
continued, 'It may be a purchase which would not be, from the financial point of 
view, attractive or indeed at all beneficial, because part of the price might be 
attributable to the special benefit represented by the acquisition of a suitable place to 
live. ' 
376 See Lewin on Trusts op. cit., paras. 35-11,35-194G, 35-197, Reed and Wilson op. cit., paras. 3.15- 
3.18 and Hanbury and Martin op. cit., p. 532-533. 
377 [191912 Ch. 58 at 64-65. The decision in the case was that on the true construction of Clause 10 of 
the testator's will, the trustees were authorised to invest the trust money in the purchase of real estate 
and that consequently they could effect a valid appropriation of the testator's real estate in or towards 
satisfaction of the settled shares of the testator's daughters in the residuary estate. 
3711 See Andrew Hicks The Trustee Act 2000 and the modern meaning of 'investment'(2001) 15 T. L. I. 
203 at 204-205. 379 op. cit., p. 64-65. 310 op. cit., p. 575. 
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This indicates that it will not be an investment if a higher price is paid in order to 
acquire premises in which to live, which requires an investigation into whether a 
premium was paid for this. Jenkins J. concluded his analysis by stating that, it 'might 
not be a purchase by way of investment, inasmuch as part of the money would or 
might be paid for the advantage of vacant possession and the benefit the family would 
get by living in the house. 38 1 This signifies that there may be an investment so long 
as part of the purchase price does not constitute the provision of an immediate 
dispositive benefit to the trust beneficiaries. 382 Jenkins J. 's indeten-ninate language 
diminishes the significance of Re Power. 
Hicks argues that the traditional meaning of investmen 083 no longer persists in the 
law of trusts for a number of convincing reasons. 384 There has been a recent 
proliferation of investments that do not produce income, but which may nevertheless 
enhance effective trust fund management 385 and judicial authority shows that the legal 
meaning of investment has evolved to reflect these developments. 386 In addition the 
special trust law considerations that historically conditioned a restrictive meaning of 
investment have no relevance today given contemporary economic conditions and 
increasingly sophisticated understandings of investment. 387 Also the persistence of a 
restrictive meaning of investment would partially frustrate the policy behind the 
Trustee Act 2000.388 
381 op. cit., p. 575. 
382 See Hicks op. cit., p. 205-206. Hicks concluded p. 206 that, 'Re Power is a weak authority due not 
only to its ambiguity but also the historical context in which it was decided. ' 
383 To purchase an asset for the purpose of yielding income: see op. cit., p. 203. 
384 See op. cit., p. 204. 
385 A large number of financial instruments have emerged that do not yield an income but are of great 
potential benefit to trusts for other reasons, such as put options, futures, warrants, zero dividend 
preference shares: see Hicks op. cit., p. 206-209. 
386 For example Marson v. Morton [ 1986] 1 W. L. R. 1343 at 1350 per Browne-Wilkinson V. -C and 
Cook v. Medway Housing Society Ltd [19971 S. T. C. 90 at 98 per Lightman J. 
387 An increased emphasis on capital growth is required in contemporary economic conditions to 
preserve the real value of the trust fund and maintain its capacity to produce a constant real income. In 
addition the modem portfolio theoryjudges the prudence of investments by reference to the total return 
(income and capital gain/loss) of the whole portfolio and the duty of even-handedness must be 
understood at this portfolio level: see Hicks op. cit., p. 211. See also L. M. Clements Bringing Trusts 
into the Twenty-First Century [2004] 2 Web J. C. L. I. at 7-10. 388 It would arbitrarily restrict the range of assets available to trustees as investments and would 
perpetuate via the back door the very evil that the Trustee Act 2000 sought to avoid, namely a form of 
categoric restriction: see Hicks op. cit., p. 212. 
110 
Due to the general uncertainty, express investment clauses state that the power applies 
whether the asset is income-producing or not. The Law Commission was of the view 
that, 'The notion of what constitutes an investment is an evolving concept, to be 
interpreted by the courts . ......... Today, there can 
be little doubt that "profif' can be 
in the form of capital appreciation rather than income yield. Trustees might, for 
example, legitimately invest (depending upon the circumstances of the trust) in 
antique silver or paintings in the expectation that they will increase in value. 
389 The 
Law Commission then quoted from Sir Donald Nicholls V. -C. in Harries v. Church 
Commissionersfor England390 who stated that 'the purposes of the trust will be best 
served by the trustees seeking to obtain therefrom the maximum return, whether by 
way of income or capital growth, which is consistent with corm-nercial prudence'. 391 
The Charity Commission, however, takes a narrower view of investment and is of the 
view that commodities, works of art, premium bonds and derivatives are not 
investments. 392 It is to be regretted that the Trustee Act 2000 was not sufficiently 
comprehensive to forestall problems of such a restrictive interpretation arising. 
Anibit ofoccupation and who is a beneficiary under section 8(l)(b)? 
A close analysis of the wording of section 8(l)(b) of the Trustee Act 2000 reveals 
potentially problematic terminology. The view that it can be occupation for a business 
purpose 393 is difficult to support, because the plain intention behind the original 
section 6(4) of the 1996 Act was occupation as a residence which although not 
specifically expressed, is the underlying theme of paragraphs 10.7 and 10.8 of the 
Law Commission Report. Occupation for business purposes will fall in (c) and in 
some cases (a) of section 8(l) and therefore it is questionable whether it is justifiable 
to distort the meaning of the word occupation to cover business use. 
389 See para. 2.28 footnote 56 of Law Com. No. 260 and Explanatory Notes to the Trustee Act 2000 
E aras. 22 and 23. See also Underhill and Hayton op. cit., p. 601-602. 
90 [1992] 1 W. L. R. 1241 at 1246. See generally Leivin on Trusts op. cit., paras. 35-194G, 35-14713,35- 
152. 
391 See also Cowan v. Scargill op. cit., at 287 per Megarry V. -C. 392 Charity Commission Operational Guidance Trustee Act 2000 General Power ofInvestment para. 2 
(OG 86 B 1- 8 February 2002). Detailed guidance on derivatives is contained in paras. 3 and 4. 
Clements op. cit., p. 6 distinguishes cases where there is only one category of beneficiary, interested in 
both the capital and the income, where there is no need to balance income against capital and in such 
cases a purchase which produces capital appreciation only would be an allowable investment. 
393 See Leivin on Trusts op. cit., para. 35-194H and Underhill and Hayton op. cit., p. 6 10 who stress that 
the trustees need to ensure that they act fairly between income and capital beneficiaries in going ahead 
with such a proposed purchase. 
III 
The Act is silent on the categories of beneficiaries in whose favour the power can be 
exercised. Yet trustees cannot allow occupation by a remainden-nan, because section 
8(l)(b) is an administrative power in aid of the beneficial interests and not a 
dispositive power, which allows the trustees to alter the beneficial interests or alter the 
balance betwe en the life tenant and the remainderman. 394 Allowing the remainderman 
to occupy is allowing the interest of that beneficiary to be brought into possession. In 
the normal situation land will be acquired for occupation by a beneficiary with a 
beneficial interest in possession. Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Act do not apply, yet 
trustees are bound by duties under the general law as well as the duty of care under 
section 1. 
Since section 8(l)(b) does not stipulate that the beneficiary must have a beneficial 
interest in possession, the question arises whether trustees could exercise the power in 
favour of a beneficiary under an accumulation and maintenance trust or under a 
discretionary trust. It would be permissible for trustees to buy land for occupation by 
a beneficiary under an accumulation and maintenance trust out of trust capital, the 
income of which is eligible to be applied solely for the maintenance of that 
beneficiary who stands to take a beneficial interest in possession or absolute interest 
in the land acquired upon attaining some specified age. 395 
Arguably, section 8(l)(b) authorises trustees to purchase land for occupation by a 
beneficiary who is an object of a discretionary trust, though this is less clear since the 
acquisition would preclude the other objects of the discretionary trust from the 
opportunity of participating in the enjoyment of the land, so long as it was retained for 
the occupational purpose (unless the 
ýeneficiary for whom the land was acquired paid 
a full rent). To that extent the character of the beneficial interests would be altered by 
the acquisition. 396 An alternative view is that trustees could purchase a house for 
394 See Lewin on Trusts op. cit., para. 35-194H and Underhill and Hayton op. cit., p. 609. 
395 This would accord with the requirements for accumulation and maintenance trusts in section 71 (1) 
of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984. See Lewin on Trusts op. cit., para. 35-1941 and Underhill and Hayton 
oT. cit., p. 6 10. 
36 36 Lewin on Trusts op. cit., para. 35-1941. 
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occupation of a discretionary income beneficiary and his family and permit him a 
licence to live there which is revocable at the whim of the trustees. 397 
There is, however, a problem of supporting the view that section 8(l)(b) allows 
trustees to exercise the power in favour of a beneficiary under a discretionary trust 
and this focuses on the meaning of the term 'beneficiary. It is anomalous that the 
term 'beneficiary' is defined in the 1996 Act but not the 2000 Act, which once more 
exemplifies legislation without a coherent, all-embracing strategy or rushed together 
without the full implications being contemplated. The definition in the 1996 Act in 
section 22(l) is "'beneficiary", in relation to a trust, means any person who under the 
trust has an interest in property subject to the trust The test, therefore, is whether 
the person has 'an interest in property subject to the trust. ' 
The House of Lords decided in Gartside v. IR&98 that beneficiaries of a discretionary 
trust do not enjoy an interest in trust assets. Lord Wilberforce stated, 'no doubt in a 
certain sense a beneficiary under a discretionary trust has an "interest": the nature of it 
may, sufficiently for the purpose, be spelt out by saying that he has a right to be 
considered as a potential recipient of benefit by the trustees and a right to have his 
interest protected by a court of equity. Certainly that is so, and when it is said that he 
has a right to have the trustees exercise their discretion "fairly" or "reasonably" or 
"properly" that indicates clearly enough that some objective consideration (not stated 
explicitly in declaring the discretionary trust, but latent in it) must be applied by the 
trustees and that the right is more than a mere spes. But that does not mean that he has 
an interest which is capable of being taxed by reference to its extent in the trust fund's 
income: it may be a right with some degree of concreteness or solidity, which attracts 
the protection of a court of equity, yet it may still lack the necessary quality of 
397 See Underhill and Hayton op. cit., p. 609 who express the view that trustees may acquire a holiday 
home to be used from time to time by discretionary beneficiaries and their families. An interest in 
possession for inheritance tax purposes could be avoided by specifying that a discretionary beneficiary 
is to use the home only as a licensee and the practice is to use the home only for short periods that 
differ each year and are at different times of year each year. Note Armitage v. Nurse [1998] Ch. 241 at 
261 where Millett L. J. held that time does not begin to run under section 21(3) of the Limitation Act 
1980 for a beneficiary under a discretionary trust or power until the beneficiary is entitled to an interest 
in possession in the property (that is receives some trust funds) with the consequence that the liability 
of trustees of a discretionary trust is open-ended. 
398 [19681 A. C. 553. See generally the discussion in Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., paras. 4.44.6. 
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definable extent which must exist before it can be taxed. 
399 The decision is obviously 
confined to the taxation sphere but general principles can be derived from it and 
applied by analogy here. 400 
Even though beneficiaries under a discretionary trust can under the rule in Saunders v. 
Vautier join together and bring the trust to an end provided that they are sui iuris, this 
does not make them beneficiaries under the Act. It is notable that Whitehouse and 
Hassall401 only consider the issue of whether discretionary beneficiaries have a 
sufficient interest in the trust property as being relevant to section 6(5), section 14 and 
sections 19 and 20 and argue that in all three contexts, it would be hard to justify 
excluding such a beneficiary. 402 Even though the Trustee Act 2000 does not define 
'beneficiary', 403 there is no justification for incorporating the definition in the 1996 
Act, since the interpretation section, section 39, does not make provision for this. 
Schedule I of the Interpretation Act 1978 does not define beneficiary, so there is a 
lacuna which the judiciary will no doubt fill by adopting the definition from section 
22 of the 1996 Act. 
Any other reason under section 8(1)(c) 
Section 8(l)(c) is the widely drafted sweeping-up provision under which trustees may 
acquire land for any reason other than investment or occupation by a beneficiary. 
Section 8(l)(c) will be important for charitable trusts to enable trustees to buy land 404 
and for non-charitable purpose trusts where land is acquired in the administration of 
the trust. 405 Where there is a large trust running a substantial estate, section 8(l)(c) 
would cover land being acquired as premises from which the trust administration 
3990 
. P cit., p. 617. 
4'0 A distinction needs to be drawn between a beneficiary under a discretionary trust and the object of a 
power of appointment, the latter only having a hope or spes: Re Brooks'Seltlement Trusts [ 1939] Ch. 
993. Fiduciary or personal objects of a fiduciary power cannot be excluded from having any right to 
make the trustee account, though objects of a personal power can: Rosewood Trust Lid v. Schmidt 
[2003] U. K. P. C. 26, [2003] 2 W. L. R. 1442. 
401 op. cit., paras. 4.74.8. 
402 Underhill and Hayton op. cit., p. 610 argue that a beneficiary under a discretionary trust does have a 
proprietary interest of sorts: Knocker v. Youle [1986] 2 All E. R. 914, Re Smith [1928] Ch. 915. 
403 Section 35(2)(b) and (c) are limited to the context of personal representatives and are not definitive. 
404 The Lord Chancellor confirmed that it would include the purchase of functional land by charitable 
trustees for carrying out the purposes of the charity, for example, a school buying land to serve as a 
playing field: see H. L. Debs., Vol. 613, col. CWH3,7 June 2000. 
405 See Lewin on Trusts op. cit., pam. 35-194K. 
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could be carried on. Section 8(l)(c) clearly covers the case of land being purchased 
for the beneficiary to run a business from, but will not cover trustees acquiring land to 
carry on a business run by the trustees as opposed to by the beneficiaries. 
Inter-relationship ofsection 6(1) ofthe 1996 Act and section 8(3) ofthe Trustee Act 
2000 
The question arises whether section 8(3) of the 2000 Act is wider than section 6(l) of 
the 1996 Act. 406 Section 8(3) of the 2000 Act provides that, 'For the purpose of 
exercising his functions as a trustee, a trustee who acquires land under this section has 
all the powers of an absolute owner in relation to the land. ' Section 6(l) of the 1996 
Act only becomes operative once land has been acquired and the trustees have 
become trustees of land. There are differing views as to whether section 6(l) 
authorises trustees who are not trustees of land to mortgage the land for the purpose of 
acquiring it, 407 and whether trustees are authorised to borrow money for the purpose 
of acquiring land under section 16 of the Trustee Act 1925.408 
Since section 8(3) of the 2000 Act does not require the trustees already to be trustees 
of land when they exercise their powers under the subsection, and uses the present 
tense, trustees will have power to buy land with the aid of a mortgage when acquired 
for any of the reasons given in section 8(1 ). 409 This is correct in so far as section 6(l) 
of the 1996 Act is limited to trustees who are trustees of land, yet it is clearly arguable 
that since section 6(3) of the 1996 Act states that, 'The trustees of land have power to 
406 Lewin on Trusts op. cit., para. 35-194L. 
407 Lewin on Trusts op. cit., para. 35-194L takes the view that section 6(l) does not authorise trustees to 
mortgage land to acquire it and discusses by way of comparison in footnote 93 Abbey National 
Building Society v. Cann [1991] 1 A. C. 56 in which the House of Lords exploded the theory that there 
was a scintilla temporis between acquisition of the legal estate in land and the grant of the mortgage 
financing the acquisition: both are one indivisible transaction. It is interesting that Lewin on Trusts 
draws upon this case by way of comparison when the case actually supports the proposition that they 
are stating, because if there were a scintilla temporis, then the trustees would arguably have the power 
under the 1996 Act. This stance should be contrasted with the view of Underhill and Hayton op. cit., p. 
608 who argue rightly that due to Cann, trustees of land orjust of movables can purchase land by way 
of mortgage over that land, but they cannot create a liability by mortgaging other trust property to 
generate money to be used in the acquisition of further investments. 
4013 Where trustees are authorised to pay or apply capital money subject to the trust for any purpose or in 
any manner, they have power to raise such money by sale, mortgage etc. of the trust property for the 
time being in possession. It does not enable trustees to raise money on the security of the trust property 
for the purpose of acquiring further land by way of investment: Re Suenson-Taylor [1974] 1 W. L. R. 
1280. 
409 See also Hayton and Marshall op. cit., para. 9-124 and the Law Com. No. 260 para. 2.44. 
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acquire land under the power conferred by section 8 of the Trustee Act 2000', that a 
trustee of land is covered by the wording of section 8(3) of the 2000 Act and such a 
trustee is enabled by the present tense wording of section 8(3) to buy land with the aid 
of a mortgage. A trustee of land is therefore not disadvantaged or restricted by section 
6(l) of the 1996 Act. 
It is worth noting that for the purposes of section 6(l) of the 1996 Act, it makes no 
difference how the land came into the trust: it could have been acquired by trustees 
under section 8 of the Trustee Act 2000 or it could have been gifted by the settlor, 
whereas section 8(3) of the Trustee Act 2000 only applies to land acquired by a 
trustee, which does not apply where land is gifted to the trust. Whitehouse and Hassall 
argue that it does not matter that section 8(3) does not apply where land is gifted to 
the trust given that the trust in such a case will be a trust of land and hence the trustees 
will have the section 6(l) powers. 4 10 They contend that when land is acquired under 
section 8, the trustees become trustees of land and hence have the section 6(l) powers 
of an absolute owner. They argue that it would, therefore, seem that the powers given 
in section 8(3) are wholly redundant. The problem with that argument is that section 8 
of the 2000 Act has been enacted to be self-contained and independent of section 6 of 
the 1996 Act. There is inevitably overlap between section 6 of the 1996 Act and 
section 8 of the 2000 Act, which demonstrates yet again that the legislation has been 
enacted piecemeal rather than as an assimilated comprehensive whole. 
Personalty and land are in any case dealt with separately in the 2000 Act. The general 
power of investment in section 3 of the 2000 Act might have been widened to include 
the acquisition of land 411 in order to achieve uniformity. The principal reason the Law 
Commission gave for structuring the Bill in this way was to facilitate consequential 
amendments to the investment powers of some bodies who, though not trustees, are 
presently subject to the provisions of the Trustee Investments Act 196 1.412 It seems 
unfortunate that short-term gains of promoting consequential amendments should 
have forestalled long-term gains of homogeneity of investment powers. 
410 op. cit., para. 11.73. 
411 See Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., para. 11.75. 412 Law Com. No. 260 para. 2.41 footnote 86 and para. 2.23. 
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A further reason given was that a wide power of investment which would include land 
may not give trustees power to purchase land for occupation by a beneficiary and 
would not permit them to do so for other reasons. 413 This obstacle could have been 
overcome by express provision. A more convincing explanation is that the law has 
traditionally dealt with personalty and land under different statutory regimes and to 
continue to deal with them independently is to continue along the same path as the 
law has been treading. The Trustee Act 2000 should have been bold and assimilated 
the provisions of the 1996 Act into the 2000 Act. 
Utility of the duty of care 
The duty of care when exercising the powers conferred by section 6 was inserted into 
section 6 as the new subsection (9) by the Trustee Act 2000.414 Section 6(9) of the 
1996 Act states that, 'The duty of care under section I of the Trustee Act 2000 applies 
to trustees of land when exercising the powers conferred by this section. ' It is odd that 
the duty of care under section 6(9) is misleadingly omitted from the list in the Trustee 
Act 2000, Schedule 1, whereas other legislation, such as the amendments to section 
415 22(l) or (3) of the Trustee Act 1925 are included. This can only be an oversight . 
There is no rationale for the omission since the amendments to section 22(l) or (3) of 
the Trustee Act 1925 are contained in the Firse 16 and Second 417 Schedules. 
Section 6(9) is a worthy addition, since it adds an extra necessary dimension to limit 
the increased powers of trustees contained in section 6(l ). 418 The duty of care seems 
to codify the general equitable duty of care, as was intended by the Law 
Commission, 419 though the duty of care had not been laid down with precision. 420 
413 See para. 2.41. 
414 Section 40(l) and Schedule 2 para. 45(3). 
415 See Leivin on Trusts op. cit., para. 37-20A and Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., para. 2.54 footnote 
I. 
416 Schedule I para. 6. 
417 Section 40(l) and Schedule 2 para. 22. 
418 In Law Com. No. 260 the Law Commission recognised in para. 3.8 that 'in devising a scheme to 
confer wider administrative powers on trustees, an appropriate balance must be struck between 
extending the powers which trustees have as a matter of law, and the imposition of safeguards in an 
allempt to ensure that they act properly in exercising those powers. ' 
419 See Law Com. No. 260 para. 2.35. 
420 The general duty was to take the care of an ordinary prudent businessman in managing his own 
affairs- see Underhill and Hayton op. cit., p. 576-577: Brice v. Stokes (1805) 11 Ves. 319, Massey v. 
Banner (1820) 1 Jac. & W. 24 1, Bullock v. Bullock (1886) 56 L. J. Ch. 22 1, Speight v. Gaunt (1883) 22 
117 
Whether a trustee has exercised such care and skill as is reasonable in the 
circumstances 421 will be a question of fact to be determined in each case. 
Can the power of sale be excluded under section 8(1)? 
Significance ofexcluding the power ofsale 
Section 8(l) of the 1996 Act provides that, 'Sections 6 and 7 do not apply in the case 
of a trust of land created by a disposition in so far as provision to the effect that they 
do not apply is made by the disposition. ' A major issue raised by section 8 is whether 
the power of sale can be excluded and whether the 'dead hand' of the settlor can take 
hold. As Watt states in Escaping Section 8(1) Provisions in 'New Style' Trusts of 
422 Land 
, section 
8(l) is stated in stark, unqualified terms and was anticipated to have a 
radical impact, so much so that Parliament felt it necessary to limit its effect to private 
423 trusts of land . 
It is extraordinary that this provision conferring on settlors a powerful new dispositive 
facility is reminiscent of the position which existed until the latter part of the last 
century when the 'dead hand' of the settlor rested heavily on the owners of traditional 
family settlements. 424 To assuage those concerned about the prevention of the creation 
of new strict settlements, the Law Commission goes to great lengths to re-assure that 
settlors will be able to use the new provisions to ensure that the trust powers are 
vested in the life tenant by delegation to achieve much the same result as that which 
flowed automatically from the constitution of a strict settlement. 425 
Ch. D. 727 at 736 and 754 affirmed (1883) 9 App. Cas. I at 19 per Lord Blackburn. A paid trustee was 
expected to exercise a higher standard of diligence and knowledge than an unpaid trustee: Re 
Waterinan's Will Trusts [ 1952] 2 All E. R. 1054 at 1055, National Trustees Co. ofAustralasia v. 
General Finance Co. ofAustralasia [19051 A. C. 373 at 381. As for a corporate professional trustee, see 
Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co. Lid [19801 Ch. 515 at 534. See also Hudson op. cit., paras. 9.3.3- 
9.3.6 who categorises the trustee's general duties of investment into three core principles: to act 
prudently and safely- Learoyd v. TPhiteley (1887) 12 App. Cas. 727, to act fairly between beneficiaries- 
Bartlett v. Barclays Bank, Nestli v. National Westminster Bank, and to do the best for the beneficiaries 
financially- Cowan v. Scargill. 
42 1 For a detailed analysis of the duty imposed by section I of the 2000 Act, see Reed and Wilson op. 
cit., paras. 2.3-2.9 and Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., paras. 10.17-10.19. 
422 Gary Watt [ 19971 Conv. 263 at 264-265. 
423 Section 8(3) disapplies section 8(l) in the case of charitable, ecclesiastical and public trusts. 
424 Eventually economic and fiscal imperatives led to the enactment of the Settled Land Acts 1882 and 
1925 as a result of which the grip of the dead hand was almost utterly cast off. see Watt op. cit., p. 263. 
See also John H. Langbein Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts (2004) 98 Northwestern U. L. R. 1105 
at 1107-1119. 
425 Law Com. No. 181 para. 'I 0.2. 
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Yet the Law Commission goes further than this by offering what it presents as an 
added bonus that the new system will in addition enable settlors to set limits on the 
exercise of the trustees' powers. There is no rationale given nor justification offered 
and no exploration of the issues involved in this change. 426 It is contrary to the 
statutory policy of unrestricted alienation by the tenant for life under a strict 
settlement 427 and indirect restriction on trustees for sale. 428 
The reason for it seems to be that in trying to find the best solution, the Law 
Commission endeavours to ascertain the best features of strict settlements and trusts 
for sale rather than inaugurate a modem, novel approach untainted by past mistakes. 
The Law Commission determines that, 'Thus, under the new system, settlors will be 
able to construct a settlement which, while giving an occupying beneficiary powers 
analogous to a tenant for life under a strict settlement, also inhibits (if they so wish) 
that beneficiary's powers of disposition. 429 Whilst this may be a worthwhile objective 
in itself, it does not justify the original aim of enabling settlors to set limits on the 
exercise of trustees' powers and confuses the strictly separate issues of limiting 
trustees' Powers and limiting beneficiaries' powers. 
The answer is purportedly given in the Law Commission Working Paper where the 
Law Commission stated that, 'The question that then arises is whether a settlor should 
be able to limit the powers of the trustee. Is it essential that there should be someone 
with an unfettered power of sale? We doubt if the conditions which gave rise to this 
being a matter of such importance in the past still exist today, and we therefore very 
much doubt whether any such provision is necessary provided that the position of 
purchasers is protected. A30 This superficial, perfunctory gloss is unworthy and 
unbefitting the importance of the provision and the significance it has in the annals of 
land and trusts law by failing to discuss the policy and substantive issues involved. It 
426 In para. 10.10 the Law Commission stated that, 'There may of course be some express limitation of 
these powers, either by way of provisions subjecting their exercise to the consent of some person or 
persons, or by way of express restrictions in the trust instrument. ' Again there is no discussion of the 
philosophy underlying such a provision and the remainder of the paragraph deals with whether 
VI rchasers are affected by such a provision. IU 
27 Section 106 of the Settled Land Act 1925. 
428 Section 26(l) and (3) of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
429 Law Com. No. 181 para. 10.2. 430 No. 94 para. 7.5. 
119 
also contradicts the accurate innate instinct of the Law Commission at the beginning 
of the Report when it stated that, 'It is important that any reform should retain the 
advantage of the present system, that there is always someone who can deal with the 
land. 9431 
The view of Emmet and Farrand on Title is that, 'It should be appreciated that the 
possibilities of exclusion and restriction represent very significant reforms. The policy 
objectives of the 1925 property legislation, particularly of the SLA 1925, included 
ensuring that there should always be an estate owner "who shall be in a position to 
carry out all usual and proper transactions for value, by way of sale, mortgage, lease 
or otherwise" (Wolstenholme and Cherry, Conveyancing Statutes 13 th ed. ), vol 3 
P1.9432 Sexton aptly states that, 'Courtesy of the Law Commission he 433 will have 
achieved, in the late twentieth century, the great ambition of every pre- 18 82 settlor of 
land. He will have rendered the land (for the duration of the trust) inalienable. 434 
Methods of circumventing exclusion ofpower ofsale 
Watt explores methods of escaping the grip of the dead hand. He dismisses the 
possibility of an application under section 14, since section 14 does not appear to 
authorise the court to make an order relating to the exercise by trustees of functions 
which have been removed by a section 8(l) clause, because such functions would 
thereby fail to qualify as 'their functions' as those words are used in section 14. 
Watt's view is misconceived for two reasons. First, the trustees' function is to hold 
title to land. The wording of section 8(l) does not per se remove the power of 
disposal as one of the functions; it merely eliminates it as one of their powers . 
435 Even 
431 lbid., para. 1.5. 
432 Op. cit., R. 45 para. 22.029. 
433 Referring to the settlor. 
434 The Law Commissions report on trusts ofland at last a lawfor contemporary society? op. cit., p. 
71. 
43 's This is supported by the view of Megarry and Wade op. cit., para. 8-137 footnote 8 that the Act 
distinguishes between the trustees' 'functions' and their 'powers', the former including the entirety of 
the trustees' powers and obligations and is therefore much wider than the latter. The trustees' functions 
include their paramount duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries and to further the purposes 
of the trust (Cowan v. Scargill op. cit., at 286,287, Harries v. Church Conunissionersfor England op. 
cit., at 1246) and their duty to maintain an even hand between life tenant and remainderman. The 
exclusion of all or some of the trustees' powers will not therefore deprive them of all their functions 
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though the trustees do not have the power to sell, it still remains within the ambit of 
their functions, albeit one which they do not have the power to carry out. Thus a court 
has jurisdiction under section 14(2)(a) to make an order relating to the power which 
may have been excluded under section 8(l). If this reasoning is wrong, then the 
countcr-argument is that section 14 gives the court jurisdiction to make an order even 
where the particular function has been excluded under section 8(l), because the 
wording of section 14(2)(a), which states 'any of their functions', is wide enough to 
cover excluded functions. 
The second related reason is one which Watt suggests and then dismisses, 436 which is 
that the express inclusion of orders freeing trustees from section 8(2) consent clauses 
within the ambit of section 14 could be read as authorising the court generally to 
make orders relating to functions which have been taken away by the settlor. This 
argument has to be correct, because section 14 would otherwise have been expressly 
extended to section 8(l). Yet Watt's view is that the more logical and natural statutory 
interpretation, by extension of the rule expressio unius exclusio alterius, 437 is to read 
the express inclusion of orders relating to section 8(2) clauses as implicitly excluding 
the court's authority to make orders relating to the potentially far more inhibiting 
(from the applicant's point of view) section 8(l) clauses. The extension of this 
maxim, however, is unwarranted, since there is no justification for doing so on the 
wording of section 14(2)(a). In fact the express inclusion of orders relating to section 
8(2) clauses raises an a priori assumption that the court has jurisdiction to make 
orders relating to powers removed by section 8(l), because there is no indication to 
the contrary in section 14(2). 438 
Watt then examines by what other means trustees and beneficiaries might escape the 
effect of a section 8(l) provision. He examines various options, 439 only one of which 
and in particular it will not affect their fundamental duties. They should therefore be able to seek the 
assistance of the court to the extent that the exclusion impedes their performance of any such duty: see 
Megarry and Wade op. cit., para. 8-144. 4360 
P. cit., p. 266. 
437 Express mention of one thing is the exclusion of the other. 
438 It is notable that section 14(3) states explicitly that the court may not under section 14 make an 
order as to the appointment or removal of trustees. 439 op. cit., p. 266-271. 
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is examined here. 440 Watt's first option is to plead that the trust of land has been 
rendered void ab initio under the rule against inalienability of capital. This would 
rarely be successful, as Watt recognises, since it would not apply to the simple case of 
a settlor excluding the power of sale for the lifetime of the beneficiary or beneficiaries 
with an interest currently in possession. The section 8(l) provision can easily be 
drafted such as not to infringe the rule against inalienability. 441 The Law Commission 
was wise enough in 1998 to 'accept the continuing need for a rule against perpetuities 
to provide a means of "dead hand control"', 442 though it expressly excluded the rule 
against alienability from the Consultation Paper. 443 
It is notable that Watt does not discuss the issue that a restraint on alienation per se is 
contrary to public policy. In accordance with the cardinal principle that the power of 
alienation is necessarily and inseparably incidental to ownership, if an absolute 
interest is given to a donee, any restriction which substantially takes that power away 
is void as being repugnant to the very conception of ownership. 444 Emmet and 
Farrand on Title states that an exclusion of a trustees' power to sell or otherwise 
dispose of the land under section 8(l) might arguably still be void despite section 8(l) 
as a restraint upon alienation contrary to public policy. 445 
Hopkins argues that, 'The Act enables the settlor of an express trust to prevent a sale, 
by removing the power of sale', 446 but Sydenham's view. 447 is that Hopkins is wrong, 
since it is contrary to public policy to make land inalienable. Hopkins replieS448 that to 
avoid the conclusion that the Act makes it possible for land to be made inalienable 
requires the general principle of land law prohibiting this to be used as a tool of 
440 The other options are by court order under Chapman v. Chapman [1954] A. C. 429, court order 
under section 53 of the Trustee Act 1925, under the rule in Saunders v. Vautier, variation under the 
Variation of Trusts Act 1958 and court order under the court's inherent jurisdiction to vary trusts in 
cases of emergency. 
" See generally Megarry and Wade op. cit., paras. 7-137-7-15 1. 
442 Law Com. No. 251 para. 1.19. The Law Commission proposed that there would be one fixed 
perpetuity period of 125 years with no lives in being, during which the 'wait and see' period will 
operate. See generally Sparkes op. cit. 
443 Paras. 1.14 and 8.35-8.36. 
444 See Cheshire and Bum op. cit., p. 367-368, Megarry and Wade op. cit., para. 3-071 and Gray and 
Gray op. cit., p. 299-301. 4-150 
. p cit., R. 45 para. 22.029. 
4'6 The Trusts qfLand and, 4ppoiniment of Trustees, 4ct 1996 op. cit., at 414. 
447 Leiters [1997] Conv. 242 op. cit. 
44' Letters [1997] Conv. 243 op. cit. 
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statutory interpretation. As a rule of interpretation, it would be subject to a statutory 
provision to the contrary. In his view the Settled Land Act embodies the public policy 
rule whereas the 1996 Act expressly confers on settlors the ability to restrict the 
trustees' powers. Hopkins concludes that 'the long title of the 1996 Act is "an Act to 
make new provisions about trusts of land including provisions phasing out the Settled 
Land Act..... " (emphasis added). Therefore, a rule of public policy embodied in the 
Settled Land Act should not be regarded as having survived unscathed. ' The answer is 
that the status of the rule of public policy is uncertain. 
Gray and Gray take a different perspective. They recognise 449 in a general discussion 
on restrictions on alienation that some sort of compromise has to be struck between 
the policy concern to promote the commerciability of land and the countervailing 
impulse to permit personal control over discretionary distributions of privately held 
property. 450 Their view is that, 'It remains to be seen whether even this compromise 
can survive the advent of European scrutiny. The European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms guarantees the entitlement to 
"peaceftil enjoyment of ...... possessions", 
451 and the European Court of Human 
Rights has emphasised that "the right to dispose of one's property constitutes a 
traditional and fundamental aspect of the right of property"'. 452 This jurisdiction thus 
enhances the prospects of subjecting the section 8(l) provision to greater scrutiny and 
of invalidating the restriction on the power of alienation. 
Conclusion 
Sections 6 and 8 represent in principle and on the whole an expedient reform, though 
the lack of a cogent policy covering land and personalty together with unco-ordinated 
and patchy legislation reflect statutory provisions which do not fulfil their potential. 
Section 6(l) should be drafted to omit the words 'For the purpose of exercising their 
powers as trustees' and section 6(5), (6) and (8) should be omitted. It was a retrograde 
step to allow the possibility of the power of sale being excluded under section 8 and 
449 Op. cit., p. 300-301. 
450 In the estate ofDunne [1988] I. R. 155 is a more recent example of the Irish High Court striking 
down a prohibition partly on the ground that it perpetuated old family divisions as contrary to public 
policy. 
45 1 Article I of the First Protocol. 
452 Afarckx v. Belgium (1979) 2 E. H. R. R. 330 para. 63. 
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section 8(l) should be drafted to state expressly that a power of sale cannot be 
excluded, but must be vested in the trustees or some other ascertained person. 
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CHAPTER 7- DELEGATION: DEFICIENT, FLAWED 
PROVISIONS OR REQUISITE, INEVITABLE COMPROMISE? 
DO SOLICITORS CONSIDER IT DISADVANTAGEOUS THAT THE PERSON 
PREVIOUSLY IN THE POSITION OF A TENANT FOR LIFE OR STATUTORY 
OWNER HAS NO POWERS UNLESS DELEGATED TO HIM? 
14 solicitors453 stated that it was not disadvantageous that the person previously in the 
position of a tenant for life or statutory owner has no powers unless they are delegated 
to him. 
3 solicitorS454 stated that it was disadvantageous that the person previously in the 
position of a tenant for life or statutory owner has no powers unless they are delegated 
to him. 
The relief evident amongst the majority of those solicitors, that the person previously 
in the position of the tenant for life would have no powers unless they were delegated 
to him, was typified by the view of Roderick Steen (May, May and Merrimans) who 
stated that, 'It is much betterfor trustees to have the powers rather than the tenantfor 
life. Ifyou are going to abolish the SettledLandAct, thenyou must havepowers 
vested in trustees. ' 
Even amongst the minority, there was the realisation that the delegation provisions 
will rarely be used, as was expressed by John Glasson (Eversheds) who asserted that, 
'I doubt whether the idea that the Settled LandActposition can be replicated by 
delegating powers to the tenantfor life will come to much. ' 
DO SOLICITORS CONSIDER IT A PROBLEM THAT THE DELEGATION IS 
REVOCABLE? 
16 solicitors stated that it was not a problem that delegation is revocable. 
I solicitor 455 stated that it was a problem that delegation is revocable. 
453 Allen and Overy, Boodle Hatfield, Burges Salmon, Charles Russell, Currey and Co, Farrer and Co, 
Herbert Smith, Linklaters and Alliance, Macfarlanes, May, May and Merrimans, Official Solicitor, 
Payne Hicks Beach, Public Trust Office, Withers. 
454 Eversheds, Speechly Bircham and Wiggin and Co. 
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It was illuminating to discover that this provision was introduced by Chris Jarman 
(Payne Hicks Beach) who explained that, 'I got that into section 9. When the Bill was 
introduced, I got a copy and thought there are problems here so I wrote to the Lord 
Chancellor's Department and copied the letter to one or two people including the 
Law Society Land Law and Succession Committee. I got a callftom Donald Lockhart 
at Farrers who was on that Committee and he said will you come to a meeting with 
the Lord Chancellor's Department about it. So I drafted amendments including the 
area ofoppointment and removal oftrustees. ' The system would have been highly 
problematic for the trustees if the powers had been irrevocable and the solicitors 
consulted were almost unanimous in welcoming the fact that the powers were 
revocable. 
Do the delegation provisions reproduce the functional equivalent of a strict 
settlement? 
Section 9 replaces the powers of a tenant for life under the Settled Land Act 1925 456 
and the powers of delegation of trustees for sale under section 29 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925 457 and adopts what may superficially be regarded as a compromise 
position between the two. Section 29458 was narrower than the current section 9, since 
it was limited to revocably delegating powers of leasing, accepting surrenders of 
leases and management to any person of full age for the time being beneficially 
entitled to the net rents and profits of the land during his life or for any less period. 
This did not enable the power of sale to be delegated. 
The Law Commission's recommendations 
The view of the Law Commission was that 'it might be considered appropriate that 
the current occupier of the land, being uniquely placed to do so, should have 
455 Speechly Bircham. 
456 See Cheshire and Bum op. cit., p. 197-208, Megarry and Wade op. cit., paras. 8-013-8-014,8-071-8- 
106 and a more detailed analysis in Megarry and Wade (5 th edn) op. cit., p. 358-384. 
457 See Megarry and Wade op. cit., para. 8-116, Cheshire and Bum op. cit., p. 221. Section 29 has been 
repealed by section 25(2) and Schedule 4 of the 1996 Act. 
458 Section 29 provided that, 'The powers of and incidental to leasing, accepting surrenders of leases 
and management, conferred on trustees for sale whether by this Act or otherwise, may, until sale of the 
land, be revocably delegated from time to time, by writing, signed by them, to any person of full age 
(not merely being an annuitant) for the time being beneficially entitled in possession to the net rents 
and profits of the land during his life or for any less period ....... 
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responsibility for the overall maintenance of the property, or for the collection of 
rents. We consider that these facilities should, in substance, continue to be available; 
settlors should be allowed to place control of the trust in the hands of those 
beneficiaries who are most directly interested in the trust land. A59 'Our 
recommendation as to the delegation of trust powers will enable settlors to go beyond 
the delegation provisions of the trust for sale. They will be able to construct what 
would in effect be an "enhanced" strict settlement. Such a settlement would not be 
precisely the same as a strict settlement because the trustees will retain the legal 
title. A60 'Should they wish to do so, settlors will be able to use the provisions of the 
new system to ensure that the trust powers are vested in the life tenant; it will, in other 
words, be possible by expressly directing that there should be a particular delegation, 
to achieve much the same result as that which at present flows automatically from the 
constitution of a strict settlement. ' 461 
The Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay, at the House of Lords Committee Stage, stated 
that the new clause will 'enable those who think it appropriate to do so to reproduce 
the functional equivalent of a strict settlement'. 462 These statements are at odds with 
the recommendation of the Law Commission at the end of the Report 463 that 
delegation should be under section 25 of the Trustee Act 1925 by way of power of 
attorney to any beneficiary with a present, vested interest, and at odds with Clause 5 
of the Bill attached to the Law Commission Report . 
464 The draft clause was 
substantially amended in its passage through Parliament at the House of Lords 
Committee Stage, 465 Report Stage 466 and Third Reading467 due to criticisms of the 
original provisions, yet section 9 does not unequivocally achieve the projected aims. 
459 Law Com. No. 181 para. 4.5. 
460 Law Com. No. 181 para. 4.11. 
461 Law Com. No. 181 para. 10.2. 
462 H. L. Debs., Vol. 570, col. 1535. 
463 op. cit., para. 20.3. 
464 Clause 5(l) stated that, 'For section 29 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (delegation of powers of 
management by trustees for sale) there shall be substituted- .... 
The power conferred by section 25(l) 
of the Trustee Act 1925 (delegation by trustees by power of attorney for period not exceeding 12 
months) may be exercised by a trustee of land so as to delegate any functions as respects land subject to 
the trust for an indefinite period if every donee of the power of attome is a person of full age with a y 
vested interest in possession in the land (other than a mere annuitant). ' 
4650 1540. When the Lord Chancellor introduced a new clause 9, the main P cit., Vol. 570, cols. 1535 
areas of concern were the liability of trustees for the acts and defaults of a beneficiary to whom trustees 
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The power to delegate 
Section 9(l) provides that, 'The trustees of land may, by power of attorney, delegate 
to any beneficiary or beneficiaries of full ageand beneficially entitled to an interest in 
possession in land subject to the trust any of their functions as trustees which relate to 
the land. ' Thus a life tenant under a trust of land has no automatic powers and will 
only obtain the powers that the tenant for life had as of right under the Settled Land 
Act 1925 where the trustees, retaining the legal estate, decide to delegate and the 
delegation is revocable. As Barraclough and Matthews articulate, 'The life tenant will 
never be sure that the authority the trustees have given him with one hand, will not be 
removed by the other. A delegated power to sell may be removed at the moment the 
tenant for life wishes to use it. The trustees can regain the initiative. It is the faqade of 
power which they delegate, not the reality. A68 This cynical view contains a modicum 
of legitimacy, though each case will depend on the particular trust itself. 
Section 9 is not a functional equivalent of a strict settlement, because delegation is at 
the trustees' discretion, unlike the position of the tenant for life under a strict 
settlement. If trustees refuse to delegate to a life tenant, a life tenant may apply to the 
court under section 14 of the 1996 Act and the intentions of the settlor will be one 
relevant consideration under section 15(l)(a) which the court will take into account. 
The best solution to fortify the position of the life tenant is for section 8(l) to exclude 
the power of disposition from the trustees' powers and for the disposition expressly to 
grant this power to the life tenant or the settlor, thus circumventing the need to rely on 
section 9(l). 
Can a selflor conipel trustees to delegate to a beneficiary? 
The issue arises of whether a settlor can make express provision to compel trustees to 
delegate to a beneficiary rather than relying on the trustees' discretion. If a settlor 
cannot compel trustees to delegate to the life tenant, then the Law Commission's 
have delegated any of their functions and the circumstances in which delegation of functions by 
trustees to a beneficiary will automatically be revoked. 4660 
P. cit., Vol. 57 1, cols. 958-96 1. The amendments concerned protection for third parties, revocation 
of the power of attorney and the standard of care to be observed by trustees in deciding whether to 
delegate any of their functions. 467 op. cit.., Vol. 572, cols. 93-95. 4680 
. P cit., para. 6.1. 
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objectives have potentially remained unfulfilled, offering little consolation to those 
settlors aspiring to mimic the structure of the Settled Land Act who are unwilling to 
utilise section 8(l). Compulsory delegation is problematic from two perspectives: 
first, section 8 (exclusion and restriction of powers) does not apply to section 9469 and 
secondly, section 9 does not state that it applies unless there is a contrary intention. 
Concerning the first problem that there is no provision permitting settlors to exclude 
or restrict the power of delegation, it can be argued that it is irrelevant that section 8 
does not apply, because the settlor does not want to exclude or restrict the power 
under section 9, but wants to extend it by making it mandatory for the trustees to 
delegate. This then leaves the second problem of whether section 9 is subject to a 
contrary intention. Section 9 is not subject to a contrary intention, thus it may be 
arguable that it cannot be altered by express provision. An express provision in a trust 
instrument requiring trustees to delegate to a particular beneficiary will thus prinia 
facie be invalid. This curtailment of the freedom of the settlor to structure the trust as 
he wishes can be justified on the grounds of conforming with general principles of 
delegation to trustees and not according priority to the wishes of the settlor, which are 
only be taken into account under section 15(l)(a). 
The argument against this view is that the absence of a contrary intention merely 
indicates that this power cannot be excluded. The absence of a contrary intention 
indicates nothing about the power being extended, so that it is feasible for it to be 
mandatory for trustees to delegate. An express clause stating that trustees of land shall 
delegate to a specified beneficiary should, therefore, in principle be valid. An 
alternative argument is that there is no provision in section 9 comparable to that which 
exists in section 4, which specifically states that the power to postpone is to be 
implied 'despite any provision to the contrary made by the disposition. A70 The 
absence of such express stipulation in section 9 may be argued to indicate that 
contrary provision may be made. 
469 Compare the power to delegate under the Trustee Act 1925 which could be excluded by the settlor 
in section 69(2). 
470 See Emmet and Farrand on Title op. cit., R. 45 para. 22.027. 
129 
A further suggestion is made by Barraclough and Matthews, who suggest that one 
possible course would be to use the power under section 8 of restricting and 
negativing section 6 absolute owner powers by providing that they were only to be 
exercised while a section 9 delegation is in force. 47 1 Barraclough and Matthews 
recognise that this may be inherently self-defeating, because 'In terms as simple and 
drastic as that the direction could stultify the settlement- there might for example be 
no beneficiary eligible as an attorney. But in addition the powers of trustees are to 
delegate "any of their functions as trustees". They could hardly delegate powers 
which had been removed from their own competence to exercise. ' 
The problem with Barraclough and Matthews' first counter-argument, that there 
might be no beneficiary eligible as an attorney, is that a section 9 delegation in such 
terms will only work where it is in favour of a specific named beneficiary. There must 
be a primafacie assumption that the designated beneficiary is competent and able to 
deal with the delegation of powers, otherwise a settlor would not contemplate such a 
delegation. Professional draftsmen will have to draft any such clause with scrupulous 
care to ensure that a named beneficiary is to be the particular delegate and insert 
provisions to cover any contingency of that beneficiary being unable or unwilling to 
act, so that there is no lacuna. For Barraclough and Matthews to defeat that argument, 
on the basis of there being no suitable beneficiary, is to fail to anticipate the subtleties 
of precise drafting. 
The problems with Barraclough and Matthews' second argument, that trustees could 
hardly delegate powers which had been removed from their own competence to 
exercise, are manifold. The appropriateness of the terin 'competence' is questionable 
in such a context, the word 'ambit' being infinitely preferable. Additionally 
competence to exercise is irrelevant to the question of whether the powers remain 
their functions. The powers remain within the trustees' functions, since they have not 
been removed by section 8 and the trustees will in any properly drafted trust have 
default powers in the event of the illness, incapacity or death of the named beneficiary 
delegate. Such powers remain within the trustees' functions, albeit ones which they 
471 op. cit., para. 6.4. 
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have delegated. The real problem with using the section 8 power of restricting and 
negativing section 6 absolute owner powers, by providing that they were only to be 
exercised while a section 9 delegation is in force, is the prospect of a stalemate 
between the trustees and relevant beneficiary and a vacuum or lacuna, where there 
will be nobody to exercise the powers where a delegation is not in force, so that 
section 8 will operate. 
The preferable course of action is to draft an express clause to override section 9 and 
structure the settlement accordingly. Whitehouse and Hassall state that, 'It seems to 
the authors that mandatory delegation sits uneasily with the concept of trusteeship 
(and with the revocation powers given by the section). A72 Enimet and Farrand on 
Title states 473 as a general observation on section 9(l) that directions made by the 
settlor in the trust instrument to trustees of land to make delegations, whether 
generally or as specified, should prove binding and enforceable, but there are no 
reasons given for this statement. 
Another possibility is to confer an overriding equitable power on a protector 474 who 
may be the tenant for life or a different individual. Positive overriding powers 
enabling the protector to direct the trustees to delegate to the tenant for life should be 
valid and enforceable by rules of equity, which prevail under section 6(6). If the trust 
instrument compels the trustees to delegate, equity should compel the trustees to 
recognise these overriding powers. The effect would be to create a situation like 
custodian trusteeship with the trustees similar to custodian trustees (though not fully 
since they will inter alia retain full powers over distribution) and the tenant for life in 
a position analogous to a management trustee. 475 
472 on. cit., para. 2.85 footnote 1. 473 Op. cit., R. 45 para. 22.027. 
474 See Underhill and Hayton op. cit., p. 29-34, Paul Matthews Protectors: two cases, Aventy questions 
(1995) 9 T. L. I. 108, Andrew Penny Rights and Powers of Trust Protectors: Rahman Revisited [ 1995] 1 
J. Int. P. 3 1. 
475 See Underhill and Hayton op. cit., p. 799-800, Hanbury and Mar-tin op. cit., p. 507-508. See also 
Public Trustee Act 1906 section 4(2). 
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Revocation ofpoivers ofdelegation 
Section 9(3) highlights the potentially transient nature of delegation, which contrasts 
with the position of a tenant for life under a strict settlement. Section 9(3) states that, 
'A power of attorney under subsection (1) shall be given by all the trustees jointly and 
(unless expressed to be irrevocable and to be given by way of security) may be 
revoked by any one or more of them; and such a power is revoked by the appointment 
as a trustee of a person other than those by whom it is given (though not by any of 
those persons dying or otherwise ceasing to be a trustee). ' Although revocation does 
not occur if one of the trustees dies or ceases to be a trustee, the appointment of a new 
trustee will automatically revoke the power of attorney. The fact that the power can be 
revoked at any time highlights the reality that the new provisions cannot be the 
functional equivalent of a strict settlement. 
Section 9(4) was substantially amended at Report Stage 476 into its present form. 
Section 9(4) states that, 'Where a beneficiary to whom finictions are delegated by a 
power of attorney under subsection (1) ceases to be a person beneficially entitled to an 
interest in possession in land subject to the trust- (a) if the functions are delegated to 
him alone, the power is revoked, (b) if the finictions are delegated to him and to other 
beneficiaries to be exercised by them jointly (but not separately), the power is revoked 
if each of the other beneficiaries ceases to be so entitled....., and (c) if the functions 
are delegated to him and to other beneficiaries to be exercised by them separately (or 
either separately or jointly), the power is revoked in so far as it relates to him. ' 
One criticism of section 9(4) raised by Lord Mishcon at Third Reading 477 is Why 
automatic revocation is prevented under subsection (3) by provision that the power of 
attorney may be expressed to be irrevocable and to be given by way of security, but 
not under subsection (4). Lord Mishcon pointed out that the security interest which is 
to be protected might be assigned. The original holder should remain able to exercise 
the power for the benefit of his assignee. The use of the term 'separately9 as opposed 
to 'severally' is interesting, since the speeches of the Lord Chancellor in the House of 
476 H. L. Debs., Vol. 57 1, cols. 959-96 1. The provision became far more specific as to revocation of 
M7 wers where powers were delegated jointly and separately. 
H. L. Debs., Vol. 572, cot. 95. 
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Lords consistently used the term 'severally', 478 yet that term was not used in the 
subsection. It seems as if there is an attempt to use layman's language in the 
subsection itself. 
Delegation can be for a fixed or indefinite period under section 9(5), which provides 
that, 'A delegation under subsection (1) may be for any period or indefinite'. This 
provision accords trustees the maximum flexibility unlike, for example, section 25 of 
the Trustee Act 1925 which is limited to 12 months or a shorter period. Since section 
9(6) provides that, 'A power of attorney under subsection (1) cannot be an enduring 
power within the meaning of the Enduring Powers of Attorney Act 1985', the 
delegation will be revoked by a trustee's mental incapacity. 
Problems of protection for third parties where purported delegation by trustees 
Section 9(2) provides that, 'Where trustees purport to delegate to a person by a power 
of attorney under subsection (1) functions relating to any land and another person in 
good faith deals with him in relation to the land, he shall be presumed in favour of 
that other person to have been a person to whom the functions could be delegated 
unless that other person has knowledge at the time of the transaction that he was not 
such a person. ' Section 9(2) was not in the original Bill. It was introduced into the Bill 
at Report Stage . 
479 The Lord Chancellor stated that 'Amendment No. 5 carries 
through an additional element of protection for third parties from section 29 of the 
480 5481 Law of Property Act 1925 , which 
Clause 9 supersedes. 
Sagacity of introducing concept of knowledge 
The original amendment did not have the words 'unless that other person has 
knowledge at the time of the transaction that he was not such a person 482 and was 
478 See H. L. Debs., Vol. 570, col. 1537 and Vol. 571, col. 959. 
479 H. L. Debs., Vol. 571, cols. 958-960. 
480 Section 29 of the Law of Property Act 1925 stated that, '... in favour of a lessee such writing shall, 
unless the contrary appears, be sufficient evidence that the person named therein is a person to whom 
the powers may be delegated, and the production of such writing shall, unless the contrary appears, be 
sufficient evidence that the delegation has not been revoked. ' 
48 ' H. L. Debs., Vol. 57 1, col. 958. 
482 The original amendment stated that, 'he shall (in the absence of evidence to the contrary) be 
presumed in favour of that other person to have been a person to whom the functions could be 
delegated. ' 
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preferable, since it is undesirable to bring concepts of knowledge into this provision. 
This comprises actual knowledge 483 as well as 'Nelsonian' and 'naughty' 
knowledgcý 84 and knowledge raises issues as to the difference between knowledge 
and notice. Notice is wider than knowledge, since a person may be regarded as having 
notice of a fact not because he knows it, but because for legal purposes he is taken to 
know it. 485 
Millett J. in Rignall Developments Ltd v. HaO 86 emphasised that notice and 
knowledge are not synonymous. The fundamental difference between the questions 
that arise in respect of notice, which are relevant in the doctrine of purchaser without 
notice, and knowledge that suffices for the imposition of a constructive trust, was 
starkly illustrated by Sir Robert Megarry V. -C. in Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts, 
when he stated that, 'The cold calculus of constructive and imputed notice does not 
seem to me to be an appropriate instrument for deciding whether a man's conscience 
is sufficiently affected for it to be right to bind him by the obligations of a 
constructive trustee. A87 There remain grey areas of knowledge and presumably like 
483 Compare the doctrine of notice where the tendency of the Court of Chancery was constantly to 
extend and refine the doctrines of constructive and imputed notice: see Megarry and Wade op. cit., 
para. 5-024. Equity's ambition was to eliminate the bonafide purchaser of the legal estate without 
notice, by ensuring that it should be almost impossible to escape notice of any equity properly created 
and recorded. 
484 'Nelsonian' knowledge covers knowledge obtainable but for shutting one's eyes to what would 
otherwise be obvious. 'Naughty' knowledge is where one's suspicions are aroused that the transaction 
was probably improper, but one deliberately or recklessly failed to make the inquiries an honest 
reasonable man would make in the circumstances. 'Nelsonian' and 'naughty' knowledge have 
developed to determine whether a person's conscience is sufficiently affected for equity to impose the 
personal burdens of accountability as a constructive trustee: see Underhill and Hayton op. cit., p. 973- 
978, Hayton and Marshall op. cit., para. 11-111, Baden v. Socijtj Ginirale [1992] 4 All E. R. 161 at 
235 and Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts [1987] Ch. 264. Sir Robert Megarry V. -C. in Re Montagu's 
Settlement Trusts at 283-284 and 285 doubted that there is a general doctrine of imputed knowledge 
that corresponds to imputed notice. See now the Court of Appeal decision in Bank ofCredit and 
Commerce International Overseas Ltd v. Akindele [2000] 3 W. L. R. 1423 where Nourse L. J. stated at 
1439 that there should be a single test of knowledge for knowing receipt, 'The recipient's state of 
knowledge must be such as to make it unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of the receipt. ' See 
also Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd v. Uni-Polaris Shipping Co. Ltd [200 11 U. K. H. L. 1, [2001] 2 W. L. R. 
170 where Lord Clyde stated para. 3 that, 'Blind eye knowledge in my judgment requires a conscious 
reason for blinding the eye. There must be at least a suspicion of a trust about which you do not want to 
know and which you refuse to investigate. ' See also Lord Hobhouse paras. 24-26 and Lord Scott at 
para. 116. 
'" Ashburner's Principles ofEquity (2 nd edn 1933) by Denis Browne p. 59. 
4a6 [ 1988] Ch. 190 at 202. 4870 
. p cit., at 273 and 278. 
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the doctrine of actual notice, there will not be knowledge where the facts have come 
to a person's ears only in the form of vague rumours. 488 
Beneficiaries in position of trustees? 
The general principle 
The first half of section 9(7) provides that, 'Beneficiaries to whom functions have 
been delegated under subsection (1) are, in relation to the exercise of the functions, in 
the same position as trustees (with the same duties and liabilities) ......... 
This 
provision demonstrates that the position of the beneficiaries is similar to that of the 
tenant for life of settled land who is a trustee of the Settled Land Act powers, 489 and it 
is also close to the wording of the old section 29(3) of the Law of Property Act 
1925 
. 
490 The limitation 'in relation to the exercise of the functions' is important, 
because where issues of duty and liability do not relate to the exercise of the delegated 
ftinctions, such beneficiaries would not for example be liable for the wrongftil 
investment by the trustees of the proceeds of sale, even if the power of sale had been 
delegated to them. 491 
In what circumstances are beneficiaries not to be regarded as trustees? 
The second half of section 9(7) provides that, but such beneficiaries shall not be 
regarded as trustees for any other purposes (including, in particular, the purposes of 
any enactment permitting the delegation of functions by trustees or imposing 
requirements relating to the payment of capital money). ' This could have been drafted 
better, since it is too broad to state that such beneficiaries shall not be regarded as 
trustees for any other purposes. It would have been preferable to have stated 
488 Barnhart v. Greenshields (1853) 9 Moo. P. C. 18 at 36 where the Right Hon. T. Pemberton Leigh 
stated, 'The rule is settled, that a purchaser is not bound to allend to vague rumours- to statements by 
mere strangers, but that a notice, in order to be binding, must proceed from some person interested in 
the property'. 
489 Section 107(l) of the Settled Land Act 1925 stated that, 'A tenant for life ...... shall, in exercising 
any power under this Act, have regard to the interests of all parties under the settlement, and shall, in 
relation to the exercise thereof by him, be deemed to be in the position and to have the duties and 
liabilities of a trustee for those parties. ' It has been described as a highly interested trusteeship by 
Younger J. in Re Earl ofStaniford and Warrington [1916] 1 Ch. 404 at 420. For more details, see 
Megarry and Wade (5h edn) op. cit., p. 319 and (60edn) op. cit., paras. 8-013-8-014 and Lewin on 
TrustS op. cit., paras. 37-27 and 37-120-37-129. 
490 The relevant wording of section 29(3) was 'the person to whom the power is delegated ....... shall, in relation to the exercise of the power by him, be deemed to be in the position of and to have the duties 
and liabilities of a trustee. ' 
491 See Kenny and Kenny op. cit., p. 12-13. 
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specifically that the two exclusions identified, subdelegation and receipt of capital 
money, are the sole purposes for which such beneficiaries were not to be regarded as 
trustees. The subsection does not specifically identify which enactment imposing 
requirements relating to the payment of capital money it is alluding to, though it is 
obviously referring to section 27(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
Barraclough and Matthews are critical of this part of section 9(7) for their view is that, 
'It would have been clearer to have said directly that trustees cannot delegate their 
competence to give receipts for capital money, but this appears to be the somewhat 
indirect effect of section 9(7). The result is not beyond all shades of doubt, but it is 
certainly the safer conclusion to work on. And if it is wrong, grave problems would 
arise in relation to overreaching by a sole section 9 attorney. 492 Lewin on Trusts is of 
the view that 'the relevant words of the 1996 Act are rather gnomic in this respect, 
they prevent trustees of land from delegating to their beneficiaries under this section 
the function of receiving capital money. 493 
Lord Mishcon at Third Reading in the House of Lords 494 was concerned that the 
provision was not sufficiently explicit and stated that, 'the Lord Chancellor stated at 
Committee stage that subsection (7), as it now is, prevents an attorney under that 
provision from giving a receipt, even on a basis that he is acting by direction of the 
trustees. But given the crucial importance of the point in a fraud context, would the 
noble and learned Lord care to consider whether some more explicit drafting is 
desirable in order to emphasise that the attorney is not authorized under that clause to 
receive capital money or sign receipts for iff 
The problem with the wording of section 9(7) is that it does not categorically rule out 
trustees giving a direction that such a beneficiary should receive capital money. A 
direction by no fewer than two trustees is specifically provided for in section 27(2) of 
the Law of Property Act 1925, and section 9(7) does not exclude this part of section 
27(2) or prevent it from operating. The effect of section 9(7) is that beneficiaries to 
492 op. cif., para. 6.5. 493 Op. cit., para. 37-27. 
494 H. L. Debs., Vol. 572, col. 95. 
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whom powers have been delegated are not to be regarded as trustees for the purpose 
of receiving capital money nor for the purpose of giving a direction as to its payment. 
Section 9(7) does not prevent the trustees from giving a direction that the capital 
money is to be paid to the beneficiary to whom powers have been delegated, for the 
beneficiary will not be acting as a trustee in this capacity. This is despite the statement 
of the Lord Chancellor at Committee Stage, who stated that, 'the beneficiary is not to 
be taken as trustee, or acting by the direction of trustees, simply by reason of having 
, 495 had functions delegated to him. Even the Lord Chancellor by implication is not 
ruling out trustees expressly directing the beneficiary to receive capital money; he 
appears only to be preventing the beneficiary by default receiving the money under 
the principle of acting by the direction of the trustees merely by virtue of having had 
functions delegated to him. 
Thus there could be a situation where trustees have delegated powers to a beneficiary 
and in addition, give a direction that the beneficiary is to receive capital money, and 
this will circumvent the relevant wording of section 9(7). Lord Mishcon was right to 
urge for more explicit drafting. It is worth comparing section 7(l) of the Trustee 
Delegation Act 1999, which ensures that the rule requiring capital money to be paid to 
at least two trustees cannot be circumvented by using a power of attorney, since it 
states that, 'A requirement that capital money be paid to, or dealt with as directed by, 
at least two trustees ....... is not satisfied by money being paid to or dealt with as 
directed by, or a receipt for money being given by, a relevant attorney An 
equivalent provision in section 9(7) would be a substantial improvement. In any event 
it would be prudent to advise a purchaser that he cannot validly pay direct to the 
beneficiary merely because the trustees authorise him to do so. 
'9,5 H. L. Debs., Vol. 570, col. 1536. 
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Problematic wording of duty of care 
Section 9A is a welcome reform remedying defects in the previous law. 496 Section 
9A(l) states that, 'The duty of care under section I of the Trustee Act 2000 applies to 
trustees of land in deciding whether to delegate any of their functions under section 
9. ' Section 1 (1) of the Trustee Act 2000 states that, 'Whenever the duty under this 
subsection applies to a trustee, he must exercise such care and skill as is reasonable in 
the circumstances, having regard in particular- (a) to any special knowledge or 
experience that he has or holds himself out as having, and (b) if he acts as trustee in 
the course of a business or profession, to any special knowledge or experience that it 
is reasonable to expect of a person acting in the course of that kind of business or 
profession. ' 
The duty of care is not expressed by the 2000 Act to be a general duty in the form of 
an all-encompassing statutory tort, but is a duty applicable in the limited 
circumstances specified in the Act. 497 Whitehouse and Hassall state that section 9A is 
unique, because nonnally the duty applies once the decision has been taken to appoint 
an agent and does not apply to the taking of the decision. 498 This is in a sense 
misguided, because the same was applicable to the old section 9(8). 499 
Is the statutory duty of care the same as the common law duty of care? 
The Law Commission considered that the 'proposals for a new statutory duty of care 
probably represent no more than a codification of the existing common law duty. '500 
Reed and Wilson analyse the differences between the statutory and common law duty 
496 The previous section 9(8) restricted the trustees' liability to where they did not exercise reasonable 
care in deciding to delegate, which seemed to absolve trustees of further responsibility for supervision, 
providing they took reasonable care in deciding to delegate the function to the beneficiary. Section 9(8) 
was repealed by the Trustee Act 2000 section 40(l), Schedule 2 para. 46 and Schedule 4. For a critique 
of section 9(8), see Ann Kenny Trusteeship Without Responsibility [ 1997] Conv. 3 72. A question was 
included in the questionnaire on section 9(8), which was in force when the interviews took place. 497 See Hudson op. cit., para. 9.2.2 referring to section 2. 49110 
. 499 
P cit., para. 2.99. 
Section 9(8) stated that, 'Where any function has been delegated to a beneficiary or beneficiaries 
under subsection (1), the trustees are jointly and severally liable for any act or default of the 
beneficiary, or any of the beneficiaries, in the exercise of the function if, and only if, the trustees did 
not exercise reasonable care in deciding to delegate the function to the beneficiary or beneficiaries. ' "0 Law Com. No. 260 para. 2.35. For a more detailed discussion of the standard of care, see paras. 
3.22-3.25. 
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of care 501 and regard the Law Commission's view as incorrect, because in their 
opinion, there are fundamental differences between the common law and statutory 
duties of care. They compare 502 the basic standard of care in Re WhiteleY503 with 
section I (I) of the Trustee Act 2000 by analysing the different terminology. They 
recognise that the basic tests are different, but conclude that the two standards can be 
reconciled relatively simply, because there is the basic underlying standard of care of 
the reasonable trustee. 
Reed and Wilson contrast the particular expertise to be expected from particular 
professions and businesses in Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co Lta'504 with section 
I (1)(a) and (b) of the Trustee Act 2000. They are of the vieW505 that the Act goes 
further than Bartlett in that it not only takes account of the standard to be expected 
from a particular class of specialist trustees, but also any particular special knowledge 
or expertise which the particular trustee holds himself out as having. In their view a 
subjective test is applied by section I (1)(a), whereas an objective test prevails at 
common law, where the trustee would be judged according to the standard of the 
reasonable trust company. 
Reading the judgment of Brightman J., this synopsis of Reed and Wilson is an 
oversimplification. Both objective and subjective elements will be involved in 
applying the principles stated by Brightman J. Brightman J. explained506 that, 'Just as 
under the law of contract, a professional person possessed of a particular skill is liable 
for breach of contract if he neglects to use the skill and experience which he 
professes, so I think that a professional corporate trustee is liable for breach of trust if 
loss is caused to the trust fund because it neglects to exercise the special care and skill 
which it Professes to have'. This resembles the wording in section I (1)(a) of the 
"' Op. cit., paras. 2.48-2.54. 
112 Op. cit., para. 2.50. 
503 (1886) 33 Ch. D. 347 at 355 per Lindley L. J. - ' ... to take such care as an ordinary prudent man 
would take if he were minded to make an investment for the benefit of other people for whom he felt 
morally bound to provide. ' 
504 Op. cit., at 534 per Brightman J., who stated, 'I am of the opinion that a higher duty of care is 
plainly due from someone like a trust corporation which carries on a specialised business of trust 
management. A trust corporation holds itself out in its advertising literature as being above ordinary 
mortals. ' 
'505 Op. cit., para. 2.5 1. 
506 Op. cit., at 534. 
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Trustee Act 2000, since it is similar wording 'to any special knowledge or experience 
that he has or holds himself out as having'. 
Reed and Wilson also consider the impact of remuneration. 507 At common law a 
higher standar d of care is owed by a trustee in receipt of remuneration than by one 
508 6 who is not. As Hannan J. stated in Re Waterman's Will Trusts .... a paid trustee is 
expected to exercise a higher standard of diligence and knowledge than an unpaid 
trustee This should be compared to section 1 (1), which does not refer to 
remuneration being a relevant factor in itself. A court is likely, however, to take 
remuneration into account when considering 'the circumstances' in section 1 (1). An 
alternative explanation is that there is no need to specify remuneration in section 1 (1), 
due to the provision in section 29 of the Trustee Act 2000 for reasonable remuneration 
for professional trustees, who will owe a higher standard of care due to section 
I (1)(b). 
The problem with this argument is that section 29(2) does not apply where the other 
trustees do not agree in writing nor does it apply to a sole trustee. In addition, it leaves 
a lacuna for 'non-professional' trustees who are entitled to remuneration but do not 
fall within section I (1)(b). In such cases any sensible judge will take remuneration 
into account under 'the circumstances' of section 1 (1). It is implicit in, though is not 
made explicit by, the Law Commission 509 that remuneration will be a factor the court 
will take into account overall and it is doubtful that Reed and Wilson are correct in 
their view that in such cases the trustee may owe a higher duty at common law than 
under the Act. Their opinion, 510 that the Act has generally created a somewhat 
conftised position and that the Law Commission's ambition of creating a unifonn duty 
of care 511 remains largely unfulfilled, must be treated with caution. 
507 op. cit., para. 2.52. 
501 op. cil., at 1055. 
509 Law Com. No. 260 para. 3.24. 
5: 0 Op. cit., para. 2.53. 
51 See paras. 3.8-3.10. 
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Has the statutory ditty of care superseded the coninion laiv ditty of care? 
Reed and Wilson question 512 whether the new statutory duty replaces the common law 
duty where it applies or whether a trustee owes concurrent duties under the statute and 
at common law. They state that the Law Commission's stated intention was that the 
statutory duty of care is not intended to 'detract in any way from the fundamental 
common law duties'. 513 But this is to quote the Law Commission out of context. What 
the Law Commission actually stated was that the 'proposals for reform are not 
intended to detract in any way from the fundamental common law duties mentioned at 
paragraph 3.2 above. ' The duties mentioned at paragraph 3.2 specify some of the 
duties of trustees and specifically do not cover the duty of care. 
In fact it is clear that the Law Commission intended the statutory duty of care to 
supersede the common law. The Law Commission reviewed the different duties of 
care including the common law duty in paragraph 3.10 and concluded that, 'it is 
necessary to replace them with a clearer and more appropriate duty of care ...... The 
need to replace these provisions provides an opportunity to create a single duty of 
care, which has obvious advantages, both in terms of clarity and coherence. ' The Lord 
Chancellor stated at Second Reading that, 'This aspect codifies the present position at 
common law where there is already a duty of care 514 
Reed and Wilson are, therefore, mistaken in their conclusion that it may remain 
possible for an aggrieved beneficiary to bring two claims against a trustee arising out 
of one single act of default or at least to bring the two claims in the alternative. Rather 
it can be argued that section I (I) impliedly repeals the common laW, 515 not because 
the statutory provision is contrary to the common law rule, but because of the 
commonsense construction rule 516 or the presumption that Parliament wishes to avoid 
an anomalous result. 517 There needs to be counterbalanced against that a presumption 
against implied repeal, whereby the courts presume that Parliament does not intend an 
5: 2 op. cit., para. 2.54. 
53 Law Com. No. 260 para. 3.11. 
514 H. L. Debs., Vol. 612, col. 374. 
515 See Bennion op. cit., section 87. 
516 Mid., section 197. 
517 Ibid., section 315. 
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518 implied repeal or an implied revocation of a common law rule. It is likely in these 
circumstances, however, that there is implied repeal to avoid an anomalous result. 
All these problems reinforce Reed and Wilson's conclusion 519 that the new statutory 
duty of care has not introduced the clarity and consistency it was widely hoped it 
would and has given rise to far more questions than it has resolved. 520 On an objective 
level Reed and Wilson's objections are somewhat exaggerated, being more academic 
than practical, though the statutory duty of care is likely to give rise to litigation on a 
number of levels for by its very nature, it is a litigious provision. 
Duties whilst delegation continues 
The major innovation is section 9A(3) which states that, 'While the delegation 
continues, the trustees- (a) must keep the delegation under review, (b) if 
circumstances make it appropriate to do so, must consider whether there is a need to 
exercise any power of intervention that they have, and (c) if they consider that there is 
a need to exercise such a power, must do so. ' Section 9A(2) highlights one of the 
many dangers of an irrevocable appointment, since it provides that subsection (3) only 
applies where the delegation is not irrevocable. Section 9A(3) is similar to the 
wording in section 22(l) of the Trustee Act 2000. 
The Explanatory Notes to the Trustee Act 2000 state (in relation to section 22) that it 
imposes a single duty with three elements to it, which may be an oversimplification. 
The Explanatory Notes also state that, 'The duty to "keep under review" does not 
oblige trustees to review the arrangements at specific intervals or in a particular way. 
The manner in which the duty should be discharged will depend upon what is 
reasonable in the circumstances. ' The Act, therefore, does not provide how often the 
trustees must carry out the reviews and this will be a question of fact in each case. 
518 Ibid., section 87. 
5'9 Op. cit., paras. 2.67 and 2.69. 
52() A further issue examined by Reed and Wilson op. cit., paras. 2.60-2.69 is whether a breach of the 
statutory duty of care is actionable in tort as a breach of statutory duty or a breach which is actionable 
in equity. It seems far more likely that a breach of the statutory duty of care is actionable in equity. See 
also Nicholas Warren Trustee risk and liability (1999) 13 T. L. I. 226 at 230-231 who argues why 
trustees should not be subject to tortuous liability as well as liability in equity. 
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The wording of section 9A(3)(b) may give rise to problems, because it is drafted 
widely with the inclusion of the phrase 'if circumstances make it appropriate to do 
so'. It will raise issues of what is 'appropriate', which may be disputed on any given 
set of facts. An objective test will be imposed, but the subsection would have been 
drafted better if that phrase had been omitted. Section 9A(3)(c) may also give rise to 
problems, since it appears to impose a subjective test of 'if they consider that there is 
a need to exercise such a power' rather than an objective test 'if there is a need to 
exercise such a power' which would have been preferable, though objective elements 
are brought into this test under subsection (5) by the duty of care under section I of 
the Trustee Act 2000. 
The definition of power of intervention in subsection (4) is narrow, since it is defined 
only as including '(a) a power to give directions to the beneficiary; (b) a power to 
revoke the delegation. ' Trustees may wish to intervene directly by dealing with third 
parties or dealing with various aspects of running the trust without necessarily 
revoking the delegation. This raises the issue where powers have been delegated to 
beneficiaries, whether the power of intervention enables trustees to exercise those 
powers which have been delegated. The straightforward answer is no, yet a power of 
intervention is meaningless unless it enables trustees to exercise powers which have 
been delegated, though this can only be after they have revoked the delegation. In this 
sense the definition of 'power of intervention' in subsection (4) is deficient, since it 
does not deal with difficult issues directly. 
Isfailitre to act a breach of the ditty of care? 
The problem with the loose wording of subsection (5) which provides that, 'The duty 
of care under section I of the Trustee Act 2000 applies to trustees in carrying out any 
duty under subsection (3)', is that it is stated to apply only 'to trustees in carrying out 
any duty'. Reed and Wilson are of the view that this suggests that a complete failure 
to fulfil such obligations does not result in a breach of the duty of care, so that there 
would seem to be no remedy for a failure to carry out the section 9A(3) duties, other 
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than a claim under the common law duty of care, provided the effect of section 9A(6) 
is not to exclude all liability for a failure to review by trustees. 521 
Reed and Wilson do not discuss section 9A but consider sections 22 and 23 of the 
Trustee Act 2000 which contain similar provisions. The reflections which they make 
in connection with sections 22(l) and 23(l) are applicable to section 9A(5) and (6) of 
the 1996 Act and are applied accordingly in the ensuing discussion. They state 522 that 
the omission of any statutory remedy for a beneficiary in circumstances where 
trustees fail to use their powers in relation to land is a serious one. If the common law 
duty does still apply, the aggrieved beneficiary will be required to bring an action on 
the basis that the trustee has failed to administer the trust with reasonable care and 
skill. 523 
The problem with Reed and Wilson's interpretation of section 9A(5) is that it is 
unduly restrictive. Failure to carry out the duty under subsection (3) is included in the 
terminology of carrying out a duty, because it is incorporated in the overall 
classification of it. On a proper construction of section 9A(5) and (3), carrying out a 
duty under subsection (3) specifically obligates trustees in appropriate circumstances 
to act by obliging them to exercise a power of intervention, thus construing section 
9A(5), the duty of care applies also to a failure to act. A court would take a broad 
view of subsection (5) and look at the purposive interpretation 524 rather than a literal 
interpretation. An alternative interpretation, which may be the correct one, is that 
section 9A(5) is inapplicable where a trustee fails to act, because in such a case a 
trustee will be directly liable for breach of section 9A(3), which constitutes an 
independent obligation, and thus the duty of care is irrelevant to a failure to act. 
Section 9A(6) limits the liability of trustees and in the view of Reed and Wilson 
creates an anomaly. Section 9A(6) states that, 'A trustee of land is not liable for any 
act or default of the beneficiary, or beneficiaries, unless the trustee fails to comply 
with the duty of care in deciding to delegate any of the trustees' functions under 
521 See Reed and Wilson op. cit., para. 2.22 and discussion of section 9A(6) infra. 
522 op. cit., para. 2.18. 
523 op. cit., para. 2.23. 
524 See Cross op. cit., p. 17-20,57-58. 
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section 9 or in carrying out any duty under subsection (3). ' By providing that the 
trustee is not liable for any act or default if the duty of care is complied Nvith in the 
particular cases in which it applies, Reed and Wilson argue that it would seem to 
exclude liability for any default arising from a failure to do something not covered by 
the statutory duty. 525 
If section 9A(6) is construed to confer wide exemption from liability, the Act has 
created an extremely serious lacuna, which leaves the beneficiaries in a somewhat 
526 
vulnerable position and less well protected than under the Trustee Act 1925. Reed 
and Wilson express the view that it is extremely unlikely that this was Parliament's 
intention. They argue 527 that an alternative construction is that a failure to comply 
with the duty is a default of the trustee, distinct from that of the beneficiary-delegate, 
and thus outside the scope of section 9A(6). In their view as the statutory duty of care 
does not extend to such a default, the trustee is subject to the common law duty of 
care. 
Yet Parliament cannot have intended that the common law duty of care should apply 
where there is a complete failure by trustees in carrying out their duties under section 
9A(3). The better view is that failure to act will be a breach of the trustees' duty under 
section 9A(3) and that section 9A(6) is irrelevant. Whitehouse and Hassall question if 
the trustee does breach the statutory duty of care, whether the trustee becomes 
vicariously liable for the acts of the attorney or whether the trustee's liability is 
determined on the basis of his own breach of duty. 528 Their view is that the wording 
of the subsection could be clearer, but that this is not a case of vicarious liability, 
because liability only occurs as a result of the personal defaults of the trustee. 
The problem with this interpretation is that the wording of subsection (6) is wording 
of vicarious liability being 'liable for any act or default of the beneficiary'. This 
reflects the language of section 25(7) of the Trustee Act 1925 'liable for the acts or 
defaults of the donor' and the old section 9(8) of the 1996 Act 'liable for any act or 
525 op. cit., para. 2.57. 5260 
. P cit., para. 2.5 8. 5270 
P. cit., paras. 2.57-2.59 and 5.44. 5280 
. P cit., para. 2.99 and para. 12.90 on section 23(l) of the Trustee Act 2000. 
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default of the beneficiary', both of which by Whitehouse and Hassall's own 
admission constitute vicarious liability. Liability under section 9(8) also arose as a 
result of personal defaults of the trustee in not exercising reasonable care in deciding 
to delegate the function to the beneficiary, but this was still a case of vicarious 
liability. On the wording of section 9A(6) only vicarious liability arises, whereas a 
breach of section 9A(3) constitutes personal liability. There may be an overlap of 
cases between the two, thus giving rise to both personal and vicarious liability in an 
appropriate case. 
Potential liability for the acts and defaults of the beneficiary-delegate is a disincentive 
to delegate and should be contrasted first, with the position under the Settled Land 
Act 1925, where trustees cannot be liable for the actions of the tenant for life, unless 
loss is caused by a trustee's own wilful default under section 96 of the Settled Land 
Act 1925, and secondly, with the trust for sale, where trustees for sale were 
specifically stated by section 29(3) of the Law of Property Act 1925 not to be liable 
for the actions of beneficiaries to whom management and leasing powers were 
delegated under section 29 of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
Conclusion 
Section 9 contains deficient and flawed provisions and at the same time represents a 
requisite, inevitable compromise. It has not been drafted to be the functional 
equivalent of a strict settlement. Section 9(l) should be made subject to a contrary 
intention and drafted to adopt wording similar to section 69(2) of the Trustee Act 
1925, so that section 9(l) applies if and so far only as a contrary intention is not 
expressed in the instrument creating the trust and have effect subject to the terms of 
that instrument. An express clause should provide for mandatory delegation where 
this is required rather than section 9 itself, since section 9 covers both co-ownership 
and successive interests, thus rendering it neither feasible nor practical to be drafted to 
compel trustee delegation. Section 9(2) should be amended to delete reference to 
knowledge and be subject to evidence to the contrary. 
The second half of section 9(7) should be drafted to specify that for the purposes of 
subdelegation and receipt of capital money, such beneficiaries shall not be regarded as 
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trustees. A clause prohibiting trustees giving a direction that a beneficiary is to receive 
capital money is also necessary. Section 9A(3)(b) should be amended to delete the 
words 'if circumstances make it appropriate to do so' and (c) should be amended to 
insert the words 'if there is a need to exercise such a power' in place of the words 'if 
they consider that there is a need to exercise such a power'. Lastly, section 9A(5) 
would have been better drafted if it had stated that, 'The duty of care under section I 
of the 2000 Act applies to trustees for the purposes of subsection (3). ' 
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CHAPTER 8- RIGHT TO OCCUPY: A JUDICIOUS 
INNOVATION? 
DO SOLICITORS THfNK THAT IT WAS WORTHWHILE TO INTRODUCE A 
STATUTORY RIGHT TO OCCUPY UNDER SECTION 12? 
10 solicitors 529 stated that they thought that it was worthwhile to introduce a statutory 
right to occupy under section 12. 
7 solicitors 530 stated that they thought that it was not worthwhile to introduce a 
statutory right to occupy under section 12. 
The refann may have been advantageous in cases of co-ownership rather than 
successive interest trusts as identified by Chris Jarman (Payne Hicks Beach) who 
stated, 'Yesfor co-ownership; definitely nofor successive interest trusts. That is 
another example ofthe whole thrust ofthe Law Commission Report being pointed at 
co-ownership and suddenly infecting other trusts as well. ' Bringing two different 
regimes under one umbrella and imposing one set of rules inevitably mean that the 
new law may be unsuited to one or the other. 
The tax advantages were stressed by Nigel Reid (Linklaters and Alliance) who stated 
that, 'It is very importantfor tax reasons: capital gains tax. To get principal private 
residence relieffor a beneficiary occupying tinder a trust, you have to be entitled to 
occupy tinder the terms of the trust. By making it statutory, you do not get any 
problems ifyou miss it out ofthe draft. ' 
Questionable scope of the right to occupy 
Section 12(l) states that, 'A beneficiary who is beneficially entitled to an interest in 
possession in land subject to a trust of land is entitled by reason of his interest to 
occupy the land at any time if at that time- (a) the purposes of the trust include 
making the land available for his occupation (or for the occupation of beneficiaries of 
529 Allen and Overy, Charles Russell, Currey and Co, Eversheds, Linklaters and Alliance, Macfarianes, 
May, May and Merrrimans, Official Solicitor, Payne Hicks Beach and Wiggin and Co. 
"'0 Boodle Hatfield, Burges Salmon, Farrer and Co, Herbert Smith, Speechly Bircham, Public Trust 
Office and Withers. 
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a class of which he is a member or of beneficiaries in general), or (b) the land is held 
by the trustees so as to be available. ' With the abolition of conversion, section 12 
recognises that beneficiaries under trusts of land have rights in the land. This right of 
occupation is completely new as compared with the previous statutory provisions 
concerning trusts for sale under which there were no statutory rights of occupation for 
beneficiaries. 531 
Prior to the 1996 Act there had been great debate over whether a person with a 
beneficial interest under a trust for sale had a right to occupy the land. 532 Beneficial 
joint tenants and tenants in common had rights of occupation, 533 but it was not clear 
whether the same was true of someone with a life interest under a trust for sale of 
land. The tenant for life under a strict settlement was generally entitled to occupy the 
land by virtue of having the legal estate vested in him as well as beneficial enjoyment 
of his estate for life in equity. 534 It is unfortunate that the Law Commission did not 
analyse the existing law on rights to occupation under trusts for sale 535 merely 
indicating a two-fold reason for the reform that, 'It is not clear whether trustees for 
sale have a power to let beneficiaries into occupation, and it may also be that, 
531 See Williams on Wills op. cit., para. 208.6. 
532 See J. G. Ross Martyn Co-owners and Their Entitlement to Occupy their Land before and after the 
Trusts ofLand andAppointinent of Trustees Act 1996., Theoretical Doubts are Replaced by Practical 
Dijjiculties [1997] Conv. 254 for a review of cases in this area. The modem view that a right of 
occupation was a constituent element of the rights enjoyed by a beneficiary in cases of co-ownership 
culminated in the House of Lords decision in City ofLondon Building Society v. Flegg [1988] A. C. 54 
and can be traced back to Lord Denning's judgment in Bull v. Bull [ 1955] 1 Q. 13.234. This should be 
compared with land held on an express trust for sale in Barclay v. Barclay [1970] 2 Q. 13.677 where 
there was held to be no right to occupy as the prime object of the trust was that the bungalow should be 
sold. The traditional view is that occupation by a beneficiary was not a right but a privilege to be 
accorded or withheld by the trustees in the fiduciary exercise of their powers of management of the 
land: see cases in Gray and Gray op. cit., p. 897 footnote 7. See also D. G. Barnsley Co-owners'Rights 
to Occupy Trust Land [1998] C. L. J. 123 and the discussion in Gray Elements ofLandLcnv (2 nd edn) op. 
cit., p. 546-550. 
533 Bull v. Bull and City ofLondon Building Society v. Flegg. 
534 See Emmet and Farrand on Title op. cit., R. 46 and 47 para. 22.034 and Lewin on Trusts op. cit., 
ams. 37-54,37-72 and 37-96. 
5 Law Com. No. 181 para. 13.2. As Barnsley criticised op. cit., p. 126 footnote 17, this issue was dealt 
with by the Law Commission in a single sentence and a three line footnote, footnote 43 in para. 1.3 
referring to their Working Paper No. 94 para. 3.22. It is also odd that the Law Commission Report 
made no mention of Flegg and it is Barnsley's view op. cit., p. 126 that if the Law Commission had 
taken Flegg into account, there would have been much less ground for their uncertainty justifying a 
closer look at the pre-] 926 common law position. Barnsley does not mention that the Law Commission 
in Working Paper No. 94 para. 8.7 did discuss the position in a little more detail and did state that, 'The 
rights of residence of co-owners depend on the pre- 1926 law, and have been the matter of some 
dispute. ' 
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although under the new system the trustees will have the powers of an absolute 
owner, this would not be considered a proper exercise of those powers. ' 536 
Section 12(l), by applying to a beneficiary who is beneficially entitled to an interest 
in possession, in land, 537 does not apply to objects of a discretionary trust, annuitants, 
pension trust beneficiaries or any beneficiary holding his beneficial interest in a 
fiduciary capacity for others. The interest must be in possession as stated by the 
Inland Revenue 538 in the sense explained in Pearson v. IRC of 'a present right of 
present enjoyment'. 539 The view of Willianis on Wills 540 is that the use of the term 
'interest in possession' in the 1996 Act is probably influenced by the Inheritance Tax 
Act 1984, but it does not follow that what is an interest in possession for the purposes 
of the 1984 Act is also one within the 1996 Act, since the statutory purposes of the 
use of the term are different. 541 
Problems identying purposes of the trust 
Section 12(l)(a) and (b) appear to be infelicitously drafted. 542 It is unclear how the 
'purposes' of the trust in section 12(l)(a) are to be ascertained. Gray and Gray are of 
the view that, 'The essence of a trust "purpose" is left perilously undefined. 5543 Land 
jointly purchased for residential occupation will usually satisfy the test. 544 There may 
536 Megarry and Wade op. cit., para. 8-139 footnote 37 are of the view that this was presumably 
because of the decision in Re Power where Jenkins J. held that an express power for trustees to invest 
in the purchase of land was held not to authorise the trustees to purchase a residence for a beneficiary. 
It is likely that section 6(l) would include such a power. An obvious alternative would have been to 
confer the power on the trustees expressly instead of giving the beneficiary a right to occupy. 
537 The Law Commission in Law Com. No. 181 explained in para. 13.3 that, 'This right will only 
extend to beneficiaries with a present, vested, interest in the land' and footnote 147 states that, 'In other 
words, those with a purely monetary interest, or with a future or contingent interest, will be excluded. ' 
Clearly where the interest of a beneficiary is in income only, such a beneficiary does not have an 
interest in land notwithstanding the effect of section 3: see Kenny and Kenny op. cit., p. 16. 
538 See Chris Jarman Q&A (1997) 3 89 Tax Journal 19. 
539 op. cit., at 775 per Viscount Dilhorne. 
540 op. cit., para. 208.12. 
54 1 For seven main differences between interest in possession in the 1996 Act and the 1984 Act, see 
Williams on Wills op. cit., para. 208.13. 
542 See Kenny and Kenny op. cit., p. 16. 
543 op. cit., p. 899. They state that it is inferable that the draftsman was attempting to incorporate a 
distinction which gained some currency under the old trust for sale between those trusts whose 'prime 
object' lay in the long-term provision of residential utility for one or more beneficiaries and trusts 
whose 'prime object' was expressly concerned with an immediate disposition of the trust land and 
division of the sale proceeds. 
544 But not always, as in Barclay v. Barclay: see Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., para. 2.126 footnote 
2. 
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be an express term of the trust or evidence in a letter of wishes, although they are 
unusual in this type of trust and if the settlor is still alive, he may indicate what his 
purposes were in establishing the trust. Lightman J. adopted a sensible approach in 
LR. C v. Evet-sden 545 when he stated that, 'it may be noted that the "purposes" of a 
trust are primarily to be found in the trust instrument, but may in appropriate cases be 
found outside it: such purposes may however be expected to be consistent with the 
contents of the trust instrument. ' 
The purposes of the trust may change in accordance with the needs of beneficiaries 
and changing circumstances. 546 Whitehouse and Hassall argue correctly that, 'The 
statutory test is what the purposes were "at that time"; i. e. not necessarily when the 
trust was created, but at any time when a beneficiary is entitled to an interest in 
possession so that the question of occupying trust land is in issue. ' 547 It should be 
noted that the words 'at that time' were not in the original clause 7(l) of the draft Bill 
attached to the Law Commission Report and their introduction reinforces the 
correctness of their assertion. Although settlors should now specify the purposes 
which they may not have done in the past, it will be for the trustees to decide what the 
current purposes are. 548 
It is to be regretted that section 12(l)(a) will encourage the court to embark on the 
kind of speculative journey it took in the 'family home' cases under section 30 of the 
Law of Property Act 1925 to inquire into the purpose of the trust. 549 Smith laments the 
fact that given that most disputes are most likely to arise when facts change and 
especially relationships break down, the operation of section 12 may well be anything 
545 [2002] E. W. H. C. 1360, [20021 S. T. C. 1109 para. 25. It should be noted that the Court of Appeal 
[20031 E. W. C. A. Civ. 668, [2003] S. T. C. 822 did not comment on the 1996 Act. 
546 Thompson Modern Land Law op. cit., p. 303 argues that one has regard to the purpose of the trust at 
the time when a beneficiary seeks to exercise his right to possession and not the time when the trust 
was created. 
547 op. cit., para. 2.126. See also Barnsley op. cit., p. 132-133. 
548 As Barnsley states op. cit., p. 133 footnote 41, a change of purpose would need the consent of all 
beneficial co-owners. It would not be open to the trustees to seek to vary the purposes of the trust so as 
to deprive a beneficiary of the right to occupy. 
. 549 See Kenny and Kenny op. cit., p. 16. They warn that the willingness of the court to manufacture a 
'purpose', which the parties to an arrangement may or may not ever have had, must be an object lesson 
to settlors. 
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but straightforward. 550 Clements questions whether there is to be a consistency of 
approach regarding purpose as between the factors to be taken into account under 
section 14 applications and a section 12 purpose or whether it is only express 
purposes declared in the trust instrument which are relevant. 551 
Despite Clements' view that the 1996 Act provides no clear guidance on this, a court 
would not limit itself under section 12 to express purposes and would take a broad 
view of purpose under section 12.552 Clementswelcomes analysis of purposes under 
section 12(l)(a), since it cleared up the issue addressed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in 
the debates on the Bill as to how the Act applied to pension ftinds held on trust and 
investment trusts which include land. 553 It is now more crucial than before for the 
draftsman of such arrangements to draw up a coherent and unambiguous trust 
instrument making the purpose of the arrangement clear. 554 
Difficulties interpreting land 'held by the trustees so as to be so available' 
The alternative in section 12(l)(b) is where 'the land is held 555 by the trustees so as to 
be so available'. This raises questions as to what is meant by 'available'. 
'Availability' is a question of fact and each case is to be analysed on its own facts. 
The view of Barraclough and Matthews is that 'availability' is not a clear cut concept 
and they ask what the position is if the property is to be sold in a few weeks, a couple 
of months or a year. 556 The obvious answer is that the property is available before the 
sale and not thereafter. They also question if the property is a hotel, whether a 
beneficiary can claim to use an unoccupied room for the night. The answer is likely to 
be in the negative as hotel rooms are to be paid for, are not to be given away 
. 550 Property Law op. cit., p. 309. 
55 1 L. M. Clements The Changing Face of Trusts: the Trusts ofLand andAppointment of Trustees Act 
1996 (1998) 61 M. L. R. 56 at 60. 
552 This view is shared by Underhill and Hayton op. cit., p. 477 who state that the purposes in creating 
the trust are ascertained from the trust instrument itself and the circumstances in which it was made. 
553 H. L. Debs., Vol. 569, col. 1725. 
554 See Michael Harwood A Homefor Life- the New Trusts ofLandAct [ 1997] Fam. Law 182. 
555 The wording in clause 7(l)(b) of the Bill attached to the Law Commission Report used the word 
'acquired' instead of 'held' and used the phrase 'for that purpose' instead of 'as to be so available'. 
'Acquired' is narrower than 'held' and 'held' is more appropriate terminology. The Notes on Clauses 
issued by the Lord Chancellor's Department on the House of Lords Bill in para. 139 clarifies that the 
new terminology allows for a subsequent purpose to be taken into consideration and gives the example 
in footnote 46 of a house bought for resale just before a slump in the property market which might now 
be used as a dwelling for a beneficiary. 556 op. cit., para. 8.4. 
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gratuitously and are to be kept unoccupied for that purpose. Smith expresses the view 
that a right conferred by virtue of section 12(l)(b) seems meaningless insofar as it 
depends upon a continuing intention upon the part of the trustees. 557 
A divergence of opinion emanates from the commentators as to whether (a) or (b) 
takes precedence. Kenny and Kenny are of the view that (a) must take precedence 
over (b), since it is inconceivable that the legislature can intend the land to be 
regarded as 'so available' if the purposes of the trust are expressly that it is not to be 
so available. 558 This view was shared by Lightman J. in LR. C v. Eversden 559 when he 
stated, 'it may likewise be noted that trustees can only hold land "so as to be 
available" for occupation by a beneficiary if this accords with the purposes of the trust 
instrument or a due exercise by them of their powers thereunder. ' 560 It is important to 
stress that where land is not intended to be available for occupation, it would be 
prudent to say so succinctly in the trust deed. 
MacKenzie, Walker and Walton, on the other hand, are of the view that (b) prevails 
since the words 'so as to be available' are sufficiently wide to enable trustees to 
561 disregard the original purpose for which the land was being held or was acquired. 
In their opinion where land is available for occupation, a beneficiary with an interest 
in possession will acquire a right to occupy it irrespective of its original purpose. The 
views of Kenny and Kenny and Lightman J. are to be preferred, since it is axiomatic 
that land will not be available for occupation if one of the purposes is that it is not to 
be available. To state otherwise is to ignore the explicit wording of section 12(l)(a) 
and to ignore the effect of the word 'so' in (b) in 'to be so available'. 
557 Property Law op. cit., p. 309. 5511 Op. Cit., P. 17. 
559 Op. cit., pam. 25. In Eversden the issue considered by Lightman J., though not considered by the 
Court of Appeal, was whether the settlor acquired on I January 1997 a right of occupation in the whole 
property by virtue of section 12(l)(a) or (b). Lightman J. held op. cit., pams. 26-28 that both conditions 
required by section 12 were satisfied to give the settlor an entitlement to occupy the land. 
5'50 Lewin on Trusts First Supplement to the Seventeenth Edition op. cit., pam. 37-56 comments that the 
mere fact that the trustees have an express power to allow a beneficiary to occupy trust land does not 
entitle the beneficiary to occupy the land unless the power is exercised. 
561 Judith-Anne MacKenzie, Andrew Walker and Peter Walton A Guide to the Trusts ofLand and 
Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (1998) p. 54. 
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Leivin on Trusts examines whether and if so, to what extent, the potentially wide 
scope of section 12(l)(b) is cut down by the words 'held by the trustees so as to be 
available' and in their view it is unclear. 562 Yet in the situation which arose in Barclay 
v. Barclay, 563 the child wishing to occupy would have had no rights of occupation 
under the pre- 1997 law and it is, in fact, extremely unlikely that the house would be 
regarded as 'held by the trustees so as to be available'. The result in Barclay v. 
Barclay was a just one on its facts and there is no justification for sidestepping it, 
unless it was the intention of the testator that the residing child should remain in 
occupation. 
Hudson maintains that there are two possibilities as to what is meant by the term 
'hold': either the trustees must have made a formal decision that the property is to be 
held in a particular manner, or more generally it must be merely practicable that the 
land is made available . 
564 Hudson does not express a preference, although a court may 
adopt the second, broader interpretation, since section 12(l)(b) is widely drafted. 
Williams on Wills, however, adopts the narrower view that the trustees must make 
some decision or take some action to make it available first 565 which in their opinion 
necessitates a discussion of (b) incontrovertibly overlapping with (a). Whether 
overlap was intended by section 12(l) is doubtful, since the word 'or' necessitates that 
(a) and (b) are alternatives and should remain as such. 
Section 12(2) states that, 'Subsection (1) does not confer on a beneficiary a right to 
occupy land if it is either unavailable or unsuitable for occupation by him. ' This raises 
the question whether the use of the word 'unavailable' in section 12(2) is otiose, since 
it does not add anything to section 12(l)(b) and cannot serve any useful purpose. The 
only rationale for its inclusion is that if the land is unavailable for occupation, this will 
override section 12(l)(a), so that a beneficiary will not be able to claim a right to 
562 op. cit., para. 37-56. 
563 As Lord Denning himself stated op. cit., p. 684, 'The prime object of the trust was that the bungalow 
should be sold. None of the five beneficiaries was given any right or interest in the bungalow itself. 
None of them was entitled to possession of it. The testator, by his will, expressly directed that it was to 
be sold and the proceeds divided between them. ' 
564 Op. cit., para. 16.2.3. 
563 op. cit., para. 208.7 on the issue of vacant land. 
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occupy on the ground of the purposes of the trust. Williams on Wills considers 
566 the 
duplication of the availability test slightly puzzling, but reaches the same conclusion 
that the explanation may be that 'unavailable' in terms of section 12(2) is intended for 
section 12(l)(a) cases, that is where the purposes of the trust are to make the land 
available. 
Barnsley states that land is not unavailable for occupation because there is another 
beneficiary already living there, due to the overriding unity of possession existing 
between beneficiaries. 567 'Unavailable' will cover where the property is let568 or 
where the trustees decide to sell the land. Kenny and Kenny question whether a house 
is unavailable where it is presently occupied by retired retainers whom the trustees 
have the right but not the will to evict. 569 The answer must be that it is unavailable 
until the trustees evict the retired retainers. 
Meaning of 'unsuitable' 
The word 'unsuitable' is difficult to apply, since it has both objective and subjective 
connotations. Jonathan Parker L. J. stated in Chan Pui Chun v. Leung Kam H0570 that, 
'There is no statutory definition or guidance as to what is meant by "unsuitable" in 
this context, and it would be rash indeed to attempt an exhaustive definition or 
explanation of its meaning. In the context of the present case it is, I think, enough to 
say that "unsuitability" for this purpose must involve a consideration not only of the 
general nature and physical characteristics of the particular property but also a 
consideration of the personal characteristics, circumstances and requirements of the 
particular beneficiary. This much is, I think, clear from the fact that the statutory 
566 Op. cit., para. 208.8. 5670 
. P cit., p. 134. 
568 Martyn op. cit., p. 260 questions whether land is unavailable if it is already occupied by tenants or 
licensees or if it is only unavailable (Martyn writes available but this must be an error) if their rights of 
occupation cannot be terminated. The answer must be that it is unavailable if it is already occupied and 
the fact that rights of occupation can be terminated does not make the property available if there is de 
facto occupation of the property. 
569 Op. cit., p. 17. 
570 [2002] E. W. C. A. Civ. 1075, [200311 F. L. R. 23 at para. 10 1. Jonathan Parker L. J. rejected at para. 
102 the suggestion that unsuitability arose on the facts of the case on the basis of the house being too 
large for Miss Chan's needs and too expensive for her to maintain. He maintained that, 'I would have 
taken some persuading that a property which was on any footing suitable for occupation by Miss Chan 
and Mr. Leung whilst they lived together should be regarded as unsuitable for occupation by her alone 
once Mr. Leung had left. ' This must be treated with caution, since every case will be determined on its 
own facts. 
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expression is not simply "unsuitable for occupation" but "unsuitable for occupation by 
him", that is to say by the particular beneficiary. ' 
Thus the unsuitability may arise either from the nature of the land 57 1 (which Barnsley 
terms objective unsuitability 572) or from the characteristics of the relevant 
beneficiary 573 (which Barnsley terms subjective unsuitability574) . Barnsley questions 
whether it is open to argument on behalf of existing beneficiary occupants that there 
exists a lack of compatibility 575 between them and a beneficiary entitled through 
inheritance on the ground of his addiction to drugs or criminal record and whether the 
beneficiary's mental or physical disability is relevant in determining suitability. These 
are all factors which must be taken into account and each case will be decided on its 
particular facts. 
The Notes on Clauses issued by the Lord Chancellor's Department 576 state that, 'The 
term "unsuitable" was added in order to ensure that a right to occupy does not arise 
where premises are empty (and therefore not "unavailable" for occupation) but it 
would be inappropriate to enable the particular beneficiary to occupy them: an 
example might be where the land is a working farm but the beneficiary is not, and has 
no intention of becoming, a fan-ner. ' The term 'unsuitable' was not in the original 
clause 7(l) of the Law Commission Bill attached to their Report which instead stated 
that 'the land is reasonably available for occupation by him'. 
It is debatable whether section 12(2) can remove an entitlement to occupy by 
intervening unsuitability. Intervening unavailability will remove the right due to the 
wording of section 12(l), but unsuitability is not covered by such wording. One way 
of interpreting section 12(2), construing the word 'confer' as the initial grant, is that 
unsuitability will ab inifio prevent a right arising but once a beneficiary is in 
371 Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., para. 2.125 footnote 2 give an example of land being unsuitable if a beneficiary with no farming experience seeks to occupy a farm. 572 0. Cit, P. P 134. 
-573 Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., para. 2.125. Leivin on Trusts op. cit., para. 37-57 also holds this 
view. 574 0. Ci P. P 134. 
575 See Thompson Modern LandLmv op. cit., p. 304 who expresses the view that unsuitable is likely to 
embrace the suitability with regard to other occupiers. 576 op. 
cit., para. 140. 
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occupation, such a beneficiary does not cease to be entitled under section 12(l) and 
cannot be excluded due to being a beneficiary in occupation under section 13(7). The 
other interpretation is that unsuitability at any time will cause the right to occupy to 
terminate. If trustees can insist that a beneficiary move to more suitable 
accommodation to be offered by the trust, this is in fact recognising that a beneficiary 
will lose the right to occupy under section 12(2) due to supervening unsuitability. The 
better answer is that in such a case, the trustees must apply to the court under section 
13(7) to prevent the beneficiary in occupation from continuing in occupation if the 
beneficiary does not consent. 
Nature of the entitlement under section 12 
Martyn identifies three kinds of entitlement under the pre- 1997 law: 577 the undoubted 
entitlement that could arise as a result of the exercise of the discretion of the trustees, 
an entitlement merely by virtue of being a co-owner 578 and an entitlement based on 
the purpose for which the trust was created. 579 Martyn points OUt580 that Lord Oliver 
in City of London Building Society v. Flegg 581 sets out both the second and third types 
of entitlement and did not choose between them. Yet this is to misconstrue what Lord 
Oliver was saying, since he was not setting out different types of entitlement for one 
to be chosen. What Lord Oliver said was, 'One of the incidents of that beneficial 
interest is, or may be according to the agreement between the beneficiaries or to the 
purpose for which the trust was originally created, the enjoyment of the property in 
specie either alone or concurrently with other beneficiaries. ' 582 
577 op. cit., p. 259. 
578 Martyn reviews the cases which enunciate this principle: Williams and Glyns Bank v. Boland [ 198 1 
A. C. 487 per Lord Wilberforce at 507 and per Lord Scarman at 5 10, City ofLondon Building Society v. 
Flegg per Lord Scarman op. cit., at 7 1, Bull v. Bull, Jones (AE) v. Jones (FW) 1977] 1 W. L. R. 43 8 per 
Lord Denning M. R. at 442. 
579 There is support for this approach from Devlin L. J. in Jones v. Challenger 196 1]IQ. 13.176 at 184 
who explained Lord Denning's remarks in Bull v. Bull on the basis that 'the house was bought for the 
purpose of providing a home for the mother and son and that, as the mother was still residing there, that 
purpose had not been brought to an end. ' As Martyn himself explains op. cit., p. 257, the Court of 
Appeal in Jones v. Challenger was primarily concerned with the jurisdiction to order a sale under 
section 30 of the Law of Property Act 1925 and not with rights of occupation. The words of Devlin L. J. 
are consistent with both the right of one co-owner to occupy, and the right of the other co-owner to a 
sale, depending on the purpose for which the property was bought. 510 op. cit., p. 258. 
581 op, cit., p. 81 * 112 op. cit., P. 8 1. 
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What Lord Oliver was examining was the origins of the entitlement: agreement 
between the beneficiaries or the purpose for which the trust was created and the fact 
that they were alternatives dependent on the facts of the particular case. In fact Lord 
Oliver explicitly continued by saying, which Martyn does not quote, 'But the 
enjoyment in specie, whilst it may serve to give notice to third parties of the 
occupier's interest under the trust, is not a separate and severable right which can be 
regarded as, as it were, free standing. ..... there is nothing in the statute or in the cases 
...... to suggest that the enjoyment of the property 
in specie of itself confers some 
independent right which will survive the operation of the overreaching provisions of 
the Law of Property Act 1925.583 
Based on this flawed foundation Martyn then proceeds with his view that section 12 
moves through the three different kinds of entitlement. 584 The opening of subsection 
(1) and paragraph (a) seem to be selecting the third alternative, the purpose rule. But 
paragraph (b) clearly goes further so that subsection (1), taken as a whole, suggests 
that beneficiaries are entitled to occupy merely by virtue of their status as 
beneficiaries, subject only to the land being available for occupation. However, 
Martyn continues, subsection (2) changes the course of the section yet again. The 
words 'unavailable' or 'unsuitable' appear to create objective criteria, but must be 
predominantly subjective in operation. The result will be that trustees will be carrying 
out much the same process as trustees carried before the 1996 Act when exercising 
their discretion whether or not to accede to the request of a beneficiary to go into 
occupation. This argument may be correct, but then Martyn makes a leap which he 
does notjustify by stating that the difference now is that section 12(l)(b) and section 
12(2) treat unavailability and unsuitability as objective criteria, depriving a 
beneficiary of an entitlement that he would otherwise have, and not as considerations 
for the exercise of a discretion. 
The problem with this argument is that section 12(l)(b) and section 12(2) are not 
exclusively objective tests, since they entail consideration of subjective criteria and do 
not. remove the operation of the discretion of trustees. Rather than there being three 
583 Op. cit., p. 8 1. 
584 Op. cit., p. 259-260. 
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kinds of entitlement prior to 1997 as Martyn claims, there is in fact one type of 
qualified entitlement expressed in subtly different ways as case law has evolved. 
Martyn himself recognises this to a certain extent when he states, before launching 
into his discussion of sections 12 and 13, that 'the distinction between a rule that co- 
owners have a right of occupation merely by virtue of being co-owners, and a rule that 
they have the right because they bought the co-owned property for the purpose and 
with the intention of occupying it, is irrelevant. ' He needs to go even further and state 
that such a distinction cannot be justified. What section 12 represents is an amalgam 
and jumble of principles derived from the old law intermingled with explicitly new 
concepts of availability and suitability to constitute a qualified right, which may be 
the subject of great uncertainty and thus litigation due to the impreciseness of drafting 
of the section. 
Hudson argues convincingly that one way to perceive section 12 is as a permissive 
provision granting a qualified right of occupation, in relation to which it is necessary 
to protect the trustees from a claim for breach of the duty of fairness by means of 
section 13 if some beneficiaries are protected rather than others. 585 He maintains that 
it seems that the 1996 Act displaces the concept of interests in possession as the 
decisive factor in the treatment of the home in favour of considering the advantages of 
pen-nitting some persons to continue to occupy the home. 
Can the common law right of occupation still be relied upon? 
Barnsley's reactionary view is that sections 12 and 13 actually curtail the occupational 
rights of co-owners compared with their entitlement prior to 1926, and indeed after 
1925, had the post- 1925 law been correctly understood. Barnsley argues that there are 
strong grounds for arguing that these pre-Act rights are still extant so that co-owners 
disadvantaged by the Act will be able to ignore its provisions and rely on the superior 
general law rights. 586 Barnsley's view is that the 1996 Act has radically altered the 
nature of co-owners' occupational rights as they existed at common law 587 and the 
5'5 Op. cit., para. 16.2.3. 586 0. Cit, P. P 124. 
5870 
CIt P. P. 130. Compare the view of Jeremy de Souza Joint Tenancies: When Should They be 
Recommended? [20031 P. C. B. 57 at 62 who states that sections 12-13 have abolished the principle in 
Bull v. Bull, citing Eversden at first instance op. cit., para. 24 where Lightman J. stated that, 'when the 
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statutory right is much less extensiVe. 588 He argues that by making the right of 
occupation dependent on the purpose of the trust, the Act has introduced a 
qualification that did not normally affect the general law right to occupy 
589 and that 
concepts of unavailability and unsuitability erode the occupational rights of co-owners 
under the general law. 590 
Barnsley challenges the assumption of the Law Commission that the statutory right of 
occupation, though circumscribed in various respects, is superior to the pre-Act rights 
available under the general law. 591 He maintains that it seems to have escaped the 
notice of the Law Commission that the imposition of a trust of land instead of a trust 
for sale, coupled with the abolition of the doctrine of conversion for the purposes of 
co-ownership, would put the law back to the pre- 1926 position -where occupational 
rights of co-owners were in no way limited or restricted in the manner introduced by 
the Act. 
Barnsley questions whether whatever occupational rights concurrent owners enjoyed 
before the Act would be replaced by the statutory scheme or whether the rights under 
the general law have been preserved. Barnsley's view is that section 12 does not 
profess to abolish pre-Act rights of occupation, that these rights continue to exist and 
in so far as they are superior to those available under the Act, an equitable co-owner is 
entitled to rely on his general law rights. His opinion is that since the general law 
rights of co-owners relating to occupation have been preserved, the Act may well turn 
out to be a dead letter. 592 
1996 Act came into force, a tenant in common in equity .... who had made a contribution to the 
purchase price was no longer automatically entitled by reason of such contribution alone to occupation 
of the property purchased. ' See Leivin on Trusts First Supplement to the Seventeenth Edition op. cit., 
para. 37-54. See also Jeremy de Souza Another APR Aluddle (2001) 19 T. & E. T. J. 9 at 10 and (2001) 
76 P. L. J. 23 at 24. 588 Op. Cit., P. 132. 
589 Barnsley's view is that the reference to the purpose of the trust introduced a limitation usually of no 
consequence at common law and was inconsistent with the unity of possession which existed between 
all co-owners: op. cit., p. 132 and p. 125 footnote 12. 
590 Op. cit., p. 134. 
591 Op. cit., p. 136. 
592 Op. cit., p. 145. 
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Barnsley's views can be challenged on two grounds. The first ground is that it is not 
axiomatic that the common law right was necessarily more extensive than the 
statutory right. There was no absolute right at common law and case law developed 
ad hoc from case to case with undefined parameters. Occupation by a beneficiary was 
historically not a right but a privilege to be accorded or withheld by the trustees in the 
fiduciary exercise of their powers of management of the land. 593 Barnsley argues that 
reliance on Re Bagot's Settlement was misplaced and had no relevance to the totally 
different situation operating in a co-ownership case. Yet such a distinction was not 
drawn by Chitty J. and has not been accepted by other commentators. 594 Although this 
approach became increasingly unsustainable as the courts gradually acknowledged 
that a right to occupy land was necessarily an integral component of the rights 
enjoyed by the trust for sale beneficiary, 595 the common law position contrasts with 
the statutory provision, which because of its defined parameters, may superficially 
seem more restricted than the common law. This is, however, because it has been 
explicitly articulated as opposed to the common law right which is implicitly 
uncertain and indeterminate in its ambit and evolves on a case by case basis. Thus one 
is not comparing like with like. 
Yet even if the common law right is more extensive than the statutory right, the 
second ground upon which Barnsley's views can be challenged would render the first 
ground otiose on the basis that the common law rights have been superseded by the 
statutory rights. A contrary view was tentatively suggested by McGonigal J. in Chan 
Pid Chim v. Lezing Kam Ho 596 who stated that, '... the common law rights are still 
593 See Gray and Gray op. cit., p. 897 footnote 7. This was the position before 1926: see Re Bagot's 
Settlement [1894) 1 Ch. 177 at 180-181 and Re Earl ofStaniford and Warrington [19251 Ch. 162 at 
17 1. This seems to have been confirmed in the restructuring of property law in the enactments of 1925: 
see Re Landi (Deceased) [1939] Ch. 828 at 835. 
594 F. R. Crane Notes ofRecent Cases (1955) 19 Conv. 146 at 147 argued that the decision in Bull v. 
Bull must be limited to its particular facts. See also Hamish R. Gray The Rehabilitation ofthe 
UndividedShare in Land (1955) 18 M. L. R. 408 at 409, G. A. Forrest Bull v. Bull: Another View (1956) 
19 M. L. R. 312 at 313 and R. E. Megarry Tenancies by the Entirelies Redivivus (1966) 82 L. Q. R. 29 at 
33. 
595 See Gray and Gray op. cit., p. 898 and Bull v. Bull, Williams & Glyn's Bank Ltd v. Boland, Kenunis 
v. Kenunis [198811 W. L. R. 1307 at 1325 per Purchas L. J., 1335-1336 per Nourse L. J., Meyer v. 
Riddick (1990) 60 P. & C. R. 50 at 54 per Fox L. J., Re Citro [ 199 1] Ch. 142 at 158 per Nourse L. J., 
State Bank ofIndia v. Sood [1997] Ch. 276 at 281 per Peter Gibson L. J. 
596 [2002] B. P. I. R. 723 at 758. McGonigal J. regarded an article in the Conveyancer as 'a slight basis 
for a contention that Parliament intended to replace common law rights of occupation with a new and 
exclusive statutory right of occupation. ' The justification for his views are judicial authority prior to the 
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relevant. ' Smith takes the view 597 that although one may concede that the Act 
nowhere excludes the previous law, it would be amazing if a court were to stultify the 
modem statutory code relating to occupation, especially the statutory powers given to 
trustees to regulate possession. 
Megarry and Wade explain 598 that the Act is not explicit as to whether this qualified 
statutory right to occupy the land is additional to any common law right to occupy the 
land or whether it has wholly replaced it. Megarry and Wade's view is that if the 
scheme laid down in the Act is to be effective, and in particular, if trustees are to be 
able to exercise their powers to exclude or restrict the right of a beneficiary to occupy 
the land, then the common law rights must be superseded. 599 But this will only be the 
case in relation to a beneficiary who is beneficially entitled to an interest in possession 
in land but who has no other rights. In such a case the common law must be impliedly 
repealed. However, Megarry and Wade assert that where that beneficiary also holds 
the legal estate as trustee, he has a right at common law to occupy the land by reason 
of his joint legal ownership of it which is intrinsic to the unity of possession to which 
all co-owners are entitled at common law. 600 Their view is that there is nothing in the 
Act to remove that right. 
However, even in such a case the statutory provisions must override the common law 
as this would otherwise lead to injustice and inconsistency. A trustee cannot be in a 
more favourable position, relying on the common law right and statutory right, just 
because he is a trustee. Implied repeal can be substantiated on the ground of the 
presumption that Parliament wishes to avoid an anomalous result. 601 The presumption 
against implied repeal is unlikely to apply invoking the principle that the statute has 
not been drafted with sufficient care which is to turn on its head the principle which 
1996 Act and the fact that section 12 is subject to section 13. His comments, which were obiter, were 
not considered by the Court of Appeal. 
. 597 Property Lmv op. cit., p. 307. 598 op. cit., para. 8-149. 
599 Charles Harpum, the editor of the Oh edition, was the Law Commissioner at the time that the 1996 
Act went through Parliament. 
"00 Similarly trustees who hold land as nominees on a bare trust cannot, in practice, impose conditions 
on the beneficiary's occupancy because they must act at his direction: see Megarry and Wade op. cit., 
para. 8-149. 
60' See Bennion op. cit., section 87 and section 315. 
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Lord Roskill enunciated in Jennings v. United States Government, 602 that earlier cases 
on implied repeal must be approached and applied with caution, since until 
comparatively late in the nineteenth century, 'statutes were not drafted with the same 
skill as today'. 603 Smith takes the view that, 'Presumably, this right to occupation is 
meant to be exclusive. It would follow that the holder of the legal estate could not 
claim to occupy personally, unless entitled by section 12 as a beneficiary. 
"' It is 
evident that modem precision drafting has not been used in these sections of the 1996 
Act. 605 
Status of the unity of possession? 
Barnsley questionS606 what has become of the unity of possession, because this issue 
was not addressed by the Law Commission. His view is that it is manifestly unjust to 
confer upon an occupying equitable co-tenant, qua trustee and owner of the legal 
estate, the right by statute to exclude his equitable co-tenant, when they both enjoy 
unity of possession attaching to their concurrent equitable interests. Barnsley's view 
can be impugned on the basis that it is misconceived to assert that the Act destroys the 
unity of possession. It is heretical, undermining the whole basis of co-ownership, and 
indeed revisionist, to suggest that if a beneficiary is excluded from occupation that 
there would be no unity of possession and thus co-ownership would cease. 
Barnsley himself admits that, 'It is, perhaps, too extreme a view to maintain that the 
Act has destroyed the unity of possession, since this unity entitles each co-tenant to 
share in the income from the land. ' Yet he continues, 'But if the land is non-income 
producing, and the excluded co-tenant has no statutory right to be paid rent by way of 
compensation, the Act does in fact destroy the unity for all practical purposes. ' The 
use of the phrase 'for all practical purposes' is revealing, since it is conceding that this 
is not the position legally. 
602 op. cit., at 116. 
603 See Bennion op. cit., section 87 footnote 6. 
6m Property Lmv op. cit., p. 308. Smith does state that this is contrary to a suggestion of Lord Denning 
M. R. in Bedson v. Bedson [1965] 2 Q. B. 666 at 678 and refers also to JVight v. CLR. [ 198212 E. G. L. R. 
236. 
605 Compare the view taken in Bennion op. cit., section 87. " Op. cit., p. 137-138. Megarry and Wade op. cit., para. 9-063 are of the view that Barnsley's 
suggestion that an equitable co-owner no longer enjoys unity of possession may be more apparent than 
real. 
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Yet if Barnsley is to follow his argument through to its logical conclusion, his 
contention should be, or at least he should make it clear, that the Act destroys the 
unity of possession ab initio in all cases of co-ownership, for if there is any possibility 
of a beneficiary being excluded from occupation and not receiving compensation, 
there cannot be unity of possession ab initio. Barnsley himself acknowledges in his 
conclusion 607 that, 'Parliament has not abolished unity of possession. Unity of 
possession, therefore, survives, and with it the incidents attaching to it at common 
law. ' 
Therein lies the answer to Barnsley's quandary. Unity of possession is a common law 
concept. Each tenant totum tenet et nihil tenet. 608 Each holds the whole in the sense 
that in conjunction with his co-tenants he is entitled to present possession and 
enjoyment of the whole; yet he holds nothing in the sense that he is not entitled to the 
exclusive possession of any individual part of the whole. This reinforces the 
theoretical entitlement to possession of the whole rather than a physical entitlement. It 
is not necessary for each co-owner to occupy the whole: the law concentrates on their 
rights. 609 Possession, as applied to equitable interests, refers to enjoyment of the 
interest rather than physical possession of the land, just as an equitable interest can be 
described as vested in possession regardless of physical occupation. 610 The common 
law right prevails unless regulated by statutory intervention, but this does not destroy 
the underlying unity of possession. It is also notable that Barnsley does not tackle the 
issue of what happened to the unity of possession prior to 1997 in cases where a 
beneficiary was excluded from possession. 
Can section 12 be excluded? 
As some of the solicitors noted in their replies, section 12 appears to be drafted in 
such a way that it cannot be excluded. Chris Jarman (Payne Hicks Beach) stated that, 
'You cannot exclude section 12. There are one or two things you can say about the 
purpose of the trust, but it does not provide in terinsfor excluding that section. If 
607 op. cit., p. 144. 
608 See Cheshire and Bum op. cit., p. 242. 609 See Smith Property Law op. cit., p. 287. 610 Ibid., p. 307 footnote 27. 
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there was provisionfor that section to yield to contrary intention, it would have said 
so. ' Section 12 did not explicitly adopt the recommendation of the Law Commission 
in its Working Paper that, 'The settlor should be able to exclude the right of residence 
if he so -wishes. ' 61 1 This means that the only way to exclude section 12 is to express 
that the purpo ses of the trust do not include making the land available for the 
occupation of the beneficiary and that the land is unavailable for such purposes. 612 
Expressly excluding section 12(l) does not appear to be contemplated by the Act, but 
a recital that it is not the wish of the settlor that any beneficiary should enjoy such a 
right and stating that any beneficial occupation should always be a matter exclusively 
within the discretion of the trustees is possible. 613 
Judicial authority in this area can be derived from Lightman J. in L R. C v. Eversden 614 
where after he stated, 'trustees can only hold land "so as to be available" for 
occupation by a beneficiary if this accords with the purposes of the trust instrument or 
a due exercise by them of their powers thereunder', he added, 'The mere fact that the 
settlement contains the additional powers is not of itself sufficient to satisfy either of 
the two conditions. ' Exactly what Lightman J. is stating is unclear, but he seems to be 
declaring implicitly that the statutory right of occupation can be overridden by a 
direction in the trust instrument that a beneficiary should not be allowed to occupy the 
land. This is a sensible interpretation of section 12(l) and there are valid policy 
reasons to justify it and to permit a settlor's freedom of choice in this manner. 
Lack of clarity in exclusion or restriction of right to occupy? 
Section 13 has been described as an innovation by Baughen, 615 which is to be 
compared with his view that section 12 makes only a formal change in the previous 
law. Section 13(l) provides that, 'Where two or more beneficiaries are (or apart from 
this subsection would be) entitled under section 12 to occupy land, the trustees of land 
may exclude or restrict the entitlement of any one or more (but not all) of them. ' 
611 Working Paper No. 94 para. 8.9. 612 See The Enoclopaedia ofForms and Precedents Vol. 40(2) op. cit., para. 459 [3223]. See also 
Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., para. 2.128. 613 The Encyclopaedia ofForms andPrecedents Vol. 40(2) op. cit., para. 459 [3223]. 6: 4 0. P cit., para. 25. 65 Simon Baughen Trusts oftand and Family Practice [ 1996] Fam. Law 736 at 73 7. Z) 
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Martyn, however, criticises section 13(l) since, in his view, 616 the intention behind the 
section seems to have been to give the trustees power to do what the court could do 
under the old law when refusing an order for sale as in Dennis iý McDonald. 617 He is 
correct that this is desirable but his view is that this is not necessarily achieved, 
because a literal reading of section 13(l) means that neither subsection (1) nor the 
later subsections depending upon it apply at all if a co-owner is not entitled under 
section 12. 
His argument is flawed, because he states that a co-owner will not be so entitled if the 
land is either unavailable or unsuitable for occupation by him under section 12(2), that 
therefore the power to impose conditions given by subsection (6) does not apply and 
in particular the co-owner in occupation cannot be ordered to compensate the co- 
owner out of occupation. He states that if this is right, then Dennis v. McDonald no 
longer applies in all cases in which it would have applied before and some co-owners 
out of occupation are worse off. 
Martyn is misguided in his arguments, because in the Dennis v. McDonald situation 
where a couple live together before splitting up, both parties will have a right to 
occupy under section 12 and the party moving out does not lose that right just by 
moving out after deciding that he or she is unable to live with his or her partner. 
Section 12(2) will not disentitle a beneficiary at that stage of moving out and does not 
mean that a beneficiary is deprived of such a right. Such a beneficiary can only lose 
that right to occupy where the trustees exercise their powers under section 13(l). Thus 
in the Dennis v. McDonald scenario the claimant would be entitled to occupation rent 
under section 13 and for this reason Martyn is mistaken. 
Barnsley laments the fact 618 that section 13, like section 12, attracted no discussion in 
its passage through Parliament and regrets that the Law Commission did not devote 
more attention to the implications of its own draft clause, especially in its possible 
616 op. cit., p. 260-261. 
617[ 1982] Fam. 63. The Court of Appeal held that rent was payable by the occupying co-owner to the 
other co-owner who had been effectively excluded by the other party's violence. 618 0. Ci P. P 135. 
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operation to co-ownership situations. 6 19 His view is that the section raises far more 
questions than it seeks to resolve. Barnsley does not discuss the Law Commission's 
Working Paper, 620 which evaluated whether the power should be placed on a statutory 
footing or whether it is best to leave the court with the widest power under a redrafted 
section 30 of the Law of Property Act 1925. The Law Commission stated that the 
advantage of legislating is that it would bring greater certainty and so make 
settlements out of court more likely. The disadvantage is that to bring greater 
certainty, one would have to define, with some precision, the situations in which an 
occupation rent could be paid and to do so would restrict what is at present a broad 
jurisdiction. 
Kenny and Kenny argue that there is a certain lack of reality about section 13(l), 
since in numerical terms the trusts that come within this subsection will be 
overwhelmingly co-ownership trusts of houses, but any dispute between beneficiaries 
such as these will in reality not be resolved by the application of section 13 . 
62 1 Their 
opinion is that what will be required is an application to the court under section 14 for 
the court to apply its very wide jurisdiction under that section. Clements highlights the 
conflict of interest for a co-ownership trustee in the large number of co-ownership 
cases where the beneficiaries will also be the only trustees or only a few of the 
beneficiaries will be trustees. 622 Almost inevitably this will require an application to 
the court under section 14 to resolve the impasse. The answer to this is the fact that 
disputes will be resolved under section 14 does not per se undermine the importance 
of section 13 as a provision in its own right or provide a justification for arguing that 
it should not have been enacted. 
619 It would be fair to say that is clear from the Explanatory Notes to the Trusts of Land Bill in clause 7 
that the Law Commission did not foresee any difficulties in its proposals. See also Law Com. No. 181 
paras. 13.3 and 13.4. 620 No. 94 para. 8.10. 621 0 Cit , P. P. . 18. Helen Clarke Co-ownership oflandandoccupation rights [1997] Legal Action, July, 18 states that section 13 is unlikely to assist where there is a dispute between co-owners. 
622 The Changing Face of Trusts: the Trusts oftand andAppointmeni of Trustees Act 1996 op. cit., p. 
61. 
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Can occipation ofall the beneficiaries be restricted? 
The operation of section 13(l) was demonstrated in Rodivay v. Landy. 623 Peter Gibson 
L. J. delivering the leading judgment in the Court of Appeal in Rodivay v. Landy held 
that, 'I do not see why, in relation to a single building which lends itself to physical 
partition, the trustees could not exclude or restrict one beneficiary's entitlement to 
occupy one part and at the same time exclude or restrict the other beneficiary's 
entitlement to occupy the other part . ........ section 13(l) seems to me to make good 
sense and to provide a useful power which trustees might well wish to exercise in 
appropriate circumstances so as to be even-handed between beneficiaries. ' 624 
The problem arose because of the words in parenthesis in section 13(l) '(but not all)'. 
A literal construction of section 13(l) would mean that the trustees cannot restrict the 
entitlement of all the beneficiaries, which would mean that the Court of Appeal in 
Rodway v. Landy could not have reached the decision which they did. However, to 
adopt such a construction would, as was asserted by counsel for the defendant, 
produce an irrational limitation on section 13(l), since it would mean that the trustees 
can exclude one of two beneficiaries entirely from the occupation of trust property, 
but not limit each of them to occupation of only part of it. Peter Gibson L. J. agreed 
with the conclusion of Martin Mann Q. C. sitting as Deputy Judge that, 'An exercise 
of the power to exclude or restrict the entitlement of all of the beneficiaries in respect 
of some part of the land subject to the trust would render section 12(l) nugatory to 
that extent. The words therefore prohibit so extensive an exercise of the power. 
Accordingly, an exercise of the power to exclude or restrict the entitlement to 
occupation of one of two beneficiaries in relation to part is not offensive to section 
12(l) so long as the other beneficiary is entitled to enjoy his right of occupation of 
that part. There is no ambiguity. The construction merely reflects that every part of a 
piece of land is unique. 625 
This approach was explained well by counsel for the defendant who urged that the 
words 'but not all' 'mean that the trustees may not exclude or restrict the entitlement 
623 [200 1]E. W. C. A. Civ. 471, [200 1] Ch. 703. 
624 Ibid., para. 33. 
625 Ibid., para. 3 1. 
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of the beneficiaries collectively; after the trustees have exercised their powers the 
beneficiaries collectively must have rights which are as extensive as those which the 
beneficiaries collectively had previously. ' This common sense construction does not 
confront head-on the problems of the drafting of section 13(l). It avoids a strict 
interpretation of that subsection and involves a rewriting and reinterpretation, which 
could have been avoided by more careful drafting. There is no support in the 
subsection for the view that the construction should reflect that every piece of the land 
is unique, yet this is the only construction possible to avoid absurdity. Rodivay v. 
Landy is an example of a shrewd decision being reached despite the constraints of the 
statutory provision, interpreting the statute in the only manner feasible to achieve a 
just solution. 
One notable feature of Rodway v. Landy is the difficulty of arranging a sale without 
626 
contravening the prohibition on selling the goodwill of a medical practice. It will be 
interesting to see whether in future cases, where the sale option is easier to effect, the 
courts will be more willing to order a sale. In Rodway v. Landy itself the occupation 
proposal agreed by the court had been proposed by one party but was opposed by the 
other party. In other cases the court may be more willing to take the view that a 
complete parting of the ways is desirable and best effected following a sale. Section 
13 is most likely to be used in relation to commercial property and every case will 
inevitably depend on its own facts. 
Uncertainty ofascertaining when it is unreasonable to exclude or restrict entitlement 
to occupy 
Section 13(2) states that, 'Trustees may not under subsection (I)- (a) unreasonably 
exclude any beneficiary's entitlement to occupy land, or (b) restrict any such 
entitlement to an unreasonable extent. 627 Kenny and Kenny are forthright in their 
views on section 13(2) stating that this is legislation at its most pointless with no real 
626 Section 54(l) of and paragraph 2(l) of Schedule 10 to the National Health Service Act 1977 makes 
it illegal to buy or sell the goodwill of a medical practice. 
627 The test of reasonableness was originally included in Clause 7(2) of the draft Bill as a reference to 
the trustees being able to 'restrict in a reasonable manner', but it was thought to merit separate 
exposition: see the Notes on Clauses op. cit., para. 143. 
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clue given as to what is reasonable or unreasonable. 628 Their criticism is exaggerated, 
since section 13(2) is merely setting parameters, albeit imprecise ones, which will be 
applied to the facts of each case. Their view is that this is, if ever there was one, an 
area where 'one man's meat is another man's poison'. The trustee has discretion so 
long as this is exercised reasonably and Kenny and Kenny regret that all that the 
introduction of this concept does is to transfer the discretion to the court. 
This argument can, however, be used wherever the concept of reasonableness is 
imported into legislation and is an unconstructive assertion, which masks the benefits 
in having this provision, which are to curb and guide the exercise of the powers of the 
trustees. Barraclough and Matthews assert that, 'Probably there was no alternative to 
using such vague terminology if (apparently) substantive justice was to be done to 
each individual case. But these unfortunate words will be productive of much 
litigation. Every beneficiary who finds him or herself on the receiving end of an 
exclusion or restriction under section 13(l) from the trustees will look for a weapon to 
beat the trustees with. 629 
Can section 13(3) apply where only one beneficiary is entitled to occupy? 
Kenny and Kenny are concerned 630 that parts of section 13 63 1 apply only where two or 
more beneficiaries are entitled under section 12 to occupy land and parts of the 
section 632 apply to all cases which fall under section 12. They admit that when section 
13 is examined as a whole, it seems to make most coherent sense if it is assumed that 
the whole of the section applies only when two or more beneficiaries are entitled to 
occupy land. But their view is that this is clearly not so, because there is nothing in 
subsection (3) and the following subsections, other than subsection (6), to link them to 
this fundamental requirement in subsection (1). 
628 0 Ci P. P. 18. Kenny and Kenny question whether in the context of the family home, it is 
unreasonable to ask somebody to share a house with a person he does not like or in the context of a 
trust of a landed estate, it is unreasonable to refuse occupation to an heir who is a devotee of free love 
and new age philosophy. 629 op. cu., para. 8.6. 
630 0 Cil P. 18. P. 
631 Subsections (1), (2) and (6). 
632 Subsections (3), (4), (5), (7) and (8). 
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This must be correct, since section 13 has not limited these subsections in this way. 
For example, section 13(3) states that, 'The trustees of land may from time to time 
impose reasonable conditions on any beneficiary in relation to his occupation of land 
by reason of his entitlement under section 12. ' This should be compared with clause 
7(2) of the draft Bill annexed to the Law Commission Report, which states 
unambiguously that the trustees have power to restrict occupation and impose 
reasonable conditions on occupiers only where two or more persons would be entitled 
to occupy. 633 
Gray and Gray, 634 SydenhaM635 and Smith 636 agree with the view that subsection (3) 
can apply where only one beneficiary has a right to occupy. This is supported by the 
Notes on Clauses 637 which states, 'That restriction has been removed, to protect the 
interests of beneficiaries who do not have a right to occupy (or whose interest has 
been excluded or restricted 638), which may be prejudiced if the occupying beneficiary 
were able to exercise his rights entirely unconditionally. The subsection also provides 
for greater flexibility by providing that conditions may be imposed from time to time. ' 
This means that where the particular circumstances of subsection (6) do not apply, the 
wording of subsection (3) does not exclude a more general condition requiring 
payment of rent for land occupied. The ability to impose conditions is of limited 
effect where there is only one beneficiary with a right to occupy. 639 Compliance with 
conditions is not a prerequisite to claiming a right to occupy and where there is only 
one beneficiary with a right to occupy, there is no provision enabling the trustees to 
exclude that beneficiary. 
633 Clause 7(2) states that, 'Where, apart from this subsection, two or more persons would be entitled to 
occupy land under subsection (1), then the trustees may- (a) restrict in any reasonable manner they 
think fit the right of any of those persons to occupy the land or any part of it; (b) impose such 
reasonable conditions on any of those persons in relation to his occupation as they think fit. ' 
634 op. cit., p. 896 footnote 19. 
635 Trusts ofLand op. cit., p. 93. 
636 Property Lmv op. cit., p. 3 10. 
6370 
. 638 
p cit., para. 144. 
639 
It is unclear why this has been added since this is covered by section 13(l). 
See Hopkins The Trusts ofLand andAppointment of TrusteesAct 1996 op. cit., p. 420. 
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Are conditions imposed on a beneficiary enforceable? 
The trustees' power to impose reasonable conditions on an occupying beneficiary 
under section 13(3) is a discretionary power to be exercised from time to time taking 
into account the matters set out in section 13(4) and which is subject to section 13(7). 
Peter Gibson L. J. held in Rodway v. Landy"O that 'a condition requiring a beneficiary 
to contribute to the cost of adapting the building to make each part suitable for his 
occupation falls within the statutory wording. ' He rejected counsel's argument that 'a 
condition "in relation to [the beneficiary's] occupation of land" is one which has 
reference only to the way in which the beneficiary conducts himself whilst in 
occupation. ' Peter Gibson L. J. 's view was that, 'I do not see why the very wide 
prepositional phrase "in relation to" should be construed so narrowly. ' 
Kenny and Kenny are of the view that section 13(5) is otiose. 64 1 Section 13(5) states 
that, 'The conditions which may be imposed on a beneficiary under subsection (3) 
include, in particular, conditions requiring him- (a) to pay any outgoings or expenses 
in respect of the land, or (b) to assume any other obligation in relation to the land or to 
any activity which is or is proposed to be conducted there. ' The reason for their view 
is that since these conditions are conditions imposed under subsection (3), the 
outgoings, expenses or obligations must be reasonable. It may never be necessary to 
test the meaning of any of the particular phrases used in subsection (5) due to 
subsection (3). 
Barnsley discusses 642 an additional burden which may be imposed by section 13(5), 
since it may require an occupying beneficiary to contribute towards the cost of 
repairs, which was not imposed prior to this time due to the decision in Leigh v. 
Dickeson. 643 Gray and Gray, without discussing the point, state similarly that, 'This 
discretion appears sufficiently wide to cover a requirement of immediate 
compensation, in appropriate cases, for improvements effected by one beneficiary on 
640 Op. cit., para. 4 1. 
" Op. cit., P. 19. 
642 Op. Cil., P. 139. 
643 (1884) 15 Q. B. D. 60. 
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the co-owned land, thereby rendering otiose much of the old case law on the equity of 
deferred reimbursement. ' 644 
These arguments are, however, difficult to uphold, because the occupying beneficiary 
under section 13(5) will be required to contribute towards expenses on a different 
basis to Leigh v. Dickeson. The principle in Leigh v. Dickeson arises where one co- 
owner voluntarily expends money on the repair or permanent improvement of the co- 
owned property. There was no suggestion in Leigh v. Dickeson that the work was 
done by a co-owner who was also a trustee acting in the proper discharge of his 
duties. As Lord Brett M. R. stated in Leigh v. Dickeson, 'it has always been clear that a 
voluntary payment cannot be recovered back'. 645 Section 13(5) will only require 
contribution to repairs which trustees have carried out on behalf of the trust and in 
that sense section 13(5) does not infringe on the principle enunciated by Leigh v. 
Dickeson. 
The view of Williams on WilIS646 is that it seems that the will or settlement cannot 
determine in advance what conditions it will be reasonable to impose. It is more 
realistic to express an intention that occupation should be subject to repair and 
payment of outgoings than to direct that it shall be. 647 It would be possible to provide 
that the occupying beneficiary's interest in possession comes to an end in the event of 
failure to repair or pay outgoings, but this could be excessively draconian in its 
practical operation, at any rate unless there was a relief from forfeiture provision. If 
provision of the latter kind were included, there could be inheritance tax problems, 
with an interest in possession terminating as a result of the failure and then starting 
again when the forfeiture was relieved. 
The conditions imposed under section 13(3) are not conditions for the right of 
occupation continuing to be exercisable, so that the right of occupation does not come 
6440 
. P cit., p. 896 footnote 19. 
645 Op. cit., at p. 64. 
646 Op. cit., para. 208.18 point (2). 
647 An expression of the testator's intentions as to the burdens to be assumed by an occupying 
beneficiary will carry weight under section 13(4) and in the event of a dispute about the discharge of 
such burdens going to court, under section 15(l): see Williams on Wills op. cit., para. 208.26. 
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to an end if those conditions are broken. 648 However, the practical position is likely to 
be that if an occupying beneficiary is in serious breach of reasonably imposed 
conditions relating to his occupation, one option will be for the trustees to apply to the 
court under section 14 for an order for sale with vacant possession and the trustees 
can also ask the court for directions as to what they should do if sale is not ordered. 
An alternative course of action would be proceedings against the beneficiary for 
compensation for failure to carry out the obligations imposed. 
By taking up occupation or continuing in it after the testator's death under a right 
given by the will which is subject to repairing and insuring, the beneficiary cannot 
take the benefit without accepting the burden, so the trustees could sue the beneficiary 
for reimbursement of insurance premiums or they or possibly the persons interested in 
remainder could sue the beneficiary's estate for compensation after his death if he had 
eS, 
650 jj 65 failed to keep the property in repair. 649 The cases of Re William ay V. ay, I Re 
Field652 and Haskell v. MarlOW653 are all cases concerning obligations to repair of 
tenants for life of settled land, but there is no reason why the benefit and burden 
principle set out in those cases should not apply equally to someone with a life 
interest occupying property held on a trust of land subject to obligations to repair 
reasonably imposed by trustees under section 13(3). 
The 1996 Act makes no express provision as to how conditions imposed on 
occupying beneficiaries are to be enforced, but the terms of section 13(3) and (5) 
seem to imply that if a beneficiary breaks a condition reasonably imposed upon him, 
he will be personally liable. In practice the lack of any additional endowment will 
make it extremely difficult for the trustees to enforce the beneficiary's obligations, 
since there may be no funds even to pay for a simple application to the court for 
directions, without first selling the property. 654 It should be explicit that trustees are 
6" Williams on Wills op. cit., para. 208.27. 
6'9 Williams on Wills op. cit., para. 208.27. 
650 (1885) 54 L. T. 105. 
651 [192411 K. B. 826. 
652 [1925] Ch. 636. 
653 [ 1928] 2 K. B. 45. 
654 Williams on Wills op. cit., para. 208.28. 
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not to be liable for any failure to enforce the beneficiary's obligations, although this 
would probably be implicit in trusts of this type. 
Where an interest in possession is wanted for tax or other reasons, it would still be 
possible to include an overriding power of appointment which enabled the interest in 
possession to be terminated if the exercise by a beneficiary of the right of occupation 
was causing problems for the administration of the trust. 655 Such a power could, if so 
exercised, apparently be effective to give the trustee a right to possession, but there 
might be tax or other reasons for not wanting to exercise the power in this way. If the 
trustee and beneficiary were already in dispute, the trustee would be open to 
accusations of improper use of the power. 
Another possibility is to restrict liability to repair to keeping the property in the state it 
is in at the testator's death (where it is likely to be in a poor state of repair) and 
providing an endowment fund to pay for repairs and insurance. 656 This could be 
adopted in inter vivos settlements as well. The most direct solution, however, would 
be a conditional interest in possession, which would fortify the trustees' position as 
well as that of remaindermen, yet few settlors and draftsmen have the foresight to 
adopt such drafting, which could have numerous pitfalls. A determinable interest in 
possession may be preferable, because it automatically determines when the specified 
event occurs. 657 
Section 13(6) provides that, 'Where the entitlement of any beneficiary to occupy land 
under section 12 has been excluded or restricted, the conditions which may be 
imposed on any other beneficiary under subsection (3) include, in particular, 
conditions requiring him to- (a) make payments by way of compensation to the 
beneficiary whose entitlement has been excluded or restricted, or (b) forgo any 
payment or other benefit to which he would otherwise be entitled under the trust so as 
to benefit that beneficiary. ' As Barnsley expostulates, 658 there is a total air of unreality 
about the concept of a trustee exercising his statutory power under section 13(6) to 
655 Williams on Wills op. cit., para. 208.18 point (4). 
656 See Williams on Wills op. cit., para. 208.28. 
657 See Megarry and Wade op. cit., paras. 3-062-3-077. f'58 Op. cit., p. 140. 
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impose a condition upon himself, qua 'any other beneficiary', to make such payments. 
As Barnsley points out, in fact section 13(6) does not specify that 'any other 
beneficiary' must be in occupation, though it must be assumed that the beneficiary 
must be in occupation. 659 
Barnsley is correct that if the trustee refuses to pay or makes an unsatisfactory offer of 
compensation, there is no provision in the Act enabling a beneficiary to challenge the 
trustee's decision. There are two possible grounds of challenge: the refusal to pay 
compensation may be a breach of trust or the act of exclusion would be tantamount to 
an ouster under the general law (though the mere fact that there has been no ouster or 
forceftil exclusion is 'far from conclusive' 660), thus enabling the excluded party to sue 
for an occupation rent assuming, as Barnsley does, that this right survives the Act. 
Where a beneficiary leaves because the conditions for living in the property have 
become so intolerable and the sole trustee in occupation refuses to pay an occupation 
rent, since a trustee in such circumstances will not have exercised its power under 
section 13(l) to exclude a beneficiary, no compensation is payable under section 
13(3). However, as Barnsley argues, 661 this would constitute a constructive ouster, 
which would entitle the beneficiary to compensation at common law. Such a residuary 
jurisdiction must remain because it is not covered by the statutory provisions. 
One problem which Barnsley highlights is how the Act is singularly unhelpful in 
making any provision for non-compliance with reasonable conditions imposed by 
trustees under section 13(3). 662 The scenario which Barnsley discusses is where A and 
B vacate the property and they allow C to move in but refuse to permit D to occupy it 
on reasonable grounds. If the trustees under section 13(6)(a) require C to make 
659 Op. cit., p. 135 footnote 48. 
660 Re Pavlou [ 1993] 1 W. L. R. 1046 at 1050 and see Gray and Gray op. cit., p. 842. 'Only in cases 
where the tenants in common not in occupation were in a position to enjoy their right to occupy but 
chose not to do so voluntarily, and were not excluded by any relevant factor, would the tenant in 
common in occupation be entitled to do so free of liability to pay an occupation rent': Dennis v. 
McDonaldop. cit., at 71. See also Re B rd[2003]E. W. H. C. 1267,2003WL21236537pam. 40, ýYfb 
where Lawrence Collins J. stressed that, 'What the court is endeavouring to do is broad justice or 
equity as between co-owners. As Millett J. said in Re Pavlou, the fact that there has not been an ouster 
or forcible exclusion is not conclusive. ' 
66' Op. cit., p. 140-141. 
662 0 Cit, P. P. . 
142 footnote 69. 
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compensation payments to D and C declines to make the payments to D, Barnsley 
asserts that D appears to have no claim under the Act against C. D is obliged to call 
upon A and B to take action on his behalf against C and as Barnsley claims, the Act is 
unhelpful in making provision for non-compliance. 
The correct procedure is for the trustees to take action against C and it is unclear why 
Barnsley states that it does not appear that the trustees can sue C for non-payment. 
Barnsley is too dogmatic in his view that D has no claim under the Act against C. 
There is a possibility that D may have locus standi under section 13(6)(a) against C. 
Barnsley's suggested solutions are for D to claim an occupation rent from C under 
general principles or seek a court order to gain occupation of the property, both of 
which may not be successful, since it is the trustees and not C who made the decision 
to exclude D. Barnsley does not mention the possibility that D may be able to sue C 
under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 on the basis that there is a 
contract which is binding on C which purports to confer a benefit on D. 
Clear criteria for exercise of trustees' discretion? 
Section 13(4) states that, 'The matters to which trustees are to have regard in 
exercising the powers conferred by this section include- (a) the intentions of the 
person or persons (if any) who created the trust, (b) the purposes for which the land is 
held, and (c) the circumstances and wishes of each of the beneficiaries who is (or 
apart from any previous exercise by the trustees of those powers would be) entitled to 
occupy the land under section 12. ' Kenny and Kenny recognise that section 13(4) is 
possibly some help in drafting trust instruments with factors (a) and (b) being spelled 
out in the trust instrument. 663 
Hudson argues 664 that all that the section 13 power to exclude achieves is the 
application of the purposes of the trust. The problem is how to discover these 
intentions and purposes where they are not spelled out, which is the case in virtually 
all trusts existing at the date of the Act. Hudson suggests that they could be divined in 
the same manner as a common intention is located in a constructive trust over a home. 
663 0 Ci P. 19. P. t. 
664 Op. cit., para. 16.2.3. 
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Thompson highlights 665 the potential conflict between section 13(4)(a) and (b) with 
(a) relating to the purpose of the trust at the time of its creation and (b) to the current 
position. It is likely that these criteria will enable the courts to take a broad approach. 
In paragraph (b) the trustees are not directed to have regard to the purposes of the 
trust, which are the criteria in section 12(l)(a), but rather the purposes for which the 
land is held. As Peter Gibson L. J. stated in Rodivay v. Landy 666 in relation to section 
667 15(l)(b), the present tense 'shows that the relevant purposes are those subsisting at 
the time the court is determining the application. ' Barraclough and Matthews are of 
the VieW668 that the test in section 13(4)(b) is rather closer to that considered by the 
courts in the case law in cases such as Re Buchanan- Wollaston's Conveyance 669 and 
Jones v. Challenger. 
Analysing these judgments it is difficult to be as dogmatic and categorical as 
Barraclough and Matthews. In Re Buchanan- Wollaston's Conveyance Sir Wilfred 
Greene M. R. delivering the judgment of the court spoke of 'the purpose of carrying 
out a trust'. 670 In Jones v. Challenger Devlin L. J. spoke of the 'purpose of the joint 
tenancy', 671 'the prime object of the trust' and 'the true object of the trUSti. 672 These 
are closer to the criteria in section 12(l)(a) rather than the factors in section 13(4). 
The real difference is that 'purposes for which the land is held' are wider and may be 
more liable to change than 'purposes of the trust', although in many cases they will 
amount to the same factors being taken into account and to the same result. 
The provisions governing the trustees' powers to regulate occupation must be seen as 
imposing a corresponding restriction on the settlor's control over whether, and by 
whom, land is occupied. 673 A right to occupy can be claimed despite this not being the 
665 Modern LandLaw op. cit., p. 304-305. 
666 Op. cit., para. 26. In Rochvay v. Landy itself, the present prevailed over the past: see Emmet and 
Farrand on Title op. cit., R. 46 para. 22.034. 
667 '(b) the purposes for which the property subject to the trust is held'. 
668 Op. cit., para. 8.5 and footnote 15. 
669 [19391 Ch. 738. 
6700 
. P cit., p. 746. 671 0 Cit, P. P. . 183. 672 Op. cit., p. 184. 
673 See Hopkins The Trusts ofLand andAppointment of Trustees Act 1996 op. cit., p. 42 L 
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purpose of the trust if the land is available for occupation. A settlor cannot compel 
sale and postponing sale is not a breach of trust, even though the land may thereby be 
available for occupation, enabling a beneficiary to claim a right to occupy. However, 
where there is more than one beneficiary with a right to occupy, any direction from 
the settlor as regards who can occupy should be complied with if compatible with and 
balanced against the other factors specified in section 13(4). 
Hopkins concludes that because as a general rule the trustees cannot act in 
contravention of any rule of law or equity, that subject to Saunders v. Vautier, it 
would be a breach of a rule of equity by being in breach of trust for trustees to 
exercise a discretion in a manner contrary to an express direction by the settlor. 674 The 
problem with this view, however, is that if the trustees have justification in balancing 
the other factors in section 13(4) to act contrary to the settlor's wishes, there can be no 
breach of trust. Since there is no indication in section 13(4) of the weight to be 
attached to each factor, the trustees are left with wide discretion to give priority to 
section 13(4)(c) and ignore the settlor's intentions under section 13(4)(a). A settlor 
needs to be advised that the purposes of the trust must be drafted in such a way in the 
trust instrument to exclude the right arising ab iniflo under section 12(l). 
An additional right to occupy? 
Section 13(7)(a) limits the power of trustees to exclude a beneficiary from occupation. 
Section 13(7) provides that, 'The powers conferred on trustees by this section may not 
be exercised- (a) so as to prevent any person who is in occupation of land (whether or 
not by reason of an entitlement under section 12 675) from continuing to occupy the 
land, or (b) in a manner likely to result in any such person ceasing to occupy the land, 
unless he consents or the court has given approval. ' Lightman J. in I R. C v. 
Eversden 676 noted in his judgment that, 's 13 (7) does not (as was suggested at one 
time in argument) notwithstanding non-compliance with either condition confer 
entitlement to occupation on the settlor by reason of the fact that she was a tenant in 
common in occupation when the 1996 Act came into force: s 13 confers on trustees 
674 Ibid., p. 42 1. 
675 It may arise on some other basis such as matrimonial home rights conferred by the Family Law Act 
1996: see Gray and Gray op. cit., p. 895 footnote 14. 6760 
. P cit., para. 25. 
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powers to exclude or restrict occupation where two or more beneficiaries are entitled 
to occupy land, and s 13(7) imposes limits on those powers. ' 677 This is correct and 
consistent with the principles introduced by the 1996 Act, although it is unfortunate 
that the Court of Appeal in Eversden did not comment on the 1996 Act. 678 
The ten-nination of a beneficiary's occupation is made more difficult under the 1996 
Act than it was under trusts for sale with a power to pen-nit residence before I January 
1997.679 Under the latter, the trustee could revoke the permission to reside and bring a 
possession action, whereas now the trustee will have to apply under sections 13(7) or 
14 if there is some strong reason for the occupation to cease, such as the beneficiary is 
disabled or the house is falling into disrepair and the beneficiary will not co-operate or 
is failing to fulfil obligations reasonably imposed by the trustee as a condition of 
occupation. 
It is an inevitable consequence of conferring a right on a beneficiary under section 12 
that terminating such a right may involve an application under section 14, but this is 
not to be condemned. It may be a defect in drafting that the right to occupy is not 
made conditional on observing the conditions reasonably imposed by the trustees 
under section 13(3) and the trustees cannot keep a beneficiary out of occupation while 
they decide on what conditions to impose. The trustees may find that they have a 
more limited power to impose conditions if a beneficiary is in occupation than if he is 
not. 
Martyn presents a radical view that section 13(7) in a sense creates another 
entitlement to occupy, different and stronger than that given by section 12, because 
the requirements of purpose, availability and suitability in section 12 do not need to 
677 Section 13(7) did not apply to the facts of the case, since there was no question of more than one 
individual being entitled prospectively to occupation, but as Jeremy de Souza noted in Essex Lass Wins 
Again (2002) 149 Taxation 537 at 539 in different circumstances, section 13(7) may create additional 
problems. 
678 De Souza in Another Winfor 'Essex'Lass (2003) 151 Taxation 322 at 323 regrets that the Court of 
Appeal did not have the opportunity to comment on Lightman J. 's observations on the effect of the 
enactment of the 1996 Act on the inheritance tax code and advocates that clarification in this area is 
urgently needed. 
679 Williams on Wills op. cit., para. 208.11. 
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be met, since mere occupation is enough . 
680 Furthermore, once that mere occupation 
exists, only the court can bring it to an end against the wishes of an occupier under 
section 14 taking into account the guidelines in section 15. Martyn's opinion is that 
now that there is no trust for sale, the court may well be less willing to order a sale 
than it was under the old law. To the extent that it is, the occupier who can rely on 
section 13(7) will be better placed than he was before. His view is that occupation will 
be nine points of the law and of equity. 
This argument is conceptually flawed, since it is not an independent right in itself as is 
evident from section 13(7). It does not confer a right on a beneficiary in limine. It 
does not create a right for 'any person who is in occupation of the land' being a shield 
rather than a sword, since it specifies whom the beneficiaries may not exclude. The 
right itself can only be conferred by section 12 and it is irrelevant that purpose, 
availability and suitability in section 12 do not need to be met. These factors are 
pertinent in establishing a right ab initio under section 12. If such a right is not 
established, section 13(7) is irrelevant. 
What Martyn does not discuss is that section 13(7) is in fact incongruous, because 
section 13(l) does not give trustees power to exclude 'any person who is in 
occupation of land (whether or not by reason of an entitlement under section 12)'. 
There is, therefore, no question of such a person who does not fall under the criteria of 
section 13(l) being excluded. Section 13(l) is silent on the point, thus raising aprima 
facie assumption that trustees have no such power. What section 13(7) does is to 
protect dejacto occupation of any person in occupation giving such persons 
potentially greater rights than a beneficiary entitled to an interest in possession. 
Purpose, availability and unsuitability are irrelevant once a person is in occupation. It 
does not create another or greater entitlement to occupy, because it is a continuation 
of the law prior to 1997. The person in occupation of the land need not actually be a 
beneficiary under the trust and could be the spouse or cohabitee of one of the co- 
owners of the property. 681 
6800 
. 681 
P cit., p. 262. 
See Thompson Modern Land Lcm, op. cit., p. 3 05. 
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What section 13(7) does not do is create a proprietary right for such persons. It gives 
protection and at most, a limited right to occupy until a court order is obtained. It 
merely prevents trustees from excluding without a court order or consent. Kenny and 
Kenny take the sardonic view of section 13(7) and (8)682 that these subsections give 
support to the view that section 13 as a whole is not involved with a world of 
reality. 683 Their view is that the fetter it imposes on a trustee's discretion is so great 
that it will be either ignored or litigated. This cynical view of these subsections 
ignores the reality of what subsection (7) is trying to achieve, misinterprets its scope 
and is a superficial gloss on its significance. 
Some tax consequences of section 13 
In exercising their powers under section 13, trustees will have to be careful not to 
accidentally destroy a beneficiary's interest in possession for inheritance tax 
purposes. 684 Chris Jarman in Q &, 4685 stated that the Inland Revenue accepts that an 
exclusion under section 13 powers, by itself, would not necessarily affect the nature 
of the excluded beneficiary's interest, thus leaving the excluded beneficiary with a 
beneficial interest in possession in the land. The Inland Revenue does not, however, 
agree with the general proposition that the exclusion could in no circumstances have 
that effect. 
The Inland Revenue's view is that the precise implications of any exercise of the 
particular powers would need to be considered in the light of all the relevant facts, 
including the various matters to which trustees are required to have regard under 
section 13(4). The amount of the compensation payable to the excluded beneficiary 
could be an important factor and a beneficiary's decision to forgo his right of 
occupation, where the trustees have not used their powers to exclude either 
beneficiary, might amount to a disposal of his interest in possession. 686 The Inland 
Revenue gave answers to various questions and examples posed by Chris Jarman and 
prefaced its comments by emphasising that their replies are necessarily provisional. 
682 Section 13(8) states that, 'The matters to which the court is to have regard in determining whether to 
give approval under subsection (7) include the matters mentioned in subsection (4)(a) to (c). ' 683 0 Cit , p. 19. P. . 
684 See Barraclough and Matthews op. cit., para. 8.7. 683 0 Cil p. 19. P. 
686 See the second part of Chris Jarman's two-part article Afore Qs and As (1997) 390 Tax Journal 19. 
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The Inland Revenue stressed that it is not possible or appropriate to express any final 
view on hypothetical situations, especially as so much would depend on the precise 
facts of particular cases. 
Section 13(6) will have important tax implications, since the Inland Revenue will 
regard any compensation paid as taxable income under Schedule A if the non- 
occupying beneficiary were a party to the decision to the exclusion from occupation 
of the land. 687 The Revenue will not allow any deduction on the part of the paying 
beneficiary if the beneficiary does not occupy the land for the purposes of a trade. 
Where an occupying beneficiary has to forgo a payment in favour of a non-occupying 
beneficiary, the income forgone is likely to be the income of the beneficiary who 
becomes entitled to receive it, but this will depend on the facts of the particular 
case. 
688 
If the diversion of income at the full market rate can properly be construed as a purely 
administrative adjustment to the distribution of trust income, the nature of the 
beneficiaries' respective interests seems unlikely to be affected if the value of those 
interests remains unchanged. 689 There is no substantive conflict between the Inland 
Revenue's approach under the Statement of Practice of October 1979 and the concept 
behind sections 12 and 13.690 Where the exercise of a wide fiduciary power to permit 
occupation of trust property had the effect of terminating a person's existing interest 
697 This should be contrasted with the view of C. J. Whitehouse Taxation Aspects ofthe Right to Occupy 
Trust Land (1997) 113 L. Q. R. 211 at 212 where he states that given that the payments are likely to be 
continuing, the correct analysis may be that they are annual payments in the recipient's hands and 
accordingly taxable under Schedule D Case III. He queries whether basic rate tax falls to be deducted 
at source by the payer when he makes the payment. See also The Encyclopaedia ofForms and 
Precedents Vol. 40(2) op. cit., para. 468.1 [3252]. 
6S3 Issue No. 389 op. cit., p. 20. 
689 See Issue No. 390 op. cit., p. 19. 
690 See Issue No. 390 op. cit., p. 19-20. De Souza comments (2002) 149 Taxation 537 op. cit., at 539 
that in the Eversden case, an alternative point which was open to the Revenue to take was that by 
reason of Inland Revenue Statement of Practice 10/79, the settlor should be deemed to have acquired 
an interest in possession in the 95 per cent interest held by the trustees. In the light of LR. C. v. Lloyds 
Private Banking Lid [1998] S. T. C. 559, a previous decision of Lightman J., it may be thought 
surprising that this possibility was not raised in the Notice of Determination. De Souza's view is that its 
absence may indicate a reluctance by the Revenue to expose that Statement of Practice to the judicial 
scrutiny which many practitioners believe it would not survive. See also Malcom Gunn AIr Clegg's 
Law (2004) 153 Taxation 183 who also criticises the Statement of Practice and regards Eversden as a 
missed opportunity to hold the Statement of Practice up to scrutiny. 
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in possession in the particular property, it would also extinguish his entitlement under 
section 12. 
Woodhall v. IRC691 considered the issue of a number of beneficiaries entitled to 
occupy a property where some live there and some do not and where the ones out of 
occupation are not formally excluded and retain the right of occupation. In Woodhall 
the issue concerned two remaining brothers who had rights of residence in a house 
(held on trust for sale), but only one lived there. The one who lived there had died in 
April 1997. It was held that he had an interest in possession in the house for 
inheritance tax purposes 692 within the meaning of section 49(l) of the Inheritance Tax 
Act 1984 693 and that interest was limited to one half of the house within the meaning 
of section 50(5) of the same Act. This could offer a method of saving inheritance tax 
in some situations. 
The Inland Revenue has said that depending on the full facts, a beneficiary's decision 
to forgo his right of occupation might amount to a disposal of his interest in 
possession, 694 but the decision in Woodhall demonstrates that in a straightforward 
case of choosing not to occupy, there will be no disposal of the interest in possession 
which is the correct decision. Woodhall followed the decision of Lightman J. in I R. C. 
v. Lloyds Private Banking Ltd and it is unfortunate that Lightman J. did not refer to 
the Privy Council decision in Hayim v. Citibank, 695 where the testator's elderly 
brother and sister, who resided in the house under a clause permitting Citibank to 
permit the siblings to live there, did not have interests in possession in the house. 
Whitehouse in Woodhall- Interest in Possession or Not 696 questions what light the 
decision sheds on the position when two persons enjoy concurrent interests in 
691 [2000] S. T. C. (S. C. D. ) 55 8. 
692 The Special Commissioner held that the will did not give the trustees a dispositive power to decide 
who should occupy the house alone if more than one wished to do so; rather it gave the trustees 
administrative powers to pen-nit such of the trustees as desired to occupy the house to do so and if more 
than one, jointly with the other or others. 
693 The decision in Woodhall is similar to the decision in Faulkner v. LR. C [2001] S. T. C. (S. C. D. ) 
112. See Lesley King Probate Law (2001) 98(4 1) L. S. G. 33. 
694 See Jan-nan Issue 390 op. cit., p. 19. 
695 [1987] A. C. 730. 
696 Chris Whitehouse [20011 P. C. B. 132 at 133-134. 
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possession in a dwelling house and the trustees exercise their powers under section 13 
to permit one to occupy whilst providing compensation to the other. He states that it is 
thought that in such cases they both continue to enjoy interests in possession in the 
trust property and this is likely to be correct. He is right that if the non-occupier does 
not want to be compensated and is perfectly content to allow the other to occupy, then 
the position should be exactly the same and Woodhall affords support for this view. 
Whitehouse then queries the position if the trustees determine that the occupation by 
one beneficiary of a house worth fI million will be 'compensated for' by the other 
being given the income from the trust portfolio with a capital value of 050,000. His 
correct view is that on the basis that the section is not seeking to disturb the beneficial 
trusts, it is thought that each continues to be entitled to an interest in possession in 50 
per cent of both the house and the portfolio. The view of Vaines in Taxing Matters 697 
is that it is going to need very careful drafting indeed to avoid creating an interest in 
possession when an interest in a property is left to a family member where they have 
any rights at all. 
Conclusion 
Sections 12 and 13 represent ajudieious, though imperfect and problematic, 
innovation in statutory law in the context of trusts of land. Section 12(l) should be 
drafted to remove (a) and (b), since (b) is mostly superfluous and (a) should be 
incorporated into section 12(2). Section 12(l) should, therefore, state that, 'A 
beneficiary who is beneficially entitled to an interest in possession in land subject to a 
trust of land is entitled by reason of his interest to occupy the land. ' It would be 
preferable for section 12(2) to declare that, 'Subsection (1) does not confer on a 
beneficiary a right to occupy the land if at the time when the beneficiary wishes to 
occupy the land, (a) the purposes for which the property subject to the trust is held do 
not include making the land available for his occupation, or (b) the land is either 
unavailable or unsuitable for occupation by him. ' The wording in section 12(2)(a) 
would thus be consistent with the wording in section 15(l)(b). 
697 p. S. Vaines (2001) 151 N. L. J. 301 at 302. 
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A new section 12(4) should specify that the statutory provisions supersede the 
common law and a new section 12(5) should clarify that, 'Subsection (1) does not 
apply in relation to a trust created by a disposition in so far as provision that it does 
not apply is made by the disposition. ' Section 13(l) should be drafted to state in 
parenthesis '(but not all in the case of exclusion)' rather than '(but not all)' as at 
present. Section 13(3) should provide in addition that, 'Such conditions are to be 
enforceable by the trustees and any beneficiary in whose favour such conditions are 
imposed. ' Section 13(4)(b) should be amended to refer to 'the purposes for which the 
property subject to the trust is held' to ensure consistency with section 15(l)(b). These 
amendments would represent an improvement to sections 12 and 13 within the 
context of the present statutory regime. 
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CHAPTER 9- POWERS OF THE COURT UNDER SECTIONS 14 
AND 15- CONSOLIDATION AND RATIONALISATION OR 
INNOVATIVE CHANGE? 
The 1996 Act has primafacie changed the juridical basis of the law from land being 
valued in terms of its exchange value under the 1925 legislation with its emphasis on 
alienability of real property to land being valued in terms of its 'use' value which is a 
policy departure in the 1996 Act with the establishment of the trust of land. 698 In 
disputes purely between co-owners, without the intervention of any third party, the 
court may well be happy to postpone sale, because sale is not the preferred solution 
under the 1996 Act. The tension between the 'use' value and exchange value is 
predominant when a secured creditor seeks sale of the land against the wishes of the 
co-owners and their family. 699 Whether section 15 effects a change in the law is 
central to the issue of how courts deal with disputes between the rights of secured 
creditors and the interests of occupiers in their homes. 
Complications inherent in section 14? 
Who can apply? 
Section 14(l) states that 'Any person who is a trustee of land or has an interest in 
property 700 subject to a trust of land may make an application to the court for an order 
under this section. ' Section 14 is drafted far wider than its predecessor section 30 of 
698 Fox Living in a Policy State: froin Trustfor Sale to Trust ofLand op. cit., p. 81 states that the ethos 
of the legislation as a whole would certainly appear to indicate a movement away from the 
commercialism which characterised rulings under section 30. Yet Fox's view op. cit., p. 78,86 is that 
despite statutory intervention in the shape of the 1996 Act which indicates a significant legislative 
policy departure and a policy turning point with the trust of land being based on a completely different 
conception of the nature of co-owned property, the legislative policy of the 1925 Act and judicial 
adherence to its principles continues to influence the exercise of the judicial discretion to order the sale 
of land. If the tendency towards protecting occupation enshrined in the 1996 Act were to be embraced 
as wholeheartedly by the courts as the trend towards alienability was after 1925, the beneficial occupier 
would receive greater protection against eviction by creditors than was previously the case. 
699 See Gray and Gray Land Law (Butterworths Core Text Series) (3rd edn 2003) para. 8.35. 
700 Smith Property Law op. cit., p. 320 states that, 'Apparently, a tenant or, say the holder of an 
easement could apply, whether or not their interests pre-date the trust. This is plainly not what the 
section was intended to achieve and it would be surprising if a court were to entertain actions from 
anybody save trustees, beneficiaries or persons with rights in a beneficiary's interest. ' The problem 
with Smith's view is that a court would be obliged to entertain a bonafide action from such an 
applicant, although it is unlikely that such applicants would need to use section 14. 
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the Law of Property Act 1925,701 which was unclear whether a trustee who had no 
beneficial interest in the property could apply under section 3 0.702 Section 14(l) 
remedies this by the wide formulation which covers trustees, 703 an interest in 
possession beneficiary, a remaindennan (whether vested or contingent), a 
discretionary beneficiary, 704 the secured creditor of a beneficiary, and trustees and 
beneficiaries of a sub-trust. 
An annuitant whose annuity is paid out of the income of the property is probably 
705 included. This is despite section 22(3) which states that, 'For the purposes of this 
Act a person who is a beneficiary only by reason of being an annuitant is not to be 
regarded as entitled to an interest in possession in land subject to the trust. M6 As long 
as an annuitant has 'an interest in property subject to a trust of land', an annuitant will 
701 Section 30(l) stated that, 'If the trustees for sale refuse to sell or to exercise any of the powers 
conferred by either of the last two sections, or any requisite consent cannot be obtained, any person 
interested may apply to the court for a vesting or other order for giving effect to the proposed 
transaction or for an order directing the trustees for sale to give effect thereto, and the court may make 
such order as it thinks fit. ' 
702 For a useful, brief summary of who could apply under section 30, see Megany and Wade op. cit., 
para. 8-142 footnote 65 and Emmet and Farrand on Title R. 46 para. 22.035. 
703 See Oke v. Rideout (1998) 10 C. L. 559 where Mr Oke was only a trustee and sought a sale to release 
him from his obligations as mortgagor. The court refused to order sale as Mrs Rideout's interests 
greatly outweighed Mr Oke's interest. See also Malcolm Warner Oke v. Rideout: ordersfor sale under 
TLA TA 1996 (1999) 4 T. E. L. J. 18. 
704 It should be noted that an object of a power of appointment does not have an interest in property and 
cannot apply. This is implicit from Re Gestetner [ 1953] Ch. 672, McPhail v. Doulton, Re Manisty's 
Settlement [ 1974] Ch. 17, Re Hay's Settlement Trusts. Prospective or presumptive next of kin and a 
potential future spouse do not have an interest, since they have only a 'spes successionis, a hope of 
succeeding': see Warner J. in Knocker v. Youle op. cit., at 937 in relation to section I (1)(b) of the 
Variation of Trusts Act 1958. A gift to whomsoever shall at the death of B, a living person, be the heir 
of B or one of the next-of-kin of B, confers no interest on anyone until the death of B: see Stamp J. in 
Re Midleton's Will Trusts [ 196911 Ch. 600 at 607. 
705 The original Bill introduced in the House of Lords contained narrower wording. Clause 14(l) stated 
that, 'Any person who is a trustee of land or a beneficiary under a trust of land ........ Lord Mackay 
said in the House of Lords Committee (H. L. Debs., Vol. 570 cols. 1542-1543) that clause 14(l) as 
currently drafted appears, inter alia, to exclude a secured creditor of a beneficiary. It is interesting to 
note that the wording in the Bill attached to the Law Commission Report, Law Com. No. 181 in clause 
6, was less problematic because it stated that, 'Any person who is a trustee of land or is interested 
(whether beneficially or otherwise) ........ Barraclough and Matthews argue op. cit., para. 9.2 that the 
amendment in the House of Lords Committee expressly to widen the range of persons who could apply 
to the court, in particular to cover a creditor of a beneficiary who obtained a charging order over his 
interest under the trust, meant that if such a person is to be included, then so must be an annuitant. See 
also Saskia Thornton Section 14- effect and interpretation [ 1999123 P. L. J. 16 at 17. 
706 Section 22(3) alters the previous law because under the Law of Property Act 1925, an annuitant 
whose annuity was to be paid out of the income of land was a person beneficially entitled in 
possession- Re House [ 1929] 2 Ch. 166: see Barraclough and Matthews op. cit., para. 1.11. The Law 
Commission does not discuss why this change has been made. See Barraclough and Matthews op. cit., 
para. 7.6 who state that it is possible that the draftsman foresaw difficulties with, for example, pension 
trust beneficiaries who had become entitled to annuities. 
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be able to apply under section 14. 'An interest in property subject to a trust of land' is 
likely to be widely interpreted and include personal property. 707 It is arguable that 
where there is a trust of the matrimonial home, a spouse who enjoys no beneficial 
entitlement under the trust might nevertheless be a person who has an interest in the 
property for the purposes of section 14(l) in view of the matrimonial home rights 
conferred by Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996 and also perhaps because of the 
708 judicial powers conferred by section 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. A 
person interested in a trust of the proceeds of sale of land can also apply under section 
14.709 
Scope ofsection 14 
Section 30 did not permit applications to prevent a sale or prevent the exercise of a 
power. Section 14(2)(a) is very wide, reflecting the Law Commission's view that 
courts should be able to intervene in any dispute relating to land '710 apart 
from the 
appointment or removal of trustees . 
711 Section 14(2) states that, 'On an application for 
an order under this section the court may make any such order- (a) relating to the 
exercise by the trustees of any of their functions (including an order relieving them of 
any obligation to obtain the consent of, or to consult, any person in connection with 
the exercise of any of their functions) ...... as the court thinks fit. ' The wording 
crelating to the exercise by the trustees of any of their functions' is, prima facie, far- 
reaching and comprehensive. 
707 Since a mixed trust comprising both land and personal property comes within the definition of 'trust 
of land', a person who has an interest in the personal property but not the land under such a trust will 
be able to apply for an order: see the Notes on Clauses op. cit., para. 15 1. See also Megarry and Wade 
op. cit., para. 8-142 footnote 72. 
708 See Emmet and Farrand on Title op. cit., R. 46 and 47 para. 22.035. See discussion of Re Beesley 
[ 1975) 1 W. L. R. 568 where it was held that a spouse was not 'any person interested' by reason only of 
matrimonial status so as to be able to apply for the annulment of the bankruptcy of the other spouse 
under section 29(l) of the Bankruptcy Act 1914. Emmet and Farrand on Title expresses the view that 
this decision is unlikely to succeed in this context, since Re Beesley was confined to the statutory 
provision, which anyway is now repealed and not replaced, and there is no restriction on who may 
apply for an annulment under section 282 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
709 By virtue of section 17(2), section 14 applies to a trust of the proceeds of sale of land as it does to a 
trust of land, which was not the position under the old section 30. 'Proceeds of sale of land' includes 
'any property representing such proceeds' under section 17(3)(b). There is no requirement that the 
proceeds have been further invested in land and this would enable an application to be made where, for 
example, shares have been purchased with the proceeds of sale of the land: see Kenny and Kenny op. 
cit., p. 20, 
710 See Law Com. No. 181 para. 12.6 and Kenny and Kenny op. cit., p. 20. 
711 Section 14(3) and see sections 19 and 20. 
189 
The heading in the Act 'Functions of trustees of land' covers sections 6 to 97 12 and, 
even though section 13 is not included in this heading, section 15(2) makes it clear 
that decisions as to occupation are 'functions'. 713 Section 14 therefore applies to 
applications under section 13 and cannot be limited to those sections with the 
heading. 714 This raises interesting questions as to the extent of the court's powers 
under section 14: can it order a beneficiary who is entitled to occupy under section 12 
(and not covered by section 13) to give up occupation? 715 If the trustee does not have 
the power to order a beneficiary out, a court should not be able to do so, because the 
wording of section 14 is not wide enough to enable a court to deny a beneficiary his 
or her statutory rights under section 12. Section 15(2) does not envisage this nor does 
section 14(2). Yet if a court ordered sale under section 14, an incidental effect of this 
would be for a beneficiary to cease occupation. 716 
Section 14(2) states that, 'On an application for an order under this section the court 
may make any such order-..... (b) declaring the nature or extent of a person's interest 
in property subject to the trust, as the court thinks fit. ' Section 14(2)(b) cannot be 
construed as giving the court discretion to vary the rights of any person, because it 
states 'declaring' and it seems improbable that the court was intended to have a 
discretion to vary such rights. 717 The court is merely given a discretion whether to 
make the order or not. 718 Support for the view that section 14(2)(b) does not give the 
court a discretion to vary rights can be derived from Neuberger J. in Mortgage 
Corporation Ltd v. Shaire 719 Who stated that, 'I do not think it is appropriate to treat 
the court's role, in deciding in what shares the beneficial interest in a property is held, 
712 Section 6- general powers of trustees, section 7- partition by trustees, section 8- exclusion and 
restriction of powers, section 9- delegation by trustees. 
713 See Smith Properly Law op. cit., p. 320 footnote 126. 
714 This is also shown by the consent and consultation provisions included in section 14(2)(a) which are 
based on functions contained in sections 10 and 11. 
715 See Smith Property Law op. cit., p. 320. 
716 Smith, however, argues in Property Law op. cit., p. 321 that a court should not be able to do this, 
because the fact that specific provision is made in section 14(2) for cases where consents are 
unobtainable, implies that the courts cannot override rights of the beneficiaries and it would be wrong 
to interpret section 14, even with its opaque reference to functions, as a basis for denying statutory 
rights. 
717 The original clause 6 of the Bill annexed to the Law Commission Report No. 181 was narrower and 
better drafted: 'On an application under this section the court may make such order as it thinks f it- 
.... (b) for the settlement of any dispute which has arisen concerning the trust or the land subject to it. ' 718 See Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., para. 2.148. 
719 [2000] 1 F. L. R. 973 at 985. 
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as involving some sort of roving commission. ' Mummery L. J. in Dear v. Robinson 720 
refers to Rudd J. at first instance who noted that he had no power to alter the 
beneficial interests and Mummery L. J. did not contradict this statement. The criteria 
in section 15(l) are not to be used in deciding whether people have equitable 
interests 721 and were not used in Oxley v. Hiscock. 722 Equitable interests are to be 
decided in accordance with property law principles. 
The provisions of section 14(2)(b) will most usually be needed where there is a claim 
to an interest in property under a resulting or constructive trust. As Cazalet J. stated in 
A v. B '723 'Section 14(2)(b) enables the court to declare the nature or extent of the 
person's interest in the property subject to the trust. This means that in cases where an 
interest in the property arises under a resulting or constructive trust, there is power in 
the court under that section to make the appropriate declaration. ' Recourse will still be 
had to the case law to decide whether a claimant has an interest and the type of 
interest. 724 Section 14, like section 30 of the Law of Property Act 1925 725 and section 
17 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882,726 does not confer an unfettered 
discretion on the court. 727 
720 [2001 ] E. W. C. A. Civ. 1543,2001 WL 1251817 para. 14. Mummery L. J. reversed the judge's order 
for an immediate sale of the property and remitted the case to the county court to determine the terms 
on which Mr Dear should continue to occupy the property. 
721 See P. H. Kenny Married Women Still Exist? [1998] Conv. 2 at 3, describing this as infelicitous 
drafting. 
722 [2004] E. W. C. A. Civ. 546, [2004] E. G. C. S. 166.2004 WL 1074174 para. 69. Title to the home was 
registered in the sole name of Mr Hiscock, but both Mr Hiscock and Ms Oxley contributed to the 
purchase and outgoings on the property without agreeing the extent of their respective shares. The 
Court of Appeal held that Ms Oxley was entitled to 40% of the proceeds of sale and Mr Hiscock 60%. 
723 Unreported, 23 May 1997, LexisNexis p. 8 in which it was held that the claimant was entitled to a 
beneficial interest amounting to 25 per cent of the value of the property. 
724 See Kenny and Kenny op. cit., p. 20-2 1. Their view is that the provisions would be used in cases 
such as Huntingrortiv. Hobbs [1993] 1 F. L. R. 736 where the court had to decide whether the registered 
proprietors were joint tenants or tenants in common. 
725 Under section 30 it was settled that the court had no such power to vary the beneficial interests of 
the parties: see Stott v. Ratcliffe (1982) 126 S. J. 3 10 and Ahmedv. Kendrick (1987) 56 P. & C. R. 120 at 
127. 
726 The House of Lords in Pettitt v. Peltitt [ 1970] A. C. 777 held that section 17 was a procedural 
provision only and did not entitle the court to vary the existing proprietary rights of the parties, 
overruling the contrary view of Lord Denning M. R. in Hine v. Hine [ 196211 W. L. R. 1124 at 1127- 
1128 and Appleton v. Appleton [ 1965] 1 W. L. R. 25 at 28. 
727 If a cohabitee has paid part of the purchase price, so giving rise to a presumed resulting trust, the 
courts are now prepared to find that this indicates a common intention to have a fair share and so gives 
rise to a right to a fair share: Chadwick L. J. in Oxley v. Hiscock op. cit., paras. 69-7 land Waite L. J. in 
Midland Bank v. Cooke [1995] 2 F. L. R. 915 at 926. See Simon Edwards Property Rights in the Family 
Home- Clarity at Last [2004] Fam. Law. 524, Richard Adkinson Cohabitee Rights (2004) 154 N. L. J. 
952 and Susan Spencer Divide and conquer (2004) 10](25) L. S. G. 28. 
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It has been suggested that the 1996 Act, by enabling the court to make such order as 
the court thinks fit, will have a major impact in the field of property disputes, 
especially between co-owning cohabitants, if the judiciary takes a robust stand on the 
new powers available to them, so that increased power and discretion of the courts 
may be utilised to benefit cohabiting clients. 728 But this is to overstate the effect of the 
Act, which has not been utilised by the courts in this way under section 30 of the Law 
of Property Act 1925 or section 17 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, and 
the judiciary is unlikely to oblige in this way. Inglis argued 729 that the court has a 
discretion to decide that the respective interests of the parties are different at the time 
the application is determined from those agreed when the trust was created, which 
would involve a radical reinterpretation of the law as it relates to trusts in land and 
would enable the courts to distribute real property on the breakdown of relationships 
between gay and unmarried couples fairly. He concludes by stating that, 'A 
reinterpretation of ss 14 and 15 of the Trusts of Land Act 1996 may provide the courts 
with the discretion to ensure a fair distribution of real property when gay, lesbian and 
unmarried couples separate. 1730 Inglis' contentions, however, have no foundation in 
authority and no substance in law. 
Otherjurisdictions? 
In disputes between husband and wife where there are no third party interests, the 
only relevant legislation is sections 22 to 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 not 
the 1996 Act. 73 1 There is no reason why section 17 of the Married Women's Property 
Act 1882 Act should not still apply to land, 732 although it may no longer be used as a 
jurisdiction since it has fallen into disuse. Kenny inquires whether the fact that the 
criteria in section 15 of the 1996 Act do not apply to applications under section 17 of 
the 1882 Act will prove a purely academic point or lead to a difference in principle. 733 
728 See Margaret Rodgers and Anne Davies Trusts ofLand. New Act (1997) 94(3) L. S. G. 30. 
729 Alan Inglis We are Family? The Uneasy Engagement between Gay Men, Lesbians and Family Law 
[2001] Fam. Law 830 at 834. 730 Ibid., at 834. 
731 See Tee v. Tee [ 1999] 2 F. L. R. 613 at 619 per Thorpe L. J. 
732 See P. H. Kenny in Married Women Still Exist? op. cit., p. 3 who states that section 17 of the 1882 
Act applies to property other than land and may still be needed in these cases. 
733 Ibid., p. 3. It is likely that the same principles apply to all property disputes whatever the procedure- 
see Pettill v. Pellitt and Gissing v. Gissing [197012 All E. R. 780, thus the existence and size of 
property interests will continue to be decided on basic property principles. 
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It is likely to be a purely academic point since section 17 will lie dormant and become 
otiose. 734 
Smith questions whether it is appropriate to consider section 14 applications between 
cohabitants, given that occupation disputes have a more appropriate forum under the 
735 Family Law Act 1996. He is right that two statutes enacted at the same time fail to 
clarify thiS. 736 The criteria to be taken into account both as regards occupation and 
compensation differ under the two statutes and this opens the spectre of different 
results according to which route is taken. Probert highlights similarly how in some 
contexts both property law and family law are applicable to the same dispute and may 
provide different answers. 737 At first instance in Chan Pui Chun v. Leung Kam Ho the 
relationship between section 33 of the Family Law Act and sections 14 and 15 was 
considered in determining occupation of the home and McGonigal J. purported to 
apply both simultaneously, 738 which merely served to highlight the differences 
734 See Williamsv. Williams[1976] Ch. 278, Laird v. Laird [1999] 1 F. L. R. 791, Tee v. Tee and Le Foe 
v. Le Foe [2001] 2 F. L. R. 970. 
735 Property Law op. cit., p. 326. Smith suggests p. 312 suggests that due to the pronouncement of the 
Court of Appeal in Williams v. Williams op. cit., at 286 that applications should be made in the Family 
Division where the matrimonial legislation would be fully taken into account, that this is a possible 
pointer to the use of the Family Law Act 1996 in preference to the trust of land powers whenever the 
co-owners are spouses or cohabitants, though he questions in footnote 64 whether it could be argued 
that orders under the Family Law Act are likely to be for shorter periods and therefore longer-term 
disputes are properly dealt with under the trust of land provisions. John Dewar Land Law, and the 
Family Home in Land Law Themes and Perspectives op. cit., ch. 13 at p. 338-339 comments that there 
is likely to be an element ofjurisdictional arbitrage as litigants seek to argue their case under whichever 
statutory jurisdiction they consider most favourable to their cause. 
736 Properly Law op. cit., p. 312. 
737 Rebecca Probert Family law andproperly law. competing spheres in the regulation ofthefamily 
home in New Perspectives on Properly Law, Human Rights and the Home edited by Alastair Hudson 
(2004)ch. 2. 
7380 
. -76 1. McGonigal J. op. cit., p. 754 preferred the jurisdiction under section 33 of the p cit., p. 75 8 Family Law Act on the issue of occupation, because it is that Act of Parliament which addressed the 
issue of occupation in most detail. Since the court is required by section 33(6) to have regard to all the 
circumstances, these will include the fact that it is a trust property, so that sections 14 and 15 apply to 
it. In the Court of Appeal Jonathan Parker L. J. did not consider the overlapping jurisdictions of section 
33 and sections 14 and 15 and limited himself to considering op. cit., paras. 100-103 the issue of 
whether the house was unsuitable for occupation by Miss Chan under section 12. 
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between them. 739 Probert doubts whether the court would have achieved the result 
which it did by simply applying the test in the Family Law Act. 740 
Hudson highlights 74 1 how the legal treatment of the family home is typically 
fragmented be tween many wel I-establi shed legal categories with the consequence that 
different areas of the law treat disputes as to the family home in radically different 
ways. The relevant contexts may be trusts law, land law, family law, 742 social security 
IaW743 or housing law, each of which is founded on distinct norms. He is right that, 
'there is a hotchpotch of rules and regulations coming at the same problem from 
different directions. A comprehensive legislative code dealing with title to the home, 
the rights of occupants, the rights of children and the rights of creditors is necessary to 
reduce the cost and stress of litigation, and to ensure that this problem is given the 
political consideration that it deserves. 3744 
Does section 15 change the law? 
The imposition of a duty to sell under the trust for sale under section 30 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925 led to courts seeking to neutralise this artificiality by developing 
the principle of collateral purpose 745 to give recognition to the use value of land. 
Where that purpose still existed, the court might refuse to order a sale in the exercise 
of its discretion under section 30 of the Law of Property Act 1925.746 Since the court's 
starting point has always been that there is a duty to sell, this has confined the 
739 See Probert op. cit., p. 37 and 4446. Probert op. cit., p. 46 compares the courts' contrasting 
jurisdictions. Under the Family Law Act the court views the matter of infringing a property right on the 
basis of purely personal, status-based rights and regards an occupation order as draconian even if the 
person seeking the order has an interest in the property. By comparison under section 14 the court 
emphasises entitlement to occupy the property and considers possession of a property right as 
conferring an advantage. 740 Op. cit., p. 46. 741 Op. cit., para. 16.1. 
742 See Hudson op. cit., paras. 16.3.1-16.3.4 on family law and the law of the home. 
743 See Nick Wikeley Co-ownership ofproperty and entitlement to means-tested benefits (2001) 8 
J. S. S. L. 95 and Nick Wikeley The valuation ofco-owners' interests in capital and means-lested 
benejlts: hal(the value or the value ofhatP in New Perspectives on Property Law, Human Rights and 
the Home op. cit., cb. 7. 744 op. cit., para. 16.2.6. 
745 See Law Com. No. 181 para. 3.3. 
746 There is an extensive body of case-law in this area, inter alia, Re Buchanan4vollaston's 
Conveyance, Jones v. Challenger, Rmvlings v. Rawlings [ 1964] P. 398, Burke v. Burke [ 1974] 1 
W. L. R. 1063, Williams v. Williams, Re Evers' Trust [1980] 1 W. L. R. 1327. For a discussion of this 
area, see Gray Elements ofLandLmv (2 nd edn) op. cit., p. 584-593. 
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development ofjudicial doctrine to the formulation of reasons why sale should not 
take place. 747 When Lord Mackay, the Lord Advocate, introduced the Bill on its 
Second Reading in the House of Lords, he indicated that the old case law would 
apply. 748 
The Lmv Commission's view 
It is unfortunate that the Law Commission does not present a clear, uniform and 
consistent approach to the status of the principles developed in the cases under the old 
section 30. On the one hand it appears that the Law Commission is advocating mere 
consolidation and rationalisation. The criteria in section 15 derive from the Law 
Commission's view that 'the court's discretion should be developed along the same 
lines as the current "primary purpose" doctrine. This approach was moulded to 
practical requirements and we consider that it gets the balance more or less right. 
Nevertheless we recommend that section 30 should set out some guidelines for the 
exercise of the court's discretion, the aim being to consolidate and rationalise the 
current approach. The criteria which the courts have evolved for settling disputes over 
trusts for sale are ones which will continue to have validity in the context of the new 
system. ' 749 
On the other hand the Law Commission did lay the foundations for a completely new 
approach. The Law Commission stated that the inclusion of a power to sell or retain 
the land 'provides a foundation for restructuring of the jurisdiction of the court under 
section 30'. 750 It also stated in relation to section 30 that, 'a restructuring of the trust 
powers ......... should clear the way for a genuinely broad and flexible approach. ' 
751 
This left the way open for courts to reassess the way that cases should be dealt with 
under section 15. 
747 See Law Com. No. 181 para. 3.6. 
748 H. L. Debs., Vol. 569, col. 1719. See Barraclough and Matthews op. cit., para. 9.3. 
749 Law Com. No. 181 para. 12.9. Footnote 141 states that, 'It is envisaged that there will be much 
value in the existing body of case law, even though these cases assume that there is a duty to sell. ' 750 Law Com. No. 181 para. 10.6. 75' Law Com. No. 181 para. 12.5. 
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Some getieraljitdicialpronoiincenients 
Neuberger J. in Mortgage Corporation Lid v. Shaire boldly stated that, 's 15 has 
changed the law'. 752 This is to be contrasted with the view of Cazalet J. in A v. B 
753 
who adopted a traditional approach by stating, 'It appears that the section constitutes a 
consolidation and rationalization of the law as developed under s. 30 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925.1 consider that effectively established case law is given statutory 
force and is not made redundant. ' A similar approach was adopted by Robert Walker 
L. J. in the Court of Appeal in Wright v. Johnson 754 when he stated, 'That section 755 
has now been replaced by s 14 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 
1996, but nothing material turns on the statutory provisions. ' In H. M. Customs and 
Excise Commissioners v. A; A v. A 756 Munby J. stated that, 'Section 15 may have 
given the court a somewhat greater flexibility except where the application is made by 
a trustee in bankruptcy but the Court of Appeal's subsequent decision in Bank of 
Ireland Home Mortgages Ltd v. Bell [200113 FCR 134 shows that it has hardly 
revolutionised things. ' 
Section 15 analysed 
The list of factors set out in section 15(l) is not exhaustive and merely includes the 
factors set out in (a) to (d), which means that other matters may also be relevant. 757 
Since no factor is given any priority or weighting, the court has great discretion 758 and 
the result of an application under section 15 cannot necessarily be predicted. Since the 
section says that the court is to have regard to the listed matters, not may have regard, 
752 op. cit., at 988. 753 Op. cit., P. S. 
754 Unreported, 2 November 1999, LexisNexis p. 1-2, a case concerning disputed beneficial ownership 
in which the Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal due to insufficient documentary evidence. 
755 Referring to section 30 of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
756 [20021 E. W. H. C. 611, [200212 F. L. R. 274 para. 115. Confirmed on appeal [20021 E. W. C. A. Civ. 
1039, [2003] 2 W. L. R. 2 10. It was held that the court's jurisdiction to make a property adjustment 
order under section 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 was not ousted when the property was the 
subject of an application to enforce a confiscation order under section 2 of the Drug Trafficking Act 
1994. 
757 Bank of1reland Home Mortgages Ltd v. Bell [200112 F. L. R. 809 para. 24. 
758 The evaluation of McGonigal J. in Chan Pui Chun v. Leung Kam Ho [2002] B. P. I. R. 723 at 759-761 
of the matters which he took into account under section 15, part of which is quoted in the Court of 
Appeal (2002] E. W. C. A. Civ. 1075, [2003] 1 F. L. R. 23 para. 47, is a good example of the weighing up 
of the different factors to arrive at the conclusion that the order for sale should be postponed until the 
time specified in the judgment, which was when Miss Chan had completed her current course of 
studies. This was not one of the grounds of appeal to the Court of Appeal. 
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the court's discretion would appear to be curtailed, at least in so far as they cannot 
ignore the listed factors. 759 
(a) 'the intentions ofthe person orpersons (ifany) who created the trust' 
Section 15(l)(a) comprises 'the intentions of the person or persons (if any) who 
created the trust' which constitutes the settlor's intentions, usually under an express 
trust, and provides a statutory equivalent to the approach in Re Buchanan-Mollaston's 
Conveyance. 760 This factor is primarily relevant to trusts created by express 
disposition or by will, particularly where the trust takes the forni of a trust for sale. 761 
In Sivain v. Foster 762 Holman J. in the Court of Appeal (sitting with Swinton Thomas 
L. J. ), dealing with an application for leave to appeal, approved the county court 
judge's decision in ordering sale based on the intention of the deceased that on the 
death of the widow the house should be sold. Holman J., however, was keen to stress 
that, 'I do not accept that the judge especially placed his findings as to intention "at 
the forefront of the decision-making process". It is true that he considered them first, 
no doubt because they appear as paragraphs (a) and (b) under section 15(l). But 
neither section 15(l) nor the judge himself accord any primacy to intention. It is but 
one of several matters in the sub-section and was but one of numerous factors taken 
into account by the judge. ' 763 
"9 See Michael Draper Trusts ofLand andAppointment of Trustees Act 1996. section 14 (1998) 142 
S. J. 1076 and Michael Draper Reformation or Revolution? op. cit., at p. 118. 
76('The Court of Appeal held that a sale would not be ordered, since the parties had entered into a 
contract agreeing not to sell the land. Nigel P. Gravells Co-ownership, Severance and Purchasers- The 
Law ofProperty (Joint Tenants) Act 1964 on Trial? [2000] Conv. 461 at 473 especially footnote 33 
states that both factors (a) and (b) of section 15(l) reflect the law developed by the courts before the 
1996 Act, such as in Jones v. Challenger where the court ordered sale after the marriage had broken 
down. Smith Property Law op. cit., p. 321 states that paragraphs (b) and probably (a) largely represent 
the law as developed by the courts prior to the 1996 Act. See also Thompson Modern LandLmv op. 
cit., p. 306-307. 
76' See Gray and Gray op. cit., p. 923-924. In Barclay v. Barclay, for example, the Court of Appeal 
uýbeld the intention of the settlor as expressed in the will in ordering sale. 
76 Unreported, 14 October 1998, LexisNexis p. 3. 
763 In Hart v. Maddison Unreported, 8 June 2001, LexisNexis p. 1-2, counsel for the applicant argued 
that Moseley J. did not take into account sufficiently the evidence in support of section 15(l)(a), but 
Thorpe L. J. in the Court of Appeal, in refusing to interfere with the judge's decision to order sale, held 
that the judge had carried out a balance to arrive at what was fair between the elderly couple. 
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(b) 'the putposesfor which the property subject to the trust is held' 
Section 15(l)(b) directs the court to have regard to 'the purposes for which the 
property subject to the trust is held'. This incorporates the collateral purpose 
doctrine, 764 the underlying essence of which has now been made statutory. The 
inclusion of section 15(l)(b) emphasises the importance of indicating any underlying 
intention or purpose when an express trust is created . 
765 The element of purpose, if 
initially shared by all parties concerned, often operates almost by way of estoppel in 
pointing either towards sale or towards retention of the trust land. 766 
The wording of section 15(l)(b) is arguably ambiguous and potentially problematic: 
does it refer to the current purposes under which land is held or the purposes for 
which it was originally acquired? 767 It is arguable that the court would look at all the 
purposes, despite the wording 'is', due to 'purposes' being in the plural, but would 
give greater weight to the current purpose. 768 The view that the use of the present 
tense 'is held' excludes a purpose which is no longer applicable is supported by Peter 
Gibson L. J. in Rodway v. Landy, 769 who stated that . ....... sub-paragraph (b), ... 
requires the examination of the purposes for which the trust property "is held". I 
emphasise the present tense, which shows that the relevant purposes are those 
subsisting at the time the court is determining the application. ' This was also the 
approach adopted by Jarvis Q. C, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, in Grindal v. 
764 See Devlin L. J. in Jones v. Challenger op. cit., at 181 who explained that the duty to sell will not 
prevail where there was a secondary or collateral ob ect besides that of sale. i 
765 This was stressed by Wroath J. in TS. B. Bank pic v. Marshall [1998] 2 F. L. R. 769 at 773 who was 
adamant that there was not a collateral purpose to provide a home for the children once they were adult. 
His view was that such a purpose would have to be expressed in clear terms and the fact that two of the 
children were living at home and the youngest one, who was 18, was in full-time vocational training, 
did not mean that the collateral purpose was still subsisting. 
766 See Gray and Gray op. cit., p. 924 citing Jones (AE) v. Jones (FW) op. cit., at 442,443 as an 
example of an explicit use of estoppel terminology and Smith Properly Law op. cit., p. 323-324. See 
also Re Buchanan- Wollaston's Conveyance which is a manifestation of the principle of proprietary 
estoppel as is Chan Pui Chun v. Leung Kain Ho. 
767 See Sydenham Trusts ofLand- the New Law: Trusts ofLand andAppointinent of Trustees Act 1996 
op. cit., p. 95 whose view is that it refers to the current purpose under which the land is held. Harwood 
op. cit., p. 184 states that, 'In any case, and significantly, s 15 breaks fforn thejudicial philosophy 
applied to s 30. The court is clearly not limited to peering into the, possibly dark-, glass of the original 
settlor's mind. It is pointed to form its own view of the current situation ...... 763 In Luciv v. Filinov Unreported, 15 May 1980, LexisNexis p. 34 Megaw L. J., in delivering the 
judgment of the court, recognised that the underlying purpose could be superseded by other factors and 
as long as the underlying purpose was taken into account, subsequent factors may be relevant. 00 769 op. cit., at para. 26. 
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Hooper 770 who, in ordering a sale of the property, rejected what appeared to be a 
cynical attempt to revive the original purpose or to claim a previously unarticulated 
purpose. 77 1 The provision of a home for the first defendant had long ceased to be a 
purpose for which the property was held. 
Gravells argues 772 that the wording of other provisions in the Act seems to point to the 
view that the identification of the purpose for which the property is held should be 
determined at the time when the court is called upon to determine the application for 
an order for sale. Gravells proceeds to refer to one provision only, section 12(l), with 
its specific reference to 'at that time', but it is difficult to see how section 12(l) can 
have a bearing on the interpretation of section 15(l)(b) and in fact, it can be argued to 
the contrary, that the fact that section 15(l)(b) omits the words 'at that time' may 
indicate that both current and past factors are to be taken into account. 
Clarke criticises 773 the narrow approach to purpose adopted in Bell where Peter 
Gibson W. stated that the purpose of providing a family home 'ceased to be operative 
once Mr Bell left the property. ' 774 Clarke notes that the court did not have the 
advantage of citation on the point, which would suggest that a purpose, especially 
where there is a child involved, may continue after the departure of one of the original 
couple who bought the property. 775 Probert argues that the idea that the departure of 
one of the adult parties brings the purpose of providing a family home to an end is a 
contentious one, because where children are involved, it has been suggested that the 
purpose of providing a family home subsists beyond the departure of one of the adult 
members of the family. 776 In Chan Pui Chun v. Leung Kam H0777 McGonigal J. held 
770 [ 1999] E. G. C. S. 150,1999 WL 33105549. 
771 See Gravells op. cit., p. 472473. 7720 
P cit., p. 473 and footnote 34. 
773 p. j. Clarke Land Law and Trusts [2001] All E. R. Rev. para. 17.1 at para. 17.3 1. 
774 Bank ofIreland Home Mortgages v. Bell op. cit., para. 28 approved in First National Bank plc v. 
Achanipong [20031 E. W. C. A Civ. 487, [2003] 2 P. & C. R. Dl 1,2003 WL 1610228 paras. 61 and 65. 
775 p. j. Clarke op. cit., para. 17.31 noted that the court did not consider cases under section 30 of the 
Law of Property Act 1925 such as Bedson v. Bedson, Williams v. Williams, Re Evers' Trust and Dennis 
v. McDonald. 
776 Rebecca Probert Creditors andsection 15 ofthe Trusts ofLand andAppointment of Trustees Act 
1996., first among equals? [2002] Conv. 61 at 64 citing Rawlings v. Rawlings, Re Evers' Trust, Dennis 
v. McDonald, though there are two earlier authorities to the contrary: Rivell v. Rivelt [1966] E. G. D. 706 
and Burke v. Burke. 
199 
that the purpose of the trust included a purpose of providing a home for Miss Chan 
until the completion of her studies even when the relationship had ended. Whether the 
purpose survives the death of one of the parties will depend on the facts of each 
case. 
778 
Probert argues that Peter Gibson L. J. 's statement in Bell concerning section 15(l)(b) 
'could be taken as indicating that if the original purpose has come to an end, no other 
purposes may be taken into account. This negates Pascoe's suggestion that 
supervening purposes may be taken into account and elides the two paragraphs. 779 
Although Probert is correct that the interpretation adopted by the Court of Appeal of 
section 15(l)(b) in Bell was restrictive, 780 Peter Gibson L. J. 's statement is not 
authority for the proposition that supervening purposes will not be taken into account 
and it does not axiomatically restrict the extent to which supervening purposes may be 
taken into account. As Probert herself admits, 781 it is possible that the court in Bell 
was influenced by the fact that the son was almost 18 at the time of the trial and 
consistent with earlier authorites that the purpose of providing a family home should 
come to an end upon his attaining that age. 
777 op. cit., p. 760. The Court of Appeal did not comment on this aspect of the decision. Probert states 
in Family law andproperty law: competing spheres in the regulation ofthefamily home op. cit., p. 46 
that the agreement between the parties, that the property would not be sold unless both of them agreed, 
was more akin to the express agreement in Re Buchanan-Wollastons Conveyance than the implied 
collateral purpose of providing a matrimonial home that was held not to survive the breakdown of the 
relationship in Jones v. Challenger and subsequent cases. 
778 Jones v. Challenger supports the idea that the purpose has come to an end. The Court of Appeal in 
Stolt v. Ratcliffe permitted the survivor to continue to occupy. This can only be reconciled with Re 
Citro if the purpose was also to provide a home for the survivor. In Shaire the house was larger than 
Mrs Shaire required and Neuberger J. was dubious whether the family home purpose survived death: 
see Smith Property Law op. cit., p. 330. Counsel for the respondent argued in Laird v. Laird op. cit., at 
796 that, contrary to the view of the district judge, even if it is established that the purpose of the trust 
is at an end, the court must exercise a discretion as to what order is appropriate in that circumstance. 
Thorpe L. J. at 797 stated that, 'it is hard to resist Miss Langridge's submission that the districtjudge Z-1 
was wrong to have concluded that she had nothing to consider once she accepted that the purpose of 
the trust was at an end. But in the circumstances it does not seem to me that that consideration is of 
much relevance'. This demonstrates the court's attitude to retaining the ability to exercise flexibility in 
cases of death of one of the parties. 
779 Creditors andseclion 15 ofthe Trusts ofLand andAppoinflnent of Trustees Act 1996. first among 
equals? op. cit., p. 65 referring to Susan Pascoe Section 15 of1he Trusts ofLand andAppointinent of 
Trustees Act 1996- A Change in the Law? [2000] Conv. 315 at 317-318. 
780 See Probert Creditors andsection 15 ofthe Trusts ofLand andAppointment of Trustees Act 1996. 
first among equals? op. cit., p. 64. 781 Ibid., p. 65. 
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There appears to be confusion exhibited by Peter Gibson L. J. in BeI1782 and 
Blackburne J. in AchamponJ83 in the overlap between section 15(l)(, a) and (b) and in 
the terminology of section 15(l)(a) and (b) by intermingling the terrns 'intentions' and 
6purposes'. In referring to section 15(l)(a) Peter Gibson L. J. stated, 'Let me assume 
that the judge thereby had regard to s 15(l)(a), the intentions of the persons creating 
the trust. But that purpose 784 ceased to be operative once Mr Bell left the family, 
either in 1991 or at any rate by 1992 when possession proceedings started. Mrs Bell is 
now divorced from Mr Bell. Therefore thatpurpose 785 is not a matter to which the 
judge could properly have regard. 9786 Peter Gibson L. J. is misguided to refer to 
purpose in discussing section 15(l)(a) and is confusing the guidelines. Peter Gibson 
L. J. then proceeded to apply the same test to section 15(l)(b) with no apparent 
distinction between section 15(l)(a) and (b). He stated, 'But that is not an operative 
purpose of the trust since the departure of Mr Bell. 3787 It would present a more 
coherent approach if fluidity had been maintained by using the terminology 
'intentions' in discussing section 15(l)(a). 
Superficially (a) and (b) may appear the same, because initially the settlor's intention 
and purpose coincide. Yet purpose is inevitably far wider, since purpose is an 
evolving concept which may change with the passage of time. 788 It is noteworthy that 
in the later case of Rodway v. Landj ý89 Peter Gibson L. J. warned against 'conflating 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 15(l)' and distinguished clearly between the 
intentions under section 15(l)(a) to practice from the property in partnership and the 
purposes under section 15(l)(b), which by the time the court was considering whether 
to make an order, did not include practising in partnership, since the partnership was 
782 op. cit., para. 27. 
783 op. cit., para. 65 where Blackburne J. stated that, 'Insofar as the purpose of the trust- and the 
intention of the Achampongs in creating it- was to provide a family home . ...... 784 Emphasis added. 7'5 Emphasis added. 7860 
. P cit., para. 27. 7870 
. 78 
P cit., para. 2 8. 
8 Hudson op. cit., para. 16.2.4 states that purpose may be flexible, since (b) refers to the purposes for 
which the property is being held at any time which might then be different to the underlying purposes 
set out in paragraph (a). 
789 Judgment in Rochvay v. Landy was delivered on 4 April 2001 whereas judgment in Bell was 
delivered on 4 December 2000. 
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at an end. 790 As Thompson stated, paragraph (b) must refer to any change from the 
original purpose, which in Achampong should presumably have meant that the 
interests of the other occupiers of the property ought to have been a factor to have 
been given consideration. 791 
6- 1 'the weUare ofany minor who occupies or might reasonably be expected to occupy LV 
any land subject to the trust as his home' 
Section 15(l)(c) directs the court to have regard to 'the welfare of any minor who 
occupies or might reasonably be expected to occupy any land subject to the trust as 
his home'. This was a factor which the Law Commission wanted as a separate 
guideline: 'Our recommendation here is that the welfare of the children should be 
expressly defined as an independent consideration. The aim is to ensure that the 
interests of children are not linked to the interests of particular beneficial owners. ' 792 
Since the 1996 Act has enhanced the status of this consideration, it is to be taken fully 
into account in every case, whether or not the purpose of the trust was to provide a 
family home, thereby changing the law. 793 
In Tee's view the 1996 Act went even further than reinforcing the statutory 
recognition of present-day realities when confirming that a beneficiary under a trust of 
land is entitled to occupy that land, in recognising the contemporary family context by 
enabling a court to take into account, when making an order concerning the trust 
under section 14, the welfare of any child living in the home. 794 Her opinion is that 
this acknowledgement that a non-property consideration is relevant is a departure 
7900 
. P cit., para. 26. 
791 M. P. Thompson Undue Influence before Efridge [2003] Conv. 314 at 323 where Thompson regrets 
that Blackbume J. in Achampong op. cit., para. 65 accepted that their interests were relevant but, 
without giving any reasons said simply that, 'I am unpersuaded that it is a consideration to which much 
if any weight should be attached. ' 
792 Law Com. No. 181 para. 12.9. Prior to 1997, the position was not always clear what weight was to 
be given to the relevance of children, though generally a sale would not be ordered until the home was 
no longer required for the children: Williams v. Williams, Re Evers' Trust, Rmvlings v. Rawlings. 
However, in other cases, children's interests were only taken into account as a factor incidentally so far 
as it affected the equities in the matter: Burke v. Burke, Re Bailey [ 1977] 1 W. L. R. 278. For more 
detail, see Gray Elements ofLandLaw (2 nd edn) op. cit., p. 58 8-592, Thompson Modern Land Law op. 
cit., p. 308, M. P. Thompson Cohabitation, Co-ownership andSeclion 30 [1984] Conv. 103 at 104-109 
and Rhona Schuz Section 30 Law ofProperty Act 1925 and Unmarried Cohabitees 11982] Fam. Law 
108 at 108-112 and 115. 
793 See Leivin on Trusts op. cit., para. 37-64. 
794 Louise Tee Co-ownership andirusts in LandLmv Issues, Debates, Policy edited by Louise Tee 
(2002) ch. 5 at p. 148-149. 
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from conventional orthodoxy; but its impact should not be exaggerated- in practice 
judges had previously managed to take such matters into account by looking at the 
underlying purpose of the trust. Dewar states that particularly striking is the fact that 
children will rarely be owners of any interest in the home in question, so this section 
represents the explicit intrusion of welfarist considerations into deliberations about 
property rights and their effects. 795 
Chappelle goes even further than this by stating that section 15(l)(c) seems to raise 
the child's occupation above a mere consideration: it seems to raise the child to the 
position of a quasi-beneficiary, although she does recognise that it is vital to 
understand that merely being a child of property-owning parents does not give any 
interest in that land. 796 Hudson argues that section 15(l)(c) ought to lead to the 
importation of elements of child law and the Children Act 1989 into this area, 
whereby the welfare of the child is made paramount. 797 
In BeIP98 Peter Gibson L. J. was right in his approach to the son who at the time of the 
trial was not far short of 18 and therefore should only have been a very slight 
consideration. 799 In A champong Blackburne J. recognised that, 'While it is relevant to 
consider the interests of the infant grandchildren in occupation of the property, it is 
difficult to attach much if any weight to their position in the absence of any evidence 
as to how their welfare may be adversely affected if an order for sale is now made. 800 
795 Dewar Land, Law, and the Family Home op. cit., p. 33 8. 
796 See Diane Chappelle Land Law (01' edn 2004) p. 198. 
7970 
. p cit., paras. 16.2.4 and 16.3.3. Where the property is jointly owned, Elizabeth Cooke in Children 
and Real Property- Trusts, Interests and Considerations [1998] Fam. Law 349 at 351 suggests that 
application for a property adjustment order for the benefit of a child where the parents are unmarried 
should be made both under the Children Act 1989 and under the 1996 Act. The considerations relevant 
in the two statutory regimes are different and the court should look at both sets. See also Mavis 
MacLean, John Eekelaar, Jane Lewis, Sue Arthur, Stephen Finch, Rory Fitzgerald and Philippa 
Pearson When Cohabiting Parents Separate- Law and Expectations [20021 Fam. Law 3 73. 
798 op. cit., para. 28. 
799 Probert Creditors andsection 15 ofthe Trusts ofLand andAppointment of Trustees Act 1996: first 
among equals? op. cit., p. 65 argues that the implication that the interests of younger children are of 
key importance perhaps does not give sufficient weight to the importance of the exams sat at 16 and 18. 
The courts have not always been receptive to such issues as in Re Bailey where the son was 16 and still 
in full-time education and Megarry V. -C., in ordering sale of the home, held op. cit., at 282 that, 'the 
evidence about the interference with his educational prospects is very slight'. Probert's view is that it 
would be unfortunate if the weight to be attached to the interests of a minor were to be graded 
according to age without the interests of the minor being considered in each case. 
goo Op. cit., para. 65. 
203 
Thompson postulates what further evidence would have made their welfare a live 
consideration, since the grandchildren would lose their home as a result of an order 
for sale. 801 Thompson regrets that it is unfortunate that continued occupation of the 
house by a person under a disability was not explored further, because in the past, the 
presence of handicapped children has been seen to be a relevant factor in deciding 
whether a house should be sold. 802 The Achampongs' elder daughter had a mental 
disability, but Blackburne J. 's judgment indicates that the mere presence of a disabled 
person or infant children is insufficient ipsofacto to prevent or postpone a sale and 
that care needs to be taken to present evidence to the court of the impact of sale. 
(d) 'the interests ofany secured creditor ofany beneficiary' 
Section 15(l)(d) is worded widely to direct the court to have regard to 'the interests of 
any secured creditor of any bencficiary'. Prior to 1997, the interests of secured 
creditors were treated in the same way as a trustee in bankruptcy with the result that a 
sale would usually be ordered. 803 The principle applied by the courts as exemplified in 
Re Citro 804 was that, 'the voice of the creditors will usually prevail over the voice of 
the other spouse and a sale of the property ordered within a short period. The voice of 
the other spouse will only prevail in exceptional circumstances. '805 The principles 
governing sale on bankruptcy are now governed by sections 335A-337 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 and section 15(4) of the 1996 Act states that section 15 'does not 
"01 Undue Influence before Etridge op. cit., p. 323. 
802 See Walton J. obiter in Re Bailey op. cit., p. 284. 
"03 See Lloyds Bankplc v. Byrne [1993] 1 F. L. R. 369 at 375 where Parker L. J. givingjudgment in the 
Court of Appeal held that, 'there is no difference in principle between the case of a trustee in 
bankruptcy and that of a chargee. ' Laddie J. followed the decision in Byrne in Barclays Bankplc v. 
Hendricks [1996] 1 F. L. R. 258. See also N. S. Price The Enforcement ofCharging Orders over the 
Alatrimonial Home [19971 Conv. 464. A sale was not ordered in Abbey NationalpIc V. Moss [1994] 1 
F. L. R. 307 where the Court of Appeal by a majority (Peter Gibson and Ralph Gibson LJJ. with Hirst 
L. J. dissenting) declined to make an order for sale, since the collateral purpose of occupation of one of 
the co-owners, the mother of the chargor, to remain in the property until her death, was still subsisting. 
Nicholas Hopkins Creditors and Collateral Purposes (1995) 111 L. Q. R. III is highly critical of the 
decision and of the majority judgment of Peter Gibson L. J. and argues that sale should have been 
ordered. See also Michael Harwood Gathering Moss- Trustsfor Sale [ 19961 Fam. Law 293 and 
Harwood A Homefor Life- The New Trusts ofLandAct op. cit. 
804 Op. cit., at 157 per Nourse L. J. The Court of Appeal made an order for sale in favour of the trustee 
in bankruptcy under section 30 of the Law of Property Act 1925. The Court of Appeal was following 
the decision in Re Solomon [1967] Ch. 573 where Goff J. held at 588 that, 'In the circumstances the 
voice of the trustee in bankruptcy is one which ought to prevail'. 
805 Exceptional circumstances were very hard to prove. A wife with young children faced with eviction, 
where she would not have enough money to buy a comparable home and where her children's 
schooling would be disrupted, did not constitute exceptional circumstances in Re Citro. 
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apply to an application if section 335A of the Insolvency Act 1986 ....... applies to 
it. ' One year after the bankruptcy the court shall assume that the interests of the 
bankrupt's creditors outweigh all other considerations unless the circumstances of the 
case are exceptional. 806 In deciding what exceptional circumstances are, the courts 
have applied the law prior to the 1986 Act. 807 
The Law Commission stated that, '.. ... it may be that the courts' approach to 
creditors' interests will be altered by the framing of the guideline as to the welfare of 
children. If the welfare of children is seen as a factor to be considered independently 
of the beneficiaries' holdings, the courts may be less ready to order the sale of the 
home than they are at present. ' 808 This clearly represents a change in the law relieving 
the harshness of the previous law for families. By putting the interests of the secured 
creditor on a par with the other matters in section 15, it is clearly arguable that 
Parliament intended to reduce or nullify the precedence of creditors. 809 
Early case law in TS. B. BankpIc v. MarshaII810 indicated that sale'would be ordered 
except in exceptional circumstances and that the cases under the old section 30 apply 
to an application under section 14. Moreover, although Bank ofBaroda v. Dhillon 811 
was a case on the old section 30, where the court ordered sale despite the existence of 
an overriding interest, there was no indication by the Court of Appeal that the 
decision would have been different under the 1996 Act. 812 This should, however, be 
806 Section 335A(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
807 See Nourse L. J. in Re Citro op. cit., at 159. Exceptional circumstances were found in Re Holliday 
[19811 Ch. 405 where the court postponed sale for five years where the ex-husband was adjudicated 
bankrupt on his own petition. For a review of cases involving exceptional circumstances (especially 
those under section 335A(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986), including Re Raval [1998] 2 F. L. R. 718, Re 
Ng [ 1998] 2 F. L. R. 3 86, Claughton v. Charalainbous [ 1999] 1 F. L. R. 740 and Re Bremner [ 1999] 1 
F. L. R. 912, see Gareth Miller Applications by a trustee in bankrupicyfor sale ofiliefamily home 
(1999) 15 I. L. P. 176. 
808 Law Com. No. 181 para. 12.10 footnote 143. 
809 See Lewin on Trusts op. cit., para. 37-65. 
810 Wroath J. op. cit., at 771-772 held that the principles established in Lloyds Bankp1c v. Byrne, Abbey 
National plc v. Moss and Barclays Batik p1c v. Hendricks were applicable to an application under 
section 14 and that where there is a conflict between a chargee's interest in a matrimonial home and the 
interests of an innocent spouse, the interest of the chargee will prevail except where there are 
exceptional circumstances. Wroath J. 's view was that the wife was not in any event an innocent spouse, 
since she created the charge to the bank with the first defendant. 
811 [1998] 1 F. L. R. 524. The Court of Appeal held that the mortgagee could obtain an order for sale 
despite the wife's overriding interest. 
812 See Susan Pascoe The Further Decline of Overriding Interests: Batik ofBaroda v. Dhillon [ 1998] 
Conv. 415. See also Rosalyn Wells Sale ofthe Matrimonial Home- Batik ofBaroda v. Dhillon [ 19981 
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compared with the view expressed by Peter Gibson L. J. in Banker's Trust Co. v. 
Namdar. 813 Having come to the conclusion that the wife's appeal against an order for 
sale under section 30 had to be refused in light of the reasoning in Citro and Byrne, 
Peter Gibson L. J. stated that, 'It is unfortunate for Mrs Namdar that the very recent 
Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act was not in force at the relevant time 
as the result might have been different. ' 814 
(i) A landmark approach in Shaire? 
It was not until Mortgage Corporation Ltd v. Shaire that the judiciary exhibited a 
clear shift in attitude demonstrating that priority was not automatically to be given to 
secured creditors. Neuberger J. gave eight reasons why section 15 has changed the 
815 law. Two of these, his second and eighth reasons, are the most convincing. His 
second reason 816 is that Parliament could not have intended the old law to continue, 
because whilst the interest of a chargee is one of the four specified factors to be taken 
into account in section 15(l)(d), there is no suggestion that it is to be given any more 
importance than the interests of the children residing in the house. 
Neuberger J. 's eighth reason is similarly compelling: the dissatisfaction with the 
existing law. '... it does not seem to me unlikely 817 that the legislature intended to 
relax the fetters on the way in which the court exercised its discretion in cases such as 
Citro and Byrne, and so as to tip the balance somewhat more in favour of families and 
against banks and other chargees. 8 18 Neuberger J. cites indications ofjudicial 
dissatisfaction 819 with which he inevitably sympathises. Neuberger J. disagreed with 
Fam. Law 208. Dhillon has recently been followed by Peter Smith J. in Pritchard Englefleld v. 
Steinberg [2004] E. W. H. C. 1908, Lawtel 6 August 2004. 
813 [1997] E. G. C. S. 20. Peter Gibson L. J. held that the subsistence of the collateral purpose (a home for 
Mr and Mrs Namdar and their children) was brought to an end by the alienation by Mr Namdar of his 
interest in it by charging that interest to the bank and the children had no separate property right to 
occupy. It followed that there was no subsisting collateral purpose which overrode the basic purpose of 
the trust for sale. 814 LexisNexis, p. 12. 
815 For a ftill analysis and critique of all eight reasons, see Pascoe Section 15 ofthe Trusts ofLand and 
Appointment of Trustees Act 1996- A Change in the Law? op. cit., p. 321-327. "' Op. cit., p. 988. 
917 Note the double negative, indicating that Neuberger J. realises that he is treading on potentially 
contentious territory. 
"' op. cit., P. 990. 
8'9 Neuberger J. stated op. cit., p. 990 that, 'Although Bingham L. J. agreed with Nourse L. J. in Citro, 
he expressed unhappiness with the result at p. 16 IF, and Sir George Waller's dissatisfaction went so far 
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Wroath J. in TS. B. Bankple v. Marshall 820 which up until now had been accepted as a 
sound decision, on the basis that 'it does not appear to what extent the matter was 
argued before him. ' 821 
This left Neuberger J. with the tricky problem of how to treat the wealth of case law 
under section 30. He concluded that, 'I think it would be wrong to throw over all the 
earlier cases without paying them any regard. However they have to be treated with 
caution, in light of the change in the law, and in many cases they are unlikely to be of 
great, let alone decisive assistance. ' 822 In the light of his bold stand, one would have 
expected him simply to refuse to order sale. Yet he would only refuse to order sale if 
the Mortgage Corporation had its equity converted into a loan and Mrs Shaire would 
pay interest on the loan. 823 He stated realistically that, 'For TMC to be locked into a 
quarter of the equity in a property would be a significant disadvantage unless they had 
a proper return and a proper protection so far as insurance and repair is concerned. 824 
He would not make an order without more information. The child in that case was 
over twenty years old, but Neuberger J. paved the way for a decision which refuses to 
order sale to a secured creditor based on the interests of children. 
This solution was fair on the creditor in the Shaire case and if Mrs Shaire would not 
agree to this or could not afford the interest, then the house would have to be sold, 
as led him to dissent: see his judgment at p. 161 to p. 163. Furthermore, there is a decision of the Court 
of Appeal in Abbey Nalionalplcv. Moss [1994] 1 F. L. R. 307, which suggests a desire for anew 
approach. ' 
820 Martin Dixon Co-ownership and TLATA 1996 (1999) 27 S. L. R. 58 at 59 noted that the old pre-1997 
presumption, that a sale should , occur unless there 
is a collateral purpose, strictly is not applicable, but 
the judge appears to have thought that he should order a sale unless such a collateral purpose existed. 
Dixon comments that one of the purposes of the 1996 Act is to ensure that the courts have a freer hand 
to deny sale than was the case previously, and to do this, the court needs to develop a new rationale that 
does not hark back to the pre- 1997 law and this case does not provide it. 
821 Op. cit., p. 990. Wroath J. did not have to deal with the conflict between the second and third 
principles, because section 15(l)(c) specifically confines consideration of the welfare of any children to 
minors and the youngest child in that case was 18. Wroath J. could therefore avoid this complex 
problem. 112 Op. Cit., P. 99 1. 
823 John M. Samson Joint Chvnership- Forcing a Sale (2001) 22 P. L. B. 25 at 31 states that the 
suggestion that the parties reach a compromise, with a particular proposed compromise in mind and the 
alternative of an order forcing the issue, sets a healthy precedent for the judicial process. A route 
whereby the court is able to bring the parties to adopt a compromise cannot but be applauded. 824 Op. cit., p. 993-994. 
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even taking into account Mrs Shaire's majority beneficial interest. 825 The case is 
important in accepting the proposition that, under the new Act, the interests of a 
secured creditor are no longer to be regarded as paramount in considering whether or 
not the property should be sold. 826 The case appears to support the view that the courts 
have been equ ipped with a useful and more flexible tool to tailor outcomes to suit the 
particular facts of the case. 827 In so doing, the case suggests a workable practical 
solution to the problems arising from the often simultaneous functions of family 
property as both a home and as an asset in commercial transactions. 828 
The application of the 1996 Act by Neuberger J., which dilutes the commercial bias of 
the law outside the bankruptcy setting, gives a welcome but necessarily imperfect 
glimpse of the practical reconciliation of the dual nature of family property. 829 The 
decision in Shaire looked after the interests of both creditor and defendant, although it 
was viable only because of the size of the shares in the case and will not always be 
viable. 830 Radley-Gardner rightly regards Shaire as an unusual case in which the court 
could afford to be generous, since Mrs Shaire was an unusual defendant, in that she 
was solvent and had the means to re-house herself. 831 
825 Jeremy de Souza The Valuation of UndividedShares in English Land [2002] P. C. B. 328 at 331 
asserts that this solution was obviously fair and reasonable for that type of applicant, but if the minority 
holder had been a newly married child in need of access to cash to buy a home for his own family, this 
would clearly not have been the case. It remains to be seen how the courts will approach such 
circumstances. 
826 M. P. Thompson Secured Creditors andSales [2000] Conv. 329 at 336. P. J. Clarke op. cit., para. 
17.29 was unduly optimistic and generalised when he stated that, 'Therefore, there was a straight 
conflict between the interest of the wife and the interest of the creditor: and the wife "won"', but was 
correct in stating that, 'This is, of course, a result totally different from that which would have occurred 
under the previous law. ' In Clarke's view, 'the most significant point is that spouses- and other co- 
occupiers- and, a fortiori, those with minor children living in the relevant property, are given greater 
protection. ' Clarke does, however, recognise para. 17.30 that Neuberger J. 's generosity became more 
muted when applying his conclusions to the facts. 
827 Roger Smithers Trust or trussed? (2002) 146 S. J. 1079 at 1080 commented that, 'The wife 
triumphed. Clearly, application of the old law would have led to the opposite result. The 1996 Act 
made a difference. ' 
828 See Oliver Radley-Gardner Chargees and Family Property [2001] 1 Web J. C. L. I. Radley-Gardner 
highlights p. 7 that the decision would nonetheless be viewed nervously by mortgagees, since 
commercial considerations must bow (albeit as slightly as possible) to the welfare of the parties. 
829 Ibid. 2 p. 7. See also Mika Oldham Balancing Commercial andFamily Interests under TLATA 1996, 
s. 15 [200 11 C. L. J. 43 at 45 who welcomes the law's flexibility to broker a solution for the two parties. 
Oldham comments that the decision meets many of the judicial and academic criticisms levelled 
a -- gainst the old section 30 and that it heralds a new flexibility of approach in which family and 
commercial interests can be balanced. 
830 Smith Property Law op. cit., p. 330. 831 Oliver Radley-Gardner Section 15 of TL4T4, or, The Importance ofBeing Earners [2003] 5 Web 
J. C. L. I. at 2-3. 
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One potential difficulty with the decision in Shaire is that lending institutions may 
now prefer to bring their application in the context of bankruptcy proceedings. 832 
Secured creditors may initiate bankruptcy proceedings when the time is right to 
ensure an almost certain sale, instead of taking their chances under a section 14 
application wi th its concern for the welfare of parties whom it is practically possible 
to protect. This may be regrettable, since it undermines the protection which the 1996 
Act provides. 833 Although this appears to be getting in by the back door since the 
mortgagee could not themselves get a sale under section 14, it is not an abuse of the 
process and will not be prevented by the court as was made clear by Peter Gibson L. J. 
in Alliance and Leicester plc v. Slayford. 834 The decision demonstrates that the 
protection given to innocent wives by Boland and Barclays Bankplc v. O'Brien 835 
may be deceptive, but it is a welcome judgment reflecting the fact that mortgagee's 
remedies are cumulative and provides mortgagees, who find themselves on the wrong 
end of either a Boland or an O'Brien defence with ways in which to recover some, if 
not all, of the money which they have lent. 836 It means that even if a more flexible 
approach has emerged under section 15, it may well be illusory, since it would easily 
be undercut by recourse to the insolvency regime. 837 
832 The view of Tee Co-ownership and trusts in Land Law Issues, Dehates and Policy op. cit., p. 152 is 
that this is not to say that the 1996 Act has dramatically altered the balance of advantage, because even 
where a creditor is refused sale, if it institutes bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor and is 
successful, it can then take advantage of section 335A(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986, which in effect 
allows a sale a year after a bankruptcy order is made. This is, however, a far more cumbersome, 
lengthy and expensive procedure. 
833 See Radley-Gardner Chargees and Family Property op. cit., p. 7. 
834 [2001] 1 All E. R. (Comm. ) I paras. 28 and 30-3 1. The court followed the decision of Jonathan 
Parker J. in Zandfaridv. B. CCL International S. A. [1996] 1 W. L. R. 1420. Mrs Slayford was an 
epileptic and it is impossible to know what effect her illness would have on a court's decision when 
faced with a petition for sale brought by the trustee in bankruptcy. The health of a bankrupt's spouse 
can, if sufficiently serious, be regarded as an exceptional circumstance inclining a court to refuse an 
immediate sale: see Re Raval [ 1998] 2 F. L. R. 718 (paranoid schizophrenia) and Claughton v. 
Charalambous [199911 F. L. R. 740 (renal failure and arthritis). It might be that ultimately a sale could 
be postponed beyond the year from the bankruptcy envisaged by the Insolvency Act. See M. P. 
Thompson The Cumulative Range ofa Mortgagee's Remedies [2002] Conv. 53 at 60. 135 [1994] 1 A. C. 180. 
836 Thompson The Cumulative Range ofa Mortgagee's Remedies op. cit., p. 60-6 1. See also Mark 
Pawlowski and Sarah Greer Undue Influence- Back Door Tactics [200 1] Fam. Law 275 at 279 where 
they conclude that it remains to be seen to what extent lending institutions adopt the practice of suing 
the husband debtor upon his personal covenant with a view to forcing a sale of the matrimonial home, 
notwithstanding the wife's equity arising from a successful O'Brien defence. Oldham Balancing 
Commercial and Family Interests under TLATA 1996 op. cit., p. 45 comments that such actions are 
likely to increase and since mortgag gees enjoy cumulative remedies, restrictions imposed on one remedy 
will no doubt impact on their recourse to others. 837 See Radley-Gardner Section 15 of TLA TA, or, The Importance ofBeing Earners op. cit., p. 3. 
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(H) Retreatftom Shaire to prioritise creditors? 
An arrangement such as that adopted in Shaire was not viable in Bank ofIreland 
Home Mortgages Ltd v. Bell. The Court of Appeal ordered sale in Bell where the 
mortgage debt of 000,000 at the time of the trial exceeded the value of the entire 
property, no payment of capital or interest had been made since 1992, Mrs Bell's 
beneficial interest was only about 10 per cent at the most, there was no equity in the 
property which would be realised for her on a sale of the property and the son at the 
time of the trial was not far short of 18. Peter Gibson L. J. stated that, 'The 1996 Act 
....... appears to 
have given scope for some change in the court's practice. 838 
Nevertheless, a powerful consideration is and ought to be whether the creditor is 
receiving proper recompense for being kept out of his money, repayment of which is 
overdue (see Mortgage Corporation pIc v. Shaire ........ ). 3839 Peter Gibson L. J. has 
retreated from the flexible approach he indicated might be forthcoming in Namdar. 840 
It is odd that Peter Gibson L. J. utilised Shaire to support his proposition, since Peter 
Gibson L. J. looks at the actual decision reached in Shaire rather than the analysis of 
Neuberger J. in that case. This represents a retreat from the reasoning of Neuberger J. 
in Shaire. Sir Christopher Staughton's reasoning pursues the traditional orthodoxy 
when he stated, 'Unless there is a sale in the foreseeable future, the bank will get no 
return for its money, and no repayment of principal, until such time as Mrs Bell 
wishes to leave the house or is compelled to do so. That would not be justice in this 
case. The bank is a beneficiary of the trust referred to in s 15 as much as Mrs Bell. 1841 
Sir Christopher Staughton's odd and loose use of terminology in referring to the bank 
as a beneficiary of the trust is misguided in this context. 
838 Peter Gibson L. J. had previously referred to the position prior to the 1996 Act where the courts 
would order sale at the request of the trustee in bankruptcy of a spouse or of the creditor chargee of a 
spouse, considering that the creditors' interests should prevail over that of the other spouse and the 
spouse's family save in exceptional circumstances. 
"'9 Op. cit., para. 3 1. 
8'0 Op. cit., LexisNexis p. 12. His judgment in Bell reflects the restrictive approach under section 30 to 
which he himself did not fully ascribe when it was still in force in Abbey NationalpIc v. Moss op. cit., 
at 317-318: see Radley-Gardner Section 15 of TLATA, or, The Importance ofBeing Earners op. cit., p. 
3. 
"' Op. cit., p. 817. 
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Dixon is concerned about the court's emphasis on the need to allow a creditor its 
money and hopes that this case is limited to its own facts rather than being taken as 
evidence of a 'silent presumption' that sale should be ordered in such cases. 842 
However, in H. M Customs and Excise Commissioners v. A; A v. A Munby J. stated 
that, 'it seems to me that the Bank of1reland case marks the limits beyond which the 
court cannot properly go. ' 843 Probert's analysis identifies three ways in which the 
interests of creditors may prevail over the interests of those opposing sale 844 and 
argues that Bell drew on all three approaches to make the point that the Court of 
Appeal were keen to limit the effect of Shaire. 845 Probert is right in stating that 
emphasising that importance is to be attached to one factor is arguably inconsistent 
with the idea of parity between the factors listed. 846 The decision was the right one on 
the facts but the danger in the reasoning lies in the way that it downgrades the purpose 
of providing a family home as against the interests of the creditors. 847 Probert 
identifies 'the risk that the interests of creditors will trump the rights of even very 
young children .......... If this interpretation of section 15 prevails then the wind 
has 
changed and blown us back to where we started. ' 848 
842 Martin Dixon Trusts ofland, sale and TOLA TA: disputes between co-owners and thirdparties 
(2001) 32 S. L. R. 59 states that whereas it was clear in Shaire that the 1996 Act had effected a sea 
change in the law by making a sale of land less likely, even at the behest of a bank with an equitable 
charge over one co-owner's share, in Bell the Court of Appeal reverts to type and finds every reason to 
favour a sale. Dixon stresses that it is important to avoid confusion between applications for sale made 
by creditors with 'merely' equitable charges over one co-owner's interest and applications by the 
trustee in bankruptcy. 
843 op. cit., para. 127. Munby J. was referring to the fact that as ajoint owner of the house, the wife 
was entitled to the full protection, not only of section 31(4) of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (since 
repealed by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 Sch. 12 para. 1), which safeguarded her right to continue 
to enjoy the property, because she was totally innocent of any wrongdoing, but also to the protection of 
section 15 of the 1996 Act. 
"44 Creditors and section 15 ofthe Trusts ofLand andAppoiniment of Trustees Act 1996., first ainong 
equals? op. cit., p. 62-63. First, the courts may privilege the interests of creditors above the other 
factors listed in section 15; secondly, the courts may restrict the scope of the other factors listed in 
section 15 without overtly declaring that the interests of creditors are more important; thirdly, on the 
facts of the case the interests of the creditors may prevail once all the relevant factors have been 
balanced against one another. 
845 Probert ibid., p. 63, stresses that Shaire did not lay down any rule that sale should only be refused if 
the owner-occupier was able to demonstrate his or her ability to repay. It was merely appropriate in that 
case once the equally weighted factors listed in section 15 had been balanced against one another. 1346 Ibid., p. 63. 
847 Smithers op. cit., p. 1080 is right that although the tone in Bell is less charitable than that adopted by 
Neuberger J. in Shaire, on the facts Bell must be correct, because not to have ordered sale would have 
been not to have accorded any weight to the bank's interests. 
R48 Creditors andsection 15 of1he Trusts ofLand andAppoint"Ient of Trustees Act 1996: first among 
equals? op. cit., p. 66-67. Rebecca Bailey-Harris Case Reports [200 1] Fam. Law 805 at 806 comments 
that it seems likely that cases where sale is refused rather than postponed will continue to be extremely 
rare. How much scope there is for a change in practice remains to be explored in future case law where 
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Bell was explicitly approved in First National Bankplc v. Achanipong 849 where 
Blackbume J. sitting in the Court of Appeal stated that, 'I regard it as plain that an 
order for sale should be made. Prominent among the considerations which lead to that 
conclusion is that, unless an order for sale is made, the bank will be kept waiting 
indefinitely for any payment out of what is, for all practical purposes, its own share of 
the property. '850 Thompson comments that it is becoming apparent that the interest of 
the secured creditor is likely to be given priority over the other considerations listed in 
section 15, unless the occupier of the property is able, as was the case in Shaire, to 
come up with a plan which will safeguard the financial interests of the creditor. 851 
Thompson highlights the irony that Mrs Achampong may have been given more time 
to come to terms with the necessity of the house being sold if her husband had been 
made bankrupt 852 than, as was actually the case, he had not. 853 He is right that when a 
secured creditor is petitioning for a sale of the family home, the court should give 
serious consideration to postponing the sale for a year, thereby arriving at a position 
consistent with that which occurs in bankruptcy. 
Radley-Gardner highlights the steady resettling of the balance in favour of 
institutional lenders which continued in Achampong and comments 854 that the 
judgment of Blackburne J. is reminiscent of the dictum of Nourse L. J. in Re Citro 855 
that a wife with young children being faced with eviction, change of neighbourhood 
and schools 'cannot be described as exceptional. They are the melancholy 
consequences of debt and improvidence with which every civilised society has been 
familiar. ' It may be that the spectre of exceptional circumstances is still haunting co- 
owners' disputes with secured creditors. Without buying out the secured creditor, the 
remaining co-owner is unlikely to be able to prevent a sale. 
the contrast between the interests of the family and those of the creditor is less marked than in Bell, for 
example where the debt is smaller, the children younger and the marriage still a going concern. 849 op. cit., paras. 61-62. 
850 Op. cit., para. 65. Blackburne J. would not accept para. 62 that Mrs Achampong could complain 
about the delay of the bank in bringing proceedings, since 'she has had the use of the whole property in 
the meantime. ' Peter Gibson L. J. also expressed such views in Bell para. 32. 
"51 Undue Influence before Etridge op. cit., p. 322. 
1152 This is due to the fact that during the year following the bankruptcy, the interests of the bankrupt's 
creditors are not afforded higher priority than the other considerations under section 335A of the 
Insolvency Act 1986. 
53 op. cil., p. 325. 
" Section 15 of TLA TA, or, The Importance ofBeing Earners op. cit., p. 5. 
855 Op. cit., at 157. 
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Radley-Gardner argues that any perceived injustice lies not in section 15, but with the 
underlying law of insolvency, since if section 15 goes further than section 335A in 
protecting co-owners, secured creditors will simply use the insolvency route to bypass 
section 15, rendering it otiose. 856 This raises the issue of whether the Insolvency Act 
1986 needs to be amended to be less creditor-friendly, whether one should introduce 
homestead legislation in this country or whether the remedies of a mortgagee should 
cease to be cumulative so that personal claims must be exhausted first. His view is 
that the declaration that 'greater flexibility' exists under section 15 has proven too 
optimistic a prognosis. He suggests re-drafting section 15 in such a way to give less 
false hope to defending co-owners. 
Further emphasis was placed on the supremacy of creditors in Pritchard Englefleld v. 
Sleinberg157 where Peter Smith J., in ordering a sale of the property, held that Mrs 
Steinberg's overriding interest under section 70(l)(g) of the Land Registration Act 
1925 was prior to the interest of the bank, but should not be paramount, since that 
would frustrate the the claimants' legitimate desire to realise their charge. Peter Smith 
J. stated that, 'Under the 1996 Act the court has considerable powers in respect of 
trusts (sections 14 and 15 and Bank ofBaroda v. Dhillon [1998] F. L. R. 324 and 
Mortgage Corporation v. Shaire [2001] Ch. 743). ' Despite following Dhillon, Peter 
Smith J. did grant Mrs Steinberg a short opportunity of two months to try to find a 
buyer who would buy subject to her intereSt, 858 which demonstrates a token, albeit 
unrealistic, degree of flexibility. 
Fox has argued that creditors almost invariably prevail, since the value of the home to 
an occupier is minimised when weighed against the concrete financial claims of 
859 
creditors. In asserting the need for a legal concept of home, she argues that the 
home represents a complex and multi-dimensional amalgam of financial, practical, 
social, psychological, cultural, politico-economic and emotional interests to its 
856 Section 15 of TLA TA, or, The Importance ofBeing Earners op. cit., p. 6. 
857o 
, P. cit., 
para. 59. 
858 op. cit., para. 63. 
859 Loma Fox The Meaning ofHome: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal Challenge? (2002) 29(4) J. 
Law & Soc. 580 at 601,607. 
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occupiers 860 and she urges that policymakers should explicitly consider whether an 
occupier's intangible attachment to the home ought to add weight to their claims 
when seeking to defend proceedings brought by creditors. 861 Barlow suggests that the 
justification for the pro-creditor stance of the law may be that it is right that in 
marriage-like relationships, the fortunes of the partners stand or fall together. 862 
Smith's view is that the introduction of secured creditors is dubious, because it is far 
from clear that one beneficiary should be able to damage the interest of other 
beneficiaries by mortgaging his or her beneficial interest to a greater extent than if the 
interest is sold. 863 There is no requirement that the security is over the beneficial 
interest under the trust and a mortgagee of other property of that beneficiary falls 
within (d). Yet what Smith does not discuss is that in evaluating the competing 
interests of secured creditors and other beneficiaries, the secured creditor may well be 
blameless and on balance should be able to enforce its security. 864 This can operate 
unfairly against a beneficiary in occupation of the property, but this may be seen as 
the lesser of two evils by the judiciary. 
Gray and Gray comment 865 that the courts have not let their concern for the lender's 
commercial interests to be deflected by reference to the principle of respect for 
'private and family life' and for the 'home' enshrined in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and that the major thrust of the House of Lords 
majority ruling in Harrow London Borough Council v. Qazi 866 is that Article 8 is not 
violated by the simple enforcement of entitlements which have been determined to 
belong to parties as a matter of private domestic law. Various attempts to invoke the 
860 ]bid, p. 607. 161 Ibid., p. 609. 
862 Anne Barlow Rights in thefamily home- timefor a conceptual revolution? in New Perspectives on 
Property Law, Human Rights and the Holne op. cit., ch. 3 at p. 70. 
63 Property Law op. cit., p. 322. 
64 Ennnet and Farrand on Title op. cit., R. 47 para. 22-03 5 notes that since lenders in practice tend to 
prefer their borrowers' land to be saleable, it could conceivably become recommended practice for 
mortgagees to insist that mortgagors who are acquiring land as co-owners do so expressly on trust for 
sale. 
865 LandLmv (Butterworths Core Text Series) op. cit., para. 8.35. 
866 [2003] U. K. H. L. 43, [2003] 3 W. L. R. 792. See Ian Loveland The Impact ofthe Human Rights Act 
on Security of Tenure in Public Housing [2004] P. L. 594, Susan Bright Ending Tenancies by Notice to 
Quit: The Human Rights Challenge (2004) 120 L. Q. R. 398 and Martin Davis and David Hughes An 
End ofthe Affair- Social Housing, Relationship Breakdown and the Human Rights Act 1998 [2004] 68 
Conv. 19 at 29-38. 
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Article 8 protection in the context of disputes between creditors and home occupiers 
867 868 have been unsuccessful. An appeal is pending in Jackson v. Bell on the issue of 
whether in the light of the terms of section 335A and Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the construction and application of section 335A was 
the appropriate one in the view of the competing interests. 
Conclusion 
Sections 14 and 15 have introduced the potential for greater flexibility into the law. 
Due to the wording of section 15(l), as was demonstrated in Shaire, courts have been 
armed with a tool to take a long-term view to arrive at a just solution balancing the 
interests of occupiers and secured creditors. If the remaining co-owner takes the 
initiative and presents proposals which in the long-term secure the financial interests 
of the secured creditor which was a factor lacking in Achampong, then section 15 will 
result in being welcomed as a worthwhile reform. Since judges are increasingly 
demonstrating a clear bias in favour of creditors, it may be questioned whether section 
15 has given too much responsibility to the judiciary and whether policy should have 
been formulated by Parliament rather than relying on ad hoe developments in case 
law. Section 15(l) should not, however, be amended, so that courts can exercise their 
discretion in appropriate cases to achieve a just and fair result. 
867 See review by Fox The Meaning ofHome: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal Challenge? op. cit., p. 
597-598 of cases where Article 8 protection has been unsuccessful: Re Karia 2001 WL 1560733 p. 2 
per Lightman J., obiter in Birmingham Midshires Mortgage Services Lid v. Sabherwal op. cit., at 264 
(the Human Rights Act 1998 was not yet in force), Ebert v. Venvil Unreported, 19 December 2000, 
LexisNexis paras. 15-18 per Aldous L. J. This should be compared with the optimistic view of Helene 
Pines Richman Using the Human RightsAct to Save the Family Home (2000) 150 N. L. J. 1102. See also 
Jackie Jones The Trusts ofLand and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996- the case law in relation to 
bankruptcy sojar (2001) 23 J. S. W. F. L. 353 who concludes at 361 that if the balance has tipped in 
favour of families and against creditors in relation to orders sought by a trustee in bankruptcy under 
section 14, she has seen very little evidence of it. 
868 [2001] E. W. C. A. Civ. 387, [2001] B. P. I. R. 612. Sir Andrew Morritt V. -C. held para. 24 that there is 
an important point for the Court of Appeal to consider as to how the balance is to be struck between the 
rights and interests of the bankrupt's family and creditors. 
215 
CHAPTER 10- IMPROVING CONVEYANCING EFFICIENCY BY 
REDRAFTING SECTION 16? 
Section 16 provides protection for purchasers of unregistered land without actual 
notice where trustees have acted beyond their powers in certain specified 
circumstances. One of the main principles of the 1925 legislation was that dealings 
with equitable interests and matters of trust management should be kept off the legal 
title and be of no concern to purchasers. Although this approach is maintained in the 
1996 Act, it is unfortunate that section 16 is riddled with inconclusive and recondite 
phraseology which undermines conveyancing efficiency due to the broad 
circumstances in which conveyances may be invalidated. Such an approach may be 
seen as a way of counter-balancing the greater insecurity to which beneficiaries are 
made subject by the grant of such wide powers to trustees of land. Yet conveyancing 
efficiency could be improved by amending section 16 in order to reduce the 
circumstances in which conveyances may be invalidated and thus diminish the 
divergence between land with unregistered title and land to which title is registered. 
Although section 16 is of diminishing importance due to the spread of registration of 
title, any dispute about whether a conveyance is invalid is likely to arise in the context 
of a disposition by trustees of unregistered land which triggers compulsory first 
registration with the issue arising in the context of proceedings for alteration of the 
register under Schedule 4 of the Land Registration Act 2002. The fact of registration 
is an important additional factor in the protection of the purchaser and will 
considerably lessen the divergence between unregistered and registered land. 
Should section 16(l) be amended? 
Section 16(l) provides that, 'A purchaser of land which is or has been subject to a 
trust need not be concerned to see that any requirement imposed on the trustees by 
section 6(5), 7(3) or I1 (1) has been complied with. ' The effect of section 16(l) is that 
a purchaser need not be concerned with whether the trustees have had regard to the 
rights of the beneficiaries under section 6(5), have obtained the consent of 
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beneficiaries to a partition under section 7(3) or have consulted the beneficiaries 
under section 11(j). 869 
Meaning of 'need not be concerned to see'? 
Section 16(l) raises the question of what the phrase 'need not be concerned to see' 
means. These words are imprecise and a perfunctory scrutiny might suggest that a 
purchaser who actually knows of the breach would not be protected in such 
circumstances, since section 16(l) may only relieve of liability where a purchaser 
fails to make such inquiries as a reasonable purchaser would make rather than in cases 
of actual notice or knowledge. However, the view of Kenny and KennY870 is that the 
purchaser has no positive duty to investigate these matters; a purchaser is not affected 
by failure to make enquiries which a reasonably competent purchaser would make; if 
the purchaser actually knows of the breach, the wording suggests that even actual 
knowledge does not damnify the purchaser; however, a purchaser who is a party to a 
breach and to equitable fraud is liable to have the sale impeached and will not be 
protected by section 16(l). 
Emmet and Farrand on Title 87 1 equates the wording in section 16(l) with the wording 
in section 27(l) of the Law of Property Act 1925 872 'shall not be concerned with the 
trusts affecting the proceeds of sale of land subject to a trust for sale' and state that it 
is 'the same in effect to protect purchasers as part of the overreaching provisions 
despite their having actual or constructive notice of the trusts affecting the land or its 
proceeds. ' Section 26(3) of the Law of Property Act 1925 uses similar language 'a 
purchaser shall not be concerned to see' in connection with consultation with 
beneficiaries and there is a lack of academic and judicial comment on its 
interpretation. 873 
869 The sections referred to in section 16(l) deal with the private relations between trustees and 
beneficiaries and matters of internal trust management. It would not be appropriate for a purchaser to 
have to investigate such matters: see MacKenzie, Walker and Walton op. cit., p. 71. 8700 
. p cit., p. 23. 8710 
. 
872 
p cit., R. 40 para. 22.037. See also Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., para. 2.169 footnote 1. 
Section 27(l) states that, 'A purchaser of a legal estate from trustees of land shall not be concerned 
with the trusts affecting the land, the net income of the land or the proceeds of sale of the land whether 
or not those trusts are declared by the trust instrument as that by which the trust of land is created. ' 
873 A. M. Prichard Express Trusts (1973) 117 S. J. 518 focuses exclusivelY on section 26(3), but does not 
refer to this aspect of it. 
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Is goodfaith a requirement ofsection 16(1)? 
Emmet and Farrand on Title ventures further by stating that, 'However, it appears 
clear that a purchaser should not be protected unless he takes "in good faith ........ it is 
thought that collusion, for example, rather than mere actual notice of breach would 
need to be shown'. 874 This is derived from the definition of the word 'purchaser' 
which has the same meaning as the Law of Property Act 1925 which by section 
205(l)(xxi) requires a purchaser to be in good faith. If the erroneous view of Graham 
J. in Peffer v. Rigg$75 is adopted that, 'He cannot in my judgment be in good faith if 
he has in fact notice of something which affects his title', then this would severely 
limit the protection purported to be given to purchasers by section 16(l) and would go 
wider than collusion referred to in Emmet and Farrand on Title. R11offand Roper on 
the Law and Practice ofRegistered Conveyancing876 takes a wider view commenting 
on the position in registered land that, 'On the question of good faith, it may be asked 
whether a purchaser can ignore express information which he has about a 
contemplated breach of trust by a single trustee-proprietor registered without a 
restriction. He can scarcely be treated as having good faith when he knows he has 
bought in direct breach of trust. ' 
The view expressed in Emmet and Farrand on Title is curious, because section 23 (1) 
of the 1996 Act states that 'purchaser' has the same meaning as Part I of the Law of 
Property Act 1925 and section 205(l)(xxi) seems to make it clear that in Part I good 
faith is not incorporated within the definition, although Ruoffand Roper question 
whether the exception which applies to Part I amounts to an entirely separate 
874 op. cit., R. 40 para. 22-037. A similar view is shared by Nigel P. GravellsLand Law: Text and 
Materials (2 nd edn 1999) p. 335 who states that it must be questioned whether a purchaser is protected 
under section 16(l) where he is a party to the breach of the relevant duty. 
875 [1977] 1 W. L. R. 285 at 294 where Graham J. was construing section 3(xxi) of the Land Registration 
Act 1925. For criticism of this view, see Gray and Gray op. cit., p. 1060-1062. Gray and Gray note 
inter alia op. cit., p. 1062 footnote 13 that this conflicts with the view expressed by Brightman J. in De 
Lusignan v. Johnson (1973) 230 E. G. 499, who took the view that only fraud was relevant in this 
context, which is the preferable view and which was favoured in Burr v. Copp [19831 C. L. Y. 2057. See 
also David Hayton Purchasers ofRegistered Land [1977] C. L. J. 227, F. R. Crane Notes ofRecent Cases 
(1977] Conv. 207, Roger J. Smith RegisteredLand. Purchasers with Actual Notice (1977) 93 L. Q. R. 
34 1, Jill Martin Constructive Trusts ofRegistered Land [1978] Conv. 52. The Land Registration Act 
2002 avoids the problems posed by Peffer v. Rigg, inter alia, by creating the concept of owner's 
powers in sections 23 and 26, but this does not have any bearing on the interpretation of section 16(l) 
of the 1996 Act, because of the reference by virtue of section 23(l) of the 1996 Act to the definition of 
purchaser in the Law of Property Act 1925. 
876 R. B. Roper, C. West, R. Feamley, J. Donaldson, Francis Twambley (6 th edn 1991 looseleaf) R. 12 
para. 32-17. The latest update, R. 24 (October 2003), does not deal with these issues. 
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definition of a purchaser or whether it merely substitutes 'money or money's worth' 
for 'valuable consideration' in the principal definition. 877 The Encyclopaedia of 
Forms and Precedents 878 adopts a more dogmatic view by stating that, "'Purchaser" 
means a person who acquires an interest in, or charge on, property for money or 
money's worth', thus omitting the reference to good faith. The better view is that 
good faith is not part of the definition of purchaser for the purposes of Part I of the 
1925 Act. 
Utility ofsection 16(1)? 
The purpose of section 16(l) is to make it clear what enquiries a purchaser does not 
have to make. If a purchaser knows that in making the disposition, the trustees are 
acting in breach of trust by not complying with the requirements of sections 6(5), 7(3) 
or I1 (1), a purchaser may be subject to in personam liabilities in equity for knowing 
receipt. 879 In order to improve the statutory provisions, section 16(l) should be 
amended to state that, 'A purchaser shall not be concerned with any breach of any 
requirements imposed on the trustees by sections 6(5), 7(3) or II (I) unless the 
purchaser colludes with the trustees in such breach. ' 
Shift in strengthening the security of beneficiaries? 
Section 16(2) and section 16(3) represent an undesirable shift away from giving 
absolute primacy to considerations of conveyancing efficiency and towards 
strengthening the security of beneficiaries in land held upon trust. Section 16(2) states 
that, 'Where (a) trustees of land who convey land which (immediately before it is 
conveyed) is subject to the trust contravene section 6(6) or (8), but (b) the purchaser 
of the land from the trustees has no actual notice of the contravention, the 
contravention does not invalidate the conveyance. ' Section 16(3) states that, 'Where 
the powers of trustees of land are limited by virtue of section 8- (a) the trustees shall 
take all reasonable steps to bring the limitation to the notice of any purchaser of the 
land from them, but (b) the limitation does not invalidate any conveyance by the 
trustees to a purchaser who has no actual notice of the limitation. ' 
$77 op. cit., R. 19 para. 32-08 footnote 3. 
878 Vol. 40(2) op. cit., para. 487 footnote 1 [3313]. 
879 See generally Underhill and Hayton op. cit., p. 970-979 and Hayton and Marshall op. cit., paras. I I- 
110-11-114. 
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The rationale behind these subsections is that due to the extension of trustees' powers 
by section 6, there is no obvious way in which a purchaser can ascertain whether there 
are any limitations on the powers of trustees of unregistered land other than by relying 
on information volunteered by trustees. Yet Ferris and Battersby 880 are surprisingly 
acquiescent in not challenging the implications of this retrograde step of forgoing pre- 
eminence to conveyancing efficiency, which should remain the overriding 
consideration. The subsections are expressed in the negative, which makes it 
problematic to state dogmatically what the corollary of the positive iS. 881 It would 
have been much easier if this had been spelt out in the subsections. In section 16(2), 
making assumptions from the negative propositions, overreaching will not occur 
(although the section does not say so explicitly) where the purchaser has actual notice 
that the trustees of land contravened section 6(6) or (8) and in section 16(3), making 
the same assumptions, overreaching will not occur where a purchaser has actual 
notice of a limitation by virtue of section 8. 
Ferris and Battersby state that the drafting of section 16(2) and (3) suggests that those 
provisions are designed to prevent overreaching occurring. 882 Thus the Act does not 
show any intention to abolish overreaching, but it does show an intention to curtail the 
operation of overreaching in some situations. Section 16(2) expresses a legislative 
policy that has shifted since the enactment of section 2 of the Law of Property Act 
1925.883 Section 2 protected even the purchaser with actual notice of wrongdoing on 
the part of trustees for sale. Section 16(2) refuses protection to purchasers with actual 
notice of relevant trustee wrongdoing. The legislation carefully continues to shield 
innocent purchasers, but refuses to shield purchasers who realise that their purchase is 
made in breach of statutory duties owed by the trustees to the beneficiaries. Section 
16(3)(b) marks an extension of the protection formerly offered to purchasers, but the 
change introduced in section 8 increases the hazards facing purchasers and so this 
8'0 Graham Ferris and Graham Battersby The General Principles of Overreaching and the Modern 
Legislative Reforms, 1996-2002 (2003) 119 L. Q. R. 94 at 118-119. 
""' See Graham Ferris and Graham Battersby The Impact ofthe Trusts ofLand andAppointment of 
Trustees Act 1996 on Purchasers ofRegistered Land [1998] Conv. 168 at 176. Nicholas Hopkins The 
Trusts ofLand andAppointment of Trustees Act 1996 op. cit., at 427 states that the corollary of both 
provisions is that a conveyance is invalidated by a purchaser's actual notice. 
1182 [1998] Conv. 168 op. cit., at 187. 
883 See Ferris and Battersby (2003) 119 L. Q. R. 94 op. cit., at 118-119. 
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favouring of them is also explicable in the light of the whole package of reform 
contained in the 1996 Act. 
Meaning and effect of 'invalidate the conveyance'9 
Invalidity in law? 
The main protagonist of the view that a purported conveyance has no effect, which is 
synonymous with the conveyance being void, is Hopkins, who regards this stance as 
self-evident, with the effect that he does not offer concrete substantiation for his 
view. 884 Hopkins' analogy of section 18 of the Settled Land Act 1925 885 is not wholly 
convincing, since section 18 is better drafted than section 16 of the 1996 Act, since it 
is unambiguous, because it states the consequences clearly by stating that the 
disposition will be void except for the purpose of conveying or creating equitable 
interests. 
By way of contrast Ferris and Battersby's view is that section 16(2) and (3)(b) cannot 
refer to any invalidity in law, since trustees of land have the legal estate vested in 
them and therefore the ability to convey that estate without recourse to the authority 
bestowed by section 6.886 Ferris and Battersby reject887 on a number of questionable 
grounds the interpretation advanced by Hopkins 888 that a purported conveyance will 
not convey the legal title if the purchaser knows of the breach. 889 First, they argue that 
one of the grounds for adopting a different interpretation is the first class enumerated 
by Kekewich J. in Churcher v. Martin 890 1 the sense of the language used'. In their 
view, since section 16 is headed 'Protection of purchasers', if section 16 can have the 
'" The Trusts ofLand and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 op. cit., p. 427. 
115 Section 18(l)(a) provides that 'any disposition by the tenant for life or statutory owner of the land, 
other than a disposition authorised by this Act or any other statute ........ shall be void, except for the 
purpose of conveying or creating such equitable interests as he has power, in right of his equitable 
interests and powers under the trust instrument, to convey or create'. 
886 [19981 Conv. 168 op. cit, at 176-177. 
887 (2003) 119 L. Q. R. 94 op. cit., at 110. 
888 The Trusts ofLand andAppointment of Trustees Act 1996 op. cit., at 427. Ferris and Battersby state 
(2003) 119 L. Q. R. 94 op. cit., at 109 footnote 47 that this construction also seems to be accepted by 
H. M. Land Registry Practice Leaflet No. 13 at para. E2.2, but an analysis of what is actually the 
Practice Advice Leaflet No. 13 reveals that it is general rather than specific and does not tackle the 
issue directly. 
889 Whitehouse and Hassall op. cit., para. 2.167 agree with the view of Ferris and Battersby and state 
that the limitations considered in section 16(2) and (3) must refer to invalidity in equity given that, as 
the legal estate is vested in the trustees, they have the power to convey it. 890 (1889) 42 Ch. D. 312 at 317. 
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effect of rendering a conveyance invalid at law, then in this respect it is not protective 
of purchasers. This argument is not convincing, since section 16 can indeed be 
construed as protective of purchasers, because section 16(2) and (3) are drafted in 
such a way that spell out when the contravention does not invalidate the conveyance, 
thus protecting purchasers in such specified circumstances but not otherwise. 
Secondly, they maintain that the third class of Kekewich J. 's analysis, which is the 
strict meaning being inconsistent with some other principle which there is no intention 
to disturb, can be invoked due to the damage Hopkin's interpretation would inflict on 
long established legal principle. It is here that Ferris and Battersby find themselves in 
troubled water. They assert that no breach of sections 6(6), 6(8), 8(l) or 8(2) can 
affect the ability of trustees to dispose of their legal estate, which is inherent in them 
as legal owners, and any construction that gives provisions of section 16 invalidating 
effects in law would be a reading of the section which offends against this very long 
established principle. This argument is unsustainable, because breach of those 
sections does not remove the inherent ability to dispose of the legal estate; this 
remains intact. Rather a breach imposes a subsequent, superimposed inability in the 
circumstances set out in section 16(2) and (3). 
Lastly, Ferris and Battersby assert that the invalidity is restricted to invalidity in 
equity, because the operative protective parts of section 16(2) and (3) restrict the 
operation of the doctrine of notice. Ferris and Battersby are here confusing two 
separate issues. The reference to notice in sections 16(2)(b) and 16(3)(b) is not 
determinative of the issue whether the conveyance is invalid in law or equity. It is to 
put the cart before the horse to maintain otherwise. Their argument cannot be justified 
when the authority which they cite, 891 Bowes v. East London Water Works 
Company, 892 is scrutinised. It is unfortunate that Ferris and Battersby do not analyse 
Bowes at all but state merely, 893 'This construction reflects the analysis of trustee 5894 
powers by Lord Eldon in Bowes v. East London Water Works Company. ' Yet there is 
no analogy between section 16(2) and (3) and the Bowes case. Bowes did not concern 
891 (2003) 119 L. Q. R. 94 op. cit., at I 11. 892 (1820) Jacob 324 at 330. 
1193 (2003) 119 L. Q. R. 94 op. cit., at I 11. "94 Presumably a misprint for 'trustees". 
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a statutory provision but a limitation upon the power of leasing by the trustees which 
was breached. Lord Eldon's reasoning is clearly limited to the facts of the case before 
him and was substantially that, 'The decree declares the leases to be void; by which, I 
presume, it is to be understood that they were to be void in equity; for the lessors 
having the leg al estate, the power did not restrain their faculty of dealing with it at 
895 law'. This has no bearing upon the construction of section 16(2) and (3). 
Invalidity in equity? 
The second possible construction is that invalidity means equitable invalidity, which 
has been advocated by Ferris and Battersby. 896 Whitehouse and Hassall agree with the 
view of Ferris and Battersby and state that the limitations considered in section 16(2) 
and (3) must refer to invalidity in equity given that, as the legal estate is vested in the 
trustees, they have the power to convey it. 897 The merit of this view is that it has the 
effect of rendering the subsection protective of purchasers and thus harmonises with 
the heading to the section 'protection of purchasers'. 
However, Ferris and Battersby's argument, that breach of sections 8(l), 8(2), 6(6) and 
6(8) renders the conveyance void in equity deriving from an ultra vires breach of trust 
and incapable of overreaching any equitable interest, is problematic, because where a 
purchaser has actual notice of the limitation in the case of a breach of section 8(l), the 
legal estate will not pass, whereas it will pass in cases of a breach of section 8(2) or 
sections 6(6) and 6(8) but subject to equitable interests under the trust. They maintain 
that this effect of a breach of sections 6(6), 6(8), 8(l) and 8(2) on the operation of 
section 2 of the Law of Property Act 1925 in turn is consonant with their construction 
of invalidity in section 16. A closer analysis, however, reveals that this analysis is in 
fact circular, using their conclusion to justify their proposition, which they have not 
proved. 
No foundation for Ferris and Battersby's arguments is to be found in the Law 
Commission Report which did not envisage conveyances being invalidated at all, 
... Op. cit., at 330. 8"6 (2003) 119 L. Q. R. 94 op. cit., at I 11. 
897 op. cit., para. 2.167. 
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since it merely states that, 'there will be no derogation from the principle that a 
purchaser should not be required to examine a trust instrument to determine the 
validity of a conveyance. Therefore, we recommend that purchasers should not be 
affected by an express limitation of the trustees' powers unless they have notice of 
that limitation. 898 There is, however, no indication of the effect of notice of that 
limitation. There is no precursor for section 16(2) in the draft Bill annexed to the Law 
Commission Report, 899 but section 16(3)(b) had an earlier incarnation as the proposed 
section 28A(2)(b) of the Law of Property Act as incorporated by clause 4 of the draft 
Bill. This stated that, 'Where land subject to a trust is not so registered- (a) a 
purchaser of the land is entitled to assume that the powers of the trustees are not 
limited by virtue of section 28(10) of this Act unless he has actual notice to the 
contrary; and (b) in favour of a purchaser without such notice such a limitation shall 
not invalidate any exercise of those powers. ' It is notable that this provision speaks in 
terms of invalidating powers and not conveyances. 
Incapable of overreaching the equitable interests under the trust? 
The third possible construction is the least plausible. It is that 'invalid' might be taken 
as synonymous with 'incapable of overreaching the equitable interests under the trust' 
with the result that section 16 contains an implied reference to section 2 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925.900 On this basis section 16(2) and (3) allows section 2 of the Law 
of Property Act to operate unless a purchaser has actual notice of a breach of section 
16(2) and (3). This construction is flawed, because it treats the protection offered by 
these subsections as wholly effected by the operation of section 2 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925. Ferris and Battersby draw support for this construction from 
clause 4 of the draft Bill attached to the Law Commission Report, the proposed 
section 28A(2)(b) of the Law of Property Act, which would have provided that, 'in 
favour of a purchaser without such notice such a limitation shall not invalidate any 
exercise of those powers. ' 
"98 Law Com. No. 181 para. 10.10. 
'99 See Ferris and Battersby (2003) 119 L. Q. R. 94 op. cit., at III footnote 52. 
900 Ibid., p. 113-114. 
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It is unfortunate that no explanation was offered by the House of Lords or by the 
Notes on Clauses as to why 'invalidity' was applied to the conveyance and why the 
essential link between the statutory intention and the powers of the trustees was 
obscured. Contrary to the view of Ferris and Battersby, it is too far-fetched and 
somewhat dubious to treat invalidity as tied to the potential operation of section 2 of 
the Law of Property Act 1925 in order to reunite the statutory protection with the 
authority of the trustees to act, as was originally intended. 901 Ferris and Battersby 
reject the first interpretation and prefer the third interpretation to the second for 
reasons which remain questionable. 
Retrograde step in insertion of concept of actual notice? 
Introduction of the concept of actual notice in section 16(2), (3) and (5) into land law 
is inevitably a regressive measure. 902 Unfortunately neither the Law Commission 
Report 903 nor the Notes on Clauses904 nor the draft Bill attached to the Law 
Commission Report905 throw any light on the interpretation of actual notice. Actual 
notice is the simple case where the purchaser subjectively knew of the equitable 
interest. 906 Ferris and Battersby suggeSt907 that 'actual notice' should be distinguished 
from 'knowledge'908 and 'actual knowledge'. 909 This is unobjectionable, since 
although knowledge is absolutely necessary with regard to actual notice, 910 notice and 
knowledge are not synonymous. 911 
901 Ibid., p. 114. 
902 See Ferris and Battersby [19981 Conv. 168 op. cit., at 177. 
903 Law Com. No. 181 para. 10.10. 
904 Op. cit., paras. 163 and 164. 
905 Clause 4(2). 
906 Hanbury and Martin op. cit., p. 36. 
907 [1998] Conv. 168 op. cit., at 177. 
908 Knowledge of the type required to establish liability for 'knowing receipt': see Re Montagil's 
Settlement Trusts. Cases exploring knowledge have produced reasoning which is far from simple or 
free from difficulty. See Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v. Cradock (No. 3) [1968] 1 W. L. R. 1555, 
Karak Rubber Co. Ltd v. Burden (No. 2) [1972] 1 W. L. R. 602, Carl Zeiss Sliflung v. Herbert Smith and 
Co. (No. 2) [196912 Ch. 276, Belmont Finance Corporation v. Williams Furniture Ltd (No. 1) [ 1979] 
Ch. 250, Baden v. Socijtj Ginirale, Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v. Tan [ 1995] 2 A. C. 378: Ferris 
and Battersby [1998] Conv. 168 op. cit., at 177 footnote 25. 
" As used in sections 24 and 25 of the Law of Property Act 1969. Ferris and Battersby argue [ 1998] 
Conv. 168 op. cit., at p. 178 footnote 27 that the provisions of sections 24(4) and 25(l 1) suggest that 
the expression primajacie excludes imputed notice. 
910 See Underhill and Hayton op. cit., at p. 988-989. The exception is where registration under the Land 
Charges Act 1972 is deemed to give persons actual notice. 
911 See Millett J. in Rignall Developments Ltd v. Halil op. cit., at 202 and Sir Robert Megarry V. -C. in 
Re Afontagu's Settlement Trusts op. cit., at 271-272,273 and 278. 
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The expression should be understood as including imputed actual notice of an agent, 
since it seems peculiar to exclude such notice in transactions in which a professional 
agent will be interposed between the trustees and the purchaser. Actual notice of an 
agent must surely be treated the same as the actual notice of the principal. Ferris and 
Battersby maintain that actual notice including imputed notice is a reading well 
supported by judicial authority. 912 Yet the authorities cited by Ferris and Battersby do 
not axiomatically support this proposition. Lord Chelmsford L. C. in Espin v. 
Pemberton 913 in unnecessarily blurring the categories of constructive and actual notice 
was not required to interpret the term actual notice and it was not necessary to the 
decision to find actual notice. His statement is obiter and is not even cited in full. 
Ferris and Battersby omit quoting the end of the paragraph where Lord Chelmsford 
L. C. admits that, 'if it is necessary to make a distinction between the knowledge 
which a person possesses himself, and that which is known to his agent, the later 
might be called imputed knowledge. 914 Thus Espin v. Pemberton cannot be relied 
upon as support for their proposition. 
Ferris and Battersby also rely on the ratio decidendi in Rolland v. Hart, 915 a case 
which concerned priority between two mortgagees where Lord Hatherley L. C. 
stated, 916 'Then the only question is, what is actual notice? It has been held over and 
over again that notice to and about a matter as to which it is part of his duty to inform 
himself, is actual notice to the client. ' A number of problems arise from this. First, 
there is no duty in section 16 on a purchaser to inform himself of the matters 
considered in section 16(2), (3) and (5). 
Secondly, it is unfortunate that Lord Hatherley L. C. does not state specifically upon 
which cases he is relying. Counsel for the first mortgagee stated in argument that, 
912 [19981 Conv. 168 op. cil., at 178. 
913 (1859) 3 G. & J. 547 at 554 where he stated that, 'The notice, which a client is supposed to receive 
through his solicitor, is generally treated as constructive notice. I think it would tend very much to 
clearness in these cases if it were classed under the head of actual notice. ' This is unwarranted 
confusion of terminology, since this is not generally considered as constructive notice. Ferris and 
Battersby themselves readily admit [ 1998] Conv. 168 op. cit., at 178 footnote 28 that constructive 
notice is excluded from actual notice. 9: 4 0. P cit., at 554. 
95 (1871) 6 Ch. App. 678 at 681-682 and 684. 
916 ]bid., at 681-682. 
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'This case is governed by Le Neve v. Le Neve', 917 which involved priority between 
two wives. Yet the ralio decidendi of Lord Hardwicke L. C. in Le Neve v. Le Neve was 
that 'the taking of a legal estate after notice of a prior right, makes a person a male 
fide purchaser this is a species of fraud'918 which is inapplicable to section 16. 
Lord Hardwicke L. C. expressed most illuminatingly . ..... who ought to suffer, the 
person intrusting an agent, or a stranger who did not employ him? He certainly who 
trusts most ought to suffer most. 919 In section 16 it is not intended that the purchaser 
should suffer the most. In Rolland v. Hart Lord Hatherley L. C. concluded, if 
actual notice is proved, then a man cannot take advantage of his registration to 
invalidate a previous unregistered security. ' Thirdly, it is notable that Lord Hatherley 
L. C. was construing notice in the context of case law and not actual notice in a 
legislative provision. Section 16 is headed 'Protection of purchasers' and if actual 
notice in section 16 is extended to include imputed notice, this will dramatically 
weaken the protection for purchasers, which was not the purpose of these provisions. 
A far better justification for the argument that actual notice must include imputed 
notice is to avoid a construction which will avoid absurdity as in Abbey National 
Building Society v. Cann. 920 It would be absurd for trustees to communicate with the 
purchaser directly and unduly onerous for section 16 to impose a requirement as part 
of the conveyancing procedure that the purchaser's solicitor furnish to the vendor's 
solicitor signed confirmation from the purchaser that he has received notice of certain 
matters. It is right that constructive notice is excluded, but a solicitor must be 
estopped from denying that he has actual notice if he does not read a particular 
document and there must be actual notice of every document which a solicitor 
receives. In addition blind eye knowledge in this context should be equated with 
actual notice. 921 
917 (1748) 3 Atk. 646. 
918 Ibid, at 654. 
919 Ibid., at 655. 
920 See Lord Bridge op. cit., at 75-76 discussing conveyancing absurdities under section 70(l)(g) of the 
Land Registration Act 1925 and the necessity to avoid such conveyancing absurdities in construing the 
statutory provision. This problem has now been avoided by the Land Registration Act 2002. 
921 See Manifest Shipping Co. Lid v. Uni-Polaris Shipping Co. Ltd. 
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There is no consequence of failure by the trustees in section 16(3) to take reasonable 
steps to tell a purchaser that their powers are limited, other than breach of trust, which 
will be applicable in any event. The 1996 Act gives no guidance as to what constitutes 
reasonable steps in this context. 922 The duty is to take reasonable steps rather than 
absolute ones. But in a simple case of limitations in the trust disposition, reasonable 
steps would surely consist of sending a copy of them to the purchaser or his solicitors 
if he was represented. 923 Emmet and Farrand on Title states that section 16(3) may be 
thought to be a disincentive to investigation of title. 924 Hopkins highlights reference to 
notice of the 'limitation' rather than 'contravention', which places the onus on a 
purchaser who does have actual notice of a limitation to ensure that it has been 
complied with. 925 A conveyance is not invalidated where a purchaser has no actual 
notice of the limitation, but this is inconceivable if the trustees comply with section 
16(3)(a) and inform the purchaser of the limitation. What is most significant about 
section 16(3) is that a purchaser is bound to have notice, because section 8(l) 
provides that provision must be in the disposition. This raises question marks over the 
significance of section 16(3)(a), which should be rendered otiose within the statutory 
framework. 
Does section 16 overrule Flegg in relation to registered land? 
Ferris and Battersby's arguments 
Section 16(7) states that, 'This section does not apply to registered land. ' Ferris and 
Battersby argue, inter alia, that the 1996 Act has overruled City ofLondon Building 
Society v. Flegg in respect of registered land. 926 Their argument is that any ultra vires 
disposition by trustees will not overreach beneficial interests; 927 one result of section 6 
of the 1996 Act is that a disposition in breach of trust is not within the trustees' 
922 MacKenzie, Walker and Walton op. cit., p. 71-72. 
923 Barraclough and Matthews op. cit., para. 10.3. 
9240 
. 92 
P cit., R. 40 para. 22.037. 
-' The Trusts ofLand andAppoinimeni of Trustees, 4cl 1996 op. cit., at 427. 
926 [ 19981 Conv. 168ff op. cit. An analogous argument was advanced on different grounds by Sydney 
M. Clayton Void Mortgages? [ 198 1] Conv. 19: see Thompson Modern Land Law op. cit., p. 250. 
927 This view was argued by Charles Harpum in Overreaching, Trustees'Powers and the Reform ofthe 
1925 Legislation op. cit., p. 294. Peter Gibson L. J. in State Bank ofIndia v. Sood op. cit., at 281 
expressly based his judgment on the arguments advanced by Harpurn when he stated that, 'Mr. Harpum 
...... argued cogently that a transaction made by a person within the dispositive powers conferred upon him will overreach equitable interests in the property the subject of the disposition, but ultra vires 
dispositions will not, and the transferee with notice will take the property subject to those interests. ' In 
the Sood case itself it was accepted at 286 that the disposition was intra vires. 
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authority 928 and therefore will not overreach the beneficial interests; some provisions 
in section 16 of the 1996 Act protect a purchaser in good faith of unregistered land 
from that invalidating effect; there is no valid reason to suppose that overreaching 
does, or should, operate in relation to registered land in any way differently from its 
operation in relation to unregistered land; 929 similar provisions are required to protect 
a purchaser of registered land from invalidity if divergence between the two 
conveyancing systems is to be avoided; the effect of section 16 excluding the 
protective provisions from application to a purchaser of registered land is to bring 
about a reversal, in relation to registered land, of City ofLondon Building Society v. 
Flegg and thus the Act creates an unwelcome divergence between the two systems. 
Ferris and Battersby argue that if the statutory mechanism of overreaching respects 
the distinction between intra vires and ultra vires dispositions, then section 16(2) and 
section 16(3)(b) were enacted to protect purchasers of unregistered land from the 
danger of ultra vires dispositions created by sections 6 and 8.930 It follows then, they 
state, that where there is a disposition in registered land, which contravenes sections 
6(6) or 6(8) or a limitation imposed pursuant to section 8, it will not overreach the 
interests of beneficiaries under a trust of land. Their argument is that the mortgage 
granted to the City of London Building Society would have been ultra vires as a 
breach of section 6(6) if it had been granted after 1997. Therefore overreaching would 
not have occurred and Mr and Mrs Flegg would have had a subsisting interest in the 
land at the time the mortgage was granted. 
Why Ferris and Ballersby's arguments are problematic 
Ferris and Battersby are wrong that the 1996 Act is a statutory reversal of the House 
of Lords decision in Flegg. 93 1 The Law Commission did not intend that the 1996 Act 
was to affect overreaching. 932 The Law Commission stated that, 'The overreaching 
928 They state [ 1998] Conv. 168 op. cit., at 175 that after 1996 the expression ultra vires indicates a 
disposition in breach of section 6(5), (6) or (8). 
929 See Ferris and Battersby ibid., at 179-184 for their three approaches to the question of why 
registered land is excluded from the provisions of section 16. 
9'0 Ibid., at 185. 
931 Ibid., at 186. If the conclusion of Ferris and Battersby were to be intended, then such a change in the 
law would be signposted in a rather less cryptic way than this: see Thompson Modern Land LMv op. 
cit., p. 210. 
932 See Nigel Jones and P. J. Kirby Are trustees at risk? (2000) 22 T. & E. L. J. 16 at 17. 
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mechanism will operate much as it currently does in relation to trusts for sale'. 933 The 
Lord Advocate, introducing the Bill on Second Reading in the House of Lords, made 
it clear that overreaching was to continue to apply when he stated '934 'Existing 
protection for purchasers of land subject to a trust by way of the overreaching 
machinery is to be maintained ....... The only proposal 
in the Law Commission's 
Report on overreaching which was introduced by the 1996 Act to include bare trusts 
within the statutory scheme, 935 had the effect of extending overreaching rather than 
restricting it. 936 It would seem very unlikely that a court could be persuaded that the 
1996 Act has severely restricted the statutory mechanism of overreaching and there is 
great temptation in agreeing with the conclusion of Jones and Kirby that overreaching 
appears to have survived the 1996 Act unscathed. 937 
In Birmingham Midshires Mortgage Services v. Sabherwal Robert Walker L. J. 
considered that, 'The principal issue before the judge was whether the decision of the 
House of Lords in City ofLondon Building Society v. Flegg [1988] A. C. 54 has been 
displaced by the enactment of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 
1996 ("the 1996 Act"). The trial judge, Mr Recorder Isaacs Q. C., sitting at the Central 
London County Court, had no hesitation in rejecting that argument. 938 Robert Walker 
L. J. did not interfere with this conclusion and indeed concluded himself, 'In this type 
of family situation, the concepts of trust and equitable estoppel are almost 
interchangeable, and both are affected in the same way by the statutory mechanism of 
overreaching, the substance of which is not affected by the 1996 Act. 939 Robert 
Walker L. J. felt some unease about the decision reached by the court quoting from 
Peter Gibson L. J. in Sood940 referring to the Law Commission's Report No. 188 '941 
933 Law Com. No. 181 para. 6.2. See also paras. 6.1 and 20.2. 
934 H. L. Debs., Vol. 569, col. 1718. 
935 See Law Com. No. 188 Transfer ofLand Overreaching: Beneficiaries in Occupation (1989) paras. 
4.27 and 5.4. 
936 Ferris and Battersby (2003) 119 L. Q. R. 94 op. cit., at 125 are unduly pessimistic as to the extent the 
court can take into account Law Commission Reports relying on the restrictive approach of the 
majority of the House of Lords in Black-Clawson International Lid v. Papierwerke Waldhof- 
Aschaffenburg A. G. [ 1975] A. C. 59 1. This, however, fails to take into account the broader views 
expressed in Pepper v. Hart: see Cross op. cit., p. 160-16 1. 
"I op. cil., p. 18. 938 op. cit., para. 1. 939 Op. cit., para. 3 1. 
9'0 Op. cit., at 290. 941 Paras. 4.3 and 5.3. 
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which has not been implemented, which recommended that a conveyance should not 
overreach the interest of a suijuris beneficiary of full age who was in occupation of 
land unless he gave his consent. 942 
Dixon regrets that Robert Walker's judgment is not quite a ringing endorsement of the 
continued validity of overreaching in registered land. 943 Since the Birmingham 
Midshires' mortgage was executed in 1990 and its overreaching effect could not 
possibly be compromised by the 1996 Act, his view is that this leaves the 
Ferris/Battersby analysis unscathed. 944 Dixon argues that the Ferris/Battersby analysis 
may be unsustainable. 945 Even though the effect of the 1996 Act is to restrict the 
powers of trustees of land more than was previously the case, this does not necessarily 
mean that dispositions contravening these new limitations are ultra vires in the sense 
of compromising the title of a registered proprietor who has relied on overreaching. 
Dixon is correct that the mechanism for ensuring that trustees of registered land do 
have proper regard for the beneficiaries is to enter a restriction on the register and not 
to resort to an expanded ultra vires doctrine. 946 It is not inconsistent for the 1996 Act 
to increase the circumstances in which trustees may be liable for breach of trust. 
Ferris and Battersby's arguments derive from a flawed premise, because there is no 
necessary correlation between trustee actions in breach of trust and actions which are 
ultra vires in the sense of destroying the overreaching effect of a registered 
disposition by two or more trustees of land. 947 
942 See Harpum Overreaching, Trusts ofLand and Proprietary Estoppel op. cit., at 345-346. 
943 Martin Dixon Overreaching and the Trusts ofLand andAppointment of Trustees Act 1996 [20001 
Conv. 267 at 271-2. 
944 Dixon is more positive in Trusts ofland, overreaching and estoppel (2000) 30 S. L. R. 64 when he 
states that, 'this case provides strong evidence that two-trustee overreaching in registered land remains 
intact after TOLATA in the same circumstances as prior its entry into force. ' Harpum also takes a more 
constructive view (2000) 116 L. Q. R. 341 op. cit., at 342. Harpum states that, 'There was in any event 
nothing in TLATA to exclude overreaching. Indeed sections 2(l)(ii) and 27(2) of the Law of Property 
Act 1925, which regulate overreaching by requiring the payment of any capital monies to at least two 
trustees, had been amended by TLATA. This was to reflect the changes in terminology from "trusts for 
sale" to "trusts of land" that had been made by the Act. ' 
945 Overreaching and the Trusts ofLand andAppointinent of Trustees Act 1996 op. cit., at 268. 
946 ibid., at 269 footnote 12. 
947 See Dixon ibid., at 273. 
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In addition Ferris and Battersby's argument cannot be substantiated when they 
maintain 948 that the situation is different with respect to a breach of trust that 
constitutes a breach of section 9 of the 1996 Act or a breach of a provision made by 
the settlor that the consent of three people is required before a disposition is made. 
They argue that they are primafacie capable of precluding overreaching, but a 
purchaser of registered land is able to shelter behind the same protective provisions as 
a purchaser of unregistered land. The only reasoning they offer is section 9(2) and 
section I 0(l). These subsections do not constitute justification for this argument, 
since these subsections provide an element of protection for third parties and are 
independent of the overreaching provisions. One can perhaps assume that their 
thinking was influenced by the fact that sections 9 and 10 are not covered by section 
16 and they are seeking justification for this omission. The better position, which is 
the traditional, orthodox approach, is that a breach of any of these provisions does not 
prevent overreaching from occurring. 
Which breaches of trust are ultra vires? 
Ferris and Battersby's arguments necessitate a close examination of what constitutes 
ultra vires breaches of trust. A transaction made by a person within the dispositive 
powers conferred upon him will overreach equitable interests in that property, but 
ultra vires dispositions will not. 949 Section 2 of the 1925 Act does not detract from the 
fundamental principle that only intra vires dispositions can overreach. 950 It is in 
Harpum's view a misconception that overreaching will take place whenever the 
trustees for sale make any disposition, whether ultra vires or not. 951 Contrary to 
Harpurn's analysis, the Law Commission, prior to Harpum's time at the Law 
Commission, considered that an ultra vires disposition could overreach beneficial 
interests. 952 The problem with the Law Commission's argument is that it is 
questionable whether the Law Commission realised the full implications and 
948 Graham Ferris and Graham Battersby Overreaching and the Trusts ofLand andAppointinent of 
Trustees Act 1996- A Reply to Mr Dixon [200 11 Conv. 221 at 226. 
949 Harpum Overreaching, Trustees'Powers andthe Reform ofthe 1925 Legislation op. cit., at 279ff. 
950 Harpum ibid., at 294. 
9-" Ibid., at 279. 
952 Law Commission Working Paper No. 106 Trusts ofLand Overreaching (1988) paras. 1.1 and 4.6 
footnote 10 relying partly on section 17 of the Trustee Act 1925 and on Flegg. Charles Harpum was a 
Law Commissioner from 1994 to 2001. This assertion was not, however, repeated in Law Com. No. 
188 in 1989. 
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repercussions of their statement. Contrary to the view expressed by the Law 
Commission, Flegg does not decide that an uIlra vires disposition by trustees for sale 
can overreach. The case was quite expressly decided on the basis that the mortgage 
was one which was within the powers conferred upon the trustees by section 28 of the 
Law of Property Act 1925.953 
It is necessary to examine the issue whether breaches of the relevant sections are ultra 
vires or not. The view expressed here is that breaches of section 6(5), 6(6), 6(8), 7(3), 
8(2) and II (I) do not render a conveyance ultra vires. Only a breach of section 8(l) 
will have that effect, because it is only under section 8(l) that the trustees will have 
no powers of disposition if these have been excluded. An analogy can be drawn with 
the exercise of a mortgagee's powers, which have not arisen under section 10 1 of the 
Law of Property Act 1925 and would be ultra vires, and an exercise of mortgagee's 
powers, which have arisen but are not exercisable under section 103 of the 1925 Act 
and would be intra vires but a breach of trust. 954 
Section 6(5) 
Ferris and Battersby change their mind as to the effect of a breach of section 6(5)955 
and have now sensibly come to the conclusion that a breach of section 6(5) may not 
render a conveyance ultra vires for a number of reasons which may not be the right 
reasons. 956 First, they state that the statutory words 'In exercising the powers 
conferred by this section' are not an entirely satisfactory form of expression, since it 
is surely at the stage of considering whether, and if so how, to exercise their powers 
that trustees are bound to 'have regard to the rights of the beneficiaries'. Their 
reasoning is that although a breach of section 6(5) would not be complete until after a 
953 Nor does Flegg decide that section 17 of the Trustee Act 1925 can be relied upon by a purchaser to 
escape liability if it transpires that the sale or mortgage was ultra vires. It only shields him if more 
money were raised on the security of the mortgage than was required. Ferris and Battersby argue 
[2001] Conv. 221 op. cit., at 222 that Harpum Overreaching, Trustees'Powers and the Reform ofthe 
1925 Legislation op. cit., at 309 was wrong to state that Flegg was decided per incuriam in failing to 
rely on section 18 of the Land Registration Act 1925. Their view is that Flegg was correct in refusing 
to section 18 a crucial role in the operation of overreaching. 
954 See Gray and Gray op. cit., p. 1427-1429 and Megarry and Wade op. cit., paras. 19-057-19-059. 
955 Ferris and Battersby had previously taken the view that the mandatory words of section 6(5) led 
them to suppose that a disposition in breach of section 6(5) was not a disposition undertaken by trustees 
of land 'for the purposes of exercising their functions as trustees' and was, therefore, not authorised by 
section 6(l): [19981 Conv. 168 op. cit., at 173-175 and [2001] Conv. 221 op. cit., at 223 and 225. 
956 (2003) 119 L. Q. R. 94 op. cit., at 10 1- 102. 
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disposition had been made in disregard of the rights of the beneficiaries, compliance 
with section 6(5) would have to occur prior to any disposition. This reasoning is 
defective, because compliance must occur not only prior to the disposition, but 
additionally at the time of the disposition whilst trustees are exercising their powers, 
since this is made mandatory by section 6(5). 
Secondly, they assert that section 6(5) seems to be concerned with regulating the 
decision-making of trustees of land and not with their authority to act. They recognise 
that before the passage of the 1996 Act, disregarding the rights of the beneficiaries 
would have left a conveyance intra vires. They acknowledge that there seems to be no 
clear legislative intention to change the law in this regard and conclude somewhat 
tentatively that, 'section 6(5) may not render a conveyance ultra vires. 957 Such 
tentative wording is overly cautious and unwarranted. Instead of stating that there is 
no clear legislative intention to deny the authority conferred by section 6(l) to trustees 
acting in breach of section 6(5), they should argue more forcefully that section 6(5) 
does not in any circumstances deny the authority conferred by section 6(l). 
Section 6(6), 6(8) and 6(9) 
Ferris and Batterbsy are wrong in their reasoning of and conclusion on section 6(6) 
that a breach renders a conveyance ultra vires. Their view is that a conveyance in 
breach of section 6(6) is not an exercise of the powers at all, since the language of 
section 6(6) is mandatory: the statutory powers 'shall not' be used in breach of section 
6 958 (6). They rationalise that section 6(l) grants the authority to make any type of 
disposition, but section 6(6) prevents the use of that extensive authority in breach of 
trust, thus limiting the operation of section 6(l). Their views are erroneous, because as 
a matter of construction, section 6(6) cannot remove the authority conferred by 
section 6(l). All that section 6(6) does is to render the trustees in breach of trust. This 
construction does not render section 6(l) ineffective contrary to their view and is 
consistent with the position prior to the 1996 Act being enacted. 
937 Mid., at 102. 
958 Ibid., at 102. 
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Ferris and Battersby admit that prior to the passage of the 1996 Act, section 2 of the 
Law of Property Act 1925 protected purchasers from being affected by the sort of 
misfeasance that many breaches of section 6(6) of the 1996 Act would entail. 959 Yet 
they offer no convincing rationale for the change which results in section 6(6) of the 
1996 Act drastically reducing the effective role of section 2 of the Law of Property 
Act 1925. First, they state that it is inconceivable that the courts would have read 
section 6(l) as giving trustees the right to act in ways that breached rules of law, 
equity or statute. This is not a cogent justification for their views, since it is not 
pertinent to the issue of intra or ultra vires. Secondly, they argue that there is no 
indication that beneficiaries' remedies against trustees are enhanced by section 6(6). 
This is extraneous to the issue at hand. Lastly, reading section 6(6) as restricted in its 
operation to the relationship between the trustees and the beneficiaries would render 
later provisions of the 1996 Act otiose and they refer specifically to section 16(2). Yet 
section 16(2) does not metamorphose a breach of section 6(6) or 6(8) into an ultra 
vires breach of trust. 
The view of Ferris and Battersby is that the statutory language of section 6(8) 
resembles that of section 8(2) and it seems likely that the same result is intended, so 
that a conveyance in breach of section 6(8) will not be an exercise of the section 6(l) 
powers and the trustees' acts are ultra vires. 960 This suffers from the same flawed 
reasoning as section 6(6), since section 6(6) and (8) do not take away with one hand 
what section 6(l) has given with the other. Their reasoning on section 6(9) is sound 
and should have been applied by them to section 6(6) and (8). They rationalise that 
that section 6(9) is directed at an intra vires use of the trustees' powers. They have no 
problem accepting that the words 'when exercising the powers conferred by this 
section' are clearly appropriate to an intra vires but wrongful use of those powers. 
It is possible that Ferris and Battersby adopt such a lenient view, because this has no 
bearing on section 16 of the 1996 Act. 
The only consoling factor from Ferris and Battersby's arguments is that construing 
section 6(6) as operating only when no other provision of the 1996 Act applies, 
959 Ibid., at 103. 
960 Ibid., at 103-104. 
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combined with a broad construction of sections 6(5) and 6(9), results in most 
dispositions made in breach of trust involving intra vires breaches of trust, which are 
capable of overreaching the interests of the beneficiaries of a trust of land. This 
premise avoids a thorough analysis of the complications inherent from the 
repercussions of their theory. It is likely to be erroneous because the wording in 
section 6(6) does not specify 'any other rule of law or equity'. 
Ferris and Battersby's alternative interpretation, which is the alanning one, is that 
section 6(5) is intended to reach only those actions of trustees of land that would 
otherwise not be breaches of section 6(6), so that compliance with section 6(6) must 
precede violation of section 6(5), which has the problematic effect of increasing the 
applicability and incidence of section 6(6). In their final analysis Ferris and Battersby 
are oversimplifying when they state that whereas a construction of sections 6(6) and 
6(9) are complementary, there are great difficulties in construing sections 6(5) and 
6(6) as being complementary, since sections 16(l) and 16(2) clearly distinguish 
between breaches of sections 6(5) and 6(6). On the basis that it is rejected that section 
6(6) renders breaches of trust ultra vires, it is perfectly legitimate to hold the view that 
section 6(5) and (6) may be complementary, with the scope of section 6(6) obviously 
being far wider than the scope of section 6(5). It is irrelevant that section 16(l) and 
(2) clearly distinguish between section 6(5) and (6), since section 16 is a self- 
contained provision and does not preclude overlap between section 6(5) and (6) where 
the circumstances arise. 
Section 11 
The reasoning of Ferris and Battersby on section 11 is resourceful and dexterous. 
They argue 961 that a breach of section 11962 is a breach which precludes overreaching. 
The reason which they give is that otherwise, the protective provisions in section 
16(l), (2) and (3) would be unnecessary. In a later article they promote a different line 
of reasoning, 963 that the word 'functions' in sections 6(l) and I1 (1) are not linked, 
since the word 'function' must carry different meanings in the two sections. In section 
961 [2001] Conv. 221 op. cit., at 225 footnote 26. 
962 They include a disposition made contrary to section 8(2) in this argument as well. 
963 (2003) 119 L. Q. R. 94 op. cit., at 106-107. 
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6(l) the reference to the trustees' functions cannot be a reference to their powers, 
since the functions must be logically prior to the powers granted. By contrast in 
section II (I) the trustees' functions are largely equated with the trustees' dispositive 
powers. They conclude that in the absence of any policy considerations, it might be 
concluded that the use of mandatory words in section I1 (1) suggests that an act done 
in breach of that statutory injunction should be considered an act that is not carried 
out by the trustees for the purpose of exercising their functions as trustees and 
therefore outside the powers granted by section 6(l) of the 1996 Act. 
Their reasoning is spurious for the following reasons. First, it is dubious to assert that 
sections 6(l) and I1 (1) are not linked. Any hairsplitting is unhelpful, since section 
11 (1) clearly derives from section 6(l) and relates back to it. Secondly, any breach of 
trust must inevitably be intra vires, since sensible policy considerations dictate that 
such a breach of trust must have the effect of overreaching equitable interests. The 
whole purpose of the legislation would be defeated if such a breach of trust was 
considered to be ultra vires and if a purchaser was not protected by a breach of 
section 11 (1). 964 Thirdly, their view is not consistent with the broad view taken in 
Notting Hill Housing Trust v. Brackle; 65 where the Court of Appeal, in examining 
the meaning of 'function' within section 11, did not circumscribe the definition with 
the reasoning advanced by Ferris and Battersby. 
Ferris and Battersby's rationale 
Ferris and Battersby approach the crux of the probleM966 when they assert that the 
shift from section 28 of the Law of Property Act 1925 to section 6 of the 1996 Act, 
which authorises any type of transaction, means that when section 6(l) of the 1996 
Act or section 8(3) of the Trustee Act 2000 applies, either ultra vires dispositions will 
no longer be possible or the expression ultra vires must take on a new meaning. One 
possible argument, which they do not accept, is that the extension of trustees' powers 
leaves all possible actions intra vires. Contrary to the view of Ferris and Battersby, 
964 Compare the view of Smith Property Lcnv op. cit., at 335-336 who states that ultra vires would be 
clear if the trustees have no power to enter into the transaction (as when the trust deed excludes 
powers) and probably applies to cases where a necessary consent has not been obtained. 
965 Op. cit., para. 15. 
966 (2003) 119 L. Q. R. 94 op. cit., at 97. 
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this is the most ideologically and conceptually appropriate analysis. Ferris and 
Battersby, however, prefer the VieW967 that section 6(l) of the 1996 Act and section 
8(3) of the 2000 Act do not stand alone. In their opinion subsections (5), (6) and (8) of 
section 6 of the 1996 Act all purport to impose limits upon trustees of land. They 
maintain that in the context of the present statutory scheme the term ultra vires takes 
on a new meaning: a conveyance is ultra vires when it is made in breach of a 
provision of the 1996 Act, breach of which prevents the general grant of powers by 
section 6(l) from applying. This argument is, however, defective, because it confuses 
the grant of a power with the misuse of a power. 
It is then unfortunate that Ferris and Battersby proceed to perform a vollejace and 
change direction without tackling the underlying issues and without answering the 
questions which their analysis poses, by arguing 968 that the real issue is not whether a 
conveyance is intra or ultra vires, but whether it is a conveyance that is capable of 
overreaching the equitable interests under the trust. 969 Ferris and Battersby are wrong 
that due to section 8(2), the trustees may not use their section 6(l) powers without 
first obtaining that consent. It is erroneous to state that a conveyance made without 
obtaining the requisite consent would be void in equity and incapable of overreaching 
equitable interests under the trust resulting in section 2 of the Law of Property Act 
1925 being unable to operate in favour of a purchaser. This is to misconstrue the 
interrelationship between section 8(2) and section 6. Section 8(2) does not remove the 
authority conferred by section 6(l); it results merely in a breach of trust and section 2 
will still operate in favour of a purchaser. Ferris and Battersby state 970 that the Law 
Commission Report971 lends support to this construction of section 8 which it 
identifies as the cause of a potential mischief which section 26 of the Land 
Registration Act 2002 is intended to overcome. 
967 Ibid., at 98. 968 Ibid., at 98-99. 
969 Tee Co-ownership and frusts op. cit., p. 149 states that the 1996 Act was not as radical as it might 
have been, because although it recognised that trusts for sale were anachronistic, it did not pursue the 
logic to the ultimate conclusion that overreaching also needed reform. 970 (2003) 119 L. Q. R. 94 op. cit., at 99 footnote 19. 971 Land Registrationfor the Twenty-First Century A Conveyancing Revolution Law Com. No. 271 
(200 1) para. 2.15 footnote 33 and paras. 4.10 and 4.11. 
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Paragraph 2.15 footnote 33 of the Law Commission Report, however, states the exact 
opposite of what Ferris and Battersby are maintaining and it is odd that they quote this 
footnote to support their proposition. It states that, 'If, for example, trustees sell land 
without obtaining the consent of a beneficiary that is required by the trust instrument, 
the transfer to the buyer will be unimpeachable. However, the trustees will remain 
liable for their breach of trust. ' Implicit within this is that overreaching will operate in 
such circumstances. In addition paragraphs 4.10 and 4.11 also recognise the validity 
of the disposition, although again not dealing explicitly with the issue of 
overreaching. The Law Commission in fact states, 'where the disposition is in fact 
unlawful, the consequences of that unlawfulness can be pursued so long as these do 
not call into question the validity of the disponee's title., 972 This is further tacit 
support for the proposition that overreaching will still operate. 
Position in registered land? 
Ferris and Baltersby's arguments 
Ferris and Battersby state 973 that the exclusion from registered land of section 16(l) 
may lead to the need for extensive and intrusive enquiries by purchasers, which would 
be unwelcome and inappropriate. However, the exclusion of section 16(2) and (3) and 
(1) in so far as it applies to breaches of section 6(5) can be explained by section 18 of 
the Land Registration Act 1925,974 'which has now been succeeded by section 23 of 
the Land Registration Act 2002. It would not explain the exclusion of section 16(5) 
nor would it be a sufficient explanation for the exclusion of section 16(l) in so far as 
it applies to breaches of section 6(5). 
Ferris and Battersby then proceed to undermine this argument 975 by arguing that the 
grant of powers to trustees qua trustees is not dealt with by section 18 of the Land 
Registration Act 1925, but by what is now section 6 of the 1996 Act, which leaves no 
explanation for the exclusion of section 16(2) and (3) and (1) in so far as it applies to 
breaches of section 6(5) from applying to registered land. Ferris and Battersby state 
thatjust as the exclusion of section 16(2) from operating to protect purchasers of 
972 Ibid., para. 4.11. 
973 [1999] Conv. 168 op. cil., at 187 footnote 66. 
974 Ibid., at 180 footnote 37. 975 Ibid., at 181-183. 
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registered land may render them vulnerable upon a breach of section 6(6) by their 
vendors, so may the exclusion of section 16(l) render such purchasers vulnerable 
upon a breach of section I1 (1) by their vendors. 976 The exclusion of section 16(2) and 
(3)(b) from registered land makes it necessary for purchasers to make enquiries of 
people in actu al occupation of registered land, even if the disposition is made by two 
trustees of land. 977 It will be necessary to ensure that the disposition is within the 
powers of the trustees (sections 6(8) and 8) and that the disposition is not being made 
in breach of section 6(6). 978 
If Ferris and Battersby are wrong and overreaching operates whenever any capital 
money is paid to two trustees, then section 16(2) is only operative when one trustee 
conveys the land, 979 which is not the situation envisaged by section 16(2). The 
exclusion of section 16(2) from registered land would then be necessary to preserve 
the authority of Williams and Glyn's Bank Ltd v. Boland. Ferris and Battersby 
comment that these difficulties are largely absent from the draft Bill contained in the 
Law Commission Report and the absence of any explanation for the departures from 
that original draft in the Bill introduced into the House of Lords leaves us with no 
guidance as to the intention behind these apparent anomalies . 
980 Ferris and Battersby 
regret that the dangerous divergence created in 1964 in the protection offered to 
purchasers of unregistered and registered land when the dangers were probably 
hidden from view, should have been apparent to the Parliamentary draftsman by 
1996.981 They lament that there was no interest group motivated by the anticipated 
damage to its interests that might follow from the passage of section 16.982 
976 Ibid., at 186 footnote 61. 
977 Gravells Land Law. Text and Materials op. cit., p. 336 highlights the effect of the disapplication of 
section 16 in relation to registered land if Ferris and Battersby's analysis is adopted. 
978 It is the wide ambit of section 6(6) which is likely to cause most problems, since it seems to prohibit 
any disposition in breach of trust. 
979 [1998] Conv. 168 op. cit., at 186 footnote 62. 
980 Ibid., at 187 footnote 66. 
9" Ibid., at 188 referring to the Law of Property (Joint Tenants) Act 1964. E. J. Cooke BenefiWal Joint 
Tenants and the Protection ofPurchasers: An Unsolved Problem [2004] 68 Conv. 41 suggested 
amendments to the Land Registration Act 2002 to resolve in relation to registered land the problem 
addressed by the 1964 Act in relation to unregistered land. 
982 They contrast this [19981 Conv. 168 op. cit., at 188 footnote 67 with the attention given to section 9, 
which Kenny and Kenny op. cit., p. 2 suggest was due to the potential threat posed by the original 
clause 9 to professional trustees. 
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ny Ferris and Battersby's arguments are problematic 
Where Ferris and Battersby go wrong is in assuming that, because section 16(7) 
excludes registered land from the operation of section 16, it necessarily follows that 
overreaching will not occur in the scenarios in section 16(2) and (3) where registered 
land is concerned, so that a purchaser of registered land does not benefit from the 
effects of section 16(2) and (3). The whole basis of registered land is different and 
section 16 is seeking to protect purchasers of unregistered land. In registered land the 
doctrine of notice is irrelevant, so subsections phrased in the terminology of notice are 
necessarily inapplicable to registered land. The purpose of section 16 is to absolve the 
purchaser from the need to investigate whether there has been a breach of trust in 
various circumstances where unregistered land is concerned. Where registered land is 
concerned, notice of a trust does not affect a purchaser of registered land 983 and 
equitable interests will have to be protected on the register by a restriction. 
In registered land it is clear that a disposition effected by a registered proprietor, even 
a sole trustee acting wrongfully and in breach of trust, is unchallengeable as a valid 
dealing with the legal title. The disponee whether by way of sale or mortgage charge 
must take a good title at law, since a 'statutory magic' operates in favour of the 
transferee or chargee. 984 No question was raised as to the validity as a legal 
transaction of the mortgage effected by a sole trustee in Boland. In Knightly v. Sun 
Life Assurance Society Ltd 985 Nourse J. expressly rejected the argument that the 
mortgage was invalid. A similar approach was adopted in relation to the transfer of an 
estate in fee simple in Chhokar v. Chhokar. 986 A disposition of the registered title by a 
987 bare trustee was effective at law in Hodgson v. Marks, even though the trustee was 
acting in breach of trust. Similarly, in cases of forgery a forged transfer to a bonafide 
purchaser was not disturbed and the victims of the forgery were compensated by 
payment of indemnity. 988 
983 Peffer v. Rigg has not survived the Land Registration Act 2002. 
9" See Gray and Gray op. cit., p. 917-918 who comment that this outcome reflects not only the plenary 
competence of the unrestricted registered proprietor under the scheme of the Land Registration Act 
1925, but also a cogent public policy in favour of the protection of innocent purchasers. 
985 (198 1) The Times, 23 July and LexisNexis p. 5-6. 
9'6 [1984] F. L. R. 313. 
987 [1971] Ch. 892. 
9's Compare, however, Argyle Building Society v. Hammond(1984) 49 P. & C. R. 148 discussed in 
NomIch and Peterborough Building Society v. Steed[1993] Ch. 116 at 123-124 and 136-138. See 
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The effect ofsection 26 ofthe Land Regish-ation Act 2002 
The problem of the dangerous divergence between unregistered and registered land 
has been addressed by modification of the law of registered land brought about by 
989 sections 26 and 52 of the Land Registration Act 2002. Section 26 confers on 
purchasers from trustees the protection denied to them by section 16 of the 1996 Act. 
Commentators are generally hailing the benefits of section 26 of the Land 
Registration Act 2002 as the solution to the furore created by Ferris and Battersby. 990 
Cooke comments that clause 26 is the Bill's vital opportunity to get rid of what has 
been called the 'Ferris and Battersby effect'. 991 She notes, 'Astonishingly, LC254 
made no mention of the problem, but the Bill is drafted with the intention of putting 
the matter beyond doubt. ' The Law Commission was right to ignore the views of 
Ferris and Battersby. 
This raises the issue of whether section 26 of the 2002 is in fact so different from the 
provisions of the Land Registration Act 1925.992 The 1925 Act did not contain an 
explicit provision which states like section 26 that, 'a person's right to exercise 
owner's powers .... is to be taken to be free from any limitation affecting the validity 
of the disposition'. The Law Commission considered993 that the correct principle was 
as stated by Peter Gibson L. J. in State Bank ofIndia v. Sood that, 'In registered 
conveyancing it is fundamental that any registered proprietor can exercise all or any 
powers of disposition unless some entry on the register exists to curtail or remove 
those powers. 994 Yet the Law Commission was uncertain as to whether this was the 
precise effect of the 1925 Act? 95 due to the decision in Hounslow London Borough 
Ruoffand Roper op. cit., R. 22 para. 40-13 discussing the notorious murderer, Haigh and see R. 24 para. 
46.029. (October 2003 update, R. 24, is by Robert B. Roper, Christopher West, Martin Dixon, David 
Fox, Stephen R. Coveney, Sarah Wheeler and Patrick Milne. ) 
989 See Ferris and Battersby (2003) 119 L. Q. R. 94 op. cit., at 95 and 119-124. They highlight at 125 the 
risk of purchasers of registered land falling into the lacunae created by section 16(7) of the 1996 Act 
between the coming into force of the 1996 Act and the coming into force of section 26 of the Land 
Registration Act 2002. 
990 For a detailed analysis of section 26, see Graham Ferris Making Sense ofSection 26 ofthe Land 
Registration Act 2002 in Modern Studies in Property Law Volume 2 edited by Elizabeth Cooke (2003) 
ch. 6. 
991 Elizabeth Cooke The Land Registration Bill 2001 [2002] Conv. II at 23. See also Elizabeth Cooke 
The New Law qfLand Registration (2003) p. 65-68. 992 Compare sections 20(l) and 59(6) of the Land Registration Act 1925. 993 Law Com. No. 271 para. 4.3. See also para. 2.15. 9940 
. -05. See also Gray and Gray op. cit., p. 916. 995 
P cit., at 284 citing Ritoffand Roper op. cit., para. 32 
Law Com. No. 271 paras. 2.15 and 4.3. 
242 
Council v. Hare, 996 which involved an ultra vires disposition of registered land by a 
charity. In Hare there was an attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to rectify the register 
against a buyer, where the disposition was one that by statute the seller had no power 
to make, but the register was silent as to this fact. 
If, however, the position was as stated in Sood, then the protection provided by 
section 16 was in any event unnecessary in the case of registered land, because any 
restrictions on the rights of the trustees to deal with the land had to be entered on the 
register of title. 997 The implication from section 94(4) of the Land Registration Act 
1925, which was a new provision inserted by the 1996 Act, 998 was that unless the 
beneficial rights were protected by the entry of a restriction, the purchaser would not 
be concerned with them. Whether this was the effect of the law prior to its enactment 
in any event, remains debateable. 999 
Conclusion 
Despite the heading of section 16 of protection of purchasers, section 16 is less 
favourable to purchasers than the previous law governing purchasers of land held on 
trust for sale, since under that law there was nothing to invalidate the conveyance and 
overreaching protected a purchaser, notwithstanding knowledge that the property was 
being misapplied. ' 000 Thus reforrns to section 16 are desirable to further the protection 
of purchasers and comply with the broad underlying purpose of section 16. The 
996 (1990) 24 H. L. R. 9. The effect of non-compliance with section 29(l) of the Charities Act 1960 was 
that the grant of the lease to Miss Hare was void, but she had acquired legal title by virtue of the 
4statutory magic' of section 69(l) of the Land Registration Act 1925: see Knox J. at 23. Knox J. C, 
refused to rectify the register under section 82(3). See Jill Martin Casenotes Editor's Notes [1993] 
Conv. 224. 
997 See Thompson Modern Land Lcnv op. cit., p. 25 1. 
998 It was inserted by Schedule 3 paragraph 5(8)(c) of the 1996 Act. It did not appear in the Law 
Commission's original draft Bill and does not appear to have been discussed or even referred to in the 
Parliamentary debates on the Bill: see Barraclough and Matthews op. cit., para. 10.5. Section 94(4) 
provides that, 'There shall also be entered on the register such restrictions as may be prescribed, or may 
be expedient, for the protection of the rights of the persons beneficially interested in the land. ' 
999 Hopkins The Trusts oftand andAppointment of Trustees Act 1996 op. cit., at 428 questions the 
breadth of the provision of section 94(4). He notes that nothing provides that a purchaser of registered 
land is not concerned with whether the trustees have consulted the beneficiaries. Hopkins is being 
idealistic in stating that it therefore seems arguable that the beneficiaries' right to be consulted should 
be protected by entry of a restriction, even though this would be a substantive difference from 
unregistered land. This highlights what may be regarded as an omission or oversight in the 1996 Act in 
not being as comprehensive as section 26(3) of the Law of Property Act 1925, which applied to both 
registered and unregistered land. 
1000 See Hopkins ibid., at 427. 
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consequences of enacting section 16(l), (2) and (3) in particular have not been 
thought through and embody ideologically, as well as functionally, inconsistent and 
unsound principles. The whole purpose of the 1996 Act was to grant wider powers to 
trustees and not to compensate by creating different problems in so doing. 
In addition to amending section 16(l), if the refonn recommended to omit section 
6(6) and (8) from future legislation is adopted, then section 16(2) should be repealed. 
If section 6(6) and (8) remain, then section 16(2) should be amended to adopt positive 
wording, so that section 16(2)(a) remains the same, but (b) would state '(b) the 
purchaser of the land has actual or imputed notice of the contravention, the 
contravention invalidates the conveyance in equity only. ' Section 16(3) should be 
amended so that (a) reads '(a) where trustees who convey land which is subject to the 
trust contravene section 8(l), the conveyance will be void both at law and in equity', 
and (b) reads '(b) where trustees who convey land which is subject to the trust 
contravene section 8(2), the contravention invalidates the conveyance in equity only. ' 
Reference in section 16(3) to trustees taking all reasonable steps to bring the 
limitation to the notice of any purchaser and to actual notice of the limitation can be 
removed due to the fact that a purchaser will have notice of breaches of section 8(l) 
and (2), since the limitation must be in the disposition. Such reforms would ensure 
that conveyancing efficiency would remain paramount. 
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CHAPTER 11- CONCLUSIONS 
The demise of strict settlements is lamented by a small minority of solicitors who 
expressed strong views as to why they should be allowed to create strict settlements in 
the future. In terms of its conceptual place within the scheme of land law as a whole, 
the enactment of the trust of land, by creating a unitary method of holding land on 
trust, raises the question of whether it covers too many scenarios without adequately 
dealing with any of them. A trust to retain with a power to sell would have properly 
laid any legal fictions to rest. The trust of land may not be the solution which the Law 
Commission was hoping for. Although the reforms may superficially give the 
appearance of being cardinal, they are not as extensive and salient as they initially 
manifest themselves. Existing strict settlements were not brought within the new 
system; there are no facilitating provisions to enable strict settlements, especially 
those created accidentally, to be converted into a trust of land; existing fee tails were 
not converted into fees simple; the abolition of the doctrine of conversion has had 
little practical effect and trusts for sale are still evident as a method of landholding. 
The prospective purported abolition one of the three estates of freehold, the entail, is a 
significant property law reform. Yet there is a window of opportunity for entails to 
raise their heads. For those who wish property to devolve along with a title, for those 
old traditional landed families who wish to stick to the old rules of descent, whose 
motives are patrilineal, primogenitive and patriarchal, there is a challenging 
opportunity to assert their rights. The purported abolition of the doctrine of 
conversion highlights the dichotomy between the complex roots of legal history and 
common usage and habitual terminology, which is a significant issue which goes to 
the very core of land law itself. The drafting of the provision without a full 
appreciation and understanding of the history of conversion leaves an undesirably 
drafted section open to interpretation by the judiciary as to whether and where the 
doctrine of conversion will rear its ominous head. 
The fact that investment is confined to land within the United Kingdom is unduly 
restrictive, which means that settlors will have to confer express powers or that 
interests in foreign land will have to be acquired by acquiring shares in a company 
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that owns foreign land. The provisions governing the powers of trustees demonstrate a 
lack of a comprehensive, all-embracing policy with legislation which has been 
piecemeal and is unsystematic. To achieve the aim of comprehensive legislation, it 
would have been advantageous if the provisions of the 1996 Act had been 
incorporated in the Trustee Act 2000. Generally, in trying to find the best compromise 
between a strict settlement and a trust for sale, the Law Commission appears to juggle 
various advantages and disadvantages of each and arrives at what it sees as the best 
solution, rather than starting afresh and analysing what powers trustees and 
beneficiaries should have apriori. 
The 1996 Act focuses on co-ownership and not successive interests, which are not 
adequately covered by the 1996 Act. The delegation provisions under section 9 are 
not a ftinctional equivalent of a strict settlement, because delegation is at the trustees' 
discretion. It is, however, arguable that the power to delegate can be extended so that 
it can be mandatory for trustees to delegate to the life tenant or settlor. Alternatively, 
an overriding equitable power could be conferred enabling the settlor or protector to 
direct the trustees to delegate to the tenant for life. It may be preferable, however, in 
order to align more closely with a Settled Land Act tenant for life, to provide 
specifically under section 8(l) that the trustees have no power to dispose of the land, 
so that section 6(l) will not apply to this extent and that the powers of disposition are 
vested in the tenant for life unless he is incapacitated, in which case the powers will 
vest in the trustees. In fact, as has been demonstrated, in some ways the position of 
the tenant for life under the 1996 Act can be stronger than under the Settled Land Act. 
It is unfortunate that sections 12 and 13 passed though the entire legislative process 
without any comment or discussion. The difficulty with sections 12 and 13 is that they 
are concerned with two very different situations, co-ownership and successive 
interests in land, and this is reflected in the drafting. Yet the right to occupy represents 
part of a shift in power from trustees to beneficiaries. With the abolition of 
conversion, this right emphasises that beneficiaries under trusts of land have rights in 
the land, though the right may not be sufficiently extensive, and clarification is 
needed that the common law has been replaced by the statutory provisions. A 
beneficiary who has acquired the right to occupy and to whom powers of management 
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have been delegated by the trustees will in some ways be in the same position as the 
tenant for life under a strict settlement. 
Apart from the inspiration and adaptability demonstrated in Mortgage Corporation 
Ltd v. Shaire, the reasoning which appears to underlie judicial decision-making, when 
deciding applications under sections 14 and 15, is a conscious or sub-conscious 
elevation of the primacy of secured creditors, despite the specific wording of section 
15(l). This approach should not, however, preclude courts on specific sets of facts 
from being enterprising and circumventing the restrictive pro-creditor stance adopted 
prior to the 1996 Act. The provisions for the protection of purchasers in section 16 do 
not have the effect of overruling City ofLondon Building Society v. Flegg in relation 
to registered land and fortunately section 26 of the Land Registration Act 2002 has 
placed the matter beyond doubt. Breaches of sections 6(5), 6(6), 6(8) and 8(2) do not 
render a conveyance ultra vires and do not prevent the legal title passing; only a 
breach of section 8(l) has this effect. Since section 8(l) and (2) provide that the 
limitation must be in the disposition, a purchaser will inevitably have notice of the 
limitation, thus requiring a substantial redraft of section 16(3). 
The weaknesses on meticulous examination of the statutory provisions are diverse and 
multifarious. What should be a straightforward enunciation of principles has become a 
morass of uncertainty and enigma. Clarity and comprehensibility are desirable aims 
and worthwhile goals which should have been achieved in drafting this legislation. 
Although many of the inherent difficulties may well prove to be merely academic and 
theoretical, some may have practical and empirical significance, which should be 
dealt with in a future Bill such as an Administration of Justice Bill, Law of Property 
Bill or Land Registration Bill, rather than be left to strained judicial interpretation. 
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APPENDIX I 
Questionnaire for solicitors' firms with clients with strict settlements 
Strict settlements under Settled Land Act 1925 
1. How many clients have you had with strict settlements under the Settled Land Act 
1925 in the last 10 years? 
Yourself (a) 0 (b) 1 -4 (c)5-10 (d)10-20 (e)morethan20 
Approximate number: 
Finn (a) 0 (b)1-4 (c)5-10 (d)10-20 (e)morethan20 
Approximate number: 
Have the numbers been declining? 
2. Were your clients satisfied with the system of strict settlements under the Settled 
Land Act 1925? 
(a) Yes (b) No (c) Partly 
3. Please explain your answer to question 2. 
4. Were you as a solicitor satisfied with the system of strict settlements under the 
Settled Land Act 1925? 
(a) Yes (b) No (c) Partly 
5. Please explain your answer to question 4. 
6. Why were the strict settlements set up in which your clients are involved? 
(a) as a medium for intergenerational transfer of wealth within the family 
(b) as a means of protection of individual beneficiaries 
(c) other purpose -please specify 
7. Do you consider it an advantage of strict settlements that the legal title is in the 
tenant for life? 
(a) Yes (b) No (c) Does not make a difference 
8. Please explain your answer to question 7? 
9. Do you consider that the tenant for life or statutory owner have wide enough 
powers? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
10. If the answer to question 9 is no, please explain why. 
11. Do you consider that the supervisory role of trustees under strict settlements is 
(a) adequate (b) inadequate. 
12. Please explain your answer to question 11. 
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13. Was it a heavy burden with strict settlements that 2 documents were required to be 
executed to create it, vesting deed and trust instrument? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
14. Please explain your answer to question 13? 
15. Will it be an advantage with the new trust of land that only one document will be 
needed to create it? 
(a) Yes (b) No (c) Not particularly 
16. Please explain your answer to question 15. 
17. Are you aware of strict settlements being created inadvertently? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
18. Can you give some examples? 
19. Were you perturbed that the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 
1996 prevents the creation of any new strict settlements? 
(a) Yes (b) No (c) Partly 
20. Please explain your answer to question 19? 
21. Do any of your clients want to create new strict settlements but are now unable to? 
(a) Yes (b) No If yes, how many? 
22. Please explain your answer to question 2 1. 
23. Have your clients been affected by the prohibition on the creation of new entailed 
interests (under Schedule 1, paragraph 5)? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
24. Please explain your answer to question 23. 
25. Have any of your clients sold part of the settled land after I st January, 1997 and 
used the proceeds to buy further land? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
26. If the answer to question 25 is yes, is the land held subject to the original strict 
settlement or subject to a trust of land? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
27. Are any of your clients affected by section 2(5) Trusts of Land and Appointment 
of Trustees Act 1996 that no land held on charitable, ecclesiastical or public trusts 
shall be or be deemed to be settled land after the commencement of this Act, even if it 
was or was deemed to be a settled land before that commencement? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
28. Was this a desirable reform? 
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(a) Yes (b) No Please explain you answer. 
Trusts of land under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of 
Trustees Act 1996 
29. Do you think that having a new unitary system of a trust of land is an 
improvement to the law? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
30. Please explain your answer to question 29. 
3 1. Is it an advantageous reform to have a power to sell and a power to retain land 
under the new trust of land i. e. no duty to sell? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
32. Please explain your answer to question 3 1. 
33. Would you still want to create an express trust for sale which would include a 
duty to sell? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
34. Please explain your answer to question 33. 
35. Do you think that the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 
should have abolished the possibility of creating an express trust for sale? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
36. Do your clients find a trust of land an easier concept to understand than a trust for 
sale? 
(a) Yes (b) No (c) Have not discussed it with them 
37. Please explain your answer to question 36. 
38. Do you consider it a disadvantage under trusts of land that the legal title will be 
vested in the trustees? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
39. Do you consider it an advantage that trustees of a trust of land under section 6 
Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 now have wider powers than 
previously, having now powers of an absolute owner replacing the former fragmented 
powers of trustees for sale? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
40. Do you consider it is a mistake under section 8 for a settlor to be able to exclude 
the wide Powers granted to trustees by section 6 and 7? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
41. Please explain your answer to question 40. 
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42. Do you consider it a disadvantage that the person previously in the position of a 
tenant for life or statutory owner has no powers unless they are delegated to him? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
43. Please explain your answer to question 42. 
44. Do you consider it a problem that the delegation is revocable? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
45. Do you consider that it will be a disincentive for trustees to delegate under section 
9 now that trustees are jointly and severally liable for any act or default of the 
beneficiary in the exercise of any function if the trustees did not exercise reasonable 
care in deciding to delegate the function to the beneficiary? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
46. Do you think that the abolition of the doctrine of conversion is a worthwhile 
reform? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
47. Please explain your answer to question 46. 
48. Do you think that it was a worthwhile reform to introduce a statutory right to 
occupy under section 12? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
49. Please explain your answer to question 48. 
50. Do you have any experience of section 13 in practice: exclusion and restriction of 
right to occupy? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
5 1. Please explain your answer to question 50. 
52. Do you have any experience of sections 14 and 15 in practice: application for a 
court order and matters relevant in detennining applications? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
53. If the answer to question 52 is yes, please clarify. 
54. Do you have experience of section 16: protection for purchasers? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
55. If the answer to question 54 is yes, please clarify. 
56. Do you think that conveyancing has become simpler as a result of reforms in the 
Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996? 
(a) Yes (b) No (c) Too early to say 
57. Please explain your answer to question 56. 
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58. Have the reforms had an appreciable effect on conveyancing costs? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
59. Please explain your answer to question 58. 
Thank you for taking the time to read the cluestionnaire. Please do 
not be put off by the number of questions. You do not have to answer 
them all. I will be 2rateful for your help in answering any of them. 
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APPENDIX 2 
NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF SOLICITORS INTERVIEWED 
Name and address of firm Person interviewed Date of interview 
(including position in firm 
and whether personal or 
telephone interview) 
Withers Murray Hallam 28 April 1999 
12 Gough Square (partner- personal 
London EC4 interview) 
Farrer and Co Christopher Jessel 4 May 1999 
66 Lincoln's Inn Fields (partner- personal 
London WC2 interview) 
Allen and Overy Geoffrey Todd II May 1999 
1 New Change (assistant solicitor- 
London EC4 personal interview) 
Currey and Co Edward Perks II May 1999 
21 Buckingham Gate (partner- personal 
London SWI interview) 
Macfarlanes Owen Clutton 12 May 1999 
10 Norwich Street (partner- personal 
London EC4 interview) 
May, May and Merrimans Roderick Steen 19 May 1999 
12 South Square (partner- personal 
Gray's Inn interview) 
London WCI 
Speechly Bircham William Hancock 7 June 1999 
154 Fleet Street (assistant solicitor- 
London EC4 personal interview) 
Linklaters and Alliance Nigel Reid 7 June 1999 
1 Silk Street (partner- personal 
London EC2 interview) 
Payne Hicks Beach Chris Jarman (partner) and 28 June 1999 
10 New Square Derek Oakley (licensed 
Lincoln's Inn conveyancer) (personal 
London WC2 interview) 
Wiggin and Co Mark Payne (partner- 13 July 1999 




Eversheds John Glasson 14 July 1999 
85 Queen Victoria Street (consultant- telephone 
London EC4 interview) 
Boodle Hatfield Nicholas Hassall 18 August 1999 
6 Worcester Street (consultant- telephone 
Oxford interview) 
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Burges Salmon Charles Wyld 20 August 1999 
Narrow Quay House (partner -telephone 
Narrow Quay interview) 
Bristol 
Charles Russell George Duncan 13 September 1999 
8 -10 New Fetter Lane (partner -personal 
London EC4 interview) 
Herbert Smith John Wood 8 October 1999 
Exchange House (partner- personal 
Primrose Street interview) 
London EC2 
Official Solicitor's Office William McBryde 17 November 1999 
81 Chancery Lane (assistant Official 
London WC2 Solicitor- personal 
interview) 
Public Trust Office Humphrey Mather 31 January 2000 
24 Kingsway (legal consultant- personal 
London WC2 interview) 
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APPENDIX 3 
TRUSTS OF LAND AND APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEES ACT 
1996 
(1996, C. 47) 
PART I TRUSTS OF LAND 
Introductory 
1. Meaning of 'trust of land' 
(1) In this Act - 
(a) 'trust of land' means (subject to subsection (3)) any trust of 
property which consists of or includes land, and 
(b) 'trustees of land' means trustees of a trust of land. 
(2) The reference in subsection (1)(a) to a trust - 
(a) is to any description of trust (whether express, implied, resulting 
or constructive), including a trust for sale and a bare trust, and 
(b) includes a trust created, or arising, before the commencement of 
this Act. 
(3) The reference to land in subsection (1)(a) does not include land which 
(despite section 2) is settled land or which is land to which the Universities and College 
Estates Act 1925 applies. 
Settlements and trustsfor sale as trusts ofland 
2. Trusts in place of settlements 
(1) No settlement created after the commencement of this Act is a settlement for 
the purposes of the Settled Land Act 1925; and no settlement shall be deemed to be made 
under that Act after that commencement. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a settlement created on the occasion of an 
alteration in any interest in, or of a person becoming entitled under, a settlement which - 
(a) is in existence at the commencement of this Act, or 
(b) derives from a settlement within paragraph (a) or this paragraph. 
(3) But a settlement created as mentioned in subsection (2) is not a settlement for 
the purposes of the Settled Land Act 1925 if provision to the effect that it is not is made 
in the instrument, or any of the instruments, by which it is created. 
255 
(4) Where at any time after the commencement of this Act there is in the case of 
any settlement which is a settlement for the purposes of the Settled Land Act 1925 no 
relevant property which is, or is deemed to be, subject to the settlement, the settlement 
permanently ceases at that time to be a settlement for the purposes of that Act. 
In this subsection 'relevant property' means land and personal chattels to which section 
67(l) of the Settled Land Act 1925 (heirlooms) applies. 
(5) No land held on charitable, ecclesiastical or public trusts shall be or be 
deemed to be settled land after the commencement of this Act, even if it was or was 
deemed to be settled land before that commencement. 
(6) Schedule I has effect to make provision consequential on this section 
(including provision to impose a trust in circumstances in which, apart from this section, 
there would be a settlement for the purposes of the Settled Land Act 1925 (and there 
would not otherwise be a trust)). 
3. Abolition of doctrine of conversion 
(1) Where land is held by trustees subject to a trust for sale, the land is not to 
be regarded as personal property; and where personal property is subject to a 
trust for sale in order that the trustees may acquire land, the personal property is 
not to be regarded as land. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a trust created by a will if the testator 
died before the conimencement of Us Act. 
(3) Subject to that, subsection (1) applies to a trust whether it is created, or 
arises, before or after that commencement. 
4. Express trusts for sale as trusts of land 
(1) In the case of every trust for sale of land created by a disposition there is 
to be implied, despite any provision to the contrary made by the disposition, a power for 
the trustees to postpone sale of the land; and the trustees are not liable in any way for 
postponing sale of the land, in the exercise of their discretion, for an indefinite period. 
(2) Subsection (1) applies to a trust whether it is created, or arises, before or 
after the commencement of this Act. 
(3) Subsection (1) does not affect any liability incurred by trustees before that 
commencement. 
5. Implied trusts for sale as trusts of land 
(1) Schedule 2 has effect in relation to statutory provisions which impose a 
trust for sale of land in certain circumstances so that in those circumstances there is 
instead a trust of the land (vAthout a duty to sell). 
256 
(2) Section I of the Settled Land Act 1925 does not apply to land held on any 
trust arising by virtue of that Schedule (so that any such land is subject to a trust of land). 
Functions oftrustees ofland 
6. General powers of trustees 
(1) For the purpose of exercising their functions as trustees, the trustees of 
land have in relation to the land subject to the trust all the powers of an absolute owner. 
(2) Where in the case of any land subject to a trust of land each of the 
beneficiaries interested in the land is a person of full age and capacity who is absolutely 
entitled to the land, the powers conferred on the trustees by subsection (1) include the 
power to convey the land to the beneficiaries even though they have not required the 
trustees to do so; and where land is conveyed by virtue of this subsection - 
(a) the beneficiaries shall do whatever is necessary to secure that it 
vests in them, and 
(b) if they fail to do so the court may make an order requiring them 
to do so 
(3) The trustees of land have power to acquire land under the power 
conferred by section 8 of the Trustee Act 2000. 
(5) In exercising the powers conferred by this section trustees shall have 
regard to the rights of the beneficiaries. 
(6) The powers conferred by this section shall not be exercised in 
contravention of, or of any order made in pursuance of, any other enactment or any rule 
of law or equity. 
(7) The reference in subsection (6) to an order includes an order of any court 
or of the Charity Commissioners. 
(8) Where any enactment other than this section confers on trustees authority 
to act subject to any restriction, limitation or condition, trustees of land may not exercise 
the powers conferred by this section to do any act which they are prevented from doing 
under the other enactment by reason of the restriction, limitation or condition. 
(9) The duty of care under section I of the Trustee Act 2000 applies to 
trustees of land when exercising the powers conferred by this section. 
Partition by trustees 
(1) The trustees of land may, where beneficiaries of ftill age are absolutely 
entitled in undivided shares to land subject to the trust, partition the land, or any part of 
it, and provide (by way of mortgage or otherwise) for the payment of any equality 
money. 
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(2) The trustees sball give effect to any such partition by conveying the 
partitioned land in severalty (whether or not subject to any legal mortgage created for 
raising equality money), either absolutely or in trust, in accordance with the rights of 
those beneficiaries. 
(3) Before exercising their powers under subsection (2) the trustees shall 
obtain the consent of each of those beneficiaries. 
(4) Where a share in the land is affected by an incumbrance, the trustees may 
either give effect to it or provide for its discharge from the property allotted to that share 
as they think fit. 
(5) If a share in the land is absolutely vested in a minor, subsections (1) to (4) 
apply as if he were of ftill. age, except that the trustees may act on his behalf and retain 
land or other property representing his share in trust for him. 
(6) Subsection (1) is subject to sections 21 (part-unit: interests) and 22 (part- 
unit: charging) of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002. 
8. Exclusion and restriction of powers 
(1) Sections 6 and 7 do not apply in the case of a trust of land created by a 
disposition in so far as provision to the effect that they do not apply is made by the 
disposition. 
(2) If the disposition creating such a trust makes provision requiring any 
consent to be obtained to the exercise of any power conferred by section 6 or 7, the 
power may not be exercised without that consent. 
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply in the case of charitable, ecclesiastical or 
public trusts. 
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) have effect sub ect to any enactment which j 
prohibits or restricts the effect of provision of the description mentioned in them. 
9. Delegation by trustees 
(1) The trustees of land may, by power of attorney, delegate to any 
beneficiary or beneficiaries of full age and beneficially entitled to an interest in 
possession in land subject to the trust any of their functions as trustees which relate to the 
land. 
(2) Where trustees purport to delegate to a person by a power of attorney 
under sub-section (1) functions relating to any land and another person in good faith 
deals with him in relation to the land, he shall be presumed in favour of that other person 
to have been a person to whom the functions could be delegated unless that other person 
has knowledge at the time of the transaction that he was not such a person. 
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And it shall be conclusively presumed in favour of any purchaser whose interest 
depends on the validity of that transaction that that other person dealt in good faith and 
did not have such knowledge if that other person makes a statutory declaration to that 
effect before or within three months after the completion of the purchase. 
(3) A power of attorney under subsection (1) shall be given by all the trustees 
jointly and (unless expressed to be irrevocable and to be given by way of security) may 
be revoked by any one or more of them; and such a power is revoked by the appointment 
as a trustee of a person other than those by whom it is given (though not by any of those 
persons dying or otherwise ceasing to be a trustee). 
(4) Where a beneficiary to whom functions are delegated by a power of 
attorney under subsection (1) ceases to be a person beneficially entitled to an interest in 
possession in land subject to the trust - 
(a) if the functions are delegated to him alone, the power is revoked, 
(b) if the ftitictions are delegated to him and to other beneficiaries to be 
exercised by them jointly (but not separately), the power is revoked if 
each of the other beneficiaries ceased to be so entitled (but otherwise 
functions exercisable in accordance with the power are so exercisable by 
the remaining beneficiary or beneficiaries) and 
(C) if the functions are delegated to him and to other beneficiaries to be 
exercised by them separately (or either separately orjointly), the power is 
revoked in so far as it relates to him. 
(5) A delegation under subsection (1) may be for any period or indefinite. 
(6) A power of attorney under subsection (1) cannot be an enduring power 
within the meaning of the Enduring Powers of Attorney Act 1985. 
(7) Beneficiaries to whom functions have been delegated under subsection 
(1) are, in relation to the exercise of the functions, in the same position as trustees (with 
the same duties and liabilities); but such beneficiaries shall not be regarded as trustees 
for any other purposes (including in particular, the purposes of any enactment permitting 
the delegation of functions by trustees or imposing requirements relating to the payment 
of capital money). 
(9) Neither this section nor the repeal by this Act of section 29 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925 (which is superseded by this section) affects the operation after the 
commencement of this Act of any delegation effected before that commencement. 
9A. Duties of trustees in connection with delegation etc. 
(1) The duty of care under section I of the Trustee Act 2000 applies to 
trustees of land in deciding whether to delegate any of their ftmctions under section 9. 
(2) Subsection (3) applies if the trustees of land - 
(a) delegate any of their ftmctions under section 9, and 
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the delegation is not irrevocable. 
While the delegation continues, the trustees - 
(a) must keep the delegation under review, 
(b) if circumstances make it appropriate to do so, must consider 
whether there is a need to exercise any power of intervention that 
they have, and 
(c) if they consider that there is a need to exercise such a power, 
must do so. 
(4) 'Power of intervention! includes - 
(a) a power to give directions to the beneficiary, 
(b) a power to revoke the delegation. 
(5) The duty of care under section I of the 2000 Act applies to trustees in 
carrying out any duty under subsection (3). 
(6) A trustee of land is not liable for any act or default of the beneficiary, or 
beneficiaries, unless the trustee fails to comply with the duty of care in deciding to 
delegate any of the trustees' functions under section 9 or in carrying out any duty under 
subsection (3). 
(7) Neither this section nor the repeal of section 9(8) by the Trustee Act 2000 
affects the operation after the commencement of this section of any delegation effected 
before that commencement. 
Consents and consultation 
10. Consents 
(1) If a disposition creating a trust of land requires the consent of more than 
two persons to the exercise by the trustees of any function relating to the land, the 
consent of any two of them to the exercise of the function is sufficient in favour of a 
purchaser. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the exercise of a function by trustees of 
land held on charitable, ecclesiastical or public trusts. 
(3) Where at any time a person whose consent is expressed by a disposition 
creating a trust of land to be required to the exercise by the trustees of any function 
relating to the land is not of full age - 
(a) his consent is not, in favour of a purchaser, required to the 
exercise of the function, but 
(b) the trustees shall obtain the consent of a parent who has parental 
responsibility for him (Nvithin the meaning of the Children Act 
1989) or of a guardian of his. 
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11. Consultation with beneficiaries 
(1) The trustees of land shall in the exercise of any function relating to land 
subject to the trust - 
(a) so far as practicable, consult the beneficiaries of full age and 
beneficially entitled to an interest in possession in the land, and 
(b) so far as consistent with the general interest of the trust, give 
effect to the wishes of those beneficiaries, or (in case of dispute) 
of the majority (according to the value of their combined 
interests). 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply - 
(a) in relation to a trust created by a disposition in so far as provision 
that it does not apply is made by the disposition, 
(b) in relation to a trust created or arising under a will made before 
the commencement of this Act, or 
(c) in relation to the exercise of the power mentioned in section 6(2). 
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a trust created before the commencement 
of this Act by a disposition, or a trust created after that commencement by reference to 
such a trust, unless provision to the effect that it is to apply is made by a deed executed - 
(a) in a case in which the trust was created by one person and he is of 
full capacity, by that person, or 
(b) in a case in which the trust was created by more than one person, 
by such of the persons who created the trust as are alive and of 
full capacity. 
(4) A deed executed for the purposes of subsection (3) is irrevocable. 
Right of beneficiaries to occupy trust land 
12. The right to occupy 
(1) A beneficiary who is beneficially entitled to an interest in possession in 
land subject to a trust of land is entitled by reason of his interest to occupy the land at 
any time if at that time - 
(a) the purposes of the trust include making the land available for his 
occupation (or for the occupation of beneficiaries of a class of 
which he is a member or of beneficiaries in general), or 
(b) the land is held by the trustees so as to be so available. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not confer on a beneficiary a right to occupy land if it 
is either unavailable or unsuitable for occupation by him. 
nis section is subject to section 13. 
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13. Exclusion and restriction of right to occupy 
(1) Where two or more beneficiaries are (or apart from this subsection would 
be) entitled under section 12 to occupy land, the trustees of land may exclude or restrict 
the entitlement of any one or more (but not all) of them. 
(2) Trustees may not under subsection (1) - 
(a) unreasonably exclude any beneficiary's entitlement to occupy 
land, or 
(b) restrict any such entitlement to an unreasonable extent. 
(3) The trustees of land may from time to time impose reasonable conditions 
on any beneficiary in relation to his occupation of land by reason of his 
entitlement under section 12. 
(4) The matters to which trustees are to have regard in exercising the powers 
conferred by this section include - 
(a) the intentions of the person or persons (if any) who created the 
trust, 
(b) the purposes for which the land is held, and 
(c) the circumstances and wishes of each of the beneficiaries who is 
(or apart from any previous exercise by the trustees of those 
powers would be) entitled to occupy the land under section 12. 
(5) The conditions which may be imposed on a beneficiary under subsection 
(3) include in particular, conditions requiring him - 
(a) to pay any outgoings or expenses in respect of the land, or 
(b) to assume any other obligation in relation to the land or to any 
activity which is or is proposed to be conducted there. 
(6) Where the entitlement of any beneficiary to occupy land under section 12 
has been excluded or restricted, the conditions which may be imposed on any other 
beneficiary under subsection (3) include, in particular, conditions requiring him to - 
(a) make payments by way of compensation to the beneficiary whose 
entitlement has been excluded or restricted, or 
(b) forgo any payment or other benefit to which he would otherwise 
be entitled under the trust so as to benefit that beneficiary. 
(7) The powers conferred on trustees by this section may not be exercised - 
(a) so as prevent any person who is in occupation of land (whether or 
not by reason of an entitlement under section 12) from continuing 
to occupy the land, or 
(b) in a manner likely to result in any such person ceasing to occupy 
the land, unless he consents or the court has given approval. 
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(8) The matters to which the court is to have regard in determining whether 
to give approval under subsection (7) include the matters mentioned in subsection (4)(a) 
to (C). 
Powers o court if 
14. Applications for order 
(1) Any person who is a trustee of land or has an interest in property subject 
to a trust of land may make an application to the court for an order under this section. 
(2) On an application for an order under this section the court may make any 
such order - 
(a) relating to the exercise by the trustees of any of their functions 
(including an order relieving them of any obligation to obtain the 
consent of, or to consult, any person in connection with the 
exercise of any of their functions), or 
(b) declaring the nature or extent of a person's interest in property 
subject to the trust, as the court thinks fit. 
(3) The court may not under this section make any order as to the 
appointment or removal of trustees. 
(4) The powers conferred on the court by this section are exercisable on an 
application whether it is made before or after the commencement of this Act. 
15. Matters relevant in determining applications 
(1) The matters to which the court is to have regard in determining an 
application for an order under section 14 include - 
(a) the intentions of the person or persons (if any) who created the 
trust, 
(b) the purposes for which the property subject to the trust is held, 
(c) the welfare of any minor who occupies or might reasonably be 
expected to occupy any land subject to the trust as his home, and 
(d) the interests of any secured creditor of any beneficiary. 
(2) In the case of an application relating to the exercise in relation to any 
land of the powers conferred on the trustees by section 13, the matters to which the court 
is to have regard also include the circumstances and wishes of each of the beneficiaries 
who is (or apart from any previous exercise by the trustees of those powers would be) 
entitled to occupy the land under section 12. 
(3) In the case of any other application, other than one relating to the 
exercise of the power mentioned in section 6(2), the matters to which the court is to have 
regard also include the circumstances and wishes of any beneficiaries of full age and 
263 
entitled to an interest in possession in property subject to the trust or (in case of dispute) 
of the majority (according to the value of their combined interests). 
(4) This section does not apply to an application if section 335A of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (which is inserted by Schedule 3 and relates to applications by a 
trustee of a bankrupt) applies to it. 
Purchaser protection 
16. Protection of purchasers 
(1) A purchaser of land which is or has been subject to a trust need not be 
concerned to see that any requirement imposed on the trustees by section 6(5), 7(3) or 
I1 (1) has been complied with. 
(2) Where - 
(a) trustees of land who convey land which (immediately before it is 
conveyed) is subject to the trust contravene section 6(6) or (8), 
but 
(b) the purchaser of the land from the trustees has no actual notice of 
the contravention, 
the contravention does not invalidate the conveyance. 
(3) Where the powers of trustees of land are limited by virtue of section 8- 
(a) the trustees shall take all reasonable steps to bring the limitation 
to the notice of any purchaser of the land from them, but 
(b) the limitation does not invalidate any conveyance by the trustees 
to a purchaser who has no actual notice of the limitation. 
(4) Where trustees of land convey land which (immediately before it is 
conveyed) is subject to the trust to persons believed by them to be beneficiaries 
absolutely entitled to the land under the trust and of full age and capacity - 
(ný the trustees shall execute a deed declaring that they are 
discharged from the trust in relation to that land, and 
(b) if they fail to do so, the court may make an order requiring them 
to do so. 
(5) A purchaser of land to which a deed under subsection (4) relates is 
entitled to assume that, as from the date of the deed, the land is not subject to the trust 
unless he has actual notice that the trustees were mistaken in their belief that the land 
was conveyed to beneficiaries absolutely entitled to the land under the trust and of full 
age and capacity. 
(6) Subsections (2) and (3) do not apply to land held on charitable, 
ecclesiastical or public trusts. 
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(7) This section does not apply to registered land. 
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